

**People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
Ammar Telidji University, Laghouat
Faculty of Letters and Languages
Department of English**



**The Propagandist Role of U.S Mass Media during
Wartimes:
A Critical Analysis of Media Discourse in the Lead-up to
the 2003 Iraq War**

A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of English in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for a Master
Degree in Anglo-Saxon Literature and Civilization

By

Ibtissem CHOUICHA

Board of Examiners:

Dr. Aribi Brahim, University of Laghouat, Supervisor

Mrs. Ben Tahar Soumia, University of Laghouat, Chair woman

Mrs. Nouioua Wafaa, University of Laghouat, Examiner

2019-2020

Dedication

I wish to dedicate this work for the loving memory of my mother and for her numerous sacrifices. She taught me to persevere and prepared

me to face the challenges

A special feeling of gratitude goes to my dearest sister who has been a great source of encouragement and motivation

Many thanks for my brother for his support and for being a truly brother when needed

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Aribi Brahim, without his support, this research paper would not have been Possible.

I extend my gratitude to all my teachers in the Department of English at Ammar Thlidji University.

Abstract

Probably every conflict is fought on at least two grounds: the battlefield and the minds of the people via propaganda. The worst case scenario, however, is that propaganda has been most effective in democratic regimes in which, respect for the diversity of opinions and freedom of expression, is considered the foundation of any democratic system. Hence, this study is directed to examine the participation of U.S media institutions in crystallizing public opinion and in continuing the cycle of propaganda in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war. That is why the present dissertation is mainly based on the “interdisciplinary approach” of research methodology. Interdisciplinary approach involves drawing appropriately from several disciplines to redefine the propagandist role of US mass media during wartimes and to reach a deeper understanding of this complex situation. A critical discourse analysis of the mainstream media presentations is, therefore, carried out to assess their performance. CDA was chosen as the study’s method for its critical aims such as uncovering power-relations within language use or unveiling ideologies. This systematic analysis reveals that the dominant media discourse privileged the military solution option and the policies of the Bush administration. Ultimately, the failure to critically debate the administration’s positions and policies reveals the mainstream media’s failure to adequately debate issues of public importance and contributes to intensifying the crisis of democracy in which the mainstream media fail to live up to their democratic and ethical responsibilities.

Table of Contents

Dedication	I
Acknowledgements	II
Abstract	III
Table of Contents	VI
General Introduction	1

CHAPTER ONE: A Background to the American Pro-War Media

Introduction	9
1. Role of the Media in Today's Society	9
1.1. The Media as a Fourth Branch of Government	10
1.2. Media Construction of Social Reality	11
1.3. Government Manipulation of the Media	12
2. Conceptualization of Media Bias	13
2.1. The Propaganda Model of Manufacturing Consent	13
2.2. Media Perception Management	16
2.3. The Power of News Frames during Wartimes	17
3. The Mobilization of Frames	19
3.1. Military Propaganda and Psychological Warfare	19
3.2. The U.S Experience of Military-Media Relationship	22
3.3. From Psychological Warfare to Information Warfare	24
Conclusion	27

Chapter Two: Prelude to the Iraq War

Introduction	30
1. The Development of Orientalist Ideology	31

1.1. Saidian Orientalism	31
1.2. American Orientalism	32
1.3. American Orientalism Fusion with Discourses of Terrorism	34
2. The Prospect of War in Iraq	36
2.1. The Growing Political Influence of Neo-Conservatives	36
2.2. Targeting Iraq and the Project of a New American Century (PNAC)	38
2.3. The September 11 Attacks: Towards Promoting Political Agendas	40
3. From the “War on Terror” to the Iraq War	41
3.1. Framing the Iraq War	41
3.2. Decapitation Strikes	43
3.3. The Shock and Awe Operations	44
Conclusion	46

Chapter Three: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the U.S Media Coverage in the Lead-up to the Iraq War

Introduction	49
1. Theoretical Foundation.....	50
1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis: Conception and Principles	50
1.2. Three Dimensional Framework of CDA: Critical- Discourse- Analysis.....	52
1.3. Interplay of Discourse, Media, Representation and Ideology	55
2. Media Representation of the Iraq War	56
2.1. Thematic Representation of the Iraq War	57
2.1.1. The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction.....	57
2.1.2. Close Links Between Iraq and the Terrorist Group al-Qaeda.....	61
2.1.3. Liberating Iraqi People and Building up a New Regime	64
2.2. Ideologies.....	68
2.2.1. Orientalist Ideology.....	69
2.2.2. Hegemony Ideology	71
2.3. Characterization of the Actors and their Actions	73
Conclusion	79
General Conclusion	82
Works Cited	85

General Introduction

Media coverage has been a large part of the attention surrounding national and international conflicts from as early as the American Civil War to the wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, to the current Syrian refugee crisis spreading over Europe. Through these years, the role that media has played- or been allowed to play- has been dynamic with the U.S government partaking in international conflicts. While the first half of the 20th century largely saw a controlled release of information as propaganda to the general populace in WW II in order to portray certain images, the Vietnam War in the 1960s to the 1970s proved to be a watershed moment in journalism and U.S foreign policy history as journalists reporting from the conflict in Vietnam had little to no censorship or restrictions from the government. The story of Vietnam and how pictures of bloody fights, American casualties, and killed Vietnamese turned around American public opinion, and eventually led to rising emotions of anti-war movement in the 1970s. Thus, the government had an undoubtedly negative experience with the media during the Vietnam War, and this experience influenced the U.S government in its subsequent international conflicts.

Many policy officials in the Pentagon and White House believe that the U.S defeat and withdrawal from Vietnam were in part, due to critical media coverage of battlefield activities that created a domestic objection to the government policies. Thus, the 1991 Gulf War witnessed new dramatic restrictions on media performance where the Pentagon placed strategic censorship on the information revealed to the public by only allowing selective journalists to visit the frontlines and communicate a one-sided account of the war “a pro-war one”. This time, a combination of government information censorship and media’s positive military propaganda contributed to an American public supporting the war efforts in Iraq. Thus, media changed its path and constituted a policy instrument that helped the U.S

government in controlling almost totally what the public would be permitted to know about the conduct of military operations.

Since then, the world of media coverage has inherently changed. This change can be clearly noticed when the United States carried out Iraq invasion in 2003. If we take a closer look at the role of mass media before the Iraqi War, we will see that media tried to justify the war. At the beginning, the U.S people were confused about the legitimacy of the war. However, when the mass media took the part of the U.S government, public perception has changed. A large number of Americans amply believed that Iraq had the weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaeda terrorist group. Mass media manufactured that belief leading to a great number of Americans supporting war efforts in Iraq.

Within this context, this dissertation seeks to analyze the nature of the relationship between the media institutions and government during times of American engagement in foreign conflicts. Also, the study aims at exploring the role of media institutions in the formation of public opinion, and in restricting or fostering access to critical information during war times.

Prevalent researches and theories have tackled how media tends to affect public opinion and understanding of events. Among these works is that of Antonio Gramsci. He develops the “theory of hegemony” to explain the complex ways through which the dominant order maintains control over ideas. Via a ‘signifying system’ that expresses the values of the ruling elites, these values become ‘common sense’ for the masses. Gramsci own ideas were drawn upon to explain how generalizations and stereotypes attributable to the ruling class were reproduced through the media system. The “propaganda model”, another conducted research to assess mass media performance, which was developed by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky during the 1980s reveals how the mainstream media tend to downplay dissenting news and opinions. In *Manufacturing Consent*, Herman and Chomsky explain in

depth this model. Instead of looking at the 'journalistic conduct' and 'public opinion' as the main determining variables for media performance, the media was seen to depend heavily on elite information sources, and act on behalf of elite interests. The propaganda model's utility was reinforced by media behaviour in the post 9/11 attacks period, when the U.S elites clearly set the news agenda, while media outlets failed to question governmental policy. Another effective theory to the understanding of media practices was further developed by Jean Baudrillard, who has been promoted as the most advanced theorist of the media and society in the so-called Post-Modern era. Baudrillard extends his semiotic approach to the world of media and focuses on the new literacy of the mainstream media. On the one hand, he analyzes the power that media has to alter 'deep down and unconsciously', the sensitive relationships and the perceptive models of the social actors. On the other hand, he deals with the power of mass media to 'neutralize the lived, unique eventual character of the world and substitute for it a multiple universe of media, as such, are homogenous one with another'. Nonetheless, there has been a limited scholarly attention to the American mass media performance in relation to the First Amendment of the U.S Constitution and to a well-functioning democracy.

Likewise, providing accurate information to enable an informed citizenry capable of self-government is one of the self-proclaimed roles of the news media and theoretical justifications of a free press as affirmed in the First Amendment seemed to be absent in the US media coverage during war times. Moreover, in a liberal democracy, the widely held view is that media should serve as an objective news provider to be free from propaganda and manipulation. During times leading up to or during conflicts, the media has the responsibility to keep the public informed so as to enable them to make a rationale judgments government actions. Without an ability to know government actions, true democracy cannot be achieved. In the period leading up to the 2003 Iraq War, accusations about Iraq's possession of WMD's, its ties to al-Qaeda as well as human rights abuses committed by Saddam Hussein's regime

were all used as a pretext for waging war against Iraq. In the context of the war, the role of the media was heavily discussed and its objectivity repeatedly questioned. Several studies on the reporting in the U.S showed that the media acted as a faithful servant to a state of a “democratic” regime and became an organized industry. It has been used as a policy instrument by the policy-makers to achieve their desired objectives. The war planners of the U.S used media as an important instrument in setting agenda and manufacture public consent in the lead-up to the Iraq War.

Hence, the objective of this dissertation is to study how the United States as a democratic state did use media to obtain its war objectives, and how it influenced and shaped the masses perceptions of the war. It will also examine how the media, which is expected to play a neutral role in order to deliver fair pieces of information to the people as well as apprising them of the facts, has discharged its obligations and has worked as a policy instrument that indulged in unfair and biased reporting.

Therefore, this work endeavours to answer an established research question that will illuminate on the selected topic regarding the propaganda uses by the American mass media with a particular focus on the 2003 Iraq war. The main research question established then is how media frames tend to affect public opinion and understanding of events? To further support the study and supplement the core research question, the following sub-questions have been developed:

- Why has the mainstream American media traditionally reinforced state doctrines during wartimes?
- Did the U.S government policies toward media access in the lead-up to the Iraq war influence media coverage, and therefore perception of this conflict?
- Do media have the right to shape public opinion and reinforce certain themes and ideologies?

That is why the present dissertation is mainly based on the “interdisciplinary approach” of research methodology. Interdisciplinary approach involves drawing appropriately from several disciplines, mainly the Orientalist and hegemonic disciplines, to redefine the problem of the of U.S’s media institutions participation in crystallizing public opinion and in continuing the cycle of propaganda in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war and to reach a deeper understanding of this complex situation. This study is also explored by a “qualitative analysis” of U.S media practices in the lead-up to the war in Iraq. The analysis focuses on three of the leading sources of news in the United States, namely *CNN*, *The Washington Post* and *New York Times*, during their coverage of events preceding the 2003 Iraq war. The choice of these media outlets as the focus of this research is due to their national character and popularity inside the United States.

The research is directed towards the ways public perceptions were formed before the Iraq war through the coverage of the selected news outlets. It is therefore important that such an examination be grounded in data which describe the chosen news outlets’ content during the period under study. A qualitative content analysis is thus conducted in which a sample of media reports is selected and analyzed. The study follows purposive sampling that reflects the purpose of examining and analysing the data. When using purposive or selective sampling, items are selected on the basis of having a significant relation to the ‘research topic’. Thus, the sample will consist of 30 reports from the aforementioned news outlets during the period that preceded the invasion of Iraq. Data was collected through online research to be consulted and to get rich and valuable electronic archives full of reporters’ comments and talk shows in the period preceding the Iraq war. The analytical tool to conduct the qualitative analysis of the selected sample is grounded in ‘critical discourse analysis’. CDA was chosen as the study’s method of analyzing media content because of its critical aims such as uncovering power-relations within language use or unveiling ideologies. Also, this method has shown to be

particularly relevant for the qualitative analysis of media texts which constitutes the methodological basis for this study.

The dissertation is structured on three chapters. The first chapter will be concerned with a historical background about the U.S media role in influencing domestic relations and social communications mainly during wartimes. Thus, it will start by taking a closer look at the significance of media in modern societies. Then, it will explain how media bias can be conceptualized within the perspectives of propaganda, perception management and framing analysis. Finally, it will discuss how frames are mobilized in warfare situations stressing the US experience with psychological as well as information warfare. In doing so, the chapter aims to leave the reader with a firm view about media's power in shaping public opinion during wartimes as well as the U.S government's violation of the First Amendment of its Constitution via its several attempts to censorship and restrict media practices.

The second chapter will consider the development of the Orientalist ideology with special reference to the American Orientalism and then its fusion with the discourse on terrorism. Orientalist ideology will be stressed because of its ample contribution to promoting pro-war views. Then, it will shed the light on the rise of Neo-conservatives and their ideology that had a strong impact on waging and legitimizing a war against Iraq. The chapter concludes with the U.S efforts to link Iraq to the attacks of the 9/11 as well as media frames to sustain such claims. The chapter's main purpose, then, is to highlight how the U.S media left out its professional responsibilities and worked hard to promoting the government's ideologies and secret agendas that legitimized the war against Iraq.

My concern in the third chapter will shift to conducting a critical discourse analysis of media content in the period leading up to the war in Iraq. The chapter will try to see whether the "why" was present in journalists' reports during the period under study. It starts by looking at the theoretical foundations of CDA so that to understand the role language plays in

the legitimization and delegitimization of power relations. Meanwhile, the second section of this chapter will conclude with an examination of 30 reports made by the most leading news sources in the U.S to determine the recurring themes in these reports, ideologies underlying the themes, and the characterization of the war actors. Conducting such an analysis will help to determine the extent to which the U.S mass media have succeeded or failed in covering real facts about the Iraq war.

Chapter I:

A Background to the American Pro-War Media

Introduction

Throughout American history, media has been considered as the main source of information to the American public both inside and beyond the boundaries of the United States. Due to its prevalent nature within the society, media has an immense power in shaping public debate about national and international events. However, the role of media in influencing domestic relations and social communications is never more important than during wartimes. Media has been proved to play a vital role within the American society during wartime events. To understand the increasing impact and relevance of media in the American society, this chapter is going first, to provide a basic introduction to the significance of the media in modern societies ranging from the fact that media have the power to influence the state politics and social consciousness and from the governments persistent attempts to hold control over this influential institution. The second part of this chapter sets out how media bias can be conceptualized through the perspectives of propaganda analysis, perception management and the framing paradigm. When examining media bias, a selectivity in the reporting of information that contradicts the standards of high quality journalism, it is absolutely necessary to draw attention to the obvious link the above mentioned concepts have with media bias. The last part of this chapter discusses the mobilization of frames in warfare situations by exploring how propaganda flourishes in times of war. The primary focus will be the effectiveness of psychological warfare in the modern age, its focus on military propaganda campaigns and the U.S. experience with the application of psychological operation. Also discussed is the evolution of the U.S military-media relationship during wartimes, which was by and large, characterized by military interventions in media practices. The chapter concludes with an in-depth analysis of the new paradigm for military propaganda, namely the information warfare. The latter was introduced as part of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a concept that emerged during the 1991 Gulf War and took shape in the period following the 9/11 events. The post 9/11 information environment was the first real test of cutting edge information warfare techniques.

1. Role of the Media in Today's Society

It is quite evident that the mass media has become an essential part of everyone's life. Rather, the media plays a constructive role in today's society – from increasing public awareness to collecting views, information, and also shaping the attitudes of the people towards certain issues.

1.1. The Media as a Fourth Branch of Government

Views of the role of the media as values presenters range from neutral transmitters to active participants. The common view, however, is that the media were actually meant to be one of the many checks against injustice. The government then has no right to stand against the media when disseminating official wrongdoings and that the media are given a total freedom to keep the citizens well-informed about the current issues.¹

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” Different interpretations were attributed to “freedom of the press”. Philosophers like John Calhoun Merrill believed that “press freedom in the modern age belongs exclusively to the press and not to the public and that autonomy serves as a condition for the press to remain a critical and a powerful institution.”² Yet, for others, the reality regarding freedom of the press is that it speaks for people’s freedom. In this regard, the media should also exercise the public’s right to know.

Given the media’s role in the society, it is only reasonable that several critics see the media as a “fourth branch of government.”³ On the basis of this view, the media have become so pervasive and have at least the same influence in determining public policy as the United States government’s executive, judicial and legislative branches do. It could even be claimed that the media have more influence than the national government in shaping the political agenda due to their power to directly address the populace. The media are therefore in a position to sustain robust public debate and efficiently track government violations. The accomplishment of these tasks has driven many to conclude that the media should be powerful.

¹Kristine A. Oswald, “Mass Media and the Transformation of American Politics.” *Mass Media and Politics*, vol.77, 2009, pp.385-414.

² Peter Gade, and A David Gordon, “John Calhoun Merrill: A Legacy of Wisdom.” *Media Ethics*, 2012, <https://www.mediaethicsmagazine.com/index.php/browse-back-issues/158-fall-2012/merrill-tribute/3998680-merrill-john-calhoun-merrill-a-legacy-of-wisdom>. Accessed 10 March 2020.

³ Frederick M. Wirt, “Book Reviews - The Fourth Branch of Government. By Douglass Cater. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.1959. Pp. Viii, 194.)” *American Political Science Review* 54.1 (1960): 216-18.Print.

1.2. Media Construction of Social Reality

Recognizing the increasing impact and relevance of the media in a man's everyday life, it can be argued that the media and media culture itself are a significant force in contemporary society. The media have the potential to put information and to provide citizens-consumers with the opportunity to embrace it without a critical or aware perception and clear understanding. The technological advances are a significant factor that led to the rapid proliferation of the media and brought further control over the portrayal of reality and the condition of society as it matches with the producers and "constructors" of that reality.

In contemporary democracies, Chomsky states that individuals can be managed more easily by manipulating their minds. People can comfortably express their creative thoughts in different manners and thus further control is needed. Chomsky believes that "the smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit the spectrum -even encourage the more critical and dissident views. That gives people the sense that there's a free thinking going on, while all the time the presuppositions of the system are being reinforced by the limits put on the range of the debate" (43).

In a broadcast program entitled "*Manufacturing Consent: Thought Control in a Democratic Society*" Chomsky asks, "What is the role and function of the media in contemporary democracies?" In the course of this program, he presented a clear yet contested media theory focused around the concept of "cultural indoctrination" where "manufacturing consent" and the production of the "necessary illusions" are the key terms: "We live, entangled in webs of endless deceit, we live in a highly indoctrinated society where elementary truth are easily buried."⁴ The system of media's indoctrination teaches how to behave and think and is like other structures targeted at producing intellectuals that will support the interests of powerful individuals. Those people will be responsible of taking control over the whole society or the "bewildered herd", in the words of Lippmann.⁵ Such people become "constructors" of social reality.

To understand more how media produce pictures of reality, it is necessary to highlight the concept of "simulation". As Baudrillard says ". . . imagine something beautiful that has absorbed all the energy of the ugliness: there you have fashion . . . imagine the truth which

⁴Michael Scriven, *Jean-Paul Sartre: Politics and Culture in Postwar France* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999) 135.

⁵Walter Lippmann was an American writer, reporter and political commentator famous for being among the first to criticize media and democracy in his newspaper column and several books, most notably his 1922 book "*Public Opinion*".

has absorbed all the energy of the falsehood: there you have a simulation” (qtd.in Nišić and Plavšić74). Baudrillard points to the idea that media construct reality through “simulation”. To clarify this point, he argues that contemporary media are concerned not just with relaying information or stories but with interpreting our most private selves for us, making us approach the world through the lens of these media image. Therefore, we no longer purchase commodities because of real needs, but because of expectations that are primarily determined by media owners, that take us apart from the reality of our bodies or of the world around us. That is to say, it is through manipulating human needs, the media actively construct social reality and control the individuals and groups.

1.3. Government Manipulation of the Media

Information is a very pivotal aspect of contemporary human life. Information, along with education, is becoming a more important aspect in everyday life and the way people interact with information determines to a greater degree the standard of their existence.

Information field can effectively influence the sphere of state politics and social consciousness. Thus, through manipulating information, one can demolish certain ideas in people’s minds and on their ashes create new ideas and principles. For that reason, the U.S. government interacts with the news media as a means-to-an-end. The method of manipulating or censoring the news media is linked to news framing, where “framing entails selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Wilson1).

The idea that messages can be distorted or “framed” to obtain a desired interpretation of the original message can be found in different fields of study and in the world of media in particular. This view is clearly stated in Orwell’s introduction to his 1946 *Animal Farm*: “unpopular ideas can be silenced and inconvenient facts kept dark, without the need for any official ban.”⁶ In this way, messages can be subject to framing, and as such, can be manipulated by stressing some aspects of the message over others. The framing technique is the core practice the elites have committed to controlling the message. Policy makers, stake holders and other groups (elites) are interested in news frames as they seek to assert control through the manipulation of the message. The reasons behind manipulating media news are varied. The most important ones are state-driven motives. Government officials tend to alter

⁶Noam Chomsky, *Powers and Prospects: Reflections on Human Nature and the Social Order* (London: Pluto Press, 1996) 68.

and filter the news before reaching the public so as to protect and expand their vested interests and promote their hidden agendas. For this reason, framing remains a crucial aspect to government. This practice of highlighting specific elements over others has been noticed in the United States, such as by Lippmann in his critical book "*Public Opinion*" in which he proposed his argument that public perception is a product of what we see in the media, and not inherently portrayal of reality, and if not reflection of reality, a reflection of representative reality. Frame can represent reality as "Frames introduce or raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas; activating schemas that encourage target audiences to think, feel and decide in a particular way". (Entman 164)

To this end, state-media relations as a mechanism or operation aimed at promoting policies or controlling discussion for some benefit_ political or otherwise.

2. Conceptualization of Media Bias

Media bias occurs when the media systematically emphasizes one particular point of view in a manner that contravenes the standards of professional journalism. However, media bias can strongly impact both the individual and public perception of the news events.

2.1. The Propaganda Model of Manufacturing Consent

The media has a surpassing nature to it. Its immensity and capacity to stir up, select and alter the attitudes of people, cultures and even nations are remarkable. In democracy, nearly all cultural, financial, economic and social decisions pass through the media. It is so effective and so critical in political life that its use demands accurate supervision and control. This is by no means a "new idea". Policy makers, businesses and leaders have long understood that media control is crucial, frequently contributing to undemocratic use and abuse of information in both repressive regimes and democracies. Although, the politically fraught issues of propaganda and media control may seem to run counter to the conceptions of individual freedom and established principles of democracy, media control and propaganda techniques are undoubtedly prevalent in many democracies today as they were in former regimes.

Repressive regimes employ a number of tactics to hold the populace docile and under surveillance. In this way, the use of propaganda and censorship proved to be an effective tool. However, propaganda, indoctrination and mind control do not require a repressive regime all the time. For all the demands for a free press and its democratic nature, close reading of

history can reveal both a different understanding and a particular use of the media in democracies. This alternative perspective is founded on the argument that politicians, corporate planners, think tanks or capital owners have effectively used the media to shape public opinion and eventually to direct the population towards the desired goals. This is analogous to how repressive regimes saw the values of harnessing the media to meet their needs.

At the turn of the twentieth century in the United States, Americans George Creel and Walter Lippmann realized the value of media control as a means to sway the nation. George Creel, named by president Woodrow Wilson to lead Commission on public information for the United States Government during the First World War, states that war was not fought in France alone but, “it was the fight for the minds of men, for the conquest of their convictions.”⁷ Over the course of the World War I, Creel created an unprecedented propaganda machine that unified the United States behind the war. He openly disclosed how he could use the advertising to sell an undesirable war to Americans.

Walter Lippmann, the dean of American political journalism known for his famous critique of democracy, argues that in the United States, the public should be merely inactive observers in the country’s life and the elites should inform and mobilize the citizens on issues. Lippmann’s thoughts can be clearly shown in the following words: “The public must be put in its place, so that it may exercise its own powers, but no less and perhaps even more, so that each of us may live free of the trampling and roar of a bewildered herd”. (Rossiter and Lare 91)

The assumption that propaganda is indispensable to manage the masses and maintain the elite-centered version of democracy continues today. The “Propaganda Model” that Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky lay out in their book “*Manufacturing Consent: The political Economy of the Mass Media*”, provides a deep analysis of media performance within a democracy. The authors investigate the key institutional conditions under which the media work. According to Herman and Chomsky, the U.S. media “serve, and propagandize on behalf of the powerful societal interests that control and finance them” (xi). Expanding the idea that mass media of the U.S are effective institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda, Herman and Chomsky identify five filters that raw news goes through before it reaches the audience.

⁷George Creel, *How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe* (New York: Harper, 1920) 3.

The first filter is “media ownership”. The search for profit opens the door for investors and capital owners to purchase large shares of media companies. Thus, media organizations are large corporations that are profit-driven businesses. Such corporations seek to influence the “public sphere”. Media make sure that information contradicting the investors’ interests is less likely to appear in the news output. Put simply, ownership entitles the owner to special rights and influence over the flow of information.

Herman and Chomsky’s second filter is “advertising” which encompasses media reliance on ads as a significant source of income, allowing marketers the power to influence the program. The result is that media outlets must be cautious not to step on the toes of those who charge the bills_ corporate advertisers. Thus, controversial issues and opinions that may interfere with advertisers’ interests have to be excluded from the program.

The third filter is, “dependence on sources”, also leads to media restriction. The fact that the news has to be produced fast in short period of time, pushes reporters to rely on materials and sources provided by government elites including government officials, corporations and trade associations due to their ability to reach the larger portion of society. However, sources can frame an issue _ highlighting some parts of the story and neglecting others, resulting in a single-sided and manipulated opinion.

Herman and Chomsky’s fourth filter is “flak” or the negative responses to media content. When a reporter covers issues that threaten corporations and governments, negative flak comes back to the reporter or newspaper. In this regard, economic and political powers decide what is acceptable for reporting and exposing. The final outcome is a decrease in investigative journalism and an increase of the elites’ power in producing far-reaching and influential impact on the media output.

The last filter of the Propaganda Model is the “ideology of anti-communism”. During the Cold War period, the depiction of Communism as America’s first adversary posing a threat to Western value, acted as an effective instrument for suppressing political opposition. It also obliged journalists to frame political events and news that support the U.S campaigns against its enemy. Although the last filter seems to be outdated in the last decades, it can also be applied to current issues such as “the war on terror” or “the war on drugs” that arouse fears and shape understanding.

Summing up the above, these five filters aim to minimize any undesirable information or debate regarding issues that affect the elites’ interests. Even worse, the five filters function

in an undemocratic manner that limits the free flow of information. This has serious implications for people, the media and democracy as a whole.

2.2. Media Perception Management

Perception is the mechanism through which individuals identify, arrange and perceive the information that they obtain via their senses to understand the world around them (Schacter et al.123). The degree and the nature of the understanding they acquire their frame of reference, life experience, culture, convictions, values and stereotypes. Perception is often voluntary and sub-conscious, however, like any other mechanism, perception may be managed by preparing, arranging, coordinating and controlling a broad variety of resources so as to accomplish particular aims behind managing individuals' common understandings and, ultimately, changing their behaviours and attitudes.

Manipulation of the masses through perception management is based on Freud's (1921) psychological theory that behavior is guided by the sub-conscious. Human beings are influenced by the ideologies and values of their peers and social classes and are compelled to conform out of fears of exclusion from the communities they belong to. When humans are placed in masses, they develop features that they did not hold until they joined the masses and their behaviours are in line with the ideals and ideas of these masses. The mass media have the ability to set the issues agenda and shape a reality that generate virtual masses shaped by the news managed perceptions.

Edward Bernays, an early American pioneer of "public relations" in America, was heavily influenced by theories from social psychology and Freudian psycho-analysis to study the influence over the behaviour and attitude of the masses. He sets out to explain the structure of the mechanism which controls the public mind. Within the rapidly expanding media systems, Bernays sees the public mind and its proliferation of opinions in need of control. Thus, the perception management model was instrumental in clarifying the need for public consent to be engineered by communications media. (Rossiter 13)

The American involvement in Vietnam is a pivotal point in the context of contemporary perception management practices. An increasingly growing claim by many military and government leaders at the time of the U.S final defeat and withdrawal in 1975 was that internal opposition and adversarial news media reporting had prevented the U.S to win (Bennett and Paletz 17). During this war, media had played a significant role in bringing information to the public and influencing their perception of the war. Media access to the

military field affected the public perception leading up to a public dissent to the U.S intervention in Southeast Asia, which escalated toward the end of the Vietnam War. Stemming from this war, the U.S. leaders realized the media's ability to impact public perception and therefore influencing the government foreign policy. The United States, then, stressed the importance of controlling the flow of information from battlefields in order to maintain public support for war efforts.

According to Kegan Thomas, there are nine strategies and principles for perception management:

1. Preparation: setting specific objectives and understanding the optimal role you want others to fill.
2. Credibility: ensure that the information you offer is accurate, sometimes utilizing prejudices or expectations to improve authenticity.
3. Multichannel support: having numerous claims, arguments and evidence to support the information.
4. Centralized control: employing agencies such as ministries of propaganda or bureaus.
5. Security: none know the essence of the operation of deceit but only a tiny proportion of the group in leadership.
6. Flexibility: the deception campaign adapts and varies over time as needs change.
7. Coordination: the agency or propaganda ministry shall be arranged in a hierarchical structure in order to ensure a coherent and coordinated dissemination of information.
8. Concealment: destruction of contradictive information.
9. Untruthful statements: make up the facts/ fabricating the truth.⁸

2.3. The Power of News Frames during Wartimes

Mass media play a critical role to the success of any political discourse in modern societies as it is the key communication belt between politics and society. There are few ways for delivering political agendas to the general public; thus, if any political discourse is to be effective, policy makers have to go via the media.⁹ At the same time, in today's mass societies, citizens depend almost exclusively on the media for public relations and depend extensively on media outlets for details about how to see and perceive facts. Due to its

⁸Carlo Kopp, *Classical Deception Techniques and Perception Management Vs the Four Strategies of Information Warfare* (Australia: Monash University, 2005) 17-18.

⁹Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) 165.

influential nature within the society, media plays a vital role in framing public debate about national and international events. News-framing, in effect, allows the media an agenda-setting position (determining the most relevant issues), a priming function (signing and training the population to accept feedbacks on those issues) and an evaluative function (providing and suggesting solutions). (Jackson 165)

The role of the media in influencing domestic relations and social communications is never more important than during wartimes. Mass media play a vital role in modern warfare. Simultaneously, media are experiencing a host of challenges in coverage of war. On one hand, they are required to serve as watchdogs, checking the authenticity of the data they collect and release, and to include the information people need in order to be autonomous and self-governing. On the other hand, they have to rely on information provided by the government outlets and in this way they are rarely independent to cover issues that serve the national interest. That is, many considerations relate to the choosing of media frames, including journalistic norms and practices, individual schemes of reporters and political ideology.

While the concept of framing in mass communication research is not new, there is no one universally accepted definition of framing. Part of the challenges with defining news frames is their intangible nature, another challenge stems from the fact that frames can be shaped by political actors, by the media, or be a part of a broader cultural outlook. Broadly defined, framing relates to how mass media organize and present issues and events. One of the most widely cited definition of media framing is given by Entman, according to whom, framing means “ selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connection among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution” (5). He further provides two classes of framing, substantive and procedural.

Entman argued that substantive frames typically perform at least two of the four main functions of covering news - defining a specific problem, diagnose a cause of that problem, make a moral judgment regarding that problem, and/or suggest remedies to that problem. This paradigm is feasible to analyze the 11 September events. For Entman, the problematic effect being that thousands of people perished as a result of an act of war against America; the cause was the Taliban government of Afghanistan and its leaders in addition to al-Qaeda terrorist network; the moral judgment, sentencing such people as being wicked; the incipient remedy, war against Afghanistan. Procedural frames, on the other hand, have a more limited scope and

role. This type of frames implies an assessment of the political leaders, on the ground of their strategy and performance. That kind of framing occupies a lot of news reporting.

To understand how news frames impact people's perceptions during war times, it is highly important to shed light on the notion of moral framing. According to Torwel, moral framing uses a type of language that clearly distinguishes between good and evil, and explains a moral reason for action (258). Another clarification for how moral frames can work was provided by Seaton in 1999, who argued that moral frames involve "a depiction of the enemy as a mad and ravaging tyrant" (46). The enemy becomes demonized which acts as a pretext for subsequent attack on the enemy. As such, the justification for war starts with the moral framing of the enemy. Such moral frames enter the news media through the official rhetoric in speeches, press releases and interviews. In the case of the 2003 Iraqi conflict, the official moral rhetoric claimed that Saddam Hussein defied the UN agreements and developed arms of mass destruction, and that was participating or sponsoring the terrorist network of al-Qaeda, thereby presenting an immediate danger to world peace. Thus, this moral justification is sought for a war against Iraq.

Hence, the power of news frames lays in their exclusivity to promote and reinforce certain issues and to influence public perception about such issues, in particularly the moral farming which is strong enough to win public sympathy and public support in order to legitimize certain actions.

3. The Mobilization of Frames

Journalistic news frames are frames that play a transformative role vis-à-vis frames sponsored by (political) elites. They take as their starting point journalistic discretion and the autonomy of journalists, they focus on what journalists and news media organizations actively do to the topics they select and they stress the adaptation and modification of frames from elites.

3.1. Military Propaganda and Psychological Warfare

Historically, the application of psychological operations in one form or another has proven to be almost as essential to the successful waging of wars as the use of weaponry. Employing psychology in warfare for military gains is as old as the war itself. Two thousand years ago, Sun Tzu, a Chinese military tactician, stressed in his book "*Art of War*" the need to subdue the enemy without fighting. Here, the target is enemy mind – his thought process –

rather than his body. He thus demonstrated the centrality of propaganda within the context of military thought, as essentially victory or defeat exists in the mind. Alexander the Great, too, sought to undermine the power and morale of his adversaries by killing or catching their king. In a similar manner, Genghis Khan the Mongol leader who assigned priority to disinformation by appointing local agents to spread rumours about the power of Khan's army as being invincible. Since then, psychological warfare has been used as a non-violent weapon to achieve military goals.

Psychological warfare is centered on the idea that enemy soldiers do not need to be killed or wounded; rather, they are convinced to leave the battlefield. Even leaders, at the first place, can be convinced not to send their troops to the military combat.¹⁰ Encyclopedia Britannica provided another definition to psychological warfare, or psywar as encompassing “the use of propaganda against the enemy, supported by such military, economic, or political measures as may be required. Such propaganda is generally intended to demoralize the enemy, to break his will to fight or resist, and sometimes to render him favourably disposed to one's position”. (Psychology Warfare).

The common thing between these two definitions is their focus on the propaganda, which seems to be the warhead of the psychological warfare. The propaganda is so critical that many prefer to call the operation “propaganda warfare”. It is either a weapon to boost morale, one of the most critical aspects of war, or to undermine the morale of the opponent.

In the modern age, during World War I, psychological operations were carried out by both the Allied and the Central Powers, although the former proved themselves more skillful and witty in this domain. For instance, U.S. military tactical psychological warfare depended on the production of leaflets as the chief disseminating medium. The military propaganda that would serve the psychological warfare centered on generating surrender appeals by means of balloons and planes that disseminated such appeals (Radvanyi 20). Other facets of U.S. propaganda are addressed in the study of the Creel Committee report, formally known as “*Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1918-1919*”.

Psychological warfare in World War II, according to Berger and Reese, integrated the advancements achieved in mass communications through the widespread use of the radio and loud speakers (8). For the United States, the army field central unit for psychological warfare was the Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) company. These units were equipped

¹⁰Ron Schleifer, *Psychological Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 1.

unconventional means of communicating including public address systems, radios, monitoring sets, loudspeakers, typewriters, mobile printing presses and leaflets bombs. These units were distributed in accordance with the army groups' presence. Their chief job was to provide support for soldiers in the combat field. (Radvanyi20).

Having learned the effectiveness of radio broadcasts and leaflets during WWII, the U.S army began radio broadcasts and leaflets drop over the Republic of South Korea. In the fall of 1950, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company was established and served as the 8th Army's tactical psychological warfare or "propaganda". The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company used both vehicle and aircraft mounted loudspeakers to get their verbal messages across. Korean War themes centered around the "happy POW", "good soldiers-bad leaders", "surrender and you will be well-treated".

Through time, interests in psychological warfare started to dissipate and consequently, a decrease in officers' psyops-training that would later on affect the U.S army confrontation with the Vietnamese. In Vietnam, adopting a psychological warfare was to some extent successful always relying on loudspeakers and leaflets. However, the US army in this time prioritizes the air attacks as part of the psychological warfare aiming at convincing the enemy leaders to start negotiations to early end the war.

During the Gulf War, the U.S army invested radio and TV broadcasts to spread themes like Arab fraternity, coalition air power and Iraq isolation to succeed in its psyops. One of the U.S army's most effective tactical propaganda was the leaflets dropping, intimidating the enemy soldiers that the area would be bombed within a day unless they surrender. The best evidence to the efficiency of psyops was acknowledged by an Iraqi General: "Psyops . . . was a great threat to troop morale, second only the coalition bombing campaign". (Singh 66)

In short, psywars / psyops have become an essential part of the statecraft of every nation. Historical experiences prove psywars efficiency in reducing the adversary's morale and promoting dissension within enemy ranks. Needless to say that even though psychological operations have been used over centuries by various military leaders, recent years confirms the effectiveness of psyops as a weapon system of great potential particularly within the advancements reached in the world of mass media.

3.2. The US Experience of Military-Media Relationship

“Our Worst Enemy Seems to Be the Press.”¹¹

President Richard M. Nixon, 1971.

The animosity displayed by President Nixon in the above-mentioned quote is reflective of the mindset between the military and the government and the press before the end of the Vietnam War. This mindset intensified after the 1968 Tet Offensive,¹² and proceeded until the end of the war. In this time, a press that never investigated the U.S military claims in Saigon expressed tremendous concern for the military troops. The military gave the press considerable flexibility in publishing while simultaneously ignored censorship. Similarly, during both the Second World War and the Korean War, the partnership between the military and the press was positive, both recognizing that collaboration was more advantageous than confrontation. In WWII, for instance, reporters were able to go to the front line units through military transport. While there, they had access to battlefield events, so they were not censored on the spot by the military. When writing reports, the censorship process took place. Photos portraying the dead, or the harsher realities of the war were banned; instead positive reporting that would shore up public support should be carried on. Nevertheless, the end of the Vietnam War marked a halt of the military-media collaboration. Although the military permitted journalists unprecedented access to troops in combat, it failed to provide journalists the background information the public required to better grasp the military actions. By not supplying the press with the appropriate operational and political context to frame their stories, the military failed to properly engage the press. The press negative reportage sapped the will of the political leaders in Washington and the morale of the soldiers on the field. Thus, the Pentagon decided to adjust its way of handling the media.

In 1983, the US led an invasion of Grenada, a Caribbean nation that was largely unknown by Americans. The reasons for that invasion went back to Grenada's attempts to build an airport with the assistance of Cuban workers. The United States regarded the airport as a possible Soviet or Cuban air base, and eventually a breach of the U.S Western Hemisphere foreign policy. Thus, the United States decided to launch a military campaign known as “Operation Urgent Fury”. Politicians and the military were determined to deter

¹¹ William M. Hammond, *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996) 620.

¹²Tet Offensive was one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War, launched by the forces of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the US armed forces and their Allies. American and South Vietnamese forces lost over 3000 men. The impact of Tet Offensive on public opinion in the United States was significant.

another Vietnam in terms of its relations with the media.¹³ The ingrained feeling in the military that the press was somehow responsible for the humiliation in Vietnam, led the Pentagon to exclude the media from covering the initial operations in the island. Consequently, a panel investigating the military-media relationship, headed by Major General Sidle, was established. The proposals of this panel included the creation of a media pool system (Hill 10). This was designed to provide access only to a relatively low number of reporters. Impressed by the British experience of press limitations, which effectively curtailed negative reports during the Falklands Wars, the US military felt the necessity to restrict press freedom.

The same experience would be repeated in Panama invasion when President Bush in 1989 sent military troops into Panama to oust General Manuel Noriega. The military once again instituted those Sidle Panel recommendations that tended to restrict the press, namely the media pool system. During the Panama's Just Cause, the Pentagon limited media pool mobility by confining it to a U.S military base during the first hours of combat. Once they were released, the hardest period of fighting was done (Soderlund et al. 597). By doing so, the military provided logistic support after the fact. Hence, it goes without saying that Operation Urgent Fury and Operation Just Cause took the military- media relationship to a new low.

While the American populace and military were delighted with media coverage of the First Gulf War in 1991, the media were not. With the consequences of media relations in the Vietnam War still fresh in their minds, the U.S military dealt with the media during the Gulf War through a system of pools and formal briefings, whereby information was submitted to the public under the Pentagon's control. This allowed the government to direct the national discourse to concentrate on the coalition's power and progress and to minimize any negative Middle East visuals. Almost everything went according to plan. During initial planning, the military intended to institute a system whereby a selected number of reporters could talk to troops and under specific conditions. The Gulf War became known as "the first televised war" and the Pentagon had anticipated it. Upon realizing the dangers of not planning for the media in Grenada and Panama, the Pentagon actively pursued media practices during the Gulf War. Prior to Operation Desert Storm, the military arranged the types of stories the press would cover during the different phases of the campaign so as to make coverage as good as possible. Within this context, it was reported that President Bush was delighted, "when the raid on Baghdad came through live on television at the time he had ordered it" (Taylor 32). The

¹³ Marc D. Felman, *The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of War: Media Spin* (Alabama: Air University Press, 1993) 14.

military only partially followed the recommendations of the Sidle Panel in terms of establishing a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) to maintain its control over the press. Any critical reporting of the military was blacklisted. For instance, John Laurence, from the U.S television network ABC, was prevented from entering the war zone after he reported problems of supplies and weapons. However, restricting media access led some journalists to express their discontent about the conditions under which they reported the war stages. Howell Raines of the New York Times briefly summed up his thoughts on the Gulf War: “We lost; [The military] managed us completely.”¹⁴ While he believed that the military had unduly stifled it by unnecessarily stringent press laws, the military was determined to avoid the problems of Vietnam reporting by tightly controlling media reportage. In this context, one journalist thought that the Gulf War was waged against two major enemies: Saddam Hussein and the Saigon press corps of 1972.¹⁵ Yet, these restrictions might cost the military to lose its credibility as the public would discover what was missing as soon as the war ended up.

3.3. From Psychological Warfare to Information Warfare

At the end of World War II, the Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces, General Eisenhower expressed his firm belief about the effectiveness of Psychological warfare in winning the war (Gough 12). During the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S military employed psyops against Viet Cong controlled areas in South Vietnam in order to reduce moral and combat efficiency within the enemy’s ranks. Yet, the U.S military put the blame on the news media coverage for harming the war efforts in Vietnam and consequently its withdrawal from the area. This event shaped the U.S military bad attitudes towards the news media for years. The U.S military-media relationship started to take a new path in the run up to the 1991 Gulf War. In this war, the military officers realized that news media had the capacity to be a 24/7 wartime player.

The paradigm of modern information warfare was introduced during the 1991 Desert Storm Operation where the key objective was sanitization. That is to say, the Pentagon tried to avoid a real representation of the war. Instead, it portrayed infrared images of Baghdad with assorted flashes and lights. The use of information technology to instil combat operation was the main goal of the Pentagon. Thus, the military sought to devise strategies that would ensure a total domination over information as a part of its successful planning. This led many commentators to consider the Gulf War as the first “information war” owing to the effective use of technologies, including satellites, computers and communications to provide support

¹⁴ Richard H. Sinnreich, "The Changing Face of Battlefield Reporting," *Army Magazine*. November, 1994:30.

¹⁵ Sinnreich, 34.

for the war efforts. Moreover, the military dominance over information and communications constituted a step forward in the military strategies planning and became part of the “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)”. (Taylor 298)

Information warfare penetrated the military lexicon under various labels such as Media Warfare,¹⁶ the media outlets to spread propaganda or to promote deception operations; Mind War,¹⁷ an overwhelm control over the enemy’s ways of information processing to make up his mind, and Soft War,¹⁸ the use of global television to shape another nation’s vision of reality. All these labels point out that information warfare involves at least three distinctive functions: “Perception management, where information is the message; systems destruction, where information is the medium, and information exploitation, where information is an opponent’s resource to be targeted” (Bellamy61). That is to say, in such conflicts, information would be the resource, the target and the weapon all at the same time.

The post 9/11 information environment served as the best epitome of how the information dominance paradigm can work relying on Bellamy’s different functions of perception management, information exploitation and system destruction. Perception management at that time sought to spread certain interpretations of reality. Thus, this process was contracted to the Rendon Group, a private company, to help in perception management campaigns on war efforts in Afghanistan. The Pentagon then assigned this job to the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) to perform more perception management activities in supporting the war against terrorism. This office devised advertising campaigns to plant pro-American stories throughout the domestic and foreign media. Due to this large burden, the OSI was unable to manage things properly. Yet, the Department of Defence was determined to carry out the programmes and practices intended for OSI by establishing the Coalition Information Center (CIC) in order to disseminate disinformation throughout the Middle East media outlets. This time, the newly-established network succeeded to reach its main objective that was encountering Taliban and al-Qaeda propaganda and disinformation. (Armistead 145)

Information exploitation, another phase of the information warfare, intended to cover a variety of actions like withholding information, omission and censorship. These actions are put into effect when covering the nettle ground events. For instance, during the bombardment of Afghanistan, western media portrayed the U.S military forces when causing the death of

¹⁶ Gary F. Wheatley and Richard E. Hayes, *Information Warfare and Deterrence* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1996) 3.

¹⁷ Paul E. Valley and Michael A. Aquino, *From Psyop to Mind War: The Psychology of Victory* (California: Headquarters, 7th Psychological Operation Group, 1980) 3.

¹⁸ Wheatley and Hayes, 22.

many civilians. The Pentagon immediately intervened to prevent the spread of scandalous photographic evidence by purchasing exclusive rights to satellites photos (Campbell). This example clarifies how well the U.S administration exercised its censorship measures. Viewpoints and opinions that exhibited opposition were restrained. The mainstream media, however, responded positively to government directives and did not express any objection to the official pro-war line. Instead, they show a total support to the war efforts in Afghanistan. (Gorman and Mclean 221)

Finally, comes the system destruction, highlighting the importance of undermining the enemy's will and capacity to fight. Media outlets play a significant role in shaping the adversary's perception and boosting his morale. Thus, the destruction of such agencies became the essence of any information warfare. In this context, during the 2001 Afghanistan War, the U.S missiles targeted the Taliban's Embassy in Islamabad which proved to stand against the U.S media. Likewise, Aljazeera's office in Kabul, which thought to be supportive to Taliban reporting, was also destroyed on November 12 by an air attack.¹⁹ These attacks were perceived as necessary to silence al-Qaeda and to prevent it from getting its message out.

¹⁹ Peter Van der Veer and Shoma Munshi, *Media, War and Terrorism: Responses from the Middle East and Asia* (London: Routledge, 2004) 127.

Conclusion

Given the significance of the media in the daily life of Americans, it is only natural that the media are considered by several commentators as a “fourth branch of government.” Its immensity and capacity to stir up, select and alter the attitudes of the people, cultures and even nations led the U.S government to interact with the media as a means-to-an-end in order to promote its policies. The inclusion of media has been deeply rooted in U.S warfare issues where the public support is very crucial for the success of the war efforts. For that reason, policy makers and government officials realized the importance of media manipulation to manage the masses and maintain their hidden-agendas.

Throughout the American history, propaganda seems to be the main tool of media in order to manipulate the Americans during war times. Despite the evolution of propaganda throughout different periods of time, two facets remain important: firstly to strengthen local morale by strengthening beliefs in the justness of one’s cause, and secondly, to demoralize and terrorize the enemy. This led the U.S officials to recognize the necessity to maintain control over media practices. During times of conflict, the Defence Department used to alter and filter the news before reaching the public so as to gain more public support o its war efforts.

In spite of the imposed restrictions over media reports, media outlets have mostly supported their military during war. Only in a few instances, such as in the later periods of the Vietnam War have elements of the media become critical of the war effort. From a military perspective, bitterness about the Vietnam experience compelled new ways of handling journalists and media organizations. Hence, concepts such as information dominance became essential tenet of waging modern warfare.

It goes without saying that media control helped produce a crisis of democracy in the United States. The tremendous concentration of power in the hands of the elites who additionally control powerful media corporations has intensified control of vital news and information and surrendered the lively and critical media necessary to ensure a vital democracy. What is even worse is when media outlets promote their own interests and agendas at the expense of their obligations. This can be seen in many cases where media corporations preferred to collaborate with the military to serve their own interests. Once the media corporations abandoned their responsibilities to serve the public, provide a forum for democratic debate and addressing significant issues of common concern, they have largely promoted the growth of corporate and state power and undermined democracy. That is to say,

media control, propaganda and indoctrination seem to run counter to the established principles of democracy.

Moreover, during the Gulf War of 1991 and the Afghanistan war following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the broadcasting network and press were subject to unprecedented pressure to conform to the views of the respective wars advanced by the Bush administration in question and the Pentagon. This may seem contradictory to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Early in the United States history, the media were considered as a common component of the government. Thus, the US Constitution guarantees freedom of the speech of the press. Arguably, such freedom is no longer deemed desirable or acceptable during wartimes. In many respects, the original meaning attributed to this document is reinterpreted by the government. For government officials, allowing media full access to the battlefield will report stories that might shape the public pinion especially leading to decreased support for the war. Thus, it is highly necessary to restrict media access to make sure that reports disseminate news that have only success stories and at the same time avoid graphic stories of massive death that might affect public opinion negatively.

Summing up the above, in their efforts to sustain public support for the war efforts, U.S governments have since the World War I created institutions that would as far as possible manoeuvre media reports reaching the public from the battlefield. The manoeuvring strategies include well-designed official propaganda machine in an effort to re-create the distance between the battlefield and the public. However, the U.S government attempts to censorship and restrict the media can be viewed as a declared war on the First Amendment that guarantees freedom of expression. Additionally, these restrictions would create a credibility gap that would cost the U.S government to lose the public trust.

Chapter II: Prelude to the Iraq War

Introduction

This chapter provides an extensive background to the 2003 Iraq War. It starts by reviewing the development of Orientalist ideology with particular reference to Edward Said's perspective on how European countries used Orientalism as a pretext for imperialism. Orientalism, then, extended from Europe to the United States. American Orientalism developed its own constructions of the Orient, which were largely focused on religious references that deemed Americans to be God's chosen people. Such conceptions with the aid of some incidents such as the 9/11 attacks contributed to bring further impetus to Orientalist discourse within American literature and mainstream media and subsequently to its fusion with official discourses on terrorism.

The chapter continues with the idea of how targeting Iraq became a necessity. In this regard, one should consider the increasing political strength of Neo-conservatives and their ideology that the world had transformed by post-Cold War realities and that the U.S must be the sole superpower in the world. The Neo-conservatives PNAC ideology aimed at promoting and protecting the U.S hegemon and interests all over the globe. Saddam was considered as a threat to the U.S interests and in the Middle East. Thus, official attitudes towards Iraq reflected the core principles of the PNAC ideology. The insecurity atmosphere that subsequently prevailed after the 9/11 attacks was the ideal situation for PNAC leaders to enact their policy against Iraq. The chapter concludes with the U.S efforts to link Iraq to the 11 September suicide attacks, and thus, the transformation from the "war on terror" to the "Iraq war". Media played a major role in framing the war against Iraq by reinforcing the claims of the Bush administration that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and Iraq's ties with al-Qaeda terrorist network. The constant repetition of these claims ultimately led to the approval of the American people for the war. So, the war against Iraq began on 20 March 2003, and was officially named "Operation Iraqi Freedom". The war went through two major phases "Decapitation Strikes" and "Shock and Awe". The two bombing campaigns aimed at exhibiting the American great potentials in using information technology to attack precisely and the U.S military full might to intimidate the enemy.

1. The Development of Orientalist Ideology

Orientalism was a system of ideological fictions whose purpose was and is to legitimize Western cultural and political superiority; furthermore, the Western understanding of the East has grown out of a relationship of power, of dominance, of varying degrees of complex hegemony.

1.1. Saidian Orientalism

In the seventh century, Islamic conquests deepened regional tensions within the Byzantine Christian Empire. The contested command of the Mediterranean Sea has been a persistent mutual problem. A string of crusades from the 11th to the 13th century embodied the European position. Once their territories were invaded, Muslims felt profoundly humiliated (Maalouf xiv). Early Muslim historians were stunned by the actions of the crusades and their violations of treaties. They even regarded particular European Nationalities, namely the Franks, to be perpetrators of wars as they constituted the majority of the crusades ranks. The crusades were termed “Frankish Wars” by Muslim historians²⁰. In the meantime, the papal clerics saw the crusades as an attempt to establish a Pan-European Christian ideology against a rising Islam. This worldview corroborated the rise of Orientalist discourse, which had dominated the Western mentality long after the religious fervour had diminished.

According to the online version of the Oxford English Dictionary, the term ‘Orientalism’ meant in the past: 1) ‘Oriental style or quality; the character, customs, etc. of oriental nations and 2) the ‘knowledge of the languages, cultures, etc. of the Orient.’ Yet, according to Edward Said, the thesis of Orientalism is initially defined at three levels: firstly, an academic discipline, broadly including anyone who writes and teaches about the Orient; secondly, “a style of thought based upon ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’; and thirdly, starting roughly in the late 18th century, “the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient (Said 2-3). Said regards the latter category as instrumental as it defines for Europeans what the Orient is about, and how it should be institutionally and educationally explained. In short, Orientalism exemplifies the “Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient”. (Said 3)

²⁰Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2000) 539.

Said's major work '*Orientalism*' critically examined Orientalism via Foucault's notion of discourse.²¹ Said outlined the European construction of the Oriental, and the ways in which Orientalist discourse became, in Foucault terminology, a regime of truth that reshaped the complexities of the Orient into a manageable entity. Orientalist discourse, in this manner, created narratives and images that helped to strengthen feelings of unity within one's own imaginary community, while assuming superiority over the other. Said found Orientalism to be generalized representation for Western conceptions of the Orient. It was, he stated "a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the, "us") and the strange (the Orient, the East, "them")."²² Freund goes even further by stating that Orientalism transforms the East and its people into an alien 'other'. In his view, that other, usually a dark other, was in every way the inferior of the West: unenlightened, barbarous, cruel, craven, enslaved to its senses, given to despotism, and, in general contemptible". (3)

Overall, Edward Said made three major statements about Orientalism. First of all, Orientalism has historically served political ends and more importantly, imperialist endeavours. Secondly, Orientalism contributed to define Europe's self image. Thirdly, Orientalism has generated a false representation of Arabs and Islamic Culture (Schaefer 1003). The resulting Western representation of the Orient has created a discourse that has developed into a sort of imagined binary ontology.

1.2. American Orientalism

In *Orientalism*, Edward Said focuses primarily on the French and British styles of the 19th and early 20th centuries. He only partly tackles American Orientalism on the basis that it only emerged in the post-World War II era, when the United States became the pivotal Western superpower. Subsequently, Said duly discussed American Orientalism in *Culture and Imperialism*. He makes a clear distinction between imperialism from colonialism, whilst at the same time combining the two concepts. He defines imperialism as "thinking about, settling on, controlling land that you do not possess, that it is distant, that is lived on and owned by others" (Said 7). This definition helped him to claim that America's intervention in the developing world was backed by the repetition of the old imperialist attitudes. Said depicts America "as an immigrant settler society superimposed on the ruins of a considerable native

²¹ According to Foucault, discursive practices delimit the field of objects, defining a legitimate perspective and fixing the norms for the elaboration of concepts. In order to produce a statement in a discourse, one has to adapt to the constraints, focus on a subject and claim authority.

²² Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) 43.

presence.”²³ In contrast to American self-perceptions of their nation as the British Empire’s anti-imperial opponent, Said points out that the United States was founded upon a successful imperial conquest.

Representations of American ‘exceptionalism’ are important to an understanding of US Orientalism. The editor and essayist John L. O’Sullivan (1813-1895) exemplified this view. He declared that America’s divinely sanctioned mission was to overrun the continent and then to establish “on earth the moral dignity and salvation of man” (Noy8). O’Sullivan coined the expression ‘manifest destiny’ to justify the annexation of Texas and the claim to Oregon territory in 1845. Manifest destiny undeniably encompassed sentiments of American exceptionalism and promoted public belief in the essential union of American virtue and power. American presidents frequently invoked manifest destiny in their speeches when mobilizing their people for war. For instance, Bush Sr. states several times “You know . . . America is a nation founded under God. And from our very beginnings we have relied upon his strength and guidance in war and peace. And this is something we must never forget.”²⁴ Following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush conjured up America’s divine destiny when delivering his State of the Union Address: “Americans will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right, true and unchanging for all people everywhere . . . In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty_ that *we have been called* to a unique role in human events”. (Colucci 452)

Another image of American Orientalism is that of the “barbarian” Oriental. Susanna Rowson’s 1794 play *Slaves in Algiers* is a good illustration of this trend. While the play is initially expected to tackle the troubling issue of slavery in the context of the United States, the whole play takes place on North African soil. The main topic of this play is the plight of white Americans held as slaves by Algerians (or “Barbary pirates”) in the 1790s. *Slaves in Algiers* Orientalist discourse is incorporated into an imaginary enemy’s constructed narrative, through the creation of a threatening image of the “other”. North Africans’ barbarity is frequently echoed in the tales of captivity, which depict them as evil, amoral and inhuman. Nonetheless, these same narratives never criticized the slavery system in America, which was based on African black slavery. At the same time, *Slaves in Algiers* effectively creates a new form of national and racial identity in a transatlantic context; this discourse served to reinforce

²³ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993) xxv.

²⁴ Roberta Coles, “Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990s’ War Discourse: Mission and Destiny Intertwined.” *Sociology of Religion*, vol. 63, no.4, 2002, pp. 403-426.

feelings of superiority among the American public in relation to the “other”. The very notion of Barbary captivity stresses the victimization of Christian and the inhumanity of the Muslim. This shaped the mindset of Americans regarding the Muslim Orient in general.

1.3. American Orientalism Fusion with Discourses of Terrorism.

According to Oxford English dictionary, the word “terrorism” was first used to in 1795 to describe state violence in post-revolutionary France. Thus, the systematic use of terror was originally interpreted as a compelling technique of subjection used by rulers to control the people. In the 19th century, the term “terrorist” was widely applied to groups or individuals that carried out violent actions and assassinations against ruling elites. Yet, in present time, there is no universally agreed upon definition of terrorism. One approach defines terrorism as “ a particular use of violence for political ends, where the violence is intended to create a psychological reaction in a person or a group of people –the psychological target –to make them act in a way which the attacker desires”(Cromer 437). Another definition defines terrorism as “the victimization of unarmed civilians in an attempt to affect the policies of the government that leads those civilians.”²⁵Some academics prefer to tackle this concept from an official perspective. It represents “the set of views, arguments, explanations and policy suggestions advanced by those who speak for the state” (qtd.in Meikle 160). The key official definers of terrorism are government officials. For them, terrorism is an extreme form of criminality with no political significance. Therefore, terrorism represents illegitimate political violence as opposed to the legitimate force used by the state.

In the United States, every president labelled and externalized various forms of political violence. After the attacks of 9/11, the discourse on terrorism became far more prominent. These attacks constituted an unparalleled assault on American soil, which witnessed one of the most dramatic media spectacles in the history. Quite instantly, American television news drew upon the discourse of patriotism to describe the atrocity. American news media relied heavily on elite sources, and the frames that they conveyed, to mobilize public support. The wake of 9/11 attacks saw a media tendency towards “patriotism” rather than impartiality, which impacted greatly on the ability of reporters to perform their jobs properly. Immediately following 9/11, there were almost no alternative perspectives to the official discourse in American mainstream media. The absence of alternative perspectives has to do

²⁵Bruce Hoffman, " Terrorism: Who is Fighting Whom?" *World Policy Journal*, vol.14, no.1, March 1997, pp.97-104.

with the fact that terrorism was represented as beyond law. By disregarding the dimension of law, official terrorism discourses rely upon political violence to reaffirm the legitimacy of the Western state and the boundaries of the Western community (Porras 312). Just as Orientalism constructed an image of the self in contrast to that of the “other”, so the official discourse on terrorism positioned the state as barrier against outside forces. Thus, terrorism has become an alternative means to write “the script for historical interpretations of national identity and political sovereignty.”²⁶

The rise of neo-conservatism as a dominant political force in Washington has led to connecting the terrorist discourse with the Middle East. Neo-conservatives drafted documents considered terrorism as the primary enemy for the United States. Consequently, countering “terrorism” became the pretext for waging wars of domination. Echoing the official frame, a mass-mediated demonization campaign in the United States was directed not just at the group responsible for attacks, but at the Islamic civilization as a whole. Islam was portrayed as being culpable for such attacks, and media audiences, particularly in the western hemisphere were frequently reminded of the backwardness, brutality and irrationality of everything Arab or Islam. At this point, one can say that Orientalism and the official institutional discourse on terrorism reached a state of fusion. The result was a prevalence of an “alarmist” literature, including publications such as: Daniel Pipes, *Militant Islam Reaches America*(2002); Bernard Lewis, *the Crisis of Islam*(2003); and Steven Emerson, *American Jihad: the Terrorists Living among Us* (2003).

As stated earlier, the convergence of Orientalism and counter-terrorism generated a discourse positioning both the “other” within the West (incarnated by the Muslim minorities) and outside the West (incarnated by the Muslim world). These attitudes were very clear after 9/11 attacks. In *Militant Islam Reaches America* (2002), Pipes demonized Muslims within the United States by claiming that Muslims in America had adopted the ambitious agenda of converting all non-Muslims and replacing the American Constitution with Quran.²⁷ Employing the counter-terrorist discourse, Pipes warns in the introduction to his book, *In the Path of God*, that “the preservation of our existing order can no longer be taken for granted; it needs to be fought for” and calls for the need to adopt “a tough line” against “the ultimate

²⁶ Annamarie Oliverio, *The State of Terror* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998) 6.

²⁷ Daniel Pipes, “The Danger Within: Militant Islam in America.” *Commentary*, vol.112, November 2001, pp. 19-24.

enemy in the war on terrorism” (Pipes xi). Consequently, the image of Islam and Arabs became popularly associated with terrorist threats to the West and liberal democracies.

2. The Prospect of War in Iraq

The events of 9/11 created a relevant atmosphere that helped Bush launch regime change in Iraq. The use of fear was essential to manipulate the public. Besides, the neoconservatives, so stepped in abstract ideological convictions that put Saddam Hussein at the core of the Middle East’s problems, and thus he was involved in the attacks of 9/11.

2.1. The Growing Political Influence of Neo-Conservatives

From 1973, when the OPEC cartel of oil-producing countries dramatically increased oil prices, a small group of Washington insiders known as neo-conservatives sought direct control over the Middle East region. In the waning months of the Cold War, just before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a group of neo-conservatives started to claim that the time had arrived to establish an American-dominated international order. Some of them labeled it as “unipolar imperative”. Instead of cutting military expenditures, they claimed, the United States had to expand its military capability (Dorrien 1). Neoconservatives became influential within the Pentagon under administrations of Ford, Reagan and Bush Senior. During the presidency of George W. Bush, neo-conservative figures filled the most influential advisory positions. Examples include Dick Cheney(U.S Vice-President), Donald Rumsfeld(Defense Secretary), Paul Wolfowitz(Deputy Defense Secretary), Richard Perle(Chairman of the Pentagon Defence Policy Board) and William Kristol(founder of the neoconservative think-tank, the *Project of a New American Century* (PNAC)).²⁸

Transforming the regime in Iraq has been followed up before the 9/11 attacks and the George W. Bush administration. When Saddam Hussein endangered the stability of President George H.W. Bush’s “new world order” and the U.S interests by invading Kuwait in 1990,²⁹ Bush administration started Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and imposed sanctions on Saddam. When the Gulf War ended, Bush senior decided not to remove Saddam from his position, a decision which turned the Neoconservatives unsatisfied. They considered it as a lost opportunity to impose U.S hegemony.

²⁸ Jim George, "Leo Strauss, Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: Esoteric Nihilism and the Bush Doctrine." *International Politics*, vol.42, 2005, pp. 174-202.

²⁹ Phil M. Haun, "Air Power, Sanctions, Coercion, and Containment: When Foreign Policy Objectives Collide." *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, edited by Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018) 77-92.

In Defence Planning Guidance in 1992, the Neoconservatives claimed that the U.S must seize the opportunity of the collapse of USSR in order to impose its doctrine and destroy any power that would be an obstacle to it. Under the presidency of Bill Clinton, William Kristol and Robert Kegan, neoconservatives and advocates of regime change in Iraq, sent him a letter in which they argued that the policy of containment of Iraq was not enough to get rid of Saddam, and that the U.S had to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect their interests in the Gulf. This letter was signed by other neoconservatives such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and John Bolton. In 2000, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) released “Rebuilding America’s Defenses”, a report that repeated the neoconservative agenda of the military plan for U.S world domination. In this way, the neoconservatives took the opportunity to develop their agenda for the new administration. Dick Cheney along with other neoconservative members was appointed in Bush’s administration.

The events of 9/11 created a vulnerable atmosphere that helped Bush launch regime change in Iraq. The use of fear was essential to manipulate the public. In the way to the invasion of Iraq, the Reagan administration used repeatedly fear to push through controversial policy. The worldview did not necessarily require that Saddam Hussein had been behind the 9/11 attacks or that he had sheltered Osama bin Laden. Nonetheless, the neoconservatives, so stepped in abstract ideological convictions that put Saddam Hussein at the core of the Middle East’s problems, and thus he was involved in the attacks of 9/11 (Fisher).

One of the key tenets of the neoconservative ideology is based on moral clarity, a major factor that helped to justify the U.S invasion of Iraq. A campaign was started to develop a dichotomy of “good” and “evil”. The use of “morality” in American foreign policy was obvious when Bush used the phrase “Axis of evil” in his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, where he portrayed Iran, Iraq and North Korea as governments that help terrorists and seek weapons of mass destruction.

A further development of the neoconservatives’ agenda was seen in the Bush Doctrine following September 11. The Bush Doctrine asserted that national security could be achieved only by American global dominance.³⁰ The ideological core of the Bush Doctrine was its neoconservative conviction that in a world transformed by post-Cold War realities and 9/11,

³⁰ David Holloway, *9/11 and the War on Terror* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008) 44.

foreign policy and national security strategy must also be reinvented in a way that the U.S would be the only superpower in the world.

Democracy and the need for preventive war in Iraq shed the light on the growing influence of neoconservatives in Bush's administration. Iraq was chosen because it was regarded as a society that can be collapsed easily in which the U.S can change its regime and control it according to its interests especially that Iraq is situated in a good geographical place where U.S can start spreading its hegemony and empire. So, Cheney, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld and other influential neoconservative White House advisors who had long envisioned war with Iraq as a centerpiece of a bold gambit to reshape the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape, finally got their satisfaction (Mann 112). On March 19, 2003, the United States, along with coalition forces primarily from the United Kingdom, initiates war in Iraq.

2.2. Targeting Iraq and the Project of a New American Century (PNAC)

Under George W. Bush, official attitudes towards Iraq reflected the PNAC ideology. Their declared aim was to 'promote American global leadership' through 'military strength and moral clarity.' With these words, PNAC envisioned America as a global hegemon and which ought to be an empire.³¹ One should recall that on February 1992, PNAC issued a document, drafted by Paul Wolfowitz, entitled *Defense Planning Guidance* which argued that the United States should be the sole 21st century superpower. This would happen by taking pre-emptive military actions to prevent the emergence of potential threats from other nations. Interestingly, this document also asserted the need for "access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil" (Muttitt 24). Thus, it became evident that the neoconservatives deemed the invasion of Iraq necessary and imminent long before the formal inception of the PNAC in 1997. So, it was not surprising to see eighteen PNAC members sending a letter to President Clinton in 1998, urging him to secure the U.S interests across the globe, and above all, to get rid of Saddam Hussein.

Senior PNAC cabinet positioned themselves as key decision makers on issues related to Iraq. They occupied various jobs such as government officials, inner cabinet members, presidential advisers, journalists and publishers. PNAC members were, therefore, the main news sources whose claims were not publically called into question. Since dependence on official sources was part of journalistic practice, mass media outlets played a crucial role in

³¹ David L. Altheide and Jennifer N. Grimes, "War Programming: The Propaganda Project and the Iraq War." *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 46, no.4, 2005, pp. 617-643.

the “war programming”, as noted by Altheide and Grimes, that took place during the American invasion of Iraq.

The events of 11 September 2001 brought maximum impetus to the initiatives of the PNAC projects. According to John Pilger, several high-level PNAC members were eager to see a catalyzing event on a paralleled scale with “Pearl Harbor” as necessary to bring about the desired transformation of the U.S foreign policy. The attacks of September 11, 2001 provided, therefore, a “new Pearl Harbor” and were described as “the opportunity of ages” (Pilger 19). The climate of insecurity that subsequently prevailed surrounded political leaders and journalists, who were willing to do anything to protect the United States. This was the perfect situation for PNAC to put into effect its agenda towards Iraq. Richard Clarke, President Bush’s chief counter-terrorism adviser till 2003, asserts that the proposal to invade Iraq was planned before the September, 11 attacks. In his book *Against All Enemies: inside America’s war on Terror*, Clarke mentioned that following 9/11, Iraq was the key subject debated by the U.S Department of Defence:

I expected to go back to a round of meetings examining what the next attacks could be, what our vulnerabilities were, what we could do about them in the short term. Instead, I walked into a series of discussions about Iraq. At first I was incredulous that we were talking about something other than getting al Qaeda. Then I realized with almost a sharp physical pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq. Since the beginning of the administration, indeed well before, they had been pressing for a war with Iraq. (Clarke 30)

Richard Clarke’s reflections from this span of time are crucial as they show the prominent figures’ motives within the U.S administration. Clarke further argued that the administration meetings and discussions, involving senior neoconservative figures, produce five fundamental reasons to justify the war against Iraq: the first one was to carry out the incomplete 1991 Gulf War task by overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Second, attacking Iraq would help protecting Israel, America’s most important ally. Third, establishing a democratic state in Iraq might act as a model for the region. Forth, invading Iraq would allow the withdrawal of the U.S troops from Saudi Arabia, where they were formerly present. Fifth, taking over Iraq would help creating a new source of oil for the U.S. (265)

2.3. The September 11 Attacks: Towards Promoting Political Agendas

Linking Iraq to the 11 September attacks was the purpose of a sustained communication exercises. Government and military elites were initially preoccupied with the “War on Terror” in Afghanistan. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the United States initiated an ambitious outreach campaign aimed at minimizing international scrutiny of its Middle East policies. The war on terror would not be confined to al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks who were presently being harboured by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, was clear from the outset. Having immediately realized that the attacks offered both the rationale for implementing a more aggressive foreign policy as well as the opportunity for securing the support of the American public, hard line leaders in Washington started pushing for a more robust and inclusive responses. US secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was excited that the attacks would finally allow the United States to move further beyond al-Qaeda, in particular, to safeguard its objective of regime change in Iraq. The aim, according to him, should be to “hit Saddam Hussein at the same time”, to “[g]o massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not”. Or as Condoleezza Rice, the President’s National Security Advisor, recommended, the US had to “capitalize on these opportunities”. Indeed, within twenty-four hours of 9/11, the President himself instructed counter-terrorism experts to extract ‘any shred’ of evidence that might be used to link Saddam to the attacks (Kettell 50). Richard Perle, the chairman of the Defense Policy Board, immediately commented after the attacks saying that “This could not have been done without help of one or more governments . . . Someone taught these suicide bombers how to fly large airplanes. I don’t think that can be done without the assistance of large governments. You don’t walk in off the street and learn how to fly a Boeing 767.”³² Perle was not alone in the presumption that there had to be a state behind the most devastating attack on American soil in history. President Bush, Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and other high-ranking administration officials sought to associate al-Qaeda directly to Iraq after 9/11.

Conceptions can often be reinforced by the repeated use of descriptions, where such repetition can instill specific interpretations. Reference to ‘Saddam Hussein’ in the prelude to Iraq war, would often be made in combination with the phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ and even with ‘al-Qaeda’ or ‘terrorism’. This process established in the public mind that Saddam Hussein not only had the WMD but that he had ties with terrorists and al-Qaeda

³² Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams Jr, *Seeking Security in an Insecure World* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012) 179.

in specific, and therefore could have been connected in any sense to 9/11. As the co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission stated, “The Bush administration had repeatedly tied the Iraq War to September 11, insinuating in some people’s minds a link between Iraq and the attacks themselves. . . [A]t different junctures a majority of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11.”³³

The non-existing al Qaeda-Saddam tie was as much as a selling point for the war as the inexistent WMD. The seller was witty that half the country was brainwashed into believing that the 9/11 hijackers had been Iraqis. Evidence of these links was debatable at the time, and was later reported to be profoundly false. Nonetheless, frequent references linking Saddam with al-Qaeda became so strong in the American’s public mind that even as facts arose that the links were untrue, a large proportion of the public continued to believe that those ties existed.

3. From the “War on Terror” to the Iraq War

Following the war in Afghanistan, the United States began to focus much of its military attention on the war in Iraq. At this point, the tone of the media coverage is very important. The mainstream media has mostly supported the perspectives of the Bush administration and stressed the inevitability of the war in Iraq.

3.1. Framing the Iraq War

After the Afghan War, the Bush administration used the media both at home and abroad, to promote its agenda in Iraq. Three significant claims were continuously repeated: Firstly, the Iraqi regime had continued to possess and develop biological, chemical, and nuclear “weapons of mass destruction” (WMDs); Secondly, there have been secret ties between the Iraqi government and members of al-Qaeda network and was thus complicit in the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001; and thirdly Iraq has posed an imminent threat both to its neighbours and to the United States. (Altheide and Grimes 626)

In *Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq*, Sheldon Rampton and James Stauber stated that these claims did not have to be accurate. All that mattered was that top ranking officials in the Bush administration persistently declared them to be true. Constant repetition through the media would ultimately persuade the public.

³³John Wilson, “Political Discourse.” *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, edited by Deborah Tannen, et al. (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018) 777-794.

A report issued by the Committee on Government Reform in March 2004, stated that President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice made 81 statements about Iraq's nuclear activities, 84 statements about chemical and biological weapons capabilities, 61 statements about Iraq's relationship with al-Qaeda and 11 statements about the urgency of Iraq's threat in over 125 separate appearances between March 2002 and January 2004. The American public gradually believed that Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda had joined their forces against the United States; a conviction which was bolstered by presidential speeches. For instance, on October 2002, President Bush declared that Saddam Hussein was 'a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al Qaeda as a forward army'. (Rampton and Stauber 95)

Meanwhile, counterclaims were denied by the White House and received little media coverage even though they were raised by senators and congressmen. Views voicing cautions, vigilance and the need for more inquiries by weapons inspectors were dismissed. The dominant official frame until 19 March 2003 was the inevitability of war and America's preparation for it. Within this frame, simple themes were repeated by military and political elites, especially the demonization of Saddam Hussein. Demonization was influential to transform negative feelings against the Iraqi nation. In *Metaphor and War, Again*, academic Georges Lakoff observed that "a nation as a person" metaphor is a key device in positioning other nations against the United States. Every time, the nation of Iraq is conceptualized in terms of a single person, Saddam Hussein. Such claims were central components of the Bush administration's communication strategy.

The American mass media also supported their administration perspective. For instance, CNN presented war as the simplest and most preferred result of the crisis. When the Secretary of State, Colin Powell delivered his speech at the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003, in which he presented his pieces of evidence trying to justify the intervention in Iraq for the reluctant UN important members, CNN reporters seemed to regard the political discussions and diplomatic negotiations taking place in the United Nations as preparations for war. Two months before the conflict, CNN introduced its Iraq coverage with the words "Showdown: Iraq" (similarly Fox used "Target Iraq: Disarming Saddam"; MSNBC used "Showdown with Saddam", and NBC nightly news used "Countdown: Iraq" and "Target: Iraq").³⁴ Jack Lule noticed that the use of the phrase "Showdown: Iraq" frames the situation

³⁴ Jack Lule, *Globalization and Media: Global Village of Babel* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012) 105.

as a dramatic confrontation, a reckoning between Iraq and the United States. The “Showdown” metaphoric framing suggested that the situation in Iraq was eventually headed toward a war. Additionally, the slogan “Target: Iraq”, like other metaphoric framings, implies taking up war with Iraq. The word “target” is aggressive and anticipates the war to be coming. As for the term “countdown”, denotes a backward counting, a structural metaphor suggesting that the upcoming event is scheduled and imminent. By using “Countdown: Iraq”, the NBC nightly news indicated the inevitability of the confrontation with Iraq. (105-106)

On 15 February 2003, a coordinated day of protests started across the world called “The World Says No to War.” This involved millions of people in almost 800 around the globe. In the United States, according to CBS News, protests were held across 150 U.S cities (Chan). In New York, demonstrations drew between 300000 people and one million (Hauben). Police prevented protesters from joining the officially-approved rally on First Avenue. Such events were mostly underestimated by American mainstream media. Meanwhile, media analysts and Pentagon officials were talking publicly about their coming “Shock and Awe” plan. This battle plan is developed at the National Defense University and focused upon the psychological destruction of the enemy’s will to fight (rather than the physical destruction of their military forces). “We want them to quit. We want them not to fight”, said Harlan Ullman, principal architect of this military strategy.³⁵ The “shock and awe” rhetoric came openly into the public realm two months before the war when *CBS Evening News* interviewed Harlan Ullman, who introduced this war strategy in an attempt to calm down the American populace and gain more support for the war efforts.

3.2. Decapitation Strikes

As soon as the CIA provided intelligence on the location of five key Iraqi leaders, including Saddam Hussein, President Bush authorized strikes against these targets, and declared war on Iraq soon afterward. So the U.S led invasion of Iraq, designated Operation Iraqi Freedom, started on 20 March 2003 at 02:34 GMT. The war in general went through three phases, all of which clearly embodied the mode of integrated joint warfare. With an early morning air strike intended to kill Iraqi leaders started the first phase of the war which refers to the so-called “Decapitation Strike”.

It was President George Bush who set the tone for the “Decapitation Strike” for American television audiences during a four minute nationwide address delivered on 20

³⁵ Charles Simic, *Memory Piano* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2006) 96.

March 2003 at 03:15 GMT. He announced that the coalition forces had been authorized to strike “selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage war”(“Decapitation strike”). These strikes were described as the opening salvo in an operation to disarm Iraq and to free its people.

The first move in this operation was to use all forms of reconnaissance, including human and hi-tech resources to track the potential hiding places and locations of Iraqi influential leaders in real time. When the information was collected, the “decapitation strike” was carried out by more than forty cruise missiles and stealth fighters in the first round of strike alone against the suspected locations (“Decapitation strike”). A second wave of air strikes was then launched against Baghdad, and ground forces crossed into southern Iraq from Kuwait. Despite the inability of the “decapitation operation” to accomplish its aims, it was featured by the use of information technology which has increased the offensive capability to attack precisely.

3.3 The Shock and Awe Operation

Beginning from March 22, the long expected “Shock and Awe” bombing campaign was unleashed. The war had entered the second phase “shock and awe” with heavy aerial attacks on key Iraqi targets. The U.S troops used more precision-guided munitions against their targets. Warplanes flew at least 1000 or so sorties every day, sometimes even more 2000 sorties, carrying out extremely intense air raid. Meanwhile, large armed vehicles were quickly pressing in from numerous directions. Backed up by space and electromagnetism forces, the integrated sea-and-air attack and the integrated air-and-ground attack, plus various forms of psychological and intelligence warfare were all carried out in a coordinated way. Operation “Shock and Awe” was by no way smooth because of certain unorthodox counter-attack tactics embraced by the Iraqi forces. But this situation rapidly changed; shortly after some re-adjustment, the U.S powers restored the strength of offensive.

The defining event of the entire war was undoubtedly the “Shock and Awe”. It authorized the U.S military to show its peak power and the new equipment. The massive conflagrations triggered by the bombing were essentially the grand opening to the war story, since they were intended to display “shock and awe” spectacle among the world audiences. American mass media outlets concentrated on the severity of the TV-revealed bombings, and ignored almost everything else, including the real impact of the blasts on civilians. The aim behind this coverage was to show the American military full might. The series of

bombardments as the opening scene may also be seen as a revenge to what the Americans had witnessed on 11 September 2001. “Shock and Awe” had a destructive effect on heavily populated sites, as did the 9/11 attacks.

As the war commenced, popular enthusiasm for “Shock and Awe” became strong. Nevertheless, the Iraqi government was not shocked and awed to surrender instantly. The war lasted for a second week then a third week. Contrary to what the public expected, Saddam Hussein’s regime did not fall overnight. Peter Arnett, a veteran war correspondent who was reporting for NBC News, evaluated the performance of American military during this war stage in an interview with an Iraqi TV in which he considered this war plan as a total failure due to the Iraqi resistance. Later on, he was fired because of his clear judgment in a time where the U.S military needed the media outlets’ support for its war efforts. On April 8, appeared Harlan Ullman, an architect of the “Shock and Awe” concept, who was interviewed by USA Today and gave some clarifications about this misunderstood war strategy. He stated that the real plan was based on nonstop attacks using all means of power to intimidate the enemy. Two major reasons, according to him, hindered the success of this war plan: the first one was the lack of readiness within American military ranks while the second was the undertaken decision to stop launching attacks in order to see if the Iraqi leaders were really shocked after the initial bombardment (Correll 53-55). Shock and Awe’s popularity faded fast. It turned out to be a common phrase in ads and war games, but the military maintained their distance and the analysis centred mostly on what went wrong.

Conclusion

In brief, Orientalism is a discourse that emerged in medieval ages. It began as religious rhetoric but then evolved to serve political ends and more precisely imperialist endeavours. Edward Said was a key contributor to this debate. Orientalists, according to him, constructed narratives and images that claimed Western superiority over the other, and generated a false representation of Arabs and Islamic culture. Gradually, Orientalism extended from Europe to the United States. American Orientalism established its own peculiar architecture of the Orient, starting from the conception of “American exceptionalism” as America is a nation founded under God to promote moral virtues and peace throughout the world. Islam was often constructed as an external threat to Western identity and interests. Many scholars took advantage of this idea to develop their counter-terrorist rhetoric especially after 9/11 attacks. This event enabled the Orientalist discourse and counter-terrorist discourse to reach a state of fusion. Both Orientalist and counter-terrorist discourses generated power relations vis-à-vis the external ‘other’ (Muslim community) and the internal ‘other’ (Muslim minorities within the U.S).

The rise of neo-conservatives consolidated those American Orientalist principles of spreading democracy and morality all over the world. Their hidden objective, however, was to promote American global leadership. This was clearly stated in their PNAC document that envisioned America as a global hegemon. The issued document also called upon the United States to secure access to pivotal raw materials, mainly Persian Gulf oil. Thus, it was obvious that the neo-conservatives found the invasion of Iraq indispensable and unavoidable long before the official establishment of the PNAC in 1997. Additionally, conducting such pre-emptive wars would ensure the U.S to be the 21st century sole superpower and preclude the rise of future rivals. Under George W. Bush, official attitudes to Iraq reflected the PNAC ideology. 9/11 attacks brought maximum impetus to PNAC projects as linking Iraq to 11 September attacks was the purpose of the U.S administration. Thus, the claims that there have been secret ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda network were continuously repeated to justify the invasion of Iraq. Accusations of possessing weapons of mass destruction and threatening peace in the world were all pointed out against Iraq. Such accusations helped the U.S administration to win the public approval for launching war against Iraq. U.S media outlets helped to frame the war in favour of the Bush administration by persuading the American populace of the inevitability of the war. In an attempt to win the public support, TV channels like CBS started advertising for war plans as the “shock and awe” strategy that would force

the enemy to surrender as soon as the war drums were beaten. However, as the war began, all these plans were just higher expectations for rapid dominance over Iraq. Operation “Shock and Awe” was faced by counter-attack tactics embraced by the Iraqi forces and this war phase lasted for more than one month contrary to what it was supposed to be. When the war ended, the Bush claim of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda was weakened as no clear evidence that Iraq was to be behind the 9/11 attacks was found. The Bush administration turned humiliated due to the higher expectations for the success of its war strategies as well as the absence of any WMDs conclusive development in Iraq.

Chapter III:

A Critical Discourse Analysis of the US Media Coverage in the Lead-up to the Iraq War

Introduction

The mass media inform the public about the rationale for war, the war's progress, the necessity for continuing the war, and the conclusion of war. Moreover, the media are influential in the construction of social reality or realities through discourse. On a micro-scale, this construction includes language signs and symbols; on a macro-level scale, it involves narratives, theories and ideological frameworks. Combined, these aspects of discourse generate social knowledge_ that is; knowledge intended to help readers make sense of the world and events that take place therein.

Critical discourse analysis is an approach that has been extensively employed in the analysis of texts, in many instances for examining the contemplation of political discourse between the state and media institutions. It is an approach that aims to bring hidden agendas to the surface and to question established and accepted frames of discourse; it seeks to highlight how ideology functions in discourse, and how this ideology inhibits an event from being objectively examined. Through paying close attention to the text's linguistic details and other discursive structures (such as narratives and themes), it can be deduced that discourse is the primary 'object' of study in understanding how the U.S news media constructed the social reality of the Iraq War, and which CDA is well suited to investigate through its focus on the role of language.

Thus, this chapter examines the prominent discourse of the most widely circulated newspapers in the United States, namely The New York times and the Washington Post as well as the transcripts of the CNN coverage during the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War. CNN TV channel was chosen because it is one of the most important sources of news information for many Americans, and it offers a leading indicator to demonstrate how these events were covered, digested, and packaged for mass consumption. The chapter starts by looking at the theoretical foundations of CDA that sought to bring a linguistic emphasis to the study of society and discourse, since language plays a central role in the legitimization and delegitimization of power relations. It is therefore necessary to touch upon the core of CDA as a mode of a linguistic study as well as its main principles. In doing so, it should be mentioned that CDA stems from a tri-dimensional framework; the three dimensions are significant in maintaining a vigorous assessment of the language as a social practice. In this vein, a convergence between media discourse, ideology and representation should be highlighted as these are the main components in the process of news building. As it is mentioned earlier, critical discourse analysis is used to examine the

role of the media in manipulating opinions and people's perceptions of certain events. Thus, the second part of this chapter examines the content of 30 reports that make-up the case for war in Iraq. It aims to determine the key themes recurring in these reports, the ideologies underlying those themes and how they are legitimized, and finally the ways through which these reports characterize the war actors and their actions. The approach adopted in this analysis is similar to that of Wenden in the study of *'The Politics of Representation: A Critical Discourse Analysis of an Aljazeera Special Report'* of the Palestinian and Israeli crisis.

1. Theoretical Foundations

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) offers rich theoretical foundations as well as a variety of methodological approaches to analyze communication. It also provides the conceptual and methodological footing for researchers of social practice and justice to examine the way social and cultural relations of discourse and power are constituted and resisted through written and spoken texts, as to reveal social inequalities that oppress human capabilities.

1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis: Conception and Principles

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an influential theory and method in examining media discourse practices. It is a form of discourse analysis that is a broad and complex interdisciplinary field (Wodak and Meyer 2). It is "a perspective on critical scholarship; a theory and a method of analyzing the way that individuals and institutions use language."³⁶ Richardson discusses the importance of CDA as a theory or method for uncovering the hidden ideological agendas of newspaper discourse. In his particular application of this approach to journalism, Richardson writes that:

Critical Discourse Analysts offer interpretations of the meanings of texts rather than just quantifying textual features and deriving meaning from this; situate what it is written or said in the context in which it occurs, rather just summarizing patterns or regularities in texts; and argue that textual meaning is constructed through an interaction between producer, text and consumer rather

³⁶John E. Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach From Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Red Globe Press, 2007) 1.

than simply being ‘read off’ the page by all readers in exactly the same way.
(15)

This constructivist approach of CDA asserts that meaning in discourse hides or lies behind the words (language). Richardson’s view shows that language is constructive, and thus discourse shapes images and representation of social actors. In this regard, in order to extract the real meaning, we should be critical in our examination of the text, discursive practices represented in the process of news production and the wider context of discourse. Being critical, according to Fairclough, means that we should further ask why is the discourse constructed or the representation of social actors like this (“ What is CDA?”,2014).

CDA basically stems from the premise that language is a social and practical construct which is characterized by a symbiotic relationship with society. In this context, Fairclough and Wodak (1997) suggested principles for CDA summarized briefly in eight points:

1. CDA addresses social problems.
2. Power relations are discursive.
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture.
4. Discourse does ideological work.
5. Discourse is historical.
6. The link between text and society is mediated.
7. Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory.
8. Discourse is a form of social action.³⁷

Within these principles and aims, CDA is used to examine the representation of social actors (American and Iraqi) in the discourse of three influential American mass media outlets in the coverage of the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war. It highlights the linguistic features and discourse practices motivated by media producers in their representation of the social actors. Namely, how these manipulate the cognition and knowledge of the target audiences when reporting war events. CDA then examines ideological stances or implications in the media discourses on the Iraq war of 2003.

³⁷ Deborah Tannen et al., *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018) 467.

1.2. Three Dimensional Framework of CDA: *Critical – Discourse – Analysis*

1.2.1 *Critical*

The usage of the term *critical* in CDA operates in a parallel manner to its usage in ‘critical theory’ or ‘critical studies’ in a way that it suggests a tendency to challenge and assumptions about society, instead of the traditional social scientific approach, which mostly attempts to clarify and interpret phenomena often without calling into question those institutions and frameworks from which such social systems originate. Ultimately, it is concerned with individual emancipation, refusing “to identify freedom with any institutional arrangement or fixed system of thought” through skepticism toward existing forms of practice and the purposes behind this (Bronner 1). There are other traditional methods that commit neutrality towards social problems, such approaches do not seek in fact to find solutions to these problems; worse than this, they may contribute to solidifying those problems as they become part of the prevailing paradigm of a discipline. For instance, Van Dijk provided an example on migration issues and how elite discourses (those dominated by politicians and journalists and other experts) presented in media concerning those issues would reinforce racial attitudes via the use of language and represent migrants as problems and threats. In the absence of the critical side of those traditional methods that would question the prevalent assumptions, they may be somehow responsible for spreading social injustices.

The realm of critical linguistics underlines that a great deal of social meaning is implicit and not necessarily found in the language of texts or statements. The critical linguistics movement is concerned with unveiling of how language can conceal or distort, often without awareness of the speaker. This *critical* aspect is made evident in CDA with the analysts’ personality, as well as through the straightforward aims of CDA, which for instance are to demystify discourses by unearthing ideologies; to bring to light structures, strategies and other properties of text that play a role in the reproduction of dominance (Dijk, “Principles of CDA” 250); to question and criticize discourses and thereby exposing inconsistencies between and within discourses; and to contribute to solving societal issues, particularly those where there are victims of unjust domination and illegitimate power relations (Dijk, “Discourse” 22). Given the variety of aims and approaches in CDA, the inclusion of this critical dimension is important for a study to be regarded as a CDA study.

1.2.2 *Discourse*

The concept of discourse has been identified in a variety of ways across a broad spectrum of disciplines. In linguistics, it is common for ‘discourse’ to refer to extended pieces

of either spoken or written language, but it may also apply to the various forms of language used in social institutions, such as newspaper discourse, advertising discourse, or classroom discourse (Fairclough, "Discourse" 3). The CDA concept of 'discourse' encompasses a bi-directional influence between society and language, with each constituting the other. In other words, discourses are socially constructed representations of the world as it is perceived or as it could be imagined (Fairclough, "Analysing Discourse" 124).

In social theory, understanding 'discourse' was primarily shaped by the work of Michel Foucault and the term generally refers to the ways in which areas of knowledge are structured through social practices. The Foucauldian conceptualization of 'discourse' examines the relationship between knowledge and power. What is constant though is that discourse is that discourses are viewed to "exercise power in a society because they institutionalize and regulate ways of talking, thinking and acting" (Jäger and Maier 35). It is this perspective that makes Foucault central to CDA and the reason critical scholars are interested in analyzing the power of discourses in shaping material realities. There are of course various approaches within CDA to unearth this larger body of discourse, but all acknowledge Foucault's influence when it comes to examining the epistemological evolution of discourse beyond the linguistic features of texts, by including an analysis of the socio-cultural and socio-political contexts within which these discourses operate.

As mentioned above concerning the conceptualization of discourse as a body of socially constructed knowledge, here comes the significance of truth and reality as socially constructed entities too. This is clearly elucidated in the works of Baudrillard, which give rise to the idea that signs and images are now substituted for reality itself in a universe of simulacra, a hyperreality that privileges simulation over the real. In other words, it is through language and the ensuing discourse that the real is overshadowed, indeed replaced by a constructed reality of signs and symbols. In the case of the first Gulf War (1990-91), Baudrillard is challenging the truth of the conflict; a battle where there is no engagement with the Iraqi air force, no large numbers of dead coalition soldiers, any decisive fights or triumph parades; rather we are simply spectators, witnessing carefully selected images of 'war'. Baudrillard brands such discourse "a masquerade of information."³⁸, that presents a sanitized informational version of war without revealing the actual realities of warfare or its casualties. CDA aims to shed light on these kinds of social constructions of reality and more precisely, analyze the role of the social, political and ideological dimensions within discourses to help

³⁸ Jean Baudrillard, *The Gulf War did not Take Place* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995) 40.

create hegemonic discourses that give meaning to events and appear truthful, rational and natural.

1.2.3 Analysis

There are various applied and applicable topics and social domains of analysis that CDA practitioners tend to work on such as media language, political discourse, economics, advertising, gender, institutional or workplace discourse, and education discourse. Within each domain, practitioners developed analytical techniques that are optimal for achieving the overall CDA aims of unearthing ideology and power at work while at the same time quite eclectic and dissimilar. One noticeable difference is in the micro and macro levels of analysis_ where the former puts more focus on the linguistic details of the discourse (such as vocabulary, syntactical structures, metaphors, etc.), while the latter attempts to analyze broader socio-political contexts (like the grand narratives, thematic structures, intertextuality, etc.). The macro-level of analysis is mostly Foucauldian in nature with emphasis on historical contexts and processes, having a greater social theory emphasis and with limited attention to linguistics. Another contributor to the macro-level analysis is Edward Said with his study of the concept of Orientalism. Through a critical analysis of Western literary cultural products over time, he demonstrated that the macro-level discourse of Orientalism permeated and resulted in negative cultural representations of non-Western peoples and places and was profoundly colonial in ideological outlook. Within CDA, macro-level approaches can include analysis of semantic macrostructures, thematic analysis, or what van Dijk calls schemata, these are the overall forms of a discourse, its superstructure.³⁹

With respect to the micro-level discourse analysis, there are varying degrees of emphasis on linguistic features and numerous methods for the analysis of linguistic structures and characteristics upon which the analyst can choose to focus. For instance, in political discourse, breaking down the rhetorical appeals and the strategies of argumentation used in the text in terms of logos (appeal to reason), pathos (appeal to emotions), ethos (appeal to morality) is concerned with local meaning. The analyst then delves deeper into the semantic and syntactic structures of the text to shed light on the nature of the discourse. Since CDA is largely descriptive and interpretive in methodological approach, it is essential for the analyst to situate the micro-level (local) meaning or meanings contained within a text in the macro-level (global) structure within which the text is contextualized. According to Chouliaraki, the

³⁹Teun A. van Dijk, *Discourse and Communication: New Approaches to the Analysis of Mass Media Discourse and Communication* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985) 69.

ability to bring together “the discursive with the textual, through a conjunction of analysis of both text and its intertextual context” is one of the methodological strengths of CDA (297).

1.3. Interplay of Discourse, Media, Representation and Ideology

Media Discourse comprises of both texts (news stories relatively), and the processes for building and producing the texts. Discourse in media evidently represents ideological aspirations and attitudes of those in positions of influence, i.e. the elites, politicians, journalists, etc (Richardson 34). In this context, Fairclough views that media discourse has certain special properties in that it can be considered as an event of “one-sidedness” in which a sharp division between producers and interpreters can be discerned.⁴⁰In other terms, one of the key functions of media discourse is to communicate between two domains: the public and the private regarding the temporal context of media properties. Media deliver news to public through TVs, radios, newspapers and most recently via social media platforms as facebook and twitter on different issues, e.g., political, war, criminal, economic or social. In this chapter, I concentrate on how the selected media outlets cover the period preceding the 2003 Iraq war and the initial period of the war and how they bring news to their audiences. In such transcripts, discourse is linked with and provides a representation of social actors.

Representation relies on particular perspectives upon which social actors are constructed. Representation in discourse analysis refers to the language used in a text or talk to assign meanings to groups and their social practices, to events, and to social and ecological conditions and objects (Wenden 90). Representation, in this dissertation pertains to the process of meaning construction by means of texts combination. Hence, via linguistic representation in news media, meaning is produced. Representation of social actors relates them to specific behaviours and attitudes such as violence making, efforts to bring about a ceasefire, missiles fire, etc. These particular media representations of individuals or groups are bound up with certain ideologies.⁴¹

It can be argued that ideology underscores any form of the linguistic expression in a text, sentence or paragraph. The assumption that mainstream media are key arenas for the production of language ideology was a shared point by researchers from sociolinguistics, language ideology and media discourse as they all “agree on the potential of discourse in mainstream media to shape the language ideologies of their audience, that is, their belief, or feelings about language as used in their social world” (Androutsopoulos 182). He further

⁴⁰ Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (New York: Routledge, 2001) 41.

⁴¹Innocent Chiluwa, "Media Representation of Nigeria's Joint Military Task Force in the Niger Delta Crisis." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, vol. 1, no. 9, July 2011, pp. 197-208.

points out the absence of neutrality and objectivity within language ideologies as they serve the interests of certain individuals or groups. Androutsopoulos clarifies that those language ideologies “are always formulated from a particular social perspective and have particular referents and targets” (183). In this vein, the linguistic choices found in media texts are deliberately done to carry ideological meaning. Thus, when covering events, we may anticipate reporters/ journalists to frame, legitimize, or endorse actions and opinions to promote certain ideologies.

The interplay among discourse, media, representation and ideology in war coverage makes them components in the process of building news especially when war is considered as an international crisis and is changed from inter-state to intra-state or vice versa (Connelly and Welch 15).

2. Media representation of the Iraq war:

Wenden explains that representation refers to the language used in a text or talk to assign meaning to groups and their social practices, to events, and to social and ecological conditions and object (90). Representation in the media implies that media texts are merely a container of opinions and judgments of interests about current social events, circumstances and relationships. In this perception, the expected role of language in social life is absolutely absent in a way that meaning does not reflect the perceived reality but instead it is constructed by linguistic representation. Representation, therefore, consists of versions of social reality that embody the status and interests of the individuals that produce them; this is typically reflected in the choices that are made in terms of what they include and what they exclude, what they foreground and what they background, what they make explicit or implicit in the text (Fairclough 47). Modes of representation can vary depending on the perspective from which they are constructed, whether biographical, historical, or socio-cultural.⁴² Additionally, particular representations of individuals or groups in the media are based on underlying ideological perceptions. In this context, Wenden notes that “ideology will also influence the manner in which groups represent matters of import and relevance to the body politic” (90).

Thus, it is necessary to examine the recurrent themes in the reports about the circumstances leading up to a preemptive war against Iraq in the representation of the legitimacy of the war, to examine the ideologies underlying these themes and how they are legitimized and finally how these reports characterized actors, their actions and the events that make up the conflict. The approach adopted is similar to that of Wenden in the study of ‘*the*

⁴²Margaret Wetherell, et al., *Discourse Theory and Practice* (London: Sage Publications, 2001) 361.

politics of representation; a critical discourse analysis of an Aljazeera special report of the Palestinian and Israeli crisis.

2.1. Thematic Representation of the Iraq War

According to Wenden, “themes communicate a writer’s representations of the conditions, events, practices, individuals, and groups that are the focus of a text or a talk. They are based on information *selected* from a wide range of rhetorical options, e.g. causes/consequences, problem/solutions, compare/contrast, argumentation or description or a combination of several” (92). Eventually, choices made by authors demonstrate what they deem important to the topic comprehension. They are, therefore, a cornerstone to their ideological prejudices. Four themes were found to be recurrent in the selected newspapers and TV channels. They are (I) the threat of weapons of mass destruction, (II) the possible links between Iraq and the terrorist group al-Qaeda, (III) liberating Iraqi people and building up a new regime and (IV) the patriotic duty of American to support their troops.

2.1.1 The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction

On September 12, 2002, President Bush formally announced to the international community that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and had to be disarmed. The assertion of Iraq acquisition of WMD which could be an eminent threat to the United States and its allies was a noticeable theme in major US mass media. By way of addition, when used in accordance with the allegation that Iraq presents an imminent threat to the United States, WMD intensify the American’s still present worries and concerns since September 11. Moreover, the assertion of the WMD and the Iraqi threat implies a sense of emergency to wage a war on Iraq. A preemptive attack to depose Saddam and disarm Iraq’s WMD is then presented by the US mass media as a matter of necessity. In the texts below, the argument that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and is willing to use them against the US is clearly promoted:

Text 1: The UN inspectors began their investigation of various Iraqi factories and military sites. They will find nothing . . . they knew that Saddam Hussein was an expert at hiding his war toys, having had four years without inspections, had probably buried under mosques or cemeteries. That means the only way we can possibly uncover anything important in Iraq is if an Iraqi official or scientist -a Saddam insider- tells the UN where it’s hidden.⁴³

⁴³ Thomas L. Friedman, “‘Sodom’ Hussein’s Iraq,” *New York Times* 1 Dec. 2002: Section4, P9.

Text 2: Former Iraqi scientists, military officers and contractors have provided American intelligence agencies with a portrait of Saddam Hussein's secret programs develop and conceal chemical, biological and nuclear weapons that is starkly at odds with the findings so far of the United Nations weapons inspectors . . . One contractor later told America officials that chemical and biological weapons were hidden beneath hospitals and inside presidential palaces.⁴⁴

Text 3: without a smoking gun to demonstrate that Iraq is developing weapons of mass destruction, Mr. Powell strategy was to make as comprehensive and detailed case as he could to demonstrate a pattern of Iraqi deceit. He provided new details about Iraq's effort to develop mobile laboratories to make germ weapons. He asserted that Iraq has sought to hide missiles in its western desert. Significantly, he cited intelligence reports that Saddam Hussein has authorized his military to use poison gas if the United States invades.⁴⁵

Text 4: Today Bush is leading the country toward confrontation with Hussein to eliminate his stockpile of dangerous weapons, trying to protect the country from a terrorist attack with potentially deadlier consequences than Sept. 11, 2001.⁴⁶

Text 5: The president's audience is no longer the American public, or even our allies. It is Hussein. Deceiving him as to the timing of the war and the manner of attack is crucial to success . . . But tactical surprise remains possible and, especially given Hussein's arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, very much desirable, if we are to minimize casualties and risks.⁴⁷

Text 6: I don't know how the United Nations felt about Colin Powell's "J'accuse" speech against Saddam Hussein. I can only say that he persuaded me. . . He talked of the mobile factories concealed in trains and trucks that move along roads and rails while manufacturing biological agents. I was struck by their ingenuity and the insistence on manufacturing agents that cause diseases. Would Saddam Hussein use them? He already has, against his own people and Iranians.⁴⁸

Text 7: Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological weapons. And of course, the President agrees with what Colin Powell has

⁴⁴Judith Miller, "Threats and Responses: Intelligence; Defectors Bolster U.S. Case against Iraq, Officials Say," *New York Times* 24 Jan. 2003.

⁴⁵Michael R. Gordon, "Threats and Responses: News Analysis; Powell's Trademark: Overwhelm them," *New York Times* 6 Feb. 2003.

⁴⁶Juliet Eilperin, "9/11 Changed Equation for Democrats," *The Washington Post* 6 Oct. 2002.

⁴⁷William Kristol, "From Truth to Deception," *The Washington Post* 12 Oct. 2002.

⁴⁸Mary McGrory, "I'm Persuaded," *The Washington Post* 6 Feb. 2003.

written . . . I think the reason that we know that Saddam Hussein possesses chemical and biological weapons is from a wide variety of means. That's how we know (Harris "Colin Powell speaks at State Department").

Text 8: In a high-tech multimedia presentation Powell presented newly declassified intelligence, which the U.S. claims proves Iraq has an active program to develop weapons of mass destruction . . . Using charts and graphics, Powell said the [United States] believes Iraq has at least seven mobile biological agent factories mounted on at least eighteen trucks (Koppel "Secretary of State").

Text 9: Well, I think what it means is it's putting pressure on the Iraqi regime to deliver up. I think it is going to be crystal clear the Iraqis have failed to deliver. It's going to be clear that the Iraqis have tried to frustrate the work of the inspectors by hiding things, by moving in advance, and, of course, by briefing people prior to inspections and so on . . . So the pressure has to be exerted, that this pressure will force the Iraqis to deliver up something. Otherwise, the only alternative is military action (Taylor "Interview with Former Officials").

In **text 1**, the article's writer provides evidence that this undeclared weaponry had ever existed before and that Saddam Hussein would not cooperate fully with the inspection process and would continue to breach the U.N disarmament resolutions dating back to 1991. The journalist further locates the storage sites of those weapons in an attempt to convince the general public of the U.S administration's right accusations. Miller's onslaught on the U.N inspectors is clearly shown in **text 2**, whom she described as being unable to find tangible and irrefutable evidence that Iraq was concealing weapons of mass destruction. She repeatedly cited the Bush administration sources that would rely heavily on evidence from Iraqi defectors. Miller was an experienced Times veteran who succeeded in bringing into an impressive journalistic niche what was described as obsession with chemical, biological and nuclear weaponry via a majority of her stories on Iraqi unconventional weapons and therefore being among the U.S journalists who were keenly focused on the Bush administration's quest for evidence of Saddam's prohibited weapons. In **text 3**, Michael Gordon consolidates pre-war judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction by supporting Mr. Powell's statements at the U.N council and who claimed that Iraq continued attempts to procure mobile biological weapons laboratories; a claim based on conclusive proof provided by intelligence reports and that Iraq would use those weapons to attack the U.S army in case of invasion. Again, reporters show a total reliance on the Bush administration claims concerning Iraq's WMD and avoided any form of critical comments on those claims. However, in **text 4**,

Eilperin of The Washington Post was following a new strategy as she was trying to gain the trust of the U.S citizenry by stating that Iraq was developing more lethal weapons of mass destruction that might be used to carry out the deadliest terrorist attack in U.S history. Reviving past memories of the terrible 9/11 attacks was a key strategy to gain a public support for the Bush administration's efforts to wage a pre-emptive war in a way that those WMD would constitute a danger of immediate attack against the United States. In **text5**, William Kristol spoke about the inevitability of the war against Iraq claiming that president Bush has already gain the support of his citizens and his allies the remaining task for him was to find ways to size Saddam's arsenal of chemical weapons and to prevent him from threatening the world's peace. **Text 6** introduces The Washington Post's Mary McGrory views who seemed so impressed by Collin's speech as she endorsed the veracity of his claims when he provided, as she described, an undeniable and irrefutable evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, and which would make the skeptics unable to argue that America's case against Iraq was based on mere suspicions. Journalists like McGrory made use of Collin's presentation to create a fitting atmosphere that consolidated Washington assessments of Iraq's purported mobile bioweapons programs. **Text 7** shows how Harris's guest discussed the issue of WMD even before Powell delivered his presentation making the case for war with Iraq at the UN Security Council. *CNN* tried, via its guest, to confirm Iraq's possession of biological weapons even without any kind of investigation about such claims and that the government's main goal was exclusively about disarming Iraq of its WMDs. In **text 8**, *CNN* State Department correspondent Andrea Koppel reported the US administration claims that Iraq had movable biological weapons and this time with intelligence combined with high-tech devices to indicate the development of such weapons and to give precise locations of the hiding places of such nerve agents and mobile biological weapons facilities. Regarding whether Iraq had really reconstituted a nuclear weapons program was never discussed. Again, journalists provided little, if any, reason to doubt the falsity of such assertions. In **text 9**, Live Event/ Special guest Terence Taylor, a former weapons inspector, presents an additional testimony to the one delivered by Colin Powell before the UN Council. Taylor had made clear that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam was witty enough to elude U.N inspections and hide his arsenal of nuclear weapons. He called for exerting much pressure on the Iraqi regime to deliver up its weapons, confirming the presence of those weapons. *CNN* sought to bring evidence from technical experts to give the accusations more credibility.

2.1.2 Close Links between Iraq and the Terrorist Group al-Qaeda

A second theme adopted to support the standpoint ‘we should go to war’ was alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush took the chance to announce that he obtained information from intelligence sources, secret communications and statements by people that reveal that Saddam Hussein is supporting and shielding terrorists including members of al-Qaeda. Yet, tying Iraq to 9/11 and to al-Qaeda proved to be a challenge. The Bush administration used a variety of strategies to reflect upon the misconceptions surrounding this issue. One pattern used to establish an Iraq- al-Qaeda link was through suggestion. This implies that when mentioning Iraq and al-Qaeda in the same breath, and by constantly repeating this connection, the link was established. Another strategy was based on speculation, which took the form of imaginary scenarios about what a potential coalition between Iraq and al-Qaeda might result in (Kumar 54). The US administration’s contention of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda was highly endorsed by the American media even with the lack of evidence that proved such claims. The following texts show how media were almost beholden to the U.S government sources when commenting upon the Iraqi links to al-Qaeda:

Text 10: President Bush asserted a link yesterday between Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and the al Qaeda terrorist network, saying he fears they will join forces and are already virtually indistinguishable. "The danger is, is that they work in concert," Bush said. "The danger is, is that al Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam's madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world."⁴⁹

Text 11: Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said today that American intelligence had “bulletproof” evidence of links between Al Qaeda and the government of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Mr. Rumsfeld said that recently declassified intelligence reports about suspected ties between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi government, including the presence of senior members of Al Qaeda in Baghdad in “recent periods”, were “factual” and “exactly accurate”.⁵⁰

Text 12: The Bush administration has received a credible report that Islamic extremists affiliated with al Qaeda took possession of a chemical weapon in Iraq . . . It also would be the most concrete evidence to support the charge, aired for months by

⁴⁹Mike Allen, "Bush Asserts That Al Qaeda Has Links to Iraq's Hussein," *The Washington Post* 26 Sep. 2002.

⁵⁰Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Says U.S. Has 'Bulletproof' Evidence of Iraq's Links to Al Qaeda," *New York Times* 28 Sep.2002: Section A, P9.

President Bush and his advisers, that al Qaeda terrorists receive material assistance in Iraq.⁵¹

Text 13: Powell also gave the most detailed explanation yet of possible links between Baghdad and al Qaeda. He said high-ranking Osama bin Laden lieutenant Abu Musab Zarqawi, who is an expert in chemical and biological weapons, led a terrorist network that had been operating freely in Iraq for more than eight months . . . "The potential marriage of weapons of mass destruction with terrorism is everyone's nightmare," said Rice. She suggested that the cost of not taking action against Iraq could be another September 11-type attack, but this time with weapons of mass destruction that could kill tens of thousands (King "Powell: Iraq hiding weapons").

Text 14: That caught the attention of the American people. And it says the al-Qaeda, who are in Iraq, have a cell in Baghdad and have basically a poison center and they are educating and training and are going to dispense those kinds of biological weaponry or say chemical weaponry and it can go to Europe, it can go to the United States. Finally the American people say, Hey, we've got a problem. We got to take care of this (Roberts "Was Colin Powell").

Mike Allen in **text 10** seems to be so convinced with the U.S administration's rationale for war concerning allegations of links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. He intentionally used the Bush words to confirm the conclusions made by the U.S administration and to make the general public trust what was delivered by the U.S government in order to gain a general consensus view about the Iraq and al-Qaeda existing relationship. Allen made use of the Bush striking words that could leave a strong impression among readers. An instance of that is the word 'danger' which was twice repeated followed by scary scenarios of what might happen if a collaboration between Iraq and al-Qaeda took place. Additionally, mentioning the September 11 attacks and al-Qaeda has always been hatefully circulating among the Americans especially when telling that Saddam's madness morphed into al-Qaeda, which constituted a source of fear that would lead Americans to support war efforts against Iraq. This was how journalists caught two birds with one stone, supporting the officials' claims while simultaneously managing public opinion in favor of the government decisions. The significant cooperation stated by the government officials between Hussein and al-Qaeda as mentioned in **text 11**, was always plausible by journalists without any kind of investigation

⁵¹Barton Gellman, "U.S. Suspects Al Qaeda Got Nerve Agent from Iraqis," *The Washington Post* 12 Dec. 2002.

about the validity of these sources. The task of persuading Americans that Hussein was cooperating with terrorists who were already attacking American civilians was performed by Eric Schmitt of the *New York Times*, who continued to repeat what the Defense of Secretary said about that collaboration despite the lack of concrete evidence. When adopting Rumsfeld claims, Schmitt wanted to assert that the ambiguity over Iraq ties to the terrorist group of al-Qaeda was vanished; therefore, Iraq was a menacing threat to the United States that must be addressed quickly. Journalists recognized very well that the U.S population had a pent-up anger and vengeful lust for aggression after the 9/11 attacks and the assertions about Iraq links to al-Qaeda was a convenient means to relieve that pressure. Again and again, journalists proved their total support to the U.S administration claims. The journalist in **text 12** adopts the U.S government allegations regarding Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda link even though there was scant credible evidence of such relationship at that time. The journalist here wanted to disseminate a kind of fear among the American public that there was a cooperative relationship between Iraq, which possessed WMDs and al-Qaeda, that was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Logically, the reader would think about the Iraqi government's complicity with al-Qaeda to accomplish those deadly attacks, and therefore leading to a general public acceptance of this war rationale for going to war against Iraq in fear of another aggressive act against the United States. What is noticeable here is the absence of question of whether Saddam Hussein had significant collaborative ties with al-Qaeda or any factual evidence that proved such a relationship; instead, the journalist endorsed the credence of the Bush administration claims as being an ultimate truth that could not be judged. **Text 13** shows how journalists largely believed Powell's contentions regarding al-Qaeda ties and operations in Iraq. Unfortunately, journalists never investigated Powell's use of the intelligence he has given to the U.N Security Council, but rather they treated Powell's claims as an established fact. For example, *CNN* White House correspondent John King repeated Collin's words about the proved relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda noting further that Iraq welcomed other terrorist cells to operate on its soil. Journalists like King used to associate Iraq acquired WMDs with the possible links between Iraq and al-Qaeda in order to raise fears among the American populace that a similar scenario of the 9/11 attacks would be repeated. In this case, king made use of Rice's warnings about the devastating effects that could have resulted if WMDs were used by terrorist groups. Thus, the remaining solution was to carry out a counter-attack against Iraq to prevent other deadly attacks. King, like many other journalists, uncritically supported the U.S government consistent contentions and warnings against further potential attacks that might result from collaboration between Iraq and al-Qaeda. In **text 14**,

Senator Robert Pat commented to *CNN* on Powell's speech and contributed to public misconceptions about Iraq's ties to al-Qaeda. He agreed upon the claims that Iraq was training and equipping al-Qaeda members who had already terrorist camps in Iraq. The worst part of this story, according to *CNN*'s guest, was that those terrorist groups would have an operational control over Iraq's nuclear weapons and the tragic consequences that might occur if they used them against America. This report has explicitly examined al-Qaeda's ability and desire to target chemical and nuclear facilities within the United States and thus a real threat to the U.S national security. The prospect of terrorists' willingness to acquire and deploy WMD capabilities expressed in this report would be helpful to undertake a scare campaign that particularly targeted American citizens about a potential mass destruction that would be equal or greater than the horrific human and capital loss of 9/11. In this way, collective fear, as Bertrand Russell said, stimulates herd instinct, and tends to produce ferocity toward those who are not regarded as members of the herd; thus, the fear factor would lead American people to praise the undertaken efforts to stop Iraq and al-Qaeda further attempts to manufacture and obtain WMDs. Here is another instance of how media outlets have supported the U.S government's allegations regarding Iraq's ties to al-Qaeda.

2.1.3 Liberating Iraqi People and Building up a New Regime

The U.S administration has stressed that regime change in Iraq through U.S.-led military intervention would yield benefits beyond disarmament, including liberation from an oppressive regime for the Iraqi people and enhancement of the prospects for peace and democracy throughout the Middle East. In the lead-up to the Iraq war, President George Bush advocated the promotion of virtues such as democracy, peace; justice and respect for human rights to such a degree that these principles, according to him, had to be installed even with aggression in countries like Iraq. This was intended to fulfil one of the US obligations as a superpower in that of being a pioneer in protecting liberty and democracy across the globe. Therefore, regime change was the rationale for war for Bush and his administration in order to dismantle Saddam's dictatorial regime and substitute it with a representative democratic party. The mass media has traditionally promoted an image of the US as committed in promoting democracy and liberty. The following texts well characterize media's pragmatic efforts to reinforce this war rationale and the noble mission of the US military in Iraq.

Text 15: Mr. Bush said, as he has often in recent times, that his argument is with Mr. Hussein and his supporters, but not with the Iraqi people. "America is a friend to the people of Iraq"; "our demands are directed only at the regime that enslaves them and threatens us." He drew a picture of a free Iraq, in which "the oppression of Kurds,

Assyrians, Turkomans, Shiites, Sunnis and others will be lifted” . . . But he spoke of maintaining a ‘unified Iraq’, and said “if military actions is necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy and create the institutions of liberty.”⁵²

Text 16: Supporters of an American and British strike might see in those and other hints some suggestions that ordinary Iraqis yearn to be freed, in the way that Afghans were liberated from the Taliban. But it has to be said, whole notebooks full of conversations with Iraqis, in the presence of minders, suggest just the opposite, at least on a literal reading of the words.⁵³

Text 17: With the administration’s blessing, a new group is forming to press the case in the United States for ejecting Hussein from power. Called the Committee for the liberation of Iraq . . . Committee chairman Bruce P. Jackson called the Iraqi government “a tyranny that needs to be changed” and said the group will be “useful for education, for talking to people about what’s at stake”. He said one purpose will be to lobby for resources to rebuild Iraq and restructure the country as a democracy, a white house ambition sure to take years, if it succeeds at all . . . its mission statement calls for the replacement of Hussein with “a democratic government that respects the rights of the Iraqi people and ceases to threaten the community of nations . . . A group of people who will talk to Americans about why the liberation of Iraq is something the United States ought to do.”⁵⁴

Text 18: The tyrant will soon be gone; the day of your liberation is near, Bush said in remarks intended to be translated for broadcast to Iraqis. Promising to rebuild an Iraq without oppression, he urged Iraqis to lay down their arms . . . In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms.⁵⁵

Text 19: Well, in 1991, when the war happened, we were afraid of the bombing, as any regular people who -- scared from bombs and war. But at the same time, we were

⁵²David E. Sanger, "Threats and Responses: the President’s Speech ; Bush Sees ‘Urgent Duty’ to Pre-empt Attack by Iraq," *New York Times* 8 Oct. 2002: Section A, P1.

⁵³John F. Burns, "Threats and Responses: Streets of Baghdad; Iraqis Cheer for Their President But Real Mood is Hard to Read," *New York Times* 15 Oct. 2002: Section A, P1.

⁵⁴Peter Slevin, "New Group Aims to Drum Up Backing for Ousting Hussein," *The Washington Post* 4 Nov. 2002.

⁵⁵ Dana Milbank and Mike Allen, "President Tells Hussein to Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours or Face Invasion," *The Washington Post* 18 Mar. 2003.

very excited because we thought this is going to be Saddam's end, and his regime. After that, we liberate Iraq and we have a free democratic government. Unfortunately, this did not happen, and we led an uprising. After the end of the war immediately, Iraqi people rose up against Saddam Hussein's regime and liberated out of the 15 out of the 18 provinces inside Iraq, but Saddam gathered his troops back and crushed us. So now the time is coming back again, and I think Iraqis are willing to rise up against Saddam Hussein's regime again, but this time they need to see the force on the land inside Iraq there to support them to help them so Saddam Hussein will not gather his army and kill the people inside Iraq (Al-Suwali "Interview with Zainab")

Text 20: Is there just one Iraqi scientist or official who wants to see the freedom of his country so badly that he is ready to co-operate with the UN by submitting to an interview and exposing the regime's hidden weapons? It takes just one person in Iraq who wants these inspections to be real, who wants Saddam to be exposed, and the whole house of cards comes down. If there is not one such person in Iraq, well, that tells us something about the Iraqi people's own quest for freedom and a different future.⁵⁶

In **text 15**, New York Times journalist David Sanger elaborates on Bush intents in Iraq stating that his administration sought only to stop the threat that arose directly from the Iraqi regime's own aggressive and terror practices against its own people. Bush further cited that due to the merciless nature of Saddam's regime, a large number of his people were humiliated and deprived from their simplest rights as citizens. Thus, the U.S intervention would be humanitarian in nature that aimed at bringing justice and freedom to the different oppressed sects in Iraq. Sanger adopted Bush's promises to rebuild a new Iraq in an attempt to portray him as a saviour who would lead a noble mission to promote democracy and the living conditions of the Iraqis stressing that this was the main aim in case of any military action against Iraq. Hence, removing such a ruthless and aggressive dictator would permit the Iraqis to enjoy the real sense of liberty and to restore their unity and their stolen rights. Picturing Bush as a sympathetic and benevolent person would encourage the Americans to gather around him and support his noble efforts to liberate the Iraqis from their cruel leader. However, in **text 16**, the article's writer tried to draw the readers' attention to the Bush administration's charitable deeds in Afghanistan where it contributed to stabilizing the country and helping the Afghan people to build a free society by attacking al-Qaeda terrorist

⁵⁶Ibid., 43.

group in that area and that the Bush administration soon had to deal with the same dilemma in Iraq and bear the responsibility of reconstructing a new Iraq where individual's liberty had to be protected. The writer attempted to depict Saddam's repressive regime and the Iraqi's desire for liberation and democracy via conducting an interview with Iraqi citizens who were unable to give voice to their opinions and ambitions in fear of being tortured by government officials who were all the time surrounding them to crush any dissident voices. The interviewer well depicted the Iraqi's instability and distress that, according to him, could be read from their eyes and thus it was the Americans burden to get rid of such an oppressive regime and provide help to its people in order to rebuild their country and realize the true sense of democracy. In **text 17**, the Washington Post reporter, Peter Slevin, clarifies how the process of reconstructing Iraq would be like. His efforts to boost support for war against Iraq were clear as he stressed that the main objective behind such an intervention was only to build and sustain a democratic and a well-governed Iraq that would meet the demands of their citizens. Slevin further reinforces the idea that the United States sought to spread virtues such as freedom, democracy and justice across the globe and to put an end to tyranny as part of the U.S policy. In the case of Iraq, the rebuilding plan consisted of enhancing the educational programs that would train the Iraqis to be active citizens to defend their rights and dignity; plus, maintaining democratic governance in Iraq as its objective revolved around the respect for human rights. The writer of this article has purposely shaped the image of the military intervention in Iraq as being humanitarian in nature which aimed at liberating the oppressed Iraqis. Such a portrayal would gain an American public consent for the U.S intervention in Iraq. **Text 18** writer has further promoted the secret behind the American behind the American presence in Iraq just two days before the invasion took place. He pretended that the Bush administration immediate goal was to remove the dictatorial regime and to help Iraqis build a new prosperous and free Iraq. He adopted Bush's words when addressing Iraqis promising them to have a different future. He approved the Bush claims regarding the nature of this military operation trying to convince the general public that the character of the war has really changed from combat operations to sustainable efforts to fight tyranny and to improve democracy and human rights. In this way, the journalist's promotion for the idea that the mission in Iraq was meant to help the Iraqis to establish new democratic governance and leadership, to improve security and to boost economic development in the country, seemed to be beneficial to help the U.S administration to gain more public support to engage in such an intervention. In **text 19**, *CNN*'s anchor, Leon Harris, hosted an Iraqi citizen in order to capture the voices and emotions of Iraqis as their country was under Saddam's brutal regime. Harris's

guest told her story since the first Gulf War when she and many of the Iraqis hoped that it was the end of Saddam. When portraying the Iraqis' happiness to be occupied by the United States, *CNN* attempted to paint vivid pictures of how life was tough for the Iraqi people under the regime of Saddam Hussein who has persecuted his people for decades and that the United States would bring relief and joy to the Iraqis who would live without fear of Saddam's brutality. Zaineb, Harris's guest described the Iraqis bitter experience when attempts to overthrow Saddam during the first Gulf War had failed; however, she asserted the Iraqis' readiness to cooperate with the U.S troops to put an end to Saddam as it was the sole opportunity for Iraqis to enjoy freedom and true democracy unknown for decades. In this way, *CNN* hosting of an Iraqi eyewitness of Saddam's tyrant rule would pave the way for a public approval that would enable the United States to smoothly intervene in Iraq. Another instance of supporting the war efforts can be viewed in **text 20** where the journalist is trying to convince the readers that the United States had no intentions of establishing its presence in the area, but rather adopting a humanitarian cause and bearing the responsibility of removing an oppressive regime and springing up democracy and freedom in Iraq. In this article, the writer misled the readers and drew their attention to the conception that the prime purpose of such an invasion was to bring democracy and liberation to oppressed Iraqis, neglecting the fact that democratization and liberation would not be realized by force. The text words hold a sense that the Iraqis were obliged to cooperate with the occupation authorities to realize the sentiment of freedom and democracy, which may seem contradictory in the sense that those virtues could not be imposed from the outside. Moreover, the journalist attempts to stimulate the Iraqis determination to participate in the operation of their liberation, claiming that those who would not engage in such an operation would not be considered as a true Iraqi citizen. This was a good strategy to leave a strong impression among the Iraqis and persuade them that having no contribution to the process of their liberation can be considered as a sort of betrayal to the principles of patriotism.

2.2. Ideologies

Ideologies are organized sets of fundamental and often normative ideas and attitudes about some aspect of social reality shared by members of a group, society or culture. They are used to frame, legitimate, or validate opinions and actions in the domain to which they are applicable. Thus, indirectly, they control how people plan and understand their social practices, including their use of language. Ideologies persist over time. They are unconscious and rarely questioned, and when they are, their common sense nature is offered as adequate explanation of their existence (Bloomart and Verschueren, 1998; Fairclough, 1989; Hodge

and Kress, 1993; Van Dijk, 1999, as cited in Wenden 93). Representing the enemy by drawing upon the existing ideologies and stereotypes to filter and shape how information is presented is a dynamic process that was legitimated by the American news media and adopted by the general public. In the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, the U.S mass media production and packaging of information was meant to solidify two main ideologies: Orientalist ideology and hegemony ideology.

2.2.1 Orientalist Ideology

Orientalist ideology had been used to exercise dominance over the orient. Thus, the U.S government utilized the Orientalist rhetoric to justify and legitimate its actions by rendering the target groups as undesirable and problematic. Orientalism in its core depicts Arabs and Muslims as violent, backward and untrustworthy. Such depictions of prevailing stereotypes about Arabs and Muslims were intensified after the 9/11 attacks. Those attacks reinforced the preexisting stereotypes of murderous and terrorist Muslims. Thus, the discourse that emerged following the attacks produces two different categories: the United States known as “us” versus the Arabs known as the “enemy” or “them”. In this context, Orientalist media practices can be clearly seen in the media portrayals of the terrorist attacks of the 9/11 September. The official news media had increasingly supported those depictions as they started to portray Islam to their readers as a menace that destroyed the Western way of life. Additionally, media outlets chief role evolved essentially around the construction of the United States as a benevolent, democratic and a peace-loving nation that was mercilessly attacked by insane evil terrorists who hated democracy and peace. This rhetoric has become the most dominant one that has often transgressed to major media outlets. Thus, the Orientalist rhetoric has essentially emerged to dehumanize and demonize the “Other” mainly the Arab Muslims. The following texts are example of the Orientalist project that swept the U.S news media:

Text 21: The religious dimension of this conflict is central to its meaning. The words of Osama bin Laden are saturated with religious argument and theological language. Whatever the Taliban regime is in Afghanistan, it is fanatically religious . . . Other Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere have not denounced these acts, have been conspicuously silent or have indeed celebrated them. The terrorists’ strain of Islam surely represents a part of Islam- a radical, fundamentalist part- that simply cannot be ignored or denied. In that sense, this surely is a religious war . . . We are fighting not

for our country as such or for our flag. We are fighting for the universal principles of our Constitution.⁵⁷

Text 22: This all about one evil dictator who possesses brutal weapons, with which he will threaten and hurt a lot of people, including a lot of Americans . . . What is the motivation for all those in the Iraqi military to continue to want to fight us? We are offering them a better way and a better life...we are standing together behind the American men and women in uniform . . . And it is a task we are taking on. It is a task of high justice and necessity and I'd say idealism in the best tradition of American principles (Lieberman "Strike on Iraq").

The changes in the image of the 'Muslim' Orient as uncivilized and backward, as a product of Orientalism, to contemporary images as a 'threatening Other' generated after 9/11, can be clearly noticed in **text 21**. Andrew Sullivan, the text writer portrayed Muslims in terms of global terrorism and fundamentalism. Such portrayal has generated what is known as Islamophobia or irrational fear of Muslims. For that reason, he described the war against those terrorists as merely religious as he viewed Islam in terms of anti-modernity, anti-peace and anti-democracy. The new Orientalist paradigm stressed in the text revolved around the conception that Muslims constituted an internal threat to the Americans resulting in anti-Arab and anti-Muslim attitudes. Sullivan tried to persuade the reader about the gruesome nature of the Islamic world as they showed no sympathy towards the tragic 9/11 attacks, and to promote the idea that this was in fact a fight of all who believe in peace, pluralism, tolerance and freedom. Moreover, one may note the religious undertone that pervaded the text, portraying the age-old dichotomy of good vs. evil, and righteous vs. sinful; as well as the representation of Muslims as opposing the fundamental and traditional American way of life. Through such depiction, Islam has increasingly been the subject of prejudice and unfair judgments. All what was important for American news media was to make the masses held such negative views about the Arab Muslims in order to support future actions to stand against that threat. **Text 22** disseminates another example of Orientalist media practice where the rhetoric drifts into an argument of good vs. evil. *CNN's* guest, Senator Joseph Lieberman tried to demonize the Muslim 'enemy' describing him as evil, treacherous and mad who was in possession of lethal weapons that might be used to target a peace loving nation like the United States. Thus, justifying such an intervention as a war of 'good' against 'evil' was his main purpose. He also believed in the divine mission of the Westerns to rescue and educate the Orient; that's why he

⁵⁷Andrew Sullivan, "This Is a Religious War," *New York Times* 7 Oct. 2001.

portrayed the American man as a savior who came all along from abroad to fight the tyrannical evil and to spread the lost values in the Orient world. He further promised to provide a better future for the Iraqis and called them to uphold the U.S efforts to protect them and the world as a whole from the devastating threats caused by an unjust and ruthless leader. Hence, his chief message was to stress the noble mission of the American troops to bring back peace and justice to the oppressed Iraqis noting that this was originally the American burden to spread progress, tolerance and freedom all over the world.

2.2.2 Hegemony Ideology

The US's global leadership, following the fall of USSR, stems from the conviction that Americans have a duty to transform the world by making it more compatible with their ideals. The promotion of American global leadership, however, can only be realized with strength and military forces to ensure that no other nation can threaten the United States and its interests. Project for New American Century (PNAC) plan consolidates the US's global leadership influence with heavy military intervention. PNAC was a think-tank promoted by a group of Neoconservatives, many of whose were high-ranking members of the Bush administration, whose stated goal was to 'to promote the U.S hegemony' achieved through 'military strength and moral values'. The PNAC plan envisioned a long-term strategy that encouraged the United States to occupy areas of geographical importance such as the Gulf region. Thus, PNAC members considered the invasion of Iraq necessary and inevitable in order to project the U.S as a global power. As usually, the American news media helped bolstering the U.S position as a hegemonic power and promoting its foreign policy goals.

Text 23: The speech was the broadest definition to date of the way Bush sees America's new role in the world after the September 11 attacks. He said that not only will the United States impose pre-emptive unilateral military force when and where it chooses, but the nation will also punish those who engage in terror and aggression and will work to impose a universal moral clarity between good and evil.⁵⁸

Text 24: It is the only nation that polices the world through five global military commands; maintains more than a million men and women at arms on four continents; deploys carrier battle groups on watch in every ocean; guarantees the survival of countries from Israel to South Korea; drives the wheels of global trade and commerce; and fills the hearts and minds of an entire planet with its dreams and desires. . . Iraq

⁵⁸"This Nation "Will Act"; President Outlines New First State Policy during Speech at West Point, *The Washington Post* 2 June. 2002

lays bare the realities of America's new role. The United Nations lay dozing like a dog before the fire, happy to ignore Saddam, until an American president seized it by the scruff of the neck and made it bark . . . The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known.⁵⁹

The projection of the U.S.'s global power that was heavily reliant on its military force to control the world is clearly stated in **text 23**. Nearly a year after the 9/11 attack, President Bush responded by laying a national security strategy. The text summarized the content of the NSS paper that described Bush's policy after the deadly attacks of 9/11. The core of this policy entailed a unilateral and pre-emptive force to change the world in the interests of the American superpower. The 9//11 attacks, in fact, was deliberately put into context to justify this policy. Thus, following the occurrence of those attacks, and in an attempt to justifying a pre-emptive intervention in Iraq, the U.S claimed itself as the world leader and had to fulfil one of its responsibilities as a superpower in defending freedom and democracy around the globe, and to punish those who were responsible for violating human rights. The text's writer further stressed the importance of the U.S new role in the promotion of virtues of liberal democracy and freedom in foreign countries. However, we may notice that this text lacked any form of questioning the legality of the U.S use of pre-emptive force "when and where it chooses." The text neglected the fact that forcible regime change and spread of virtues did not comply with respect for human rights or the sovereignty and freedom of nations. Additionally, the writer did not address what potential ramifications of such a policy might be. In respect to true journalism, the writer had to raise a set of legitimate questions as who had the right to impose moral clarity over the world nations or to decide on their behalf on what is compatible or inconvenient for them. Again, the critical and questionable aspect of the journalistic profession towards the government's decisions seemed to be absent in the U.S news media. In the same vein, **text 24** reveals the presence of the United States in the world as an immense superpower, a giant dominant extending its influence into every corner of the earth. Michael Ignatieff, the writer of the text, depicted the United States as a political and military power beyond the scope of its lands, wielding domination over foreign territories. He tried to describe the United States new role in the 21st century as a global hegemon where the geographical expansion per-se was not conclusive. The crucial criterion of this new role was

⁵⁹Michael Ignatieff, "The American Empire; The Burden," *New York Times* 5 Jan. 2003.

to maintain political, economic and military control from the homeland. Through his article, Ignatieff attempted to convince the Iraqi enemy and the whole world that the U.S became the sole global power that dominated to an unprecedented degree many parts of the world. Moreover, extending its reach to foreign countries would enable the United States to monopoly the world's trade, politics and military force. Although the U.S's new obtained privileges, Ignatieff approved the U.S policy of open aggression to install democracy and civil liberties in countries like Iraq. He asserted that the forcible efforts to assure the growth and spread of virtues were part of the U.S new role as a world superpower as it was before part of the American burden towards other nations. However, he neglected the fact that the act of imposing collides with virtues of democracy and freedom. True democracy guarantees peace, justice, and respect of human rights for other nations. Yet, what was noticeable contradicted those virtues in the sense that the United States did not recognize and respect them in terms of its actions against Afghanistan and later on in Iraq. Again and again, journalists attempted to paint an ideal picture of the U.S's policy in the world neglecting their duty to question the shortcomings of such policy.

2.3. Characterization of the Actors and their Actions

Words or expression in a text are often carefully chosen from a wide range of available options to construct and characterize certain people, social relations or events in a particular way to reinforce and legitimize the ideology that have been communicated in the themes of the discourse (Wenden 94). As already pointed out in the aforementioned analysis, the U.S news media sought to portray the actions of the Bush administration in a constructive and positive way while simultaneously portraying the Iraqi regime as ruthless and brutal. Practically speaking, such characterization served to justify the above highlighted ideologies and related values underlying the themes. However, one may note that the American news media have exaggerated their dehumanization and demonization of the Iraqi regime while in the same stance giving the United States the full right to practise its hidden agendas at the expense of its own people and the lives of innocent Iraqis. This can be illustrated in this section through an examination of the characterization of both Saddam Hussein and his regime and the Bush administration in the lead-up to the Iraq war. In the texts below, samples of news reports about the ways Saddam was characterized as well as Bush and his administration:

Text 25: President Bush declared tonight that Saddam Hussein could attack the United States or its allies “on any given day” with chemical or biological weapons . . . He called Mr. Hussein a dictator, “a student of Stalin” and a murder . . . The president

likened the threat the country faces today from Iraq to the Cuban missile crisis, which unfolded exactly 40 years ago this month.⁶⁰

Text 26: Third, the Bush administration has launched a pre-emptive public relations campaign warning that Mr. Hussein might try to put his own people at risk in order to increase the civilian body account . . . Last month, the White House Office of Global Communications issued a report saying that Mr. Hussein purposely put civilians into military bunkers like the one bombed in 1991, and might try to do so again. Two weeks ago, President Bush said Mr. Hussein was likely to use chemical or biological weapons against his people, and blame the United States for their deaths.⁶¹

Text 27: Those primarily concerned with human rights struggle to weigh which cost is higher: the lives inevitably lost in a war, or the lives of the Iraqis they say Mr. Hussein kills each year . . . "It's because Saddam is a fascist regime" Mr. Walzer said. "I think there a lot of people in my position who want to do something about that. And they wish the marchers were marching for that, as well."⁶²

Text 28: We're sending that message very clearly. Now, as to Iraq, we didn't need September 11 to tell us that Saddam Hussein is a very dangerous man. We didn't need September 11 to tell us that he's trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction . . . In 1991, when our forces arrived in Iraq; they saw that, again, he was trying to acquire nuclear weapons. He is a very dangerous man. We have to deal with him on his own terms. We didn't need September 11 to tell us that he's a threat to American security.⁶³

Text 29: The Bush administration has been working for months to develop a plan for humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people in the event of war, according to U.S. officials . . . Abrams said the U.S. military plan was "carefully tailored" to limit the displacement of Iraqi civilians and damage to the country's infrastructure in hopes of minimizing the humanitarian crisis. The Pentagon has set up the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to coordinate the relief effort, and troops will help relief workers reach civilians, who need help(Starr "U.S plans").

Text 30: You and I serve our country in a time of great consequence. During this session of Congress, we have the duty to reform domestic programs vital to our

⁶⁰Ibid., 52.

⁶¹James Dao, "The Nation: Damage Control; Battle Plan: Spare Iraq's Civilians," *The New York Times* 23 Feb. 2003.

⁶²Kate Zernike, "Threats and Responses: Liberals for War; Some of Intellectual Left's Longtime Doves Taking on Role of Hawks," *The New York Times* 14 Mar. 2003.

⁶³Tim Russert, "Administration Comments on Saddam Hussein and the Sep. 11 Attacks," *The Washington Post* 8 Mar. 2003.

country; we have the opportunity to save millions of lives abroad from a terrible disease. We will work for a prosperity that is broadly shared, and we will answer every danger that threatens the American people . . . and if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the full force and might of the United States military, and we will prevail. And as we and our coalition partners are doing in Afghanistan, we will bring to the Iraqi people and medicine and supplies and freedom. America is a strong nation and honorable in the use of our strength. We exercise power conquest, and we sacrifice for the liberty of strangers. (Bush)

From the 9/11 attacks, the U.S mainstream media demonized Saddam Hussein and characterized the conflict as a conflict between ‘good’ allies and ‘evil’ Iraqis. Via a combination of rhetoric, Saddam’s negative image was promoted and quickly became the villain, a dictator, and a madman who was a menace to world peace and the American way of life. Such a demonization was meant to create a climate in which the necessity to take decisive military actions to eliminate him was privileged. Countless reports of Saddam’s brutality were partly carried out by his alleged possession of biological weapons. **Text 25**, for instance, promotes the assumption of Saddam’s potential nuclear capacity and his ability to mobilize terrorist attacks on the U.S and its allies. The writer of the text stressed the absence of democracy in Iraq as he likened Saddam’s rule to that of ‘Stalin’ , a rule that was merely totalitarian in which the Iraqis had virtually no authority as the state wielded absolute control of every aspect of life, be it socially, financially or politically. He wanted to depict the Iraqi society as lacking their simplest rights to enjoy a democratic life. He further condemned Hussein as being responsible for the death of many Iraqi civilians who voiced their dissent to his regime and labeled him as a ‘murder’. Such depiction would lead the American public and the whole world to sympathize with the innocent Iraqis and call for an urgent intervention to stop such a ruthless leader. The writer further endorsed the Bush’s gross exaggeration when equating the threat to the United States from Iraq to that during the Cuban missile crisis in order to raise fears among Americans. One may notice that such a comparison was illogical and had no basis as no biological weapons were found in Iraq in comparison with the operational active nuclear warheads deployed in Cuba. Yet, the *Times* reporter did not challenge such an analogy; instead, he praised Bush for the exact description of the Iraq’s threat. **Text 26** exhibits Saddam’s brutality by reflecting his criminal actions against his own civilian population. Journalists recognized very well that portraying Saddam Hussein as evil helped rally public support. In this text, James Doe adopted the U.S government’s newfound concern for the people of Iraq. He depicted Saddam as an ‘evil madman’ who has shown his

willingness to use his obtained biological weapons in wars against other nations or even against his own people. He further acknowledged that, in the past, Saddam carried out dreadful practices against powerless Iraqis and was ready to perform the same actions and to sacrifice the lives of his own people to reach his objectives. Dao purposely reported Hussein's actual and alleged crimes to forge a negative image about him and to support the Bush administration that wanted war with Iraq. U.S officials have launched a full-scale public relations campaign to build support. They even rely on exaggerations and half-truths to meet their goals. The worst part of this story was media confirmation of these allegations and the absence of the critical aspect of journalism. In **text 27**, one may notice *New York Times* anchor, Kate Zernike's efforts to promote consent for going to war against Iraq. A considerable number of Americans manifested against the U.S's military intervention in Iraq. The *Times* thought to bring a war expert in order to convince the general public of the humanitarian nature of this intervention. The war expert's main strategy implied a demonization of Saddam Hussein and his regime. He asserted that the number of Iraqi dead civilians, if any military action to happen, would be far less than the number of murdered Iraqis under Saddam's rule. In this sense, he attempted to reveal how merciless was the Iraqi regime in terms of its actions against its natives. He further compared the Iraqi regime to that of the fascist, which was featured by an authoritarian and dictatorial way of ruling people, and the forcible oppression of any opposition. Thus, he called those anti-war protestors to assemble around the Bush administration and contribute to a noble mission that would save millions of Iraqis from a ruthless leader and grant them a prosperous and democratic life. What is noticeable here is that the *Times* did not disseminate any opposition viewpoints to a military intervention in Iraq. Rather, it welcomed and promoted arguments that contribute to gain support for war efforts in Iraq. **Text 28** provides another instance of how news media kept endorsing the Bush administration claims that characterized Saddam as evil and ruthless. National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice portrayed Saddam as a real menace to the U.S national security and way of life, and therefore must be eradicated and destroyed. She wanted to convey to the Americans the message that Saddam was more dangerous than I was expected and she deliberately repeated the tragic 9/11 attacks in her claims to refresh the Americans' memories and raise vengeful nationalism. She further attempted to draw the reader's attention to Saddam's dreadful and countless deeds as well as his ability to reach any nation in the world and mobilize his acquired WMDs. She even characterized him as 'dangerous' and repeated that description several times in an attempt to spread a public scare inside the American society. The latter would logically support future military actions that

would protect the U.S national security. In this way, Rice's message reached the American public at a large scale thanks to media efforts that promoted such hidden agendas. Again, U.S officials' claims found echoes in the mainstream media that enabled them to reach millions of Americans.

While Saddam Hussein and his regime were portrayed as vicious and ruthless, Bush and his administration were characterized as protectors of international laws and civil liberties, as well as fighters against injustice and human rights violations. In **text 29**, Barbara Starr, *CNN*'s anchor worked to create a more humanitarian and better war when the U.S was marching to toward an invasion of Iraq. She further attempted to protect the government's image and clarified the U.S government efforts to wage as a good war as possible, by limiting civilian casualties and suffering. Due to the large number of American people opposing any war, a fulsome praise of the U.S's ability to weigh the losses of the war and to protect the Iraqi civilians was highly needed. Thus, many media outlets praised and characterized the U.S as being able to stand up against aggression that was practiced on Iraqis and to grant them democracy and freedom lost for decades. Here, *CNN* tried to make the war in Iraq more civilized and interpret the U.S future actions in Iraq as merely humanitarian seeking to save millions of Iraqis from a brutal regime. Therefore, it promoted the U.S programs if it would proceed with an invasion of Iraq, through which the United States would work with all its might to minimize the civilian consequences, to avoid the further destruction of Iraq's infrastructure and to provide accommodation for homeless Iraqis. Hence, media's characterization of the Bush administration's future actions in Iraq as benevolent and responsible for the safety of Iraqis might reduce dissident voices in the United States and gain more support for such a humanitarian intervention. However, in **text 30**, *CNN* attempted to promote President Bush's claims about America's good deeds in the world. This TV channel depicted a brilliant picture of the United States in the sense that despite being a global superpower, the U.S worked hard to establish security, freedom and prosperity as to promote trade, international finance and foreign assistance and to defend human rights. In this way, *CNN* stressed a one-sided view of the U.S willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining a democratic and liberal international order and failed to view this act as serving the U.S interests and promoting U.S world primacy and hegemony. *CNN* dodged to ask the question of what would the U.S benefit in return when bearing the costs of promoting and sustaining an international order. Seemingly, *CNN* wanted to comment only on the positive and humanitarian side of the U.S's policy in the world. Concerning the Iraqi cause, *CNN* attempted to depict the Bush administration as a non-warlike one, and if war had to be forced

upon the United States, the Bush administration's prime goal would be to liberate Iraqis and to bear its full civil responsibilities towards Iraq. *CNN* further reinforced Bush's claims that the US role in the world as a superpower would be to serve the well-being of those in other countries, to establish liberal values of peace and democracy, and to promote justice and freedom rather than invading other nations and threatening their national security. After all, glorifying the Bush administration's actions in foreign countries as voluntary and benevolent became the essence of the U.S media outlets' content.

Conclusion

In comparison with other modes of linguistic study, along with discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis is extremely socio-political in purpose. It aims at better understanding the role discourse plays in reproducing social injustices. CDA attempts to elucidate that discourse is needed by the ruling powers in a society to the creation and production of versions of reality that serve their own interests. Furthermore, using CDA framework can direct society to be more analytical and mindful about the control of power and ideology of media. Hence, CDA is well-suited to investigate the ways through which the U.S media outlets constructed the social reality of the Iraq war.

This chapter concentrated on conducting a critical analysis of US media discourse in the lead-up to the Iraq war and evaluating its performance. What is noticeable, then, is that media coverage largely supported the Bush administration's take on the issues of the al-Qaeda connection with the Iraqi regime and Iraq's WMDs. Their heavy reliance on the administration sources led them to treat the al-Qaeda connection and Iraq's WMDs as established truth. Additionally, most of coverage consisted of roundtable discussions with various officials, military men or war experts and that raised one-sided views that would automatically support the ultimate decisions to go for war. Opposing views to waging war against Iraq did not appear throughout the coverage and were in fact marginalized and isolated. Furthermore, American news media drew upon the existing ideologies and stereotypes to shape and deliver information to the general public as they worked to solidify two main ideologies: Orientalist ideology and hegemony ideology. Both ideologies seem to serve and protect the U.S interests in the world as they highlight the US exceptionalism and hegemonic position in the globe. Via analyzing the promotion of those ideologies in media coverage, we may notice media's failure to question the US's new undertaken role and policy in the world as it sought to impose democracy and freedom over foreign countries' people neglecting to respect their national security and their right to decide for their future. Lastly, the mainstream media aided the Bush administration in its war against Iraq by their excessive reports that demonize Saddam Hussein and his regime while glorifying the US's troops as partaking in a noble mission that would help the Iraqis to get rid of a ruthless leader. The extremely negative characterization of Saddam Hussein and his regime resulted in raising calls to handling the crisis in Iraq as well in the Middle East. Media portrayed the confrontation as a struggle between the 'good' and the 'evil' with the evil 'Hussein' ready to threaten the world's peace and the US's national security.

In the light of this discussion, the U.S mainstream media failed to meet their democratic responsibilities of providing a wide range of opinions on issues of public importance and of informing the public concerning contemporary events. In reviewing the US journalistic practices in the lead-up to the Iraq war, we may notice that the mainstream media became even more compliant and only raising voices supportive of the war efforts. However, the normative role that media should play is to present competing viewpoints and perspectives as accurately as possible as well as to evaluate the validity of the resulting claims. Finally, they should give out reliable decisions based on factual evidence irrespective of the status of the side being supported.

General Conclusion

At the end of the Gulf War of 1991, Jean Baudrillard introduced '*The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*', a slim volume of three essays in which he described the war as an attentively constructed phantasmagoria. He stated that people were driven to believe in a conflict that is really dangerous distinct from the one that is going on. The information and mass media system manufactured a simulated war in a hyperreal universe, where the idea of a war has been conveyed through media discourse without transmitting the war real events. Thus, it becomes more comprehensible that the news media are the main source of those pictures in our heads about the global public relations and that what we perceive about the world is primarily dependent on what the media want to inform us. Such envisioned world will have a deep impact in the sense that media priorities will surpass the priorities and views of the public. Like the first Gulf War, the events leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq were promoted by a large media show, a socio-cultural and ideological drama permeated with exaggerated images and narratives, that sought to manufacture public consent for going to war against Iraq.

The media had an enormous impact on the public interpretation of events leading up to the war in Iraq. Their behavior was surrounded by many issues such as the conflict between the political needs of the leaders and operational security of the military, and the need for an informed public. In the build up to the Iraq war, reporters did not ask tough questions to their leaders. The lack of sufficient objective media coverage regarding the Bush Administration's Gulf policy allowed Bush to brace for his imminent war and victory by giving him room to gradually but relentlessly develop his war machine and military planning. The American journalists preferred to stand up with Bush and his administration and to become more compliant and supportive to the U.S policy in Iraq at the expense of keeping the citizenry well-informed about their government's practices so as to enable them make rational judgment about government actions. Thus, the mainstream media failed to carry out a serious debate over the U.S policy and future actions. What the American journalists did not realize is that debate does not threaten a country; passive acceptance of ideas does. Consequently, the U.S mass media have stepped from objectivity to partiality through their persistent attempts to demonize Saddam Hussein and to glorify the American impending invasion of Iraq. Saddam was depicted as vicious, violating human rights and as an imminent threat to the world peace, while the US future mission in Iraq as noble, humanitarian and benevolent that the only logical solution to stop such an evil was decisive military action and an absolute support for the US war efforts in Iraq.

Consequently, the utter absence of any dissenting voices in the mainstream media in the run up to the Iraq war reveals the passivity, narrowness, and full submission of the mainstream media in the United States. Most of the discourse at the times leading up to the Iraq war appears to be propagandistic and combative in nature. Additionally, a relentless war talk has generated an atmosphere in which only armed intervention would address the problem. The media depiction of the conflict as a clash between good and evil with the evil Hussein reluctant to surrender and menacing the US national security created turmoil and the desire for a solution that only war could offer. Accordingly, mass media were unsuccessful to meet their democratic duties of presenting a broad variety of viewpoints on matters of national interest and of informing the public regarding current issues. True democracy implies that media should not be an instrument of the government but rather an arbiter of truth to reveal its actions. It also requires an independent and investigative media and separation of the state institutions. Though, the opposite was occurring in the U.S when the Bush government, the military and the media together pressing for war. Such combined efforts weakened the democratic system under which checks and balances are empowered to prevent abuse of power, and intensified the crisis of democracy in the United States.

In reviewing the US journalistic practices and the content of their coverage in the run-up to the Iraq war, the normative task of media of providing a forum for diverse perspectives and performing an arbitrator role to clarify issues seemed to be abandoned. Analysis of the U.S leading news sources of the events preceding the Iraq war reveals how those news outlets were quick to accept the Bush administration's claims as established facts and treated them as viable in spite of the absence of any supporting evidence. Ultimately, the ethical responsibilities of the media were dismissed and denied when preparing for the war against Iraq. Thus, a revolutionary media reform is highly needed in a country that was established on democracy and freedom of expression as well as a government self-assessment of its malpractices vis-à-vis media institutions. Apart from advocating a positive shift in the Mainstream media, news followers have to tackle media content with a critical eye so as to understand issues of propaganda and bias associated with media reporting.

Works Cited

- Al-Suwali, Zainab. Interview with Zainab Al-Suwali. "CNN Live Today, hosted by Leon Harris, CNN, 19 Mar 2003. Transcript, <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0303/19/lt.01.html>. Accessed 4 August 2020.
- Altheide, David L and Jennifer N. Grimes. " War Programming: The Propaganda Project and the Iraq War." *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 46, no.4, 2005, pp. 617-643.
- Androutsopoulos, Jannis. " Ideologizing Ethnolocal German." *Language Ideologies and Media Discourse: Texts, Practices, Politics*, edited by Sally Johnson and Tommaso M. Milani, Continuum, 2010, pp. 182-202.
- Armistead, Leigh. *Information Warfare: Separating Hype from Reality*. Washington: Potomac Books, 2007.
- Bellamy, Christopher. " What is Information Warfare." *Managing the Revolution in Military Affairs*, edited by Ron Matthews and John Treddenick, New York, Palgrave Publishers, 2001, pp. 56-75.
- Bennet, W. Lance, and David L. Paletz. *Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.
- Berger, Carl, and Howard C. Reese. *A Psychological Operation Bibliography*. Washington: The American University, 1960.
- Bronner, Stephen Eric. *Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Bush, George. W. 'Bush's State of the Union speech.' "CNN. Transcript, <https://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/28/sotu.transcript>. Accessed 13 août 2020.
- Campbell, Duncan. " US buys up all satellite war images." *The Guardian*, 17 October 2001, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/17/physicalsciences.afghanistan>. Accessed March 25, 2020.
- Chan, Sue. "Massive Anti-War Outpouring." *CBS News*, CBS Interactive, February 16, 2003, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/massive-anti-war-outpouring/>. Accessed 2 May 2020.

- Chomsky, Noam. *The Common Good*. Arizona: Odonian Press, 1998.
- Chouliaraki, Lillie. "Political Discourse in the News: Democratizing Responsibility or Aestheticizing Politics?" *Discourse and Society*, vol. 11, no. 3, 2000, pp. 293-314.
- Clarke, Richard A. *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*. New York: Free Press, 2004.
- Colucci, Lamont. *The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How They Shape Our Present and Future*. California: Praeger, 2012.
- Connelly, Mark, and David Welch. *War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, 1900-2003*. New York: Martins Press, 2005.
- Correll, John T. "What Happened to Shock and Awe?" *Air Force Magazine*, November 2003, pp. 52-57.
<https://www.airforcemag.com/PDF/MagazineArchive/Documents/2003/November%202003/1103shock>.
- Cromer, Gerald. *Insurgent Terrorism*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2006.
- "Decapitation strike was aimed at Saddam." *CNN*, 20 March 2003.
<https://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/20/sprj.iq.target.saddam/>. Accessed 5 May 2020.
- Dijk, Teun A. van. "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis." *Discourse and Society*, vol. 4, no. 2, 1993, pp. 249-283.
- Dijk, Teun A. van. *Discourse as Structure and Process*. London: Sage Publications, 1997.
- Dorrien, Gary. *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Entman, Robert M. "Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power." *Journal of Communication*, vol. 57, no.1, March 2007, pp.163-173.
- Entman, Robert M. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.

- Fairclough, Norman. *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Fairclough, Norman. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.
- Fairclough, Norman. *Media Discourse*. London: Arnold, 1995.
- Fairclough, Norman. *What is CDA? Language and Power Twenty- Five Years On*. 2014. [https://www.academia.edu/8429277/What is CDA Language and Power twenty-five years on#:~:text=What%20is%20CDA%3F,earlier%20paper%20\(Fairclough%201985\).](https://www.academia.edu/8429277/What_is_CDA_Language_and_Power_twenty-five_years_on#:~:text=What%20is%20CDA%3F,earlier%20paper%20(Fairclough%201985).) Accessed June 04, 2020.
- Fisher, Max. "America's unlearned lesson: the forgotten truth about why we invaded Iraq." *Vox*, 16 Feb 2016, <https://www.vox.com/2016/2/16/11022104/iraq-war-neoconservatives>. Accessed April 22, 2020.
- Freund, Charles Paul. "2001 Nights: The End of the Orientalist Critique." *Reason*, 2001, <https://reason.com/2001/12/01/2001-nights-2/>. Accessed April 10, 2020.
- Gorman, Lyn, and David Mclean. *Media and Society into the 21st Century: A Historical Introduction*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
- Gough, Susan L. "The Evolution of Strategic Influence." A Research Project to the U.S Army War College, Pennsylvania, 7 April 2003. Accessed March 20, 2020.
- Harris, Leon. "Colin Powell speaks at State Department." *Live Event/ Special*, CNN, 3 Feb 2003. Transcript, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/03/se.01.html>. Accessed 24 July 2020.
- Hauben, Ronda. "Massive Anti-War Protest in New York City Demonstrates." *Heise*, February 16, 2003, <https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Massive-Anti-War-Protest-in-New-York-City-Demonstrates-3428466.html>. Accessed May 02, 2003.
- Herman, Edward S, and Noam Chomsky. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon, 1989.

- Hill, Raymond R. "The Future Military-Media Relationship: The Media as an Actor in War Execution." A Research Paper Presented to The Research Department, Air Command and Staff College, Alabama, March 1997.
- Jackson, Richard. *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.
- Jäger, Siegfried, and Florentine Maier. "Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis and Dispositive Analysis." *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michel Mayer, Sage Publications, 2009, pp. 34-61.
- Kettell, Steven. *Dirty Politics? New Labour, British Democracy and the Invasion of Iraq*. London: Zed Books, 2013.
- King, John. "Powell: Iraq hiding weapons, aiding terrorists." Special Report: War in Iraq, CNN, 6 Feb 2003. Transcript, <https://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.un/>. Accessed 30 July 2020.
- Koppel, Andrea. "Secretary of State Colin Powell Pleads Case; Was NASA Warned of a Danger to Shuttles 10 Years Ago?" *Connie Chung Tonight*, CNN, 5 Feb 2003. Transcript, <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/05/cct.00.html>. Accessed 25 July 2020.
- Kumar, Deepa. "Media, War, and Propaganda: Strategies of Information Management During the 2003 Iraq War." *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, vol. 3, no. 1, March 2006, pp. 48-69.
- Lieberman, Joseph. "Strike on Iraq" Decapitation Strike ". *CNN Breaking News*, hosted by Aaron Brown, CNN, 19 Mar 2003. Transcript, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0303/19/bn.03.html>. Accessed 10 August 2020.
- Lule, Jack. *Globalization and Media: Global Village of Babel*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012.
- Maalouf, Amin. *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*. New York: Schocken Books, 1984.

- Mann, James. *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*. London: Penguin Books, 2004.
- Meikle, Graham. *Future Active: Media Activism and the Internet*. New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Muttitt, Greg. *Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq*. New York: The New Press, 2012.
- Nišić, Vanja, and Divna Plavšić. "The Role of Media in the Construction of Social Reality."
- Noy, Gary. *Distant Horizon: Documents from the Nineteenth –Century American West*. London: University of Nebraska Press, 1999.
- Pilger, John. "Axis of Evil; John Pilger Exposes the Frightening Agenda in Washington that Is Behind the United States Threat to World Peace." *Morning Star*, December 14, 2002.
- Pipes, Daniel. *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009.
- Porras, Ileana M. "On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw." *After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture*, edited by Dan Danielsen and Karen Engle, New York, Routledge, 1995, pp. 294-313.
- "Psychology Warfare." Encyclopedia Britannica, Encyclopedia Britannica, inc, November 30, 2015, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/psychological-warfare>. Accessed March 20, 2020.
- Radvanyi, Janos. *Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term Strategic Planning*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.
- Rampton, Sheldon and John Stauber. *Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq*. New York: Tarcher & Penguin, 2003.
- Richardson, John E. *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach From Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Red Globe Press, 2007.

- Roberts, Pat. "Was Colin Powell's Report on Iraq Accepted Globally; Analysis of Shuttle Re-entry Videotape; New Al Qaeda Threat on United States Soil." *Wolf Blitzer Reports*, hosted by Wolf Blitzer, CNN, 5 Feb 2003. Transcript, <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/05/wbr.00.html>. Accessed 2 August 2020.
- Rossiter, Clinton, and James Lare. *The Essential Lippmann: a Political Philosophy for Liberal Democracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Rossiter, Ned. *Software, Infrastructure, Labor: Media Theory of Logistical Nightmares*. New York: Routledge, 2016.
- Said, Edward. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
- Schacter, Daniel L, et al. *Psychology*. New York: Worth Publishers, 2011.
- Schaefer, Richard T. *Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society*. California: Sage Publications, 2008.
- Seaton, Jean. "The New "Ethnic" Wars and the Media." *The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence*, edited by Tim Allen and Jean Seaton, Zed Books, 1999, pp. 43-63.
- Singh, Anil Kumar. *Military and Media*. India: Lancer Publishers and Distributers, 2006.
- Sociological Discourse*, year 4, number 7 / April 2014, pp. 73-81.
- Soderlund, Walter C, et al. "Cheerleader or Critic? Television News Coverage in Canada and the United States of the US Invasion of Panama." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol.27, no.3, 1994, pp. 581-604.
- Starr, Barbara. "U.S. Plans to help Iraqis after War." *Special Report: War in Iraq*, CNN, 26 Feb 2003. Transcript, <https://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/25/sprj.irq.after/index.html>. Accessed 12 August 2020.
- Taylor, Philip M. *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.

- Taylor, Philip M. *War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.
- Taylor, Terence. "Interview With Former Officials Ken Pollack, Terence Taylor." *Live Event/Special*, CNN, 5 Feb 2003. Transcript, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/05/se.03.html>. Accessed 26 July 2020.
- Torwel, Vitalis. "Moral Framing and the Development of Political Conflicts: An Analysis of New York Times' Stories in the Build up to the 2003 Iraqi war." *Athens Journal of Mass Media and Communications*, vol. 1, no.4, 2015, pp. 257-274.
- Wenden, Anita L. "The Politics of Representation: A Critical Discourse Analysis of an Aljazeera Special Report." *International Journal of Peace Studies*, vol. 10, no. 2, 2005, pp. 89-112.
- Wilson, Michael Raphael. "Media Government Interactions in the United States." *Global Media Journal*, vol. 17, no. 32:161, 2019, pp. 1-4.
- Wodak, Ruth and Michael Meyer. *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage Publications, 2009.