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DEPARTMENT OF LETTERS AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE



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## **Bias in Mediation:**

### **Exploring the American Role in the Camp David Summit 2000**

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master in  
literature and civilization

***By:***

***Mr. Mohamed SEDDIKI***

***Supervised by:***

***Dr. Assia. GUELLIL***

**Board of Examiners:**

- |                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| ➤ <b>Dr. Aicha Hocine</b>  | <b>University of Laghouat (President)</b>  |
| ➤ <b>Dr. Assia GUELLIL</b> | <b>University of Laghouat (Supervisor)</b> |
| ➤ <b>Dr. Raouf NEBEG</b>   | <b>University of Laghouat (Examiner)</b>   |

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# Dedication

To my beloved wife,

To those I love most,

Very affectionately all my teachers especially:

Dr. Amira NOUIOUA.

Dr. Nadir MHAMDI.

Dr. Mustapha GASMI.

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# Abstract

This research aims to critically analyse the American mediation during the Camp David Summit in the year 2000, specifically whether the United States was biased in favour of Israel to the prejudice of Palestine. The central aim is, therefore, to establish whether the US could be deemed neutral and, therefore, efficient in the process of its diplomatic process within this critical phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To achieve this, the research retraces the historical trajectory of US-Israeli diplomatic relations since 1948, in order to critically analyse the way strategic, political, and economic variables influenced American intervention within the Middle East Peace Process. The methodology used is qualitative method. This research method provides a suitable tool to analyse critically the US intervention's motives at the Camp David Summit, strategies used during the negotiation of the mediation, and the techniques of negotiation and diplomatic moves that ensued. The results indicate an apparent bias in the US approach in favour of Israel. Such bias is, however, evident in the strategies, diplomatic paths, and narratives of American mediators during the summit. The research shows that the US-Israeli relationship, which is characterized by closeness due to strategic, political, and economic support, actively shaped the process of peace overall and most of the time disadvantaged the interests of Palestine.

**Keywords:** Bias, Camp David Summit, Israel, Middle East, Palestine, Peace Process, US Mediation.

# List of Abbreviations

DOP	Declaration of Principles
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PA	Palestinian Authority
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America

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# **General Introduction**

## General Introduction

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The conflict between Palestine and Israel has been a longstanding affair of the world, leading to catastrophic wars and tragedies in the Middle East. Its impact has been both direct and indirect all over the globe, yet the conflict has remained unresolved. The reason for such a global manifestation of affairs is its inability to address the concerns of the parties involved in a sustainable and viable way either on their own or with the help of mediators such as the United States of America. The United States has been historically presiding over the table of negotiations whenever the Palestinian question is negotiated. The presidents of the United States have not been ignorant of the viability of an Arab-Israeli conflict to be settled against the backdrop of Washington's Middle Eastern security and economic interests.

In the case of the Middle East, the Camp David summit marked the beginning of the end of an excruciating peace process of more than a decade, which was seen by many as the last nail in the coffin of a process that was already failing. It came at a time when US President Bill Clinton was having his second term and last couple of months in office as the files of his various scandals were being released to the public. At the same time, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had to face the disintegration of his ruling coalition, while Yasser Arafat, President of the Palestinians, was living in miserable conditions in his occupied state. The course of negotiations at the world-famous American resort was held in tense conditions, based on the leaders' situations in their respective countries prior to the beginning of the summit.

The second Camp David summit failed to bring an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and realize the goal of establishing an independent Palestinian state. It was instead the end of a series of negotiations that did not come out positively for the Palestinians but helped Israel to further consolidate its grip on the land. The American side pinned the failure of the summit on the disruptive role of the Palestinian delegation. Their version of events was close to the Israeli narrative.

## General Introduction

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This study will help to shed light on the American role in Camp David 2000 because its major objective is to find out if the American side was biased towards Israel at the expense of the Palestinian side during the summit. In order to achieve this, the study will evaluate key milestones in the US-Israel diplomatic relationship since the founding of the latter in 1948. It will examine how these developments affect the peace process in the Middle East. The study will also evaluate the motives for American intervention at the Camp David summit and discuss strategic, political, and economic reasons prompting America to sponsor the negotiations. In addition, it will analyse the specific mediation strategies the United States used during the summit and scrutinize the negotiation techniques and diplomatic manoeuvres used. Finally, the study will evaluate critically the results of the Camp David summit, focusing on how effective and neutral were the diplomatic efforts of the United States.

The main research question of this study is: Was the American side biased towards Israel at the expense of the Palestinian side during the Camp David Summit 2000? In order to answer it, the study examines a number of sub-questions: What have been the key milestones in the US-Israel diplomatic relationship since Israel's founding in 1948? In what ways have these diplomatic developments influenced the Middle East peace process? What were the strategic, political, and economic reasons that urged the United States to sponsor the negotiations at the summit? What were the specific mediation strategies and negotiation techniques used by USA? Did its mediation strategies and diplomatic manoeuvres reflect impartiality or bias towards Israel? What were the outcomes of the summit, and how did it reflect on the neutrality and effectiveness of US diplomatic efforts?

The rationale of the study is to critically analyze the role played by the 2000 Camp David Summit in the eventful Israeli-Palestinian conflict and determine whether the American mediation was biased towards Israel. There are various reasons that called for an understanding of whether American mediation was biased towards Israel. United States had been among the

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key players of Middle Eastern international relations whose actions had far-reaching impacts on regional stability and international dealings as a whole. The dissertation will further elaborate on the historic process, featuring US-Israeli diplomatic relations and the motivations behind US intervention, in an attempt to give readers a comprehensive understanding of dynamics that influenced the negotiations. Furthermore, analysis of the mediation strategies and the impact on the involved parties, in seeking to give meaning to the effectiveness and fairness of US efforts at diplomacy, will be applied to shed light on broader implications for future initiatives aimed at peace. Ultimately, this study seeks to contribute to the discourse on international mediation and conflict resolution, emphasizing the importance of neutrality in promoting sustainable peace agreements and achieving convincing solutions.

Historical analysis involves following the occurrence, clarification of the events, determination of the contributing factors, and outcomes. History is the most fundamental basis of political knowledge because it explains to us the present and helps in the preparation of the future. In applying the historical approach, political researchers must try to discern principles and laws that will prove to be the foundation of political hypotheses and theories. Moreover, primary sources as diplomatic cables, speeches, official statements, and the memoirs of some leading personalities who took part in the negotiations are used in a painstaking way to get the feel of the United States' role and its decision-making process.

This research, however, contains several limitations. The first limitation lies in the bias of authors writing the primary resources. All the primary resources are subjective and influenced by the perspectives of the authors and their backgrounds. This can only be remedied by comparing and contrasting different primary resources with different perspectives to have a balanced one. Another limitation is the shortness of the time frame. It is possible to miss the extensive nature of archival research, so only readily available data with key documents will be given precedence. The last limitation lies in the fact that this is sensitive research and without

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the availability of classified sources, an incomplete and inaccurate picture might be presented in the analysis. This last limitation may be remedied with the use of declassified sources and reliance on Arab-Israeli conflict and US foreign policy scholars and experts for an alternative perspective.

This study thesis will present a comprehensive framework to consider the United States' involvement in the 2000 Camp David Summit. The study tries to appreciate better the United States' diplomatic efforts with respect to conflict mediation in the Middle East by considering motives, strategies, outcomes, and geopolitics more broadly.

The thesis has three chapters. The first chapter will deal with US foreign policy in the Middle East, elaborating on the different orientations of US foreign policy and the major interests of the US in the region. The second chapter will involve the presentation of the Camp David Summit, major actors, and the various attempts at peace prior to the Summit. The main core issues that were negotiated in the Summit will be discussed too. The third chapter will analyze the involvement of the US in the Summit as a mediator, its motivations, mediation strategies, and its impact on the different parties. Through this chapter, the compatibility of the Israeli and American stories was made to contrast with the Palestinian narrative.

## **Chapter One:**

# **The US Foreign Policy in the Middle East**

## **Chapter One: The US Foreign Policy in the Middle East**

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Country's foreign policy refers to the political goals that determine how this country communicates with other countries. Generally, states use their foreign policies to protect their national interests, ensure internal security, promote intellectual and ideological goals, and enhance economic prosperity. All the above can be achieved through peaceful cooperation, or through war, aggression, and the exploitation of other nations. Since the dawn of the twentieth century, the significance of foreign policy increased remarkably, so nowadays countries rely heavily on the communication and interaction with other nations through diplomatic channels.

Defining the concept of the diplomacy of the United States is a complex subject due to its large geographical area in terms of political and social variables. What makes it challenging to determine the general framework of American foreign policy is the extent of its influence and effectiveness internationally, as well as its status among the world powers.

### **1.1 Historical Overview of US Foreign Policy:**

With independence and recognition by major world powers, the need arose for the United States to pursue certain foreign policies, especially with its neighboring nations. The United States has since then largely pursued two different types of foreign policy orientations, each with its uniqueness and a formative contribution to the establishment of American diplomacy.

#### **1.1.1 Unilateralism and Isolationism:**

##### **1.1.1.1 Thomas Jefferson's Influence:**

From its independence until the start of World War I, the United States' foreign policy was characterised by isolationism, which made it easy for it to deal freely with other nations economically, while remaining protected from any type of formal agreements and alliances. Thomas Jefferson, secretary of state of George Washington, is the one who advocated this political detachment from foreign diplomacy; he saw this as “the best way to preserve and

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develop the nation as a free people” (Wittkopf et al., 20). The US founding fathers advocated the same approach as Jefferson (Kaufman 16).

### **1.1.1.2 John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine:**

In 1805, the second president John Adams, wrote in a letter about the foreign policy principles that he adopted during his presidential term (1797–1801). In the letter, Adam states that: “we should make no treaties of alliance with any European power; that we should consent to none but treaties of commerce; that we should separate ourselves, as far as possible and as long as possible, from all European politics and wars” (17).

As he was always sceptical about the intentions of European powers towards the Western Hemisphere, John Quincy Adams was determined that the United States would be better served through the pursuit of isolationist diplomacy. His belief put him on the same wavelength as President James Monroe. Therefore, on December 2, 1823, Monroe clarified the US position through his address to Congress. He announced that the United States of America would replace European powers in controlling Latin American countries and warned these powers of the danger of their interference in this region. He stressed that this would represent a threat to the national security of the United States and would be considered as a justification for war. The Monroe Doctrine also included provisions on the freedom of maritime trade in the Atlantic, the freedom of American products to reach Europe, and the freedom of trade and settlement throughout the American continent (Gilderhus 8).

Hence, we come to know that the roots of American expansionist ideas took their start from Latin America. It was initiated on the grounds of ensuring national security and developing the economy as one of the most essential determinants of American national interest. Prior to this, Europe dominated Latin America, but the focus shifted to the United States, and the glance

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was towards the expansion of American authority, hegemony, and influence over the most crucial areas.

### **1.1.2 Engagement and Internationalism:**

Initially, the United States viewed World War I as a European war in which it had no business or interest. This perspective allowed the United States to approach all parties involved on equal terms, particularly from an economic standpoint, which created a solid American economic foundation along with internal stability, while the European economic infrastructure remained fragile. This was a strong incentive for American politicians to move towards openness abroad in the period between the world wars.

#### **1.1.2.1 World War I and American Involvement:**

In 1916, President Wilson proposed American mediation to resolve European disputes under the slogan of peace without victory. This was considered the first indication of the United States' intention to open up to the outside world. In fact, the United States got involved in the war in 1917 on the side of the Allies. This change in American policy contributed to the defeat of the Central Powers and the emergence of America's role in the international arena (Kaufman 48–49).

#### **1.1.2.2 President Wilson's Fourteen Principles:**

After the end of World War I and the outstanding of the United States as a superpower, President Wilson presented his famous Fourteen Principles to Congress on January 1918, which dealt with the topics of human rights, freedom, democracy, freedom of trade, and the idea of establishing an international organization. In this way, the United States of America intelligently emerged from its isolation that lasted from its independence until the end of World War I,

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achieving political size through its role in ending the war and economic size by reducing the negative effects of the economic crisis that struck the world after the war (Hodge 125).

### **1.1.2.3 America's Role in World War II:**

Similar to the behaviour followed by the United States during the First World War, it largely distanced itself during the Second World War. It did not intervene directly in the war and did not initiate any military actions against any party, despite its preparations for war. However, this changed when Japan launched the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941. This incident guaranteed the United States the support of American public opinion to enter the war. The response to Japan then expanded to the level of turning the tide of the war in favour of Britain and the allied countries (Kaufman 66).

As was the case the first time, the United States emerged with important international and economic influence that made it a country capable of expanding its foreign policy and transitioning from isolation to openness. However, at the same time, the Soviet Union rose as a stronghold for global socialism, opposing the American capitalist foundation. This created a new structure within the international system, shifting from multi-polarity to bipolarity.

### **1.1.2.4 The Cold War Era:**

The conflicting interests and the emergence of two countries (the United States and the Soviet Union) as the sole superpowers competing for world leadership led to the onset of what was called the Cold War phase, which continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. During that period, the United States opened up to the world to a great extent. This openness was accompanied by a set of complex interests in American foreign policy, the most important of which was containing the communist tide and pursuing global hegemony (Nye 116).

### 1.1.2.5 Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan:

The policies of the United States, aimed at global hegemony, were clearly demonstrated when President Harry Truman took office and made changes to American foreign policy. These changes addressed the idea of protecting all free people worldwide, which was the ideological basis for the American aid program known as the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was first implemented by providing aid to Turkey and Greece in 1947 (125).

On March 12, 1947, in order to call on Congress to act, President Harry S. Truman uttered the often-quoted words asking for \$400 million in military and economic assistance for Turkey and Greece:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. (*Truman Doctrine (1947) | National Archives*)

Later, in addition to Truman's principles, a policy called containment emerged, which aimed to counter the communist tide. This policy was clearly demonstrated through the Marshall Plan, which aimed to rebuild the European continent and help recover what was destroyed by the war. In fact, the goal was to establish American influence in Western Europe and make it an area of influence for the United States of America (Steil 85).

### 1.1.2.6 The Collapse of the Eastern Bloc:

With the arrival of Richard Nixon from the Republican Party to the presidency, a policy of reconciliation between the two factions was followed, and the idea was later reached: that we can live in peace. Accordingly, the policy of reducing armaments began by both parties to show goodwill. However, this effort soon collapsed with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 during the presidential term of President Jimmy Carter (Nye 148).

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In the last stages of the Cold War, with the return of the Republicans to the presidency with Ronald Reagan, foreign policy began to establish a unilateral global vision based on the idea of spreading the American model by combining military power with the spread of the principles of peace and capitalist democracy. Reagan stated that American national interests were the top priority, as he wanted to restore America's reputation (Busch 460–61).

With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, signs of exclusivity began to dominate the world and impose the American model. America had to convince the world that it was the greatest country dominating international affairs. Thus, a new phase of the American strategy was opened with President George H. W. Bush's announcement of the establishment of a new world order devoid of terrorism, seeking justice and greater security, and allowing nations from all corners of the world to prosper and live together in harmony (Kaufman 123). This was further consolidated with the arrival of Clinton, who built his policy on what is known as the commitment and expansion strategy, based on three pillars: maintaining American military hegemony in the world, achieving economic prosperity, and strengthening and promoting free market democracies worldwide (137).

When studying American foreign policy, we observe a set of underlying principles that have accompanied it since independence and continue to guide its behaviour on the global stage. However, an examination of the development of American foreign policy throughout different time periods reveals the existence of intermittent phases that can be characterized as pragmatic, or as a phase of power restoration where the president's personality and psychological aspects, in general, play a crucial role. We find with this phase, more emphasis on issues related to the economic and internal security affairs as compared to matters of international security. They tend to view foreign policy as a tool that must try to accommodate domestic interests and needs, and Democratic politicians tend to hold that tendency to an extreme degree.

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It can be said that the president's personality factor plays an important role in influencing foreign policy, especially when coupled with broad powers granted to the president in the field of foreign policy. His personality type, which is composed of a group of distinct needs such as the need for achievement, the need for power and control, plays a significant role in determining the behaviour of individuals and, consequently, the behaviour of decision-makers.

### **1.2 The United States' Interests in the Middle East:**

Since the end of World War II, United States interests in the Middle East have significantly increased as a result of responding to a variety of economic and political concerns. This American intervention is still ongoing till nowadays. US interests in the region include several aspects, such as ensuring strategic access to oil resources in the Gulf region, supporting and protecting Israel's sovereignty, preserving US military bases, especially those in the Gulf states, defending friendly governments and supporting allies, and combating what is known as terrorist groups such as Hamas, Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and many others that pose a threat to American interests and its allies in the region.

#### **1.2.1 Strategic Access to Oil Resources in the Region:**

##### **1.2.1.1 Historical Context of Oil Demand:**

The primary interest of the United States in the Middle East is to secure access to energy sources, specifically oil. However, the significance of oil was not realized until the late nineteenth century, coinciding with the onset of the First Industrial Revolution, which initially relied on waterpower and then later on coal. The second industrial revolution brought about a significant demand for oil, which was readily available at a relatively low cost. Consequently, oil became an urgent necessity for economies heavily dependent on it, leading to their rapid

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expansion on a global scale. This surge in demand resulted in a growing desire to acquire new oil sources and explore new markets. Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the oil industry thrived, and petroleum products were consumed rapidly across the globe, including Europe and North America. During this period, major oil producers included Russia, the United States, Mexico, and Romania (Gelvin 257).

In the early twentieth century, the oil industry boomed around the world, particularly in Europe and North America. During World War I, major world powers started prioritizing oil due to its crucial role as a military resource. Modern methods of warfare necessitated oil and its by-products for ships, airplanes, tanks, and submarines, as well as the lubrication of modern firearms. As a consequence of this heightened demand during World War I, oil stocks experienced severe shortages from 1917 to 1918 (*Great Power Conflict over Iraqi Oil: The World War I Era*).

### 1.2.1.2 US Dependence on Middle Eastern Oil:

The level of oil production in the United States has decreased in relation to its consumption, which has increased to thirty percent of the world's total consumption of crude oil. However, the United States only has an estimated six percent of the total global reserves. As a result, after World War II, the United States began searching for other sources of oil abroad to meet its future needs. At that time, the Middle East was considered attractive to the United States government and American oil companies due to its abundant reserves of crude oil. Studies and research have shown that Arab oil reserves could potentially account for sixty percent of global oil reserves, a higher percentage than originally estimated (Al Sarhan 460).

One of the United States' main objectives in the Middle East is to guarantee Western access to oil resources. There are two key reasons behind this goal. Firstly, there is an urgent economic need for oil to sustain the American economy. Secondly, from a strategic standpoint,

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it is crucial to supplement domestic oil production by sourcing oil from the Middle East. This can be clearly observed in the events of 1973, when up to a third of US oil imports originated from the Middle East prior to the oil embargo crisis. Even today, oil still constitutes approximately fifty percent of US imports. From a strategic perspective, the Middle East's provision of cheap oil played a pivotal role in boosting the economic recovery of Europe and Japan after the war. Following the oil embargo crisis, the United States and its Western partners came to view oil as a strategic resource. Over forty years later, the European Union now obtains more than a third of its oil from the Middle East, while Japan relies on its Middle Eastern trading partners to secure more than eighty percent of its oil requirements (Gelvin 271).

### **1.2.2 Protecting Israel's Sovereignty:**

The second goal of the United States in the Middle East is to protect the state of Israel and ensure its long-term stability in the constantly volatile region. In fact, by maintaining Israel's power and sovereignty in the Middle East, the United States greatly strengthens and consolidates its own interests there. This political perspective has been the dominant American foreign policy toward Israel since the mid-twentieth century, and it continues to shape current foreign policy.

#### **1.2.2.1 Historical Relationship between US and Israel:**

Most ancient history books indicate that the relationship between America and Israel began with the existence of the Puritan movements. These movements worked to mobilize American public opinion with their Zionist beliefs in the nineteenth century. They believed in the resettlement of non-Jewish Christian Zionism in Palestine to establish a national homeland for it. Under the pretext that Palestine is the Kingdom of Israel, they aimed to restore it as the Kingdom of the Awaited Messiah and the land that God promised to His chosen people in the

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Old Testament. This belief implies that the birth of Israel in Palestine is a confirmation of Biblical prophecies and a sign of the second coming of Christ (Mearsheimer and Walt 132–33).

Until the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire controlled Palestine. After the war, the territory was transferred to British control under the League of Nations' British Mandate. During World War I (1914-1918), the British government made secret agreements with leaders of the British Zionist community. These agreements led to the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine (Al Sarhan 461).

Before publishing the Balfour Declaration, the British government attempted to persuade President Woodrow Wilson to support the proposed speech. At first, Wilson was reluctant to do so because he believed that such a public notice would complicate American-Ottoman relations. In the end, as a result of pressure exerted on him by Louis D. Brandeis, America's effective Zionist leader and a close and trusted friend, President Wilson showed sympathy with the Balfour Declaration. The British considered Wilson's acceptance of the proposed draft as actual support for the establishment of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine and support for English hegemony over that place as a protectorate. However, this implicit aid from Wilson contradicted his agenda for self-determination stipulated in his fourteen points and undermined the right of the Palestinian Arabs to secure self-determination. Nevertheless, that did not prevent America from adopting the Balfour Declaration (461).

In *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy*, Mearsheimer and Walt state that the United States recognized Israel as an independent nation on May 14, 1948, making it the first country to do so. President Harry Truman issued a statement of recognition following Israel's declaration of independence on the same date. Then diplomatic relations were established on March 28, 1949, when US Ambassador James Grover MacDonald presented his credentials. Since then, Israel has remained America's most important partner in the Middle East. The two countries share strong historical and cultural ties, as well as common interests (24–25).

### 1.2.2.2 Israel's Strategic Importance in the Region:

The relationship deepened further, and Israel became an important strategic ally in the region during the Cold War, especially in light of the containment policy. It served as the American tool to contain the communist tide in the countries of the region, and acted as an important barrier to prevent Soviet access to the Gulf oil sources. Therefore, it provided preliminary information to America in this regard. Consequently, Israel provided important intelligence information to the United States (51).

Following the tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956, Israel assumed a greater role in the region after the British and French withdrew. It joined the Eisenhower Doctrine, which aimed to establish a regional security agreement (Gelvin 285).

After the Six-Day War in 1967, during which Israel occupied the Syrian Golan, the Egyptian Sinai, and other Palestinian territories like the West Bank and Gaza, Israel solidified its position in the region and gained increased support from the United States (285).

It should be noted that the feature enabling Israel to play a strategic and vital role in the Middle East is its geographical location. Israel is located close to the Gulf, which is considered a strategic base from which the American Rapid Intervention Forces can launch military actions in the Middle East. Additionally, Israel has the best military facilities in the region, with ports capable of receiving the largest ships and airports equipped for the landing and take-off of various types of aircraft. Israel is also able to protect American forces from air or ground attacks and has the ability to deter possible non-nuclear attacks. Furthermore, Israel is considered a centre for providing intelligence information to America about the political systems of the countries in the East. These qualities may make Israel one of the NATO countries (Cozy).

## Chapter One: The US Foreign Policy in the Middle East

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It is challenging to study the Middle East without considering the role played by Israel in the region, its involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the state of tension and instability in the area. Israel being the first military and nuclear power, comparable to all Arab countries, only reflects Britain's interest in the past and the United States' recent interest in its position as an advanced central base that serves their interests. As for the unwavering American support, it has two dimensions: firstly, support for Israel as a strategic ally and protector of interests, and secondly, the result of continuous pressures exerted by the Zionist lobby on various American administrations.

In conclusion, the first chapter has laid the foundation for understanding the intricate and multifaceted nature of American foreign policy. We have traced its evolution from the early principles of unilateralism and isolationism advocated by figures like Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams, through periods of engagement and internationalism, marked by significant events such as World Wars I and II, and the Cold War era. This historical overview underscores the pivotal role that key doctrines, such as the Monroe Doctrine, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan, have played in shaping the United States' interactions on the global stage.

Furthermore, the chapter has highlighted the dynamic interplay between domestic interests and international engagements, emphasizing how the personality and policies of individual presidents have influenced the direction of American diplomacy. The discussion on the United States' strategic interests in the Middle East, particularly in securing access to oil resources and protecting Israel's sovereignty, provides a crucial context for understanding the continuity and change in American foreign policy objectives.

As we move forward, this historical perspective will serve as a critical lens through which we can analyze contemporary foreign policy issues and predict future trends. Understanding the foundations of American foreign policy not only illuminates the past but also

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equips us with the insights necessary to navigate the complexities of today's global political landscape.

## **Chapter Two:**

# **Camp David Summit 2000**

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No people on Earth have suffered as much as the Palestinians; while many other peoples have gained their national independence, the Palestinian people have been struggling since they came under the influence of the British Mandate. Later, the World Zionist Organization made continuous efforts to establish a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine, leading to the successful establishment of the State of Israel. On the other hand, the Palestinians, regardless of their partisan and organizational affiliations, have been striving for their desired independence. Eventually, they were able to sign the Oslo Accords with Israel on September 13, 1993. This agreement resulted in the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) on Palestinian soil in mid-1994.

The Palestinians were planning to announce the establishment of their desired state in 1999, but Israeli obstinacy prevented it. However, in an effort to resolve the final status issues, US President Bill Clinton called for the Camp David Summit on July 11, 2000, despite the Palestinian side's reservations, as they believed that the conditions are not yet favourable for achieving tangible progress or success, particularly because the Israelis have not fulfilled the minimum requirements for completing the transitional phase of the previous peace negotiations.

### **2.1 Key Players:**

#### **2.1.1 Yasser Arafat:**

Yasser Arafat was a prominent Palestinian leader and influential figure in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He was born in Jerusalem in 1929 and grew up in Jerusalem and Cairo. He later became involved in the Palestinian struggle and remained dedicated to it for the rest of his life (Boopathi 21).

He founded the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and held various positions within it, including its presidency since 1969. Arafat adopted a strategy of armed

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struggle against Israel and led the Palestinian movement towards international recognition and global political influence (23).

In 1993, Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo Accords, which led to the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in parts of the occupied Palestinian territories. However, peaceful efforts did not achieve sustainable peace (25).

In July 2000, Yasser Arafat met with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David, under the supervision of US President Bill Clinton. In that summit, the American President and the Israeli Prime Minister had the ambition to sign a final solution agreement, ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, Arafat disappointed the Americans and the Israelis by refusing to sign the proposed solution, as he considered it incomplete and believed that it did not meet his expectations because the Palestinians aspire to achieve a resolution that meets their aspirations (Peters and Newman 69).

After the failed Camp David Summit, Arafat encountered internal and external criticism, which included accusations of corruption and an inability to secure a peace settlement (Boopathi 26).

In November 2004, he passed away unexpectedly in France, prompting doubts and allegations regarding the cause of his death. Nevertheless, the true cause was never officially disclosed, though Israel continued to be blamed for it (*BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Cause of Arafat Death 'Unknown'*).

As a pivotal figure in modern Palestinian history, Yasser Arafat is considered a symbol of the Palestinian struggle and has played a major role in shaping the global political landscape surrounding the Palestinian issue.

### 2.1.2 Ehud Barak:

Ehud Barak, a prominent Israeli politician and former military commander, was born in Israel in 1942. He began his career in the Israeli army, where he achieved great success and rose through the ranks to become Chief of Staff of the Army and later Minister of Defence (*Ehud Barak | Biography & Facts | Britannica*).

In politics, Barak held multiple positions, including serving as the head of the Israeli government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defence. During his tenure as prime minister (1999-2001), several significant events took place, such as the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, direct negotiations with the Syrian government, the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and the unsuccessful Camp David summit involving Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and American President Bill Clinton (*Ehud Barak | Biography & Facts | Britannica*).

### 2.1.3 Bill Clinton:

The forty-second President of the United States of America (1993-2001) was born in Arkansas in 1946. He started his career as a lawyer and university professor before venturing into politics. In 1978, he was elected as the governor of Arkansas and later went on to win the presidential elections in 1992. He was re-elected for a second term in 1996 (Davis 561).

During his presidency, the United States experienced a period of economic prosperity, and significant reforms were made in healthcare and education. Additionally, efforts were made to mediate peace processes in the Middle East, resulting in the conclusion of the Oslo Accords under his leadership (Clinton 489–90).

Clinton also faced numerous challenges during his tenure, most notably the Lewinsky scandal that ultimately led to his impeachment in the Senate in 1998. Furthermore, he faced

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criticism for his policy decisions and personal style. However, after his presidency, Clinton dedicated himself to philanthropy and diplomacy. He established the Clinton Charitable Foundation and actively participated in diplomatic efforts to resolve various international conflicts (Davis 568).



*Fig. 2.1 "US President Bill Clinton, centre, Prime Minister Ehud Barak, left, and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat walk on the grounds of Camp David, Maryland" (John)*

### 2.2 Previous Attempts at Peace Negotiations:

#### 2.2.1 Madrid Conference 1991:

In January 1991, the United States headed an international coalition that included some Arab countries, with the goal of removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait took place on August 2, 1990, and this crisis highlighted the Palestinian issue once again. This was primarily due to Iraq's bombing of Israel during the war and its support for the liberation of Palestine slogan (Peters and Newman 89).

The Bush administration had to navigate numerous contradictions to successfully bring the conflicting parties together. Israel headed by its Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, placed conditions on the negotiations, such as excluding the PLO and avoiding discussions about an independent Palestinian state. It also emphasized the importance of its own security, ensuring that the negotiations would not compromise it. Additionally, required that the conference would not impose any mandatory formula and should not represent any particular American positions ('The Madrid Peace Conference' 124–25).

In contrast, the Arab countries insisted on multilateral negotiations, while Israel proposed adding bilateral sessions alongside the multilateral ones. As for the Palestinians, they were promised to participate in a negotiating process extending for five years, starting from the third year to discuss the final status (121).

The United States provided each party with guarantees that their interests would be protected and their requirements would be respected. The conference was held on October 30, 1991, in Madrid and lasted for three days. US President George Bush confirmed that the

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negotiation process would continue between Israel and the Arab countries, as well as between Israel and Palestine, based on Resolutions 242 and 338<sup>1</sup> (121).

In the opening session, George Bush spoke about a comprehensive peace in which Israel would participate, and under which it would be linked to its Arab surroundings through economic, security, and diplomatic agreements. On the other hand Mikhail Gorbachev spoke about the normalization of Israel's existence (125–27).

Israel insisted that bilateral negotiations not begin in Madrid for fear of forming a front between the Palestinians and the Arab delegations and proposed that the negotiations be held alternately in Israel and a relevant Arab capital. On the other hand, Syria insisted on starting negotiations immediately. As a response, the US administration proposed a compromise solution: holding a new round of negotiations in Washington during the following December. Between December 1992 and August 1993, several rounds of bilateral negotiations were held in Washington, but they did not produce significant results (Mansour 10).

In the fall of 1992, George Bush lost the US presidential election to his rival, the Democratic Party candidate, Bill Clinton. During the same year, in Israel, Shamir also lost the election to Yitzhak Rabin. As a result, the Madrid path effectively came to an end (*Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian*).

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<sup>1</sup> Resolution No. 242 is a resolution issued by the United Nations Security Council on November 22, 1967, and came in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War, which took place in June 1967.

This decision came as a compromise between several draft resolutions put forward for discussion after the war. Article 1, paragraph A, states: "Withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied in the recent conflict." In addition to the issue of withdrawal, the resolution stipulated ending the state of war and implicitly recognizing Israel without linking this to resolving the Palestine issue, which the resolution considered a refugee problem. Since its issuance, this resolution has formed the core of all Arab international negotiations and efforts to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

UN Security Council Resolution 338, which was adopted on October 22, 1973, called for a ceasefire in the Yom Kippur War. This resolution was based on a joint proposal by the United States and the Soviet Union. According to the decision, the ceasefire was supposed to take effect within 12 hours of the resolution being passed. However, despite the conditions outlined in the resolution, the fighting persisted. As a result, Resolution No. 339 was issued, which finally led to a ceasefire.

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It can be said that Israel has succeeded in manipulating the Arab parties with regard to timing and negotiation issues. It has also succeeded in stimulating a spirit of competition between certain Arab delegations and parties, by encouraging the desire to reach a bilateral solution before the political process loses its significance.

The Israeli side was united in the negotiations because its leadership was unified and organized, while the Arab delegations represented several countries, and each country had its own issues that distracted it from supporting the main cause. At that time, Israel was trying to isolate each Arab delegation individually and give each delegation specific suggestions then pretend as if an agreement had been reached, in order to create a wedge between the Arab delegations.

Although the Madrid Conference did not achieve an immediate agreement, it laid an important foundation for future negotiation processes, including the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO.

### **2.2.2 Oslo Accords:**

Oslo Accords are a set of agreements between the Israeli government and the PLO; they derived their name from Oslo, the capital of Norway, where the involved sides had, in secrecy, met to negotiate. These agreements comprise the Rabin-Arafat letters exchange leading to mutual recognition between them, Oslo I otherwise known as Declaration Of Principles DOP, and Oslo II which is the Interim Agreement on West Bank and Gaza.

#### **2.2.2.1 Mutual Recognition Agreement:**

On September 9, 1993, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat sent a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The speech included an explicit recognition of Israel's right to exist in

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peace and security, an acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, a renunciation of violence, and a commitment to resolving the conflict peacefully (Shlaim 25) (Appendix 1).

On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin responded to Arafat with a letter recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people (Appendix 2).

### **2.2.2.2 Oslo I 1993:**

In the article: “ANALYSIS OF OSLO ACCORDS,” Malik Iffat says that Oslo I Accord is an agreement between the Palestinian and Israeli sides that was secretly negotiated on the outskirts of the city of Oslo in Norway. It paved the way for the start of the Oslo negotiation process. The agreement was officially signed on September 13, 1993, in Washington, in the presence of US President Bill Clinton. On the Palestinian side, it was signed by Mahmoud Abbas on behalf of the PLO, and on the Israeli side, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. The agreement was officially known as the Declaration of Principles (135–36).

Malik goes on to explain that this agreement constituted an important turning point in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It led to a temporary end to the conflict and stipulated the establishment of a limited self-rule authority for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a period of five years. It also stipulated that negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip should begin before the beginning of the third year of self-rule. The article goes on to say that the agreement aimed to lead to a permanent settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. However, it did not specify the form of the settlement, leaving that to the negotiations between the two parties during a second phase (136–37).

On the other hand, in his article: “The Oslo Accord,” Shlaim Avi states that the DOP did not address important issues such as the right of return for the 1948 refugees, Palestinian borders, the future of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the status of Jerusalem. The reason for this omission is that both sides recognized the potential dangers of discussing these issues and realized that reaching an agreement would be unlikely. Therefore,

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they decided to postpone these topics until after the Palestinian self-rule had been implemented and its practical experience gained (34).

### 2.2.2.3 Oslo II 1995:

In his book: “International Relations of the Middle East,” Louise Fawcett states that the Oslo II Accord which is known as the Taba Agreement, is an interim agreement concluded by the PLO and Israel regarding governance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. She says that the discussions took place in Taba, Egypt, and it was officially signed in Washington on September 28, 1995. Although the two parties to this agreement are Israel and the PLO, it was signed by the United States of America, Russia, the European Union, Norway, and Egypt (278).

On the same page, Fawcett continues demonstrating that the Taba Agreement established a second transitional phase and was an introduction to final status negotiations between the two parties. It included the issues of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations, and cooperation with neighbouring countries. This agreement confirmed the two parties’ previous understandings as stated in previous agreements regarding security arrangements and crossings, stipulating that they would come into force on the day of their signing.

Among the most prominent points contained in the Taba Agreement is the division of the West Bank into 3 regions, with Israel retaining control over the borders, external security, Jerusalem, the settlements, and comprehensive security responsibility for the Israelis. The three regions are:

**Area A:** It is completely subject to Palestinian Authority in terms of security and administration.

**Area B:** It is subject to Palestinian Authority in terms of administration, but security is under Israeli control.

**Area C:** Both security and administration are under full Israeli control (Peters and Newman 93).

What the Oslo Accords provided was not a clear-cut solution for the problem of the Palestinians as its stipulations did not present the crux of the problem of the Palestinians which is represented by the right of Palestine for self-determination. On the other hand, the significance of the Oslo Accords lies in the fact that they opened the door for continuing processes of negotiation between the two sides and raised the level of hope for reaching peace in the region.

### **2.3 Core Issues Addressed:**

The Camp David Summit took place, but Barak's government coalition was not cohesive when he joined the isolated presidential retreat in the mountains of Maryland. Arafat's supporters also had great doubt, questioning whether he truly aspired to be the first president of the Palestinian state. They were concerned that the concessions made to Israel regarding the territories would be too high, or that there would be disruptions regarding rights in Jerusalem or the issue of refugees. Many Palestinians will oppose the agreement because, from their perspective, accepting Israel within the 1967 borders is already a significant concession and should not serve as the starting point for further concessions (Quandt 365).

Barak goes to Camp David, carrying with him, as he announced literally before the Knesset at Ben Gurion Airport before his departure for Washington, a series of his red lines and known "no's". He also takes into consideration the "no's" of the Israeli opposition in his calculations.

#### **2.3.1 Borders and Israeli Settlements:**

When it comes to the issue of borders and settlements, the central problem for Barak is that Arafat is demanding withdrawal to the 1967 borders, but he refuses to do so. Therefore,

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a formula must be sought that bridges the gap between the two positions, and the opportunity to achieve this is unclear. Barak will accept a Palestinian state adjacent to most of the West Bank and Gaza, but he will demand border adjustments. It is required that Israel includes three settlement camps that house about eighty percent of the settlers who should be geographically connected to the State of Israel (Pressman 22–23).

### **2.3.2 Sovereignty of Jerusalem:**

Regarding the issue of Jerusalem, Barak will demand Israeli sovereignty over a unified Jerusalem, but he does not sanctify its current municipal borders. Officials in his office are discussing the unification of Jewish neighbourhoods in the two parts of Jerusalem, in addition to the annexation of the “Maale Adumim and Givat Zeev” settlements, while the Arab neighbourhoods will be transferred to the Palestinian Authority. In this way, Barak can fulfil his pledge that Jerusalem will be more unified than ever. As for the main differences over Jerusalem, they pertain to the Old City, over which both sides claim sovereignty. Sources close to Barak state that he will not relinquish control within the walls of the Old City (17–18).

### **2.3.3 Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees:**

As for the Palestinian refugees, the dispute in this issue centres on determining responsibility for the refugee problem and the right of return. It seems that Barak's government is ready to agree to the return of about 10,000 Palestinian refugees over a period of fifteen years, but under the condition of family reunification and humanitarian cases only (*Mideast Peace Process/Camp David Summit (July 2000) - Abu Mazen's Speech/Non-UN Document - Question of Palestine*).

Whatever the case, the Israeli goal of the summit is limited to trying to pass an agreement that returns part of the occupied territories, reserves for Israel's security preferences in the border areas, and proposes a solution to the refugees' issue through provisions for

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compensation, settlement, or displacement to other countries. In addition, the agreement grants functional powers in Jerusalem with control over the Temple Mount to the next Palestinian state. This means, in the final analysis, that Israel did not want a comprehensive solution, but rather a distorted solution that could not last long. In return, the Palestinians must sign an agreement to end the conflict once and for all. Yet, the Israeli delegation was surprised by President Arafat's strong position regarding the sensitive issues.

The second chapter provides an in-depth exploration of the prolonged and intricate struggle of the Palestinian people for national independence, amidst the backdrop of international politics and regional conflicts. The journey of the Palestinians, marked by continuous efforts to achieve statehood and sovereignty, is juxtaposed with the establishment and consolidation of the State of Israel, fueled by the determination of the World Zionist Organization and later Israeli leaders.

Key figures such as Yasser Arafat, Ehud Barak, and Bill Clinton played pivotal roles in shaping the trajectory of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arafat's leadership within the PLO and his strategic shift from armed struggle to negotiation led to the landmark Oslo Accords, which, despite their limitations, marked a significant turning point. Barak's tenure as Prime Minister was characterized by critical events, including the Camp David Summit, which highlighted the deep-seated challenges in achieving a final peace agreement. Clinton's mediation efforts underscored the United States' commitment to resolving the conflict, even as his presidency faced various domestic and international challenges.

The chapter meticulously outlines previous attempts at peace negotiations, such as the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords. These initiatives, although fraught with complexities and unmet expectations, laid essential groundwork for ongoing dialogue and potential resolution. The discussions at Camp David, despite their ultimate failure, addressed core issues

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like borders, settlements, Jerusalem's sovereignty, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees, reflecting the intricate and often contentious nature of the peace process.

In essence, this chapter encapsulates the arduous path toward peace, marked by intermittent progress and persistent obstacles. The historical context, key players, and pivotal events presented here provide a comprehensive understanding of the enduring conflict, setting the stage for further analysis of contemporary developments and future prospects in the quest for a lasting resolution.

## **Chapter Three:**

# **The US involvement in Camp David**

## **Summit**

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The Camp David Summit resulted in significant developments that altered the trajectory of the Palestinian negotiations. It exposed the American bias towards Israel and compelled Israel to demonstrate its unwillingness to make concessions for the sake of achieving genuine peace and accepting an independent Palestinian state with full sovereignty over its land, air, sea, and capital.

Over the past two decades, the US continued to put pressure on Palestinians to drop their national constants and reached the peak in early 2020, as US President Donald Trump announced the "Deal of the Century. Trump's efforts included moving the American embassy to Jerusalem and granting the complete domination on the city to Israel, as well as working towards resolving long-standing issues in favour of Israel.

### **3.1 Motivations for US Mediation:**

#### **3.1.1 Regional Stability and Global Standing:**

The nature of American foreign policy interests in the Middle East is twofold. First, it seeks to ensure the arrival of oil supplies. Second, it aims to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and its influence. These policies and interactions cannot occur without the presence of a strategic ally like Israel. Israel is capable of meeting American interests and ambitions in the region. Therefore, American support for Israel is necessary to achieve these goals. The presence of hostile regimes in the Middle East poses a direct threat to American interests. As a result, the United States actively works to thwart any force, movement, or political system that may contribute to changing the situation in the region (Gelvin 269–73).

The United States was eager to intensify its role as an international peacemaker. Through the mediation of these negotiations, it aimed to decrease its image as an international war monger and affirm its ability to solve international conflicts. USA always desires to maintain friendly relations with its allies and partners in the Middle East, so sponsoring this

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peace process was one of the ways to solidify these relations. This summit therefore affords an opportunity on the world stage for the USA to exercise leadership and to commit itself to the peace process.

### **3.1.2 Alliance with Israel:**

Despite the United States securing oil supplies and the presence of a number of huge American military bases in the Middle East, it is still the primary supporter of Israel due to the influence of the Zionist lobby on American foreign policy. Zionist propaganda has succeeded in creating an opinion loyal to Israel. It portrays Israel as a small, peaceful country surrounded by hostile countries determined to destroy it and throw its people into the sea. Additionally, Israel is often depicted as a democratic country surrounded by totalitarian dictatorships. Islam is portrayed as an extremist religion in its violence, while Judaism is the mother religion of Christianity, and Israel is part of the Judeo-Christian civilization (Mearsheimer and Walt 107–09).

Supporters of Israel in the United States argue that Israel is a strategic asset in the Middle East region. They point to Israel's advantageous geographical location, infrastructure, logistics, defence capabilities, combat experience, and intelligence and research capabilities, all of which benefit the United States.

In his article *"US Foreign Policy in the Middle East,"* Noam Chomsky asserts that America has succeeded in the Middle East in an unparalleled way. It has maintained Israel as a military power comparable to all the countries in the region, supported loyal regimes in most countries in the region, and retained control over the oil wells.

### **3.1.3 Clinton's Legacy and Diplomatic Achievement:**

President Clinton and his staff at the State Department and the White House refused to listen to the Palestinians' advice to postpone the summit for a few weeks until the necessary

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preparations were completed to ensure its success. They underestimated the statements of some Palestinians that the USA is committing a grave mistake if it thinks that Yasser Arafat can sign an agreement that does not meet the minimum Palestinian rights stipulated in international legitimacy resolutions, especially with regard to Palestinian sovereignty over occupied East Jerusalem in 1967 (Hanieh 76).

Clinton believed that either agreement would be sufficient to relieve the intense tension in the peace process, thus erasing the scandal<sup>1</sup> that stuck to his personal record before leaving the White House, and enhancing the chances of his deputy, Al Gore, in the presidential elections, as well as his wife's chances of winning a seat in the Senate. He hoped to enter history as a peacemaker who succeeded in settling the most complex and longest case witnessed in the twentieth century (Quandt 29).

Overall, broader geopolitical interests, pertaining regional stability and international positioning, the alliance with Israel, Clinton's Legacy and diplomatic achievements pick the US involvement in the Camp David Summit. These factors defined its strategic interest and diplomatic approach to how it played host to the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

### **3.2 Analysis of US Involvement during the Negotiations:**

President Clinton was about to end his second term without achieving any progress on one of the most important regional and international problems in which he had invested so much. Hence, he decided to take the risk in order to achieve personal diplomatic success. If this

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<sup>1</sup> The scandal that affected Bill Clinton, 49 years old, and White House intern Monica Lewinsky, 22 years old, almost removed him from office. This relationship occurred between 1995 and 1996 and came to light in 1998. Clinton appeared in a televised speech, denying the existence of a relationship between him and Monica, but additional investigations were conducted, which led to accusations against Clinton of perjury. This prompted Congress to begin impeachment proceedings against the president in 1998. He was acquitted in a session in the Senate in 1999, and he continued in his position for the remainder of his presidential term.

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happens, it will be a resounding and dazzling event in the areas most vital to American interests. This hoped-for, not carefully planned, success could make Clinton a potential candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. In addition to the fact that this success will improve the chances of the Democratic Party winning the presidential elections scheduled in four months.

### **3.2.1 Diplomatic Efforts Leading up to the Summit:**

Before the summit, the region witnessed shuttle visits by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. These visits focused on discussions with the Palestinian and Israeli sides in order to revive the peace process on the Palestinian track and plan a tripartite summit that would create a clear vision and address the final status.

The Palestinian side believed that the conditions were not prepared to hold such a fateful summit in terms of its conduct and results. The prevailing Palestinian view was that the failure of the summit would have serious consequences for all parties involved. The American side agreed with this position, especially after the failure of the negotiation experience with the Syrian side. However, at the same time, hesitation characterized them due to a lack of conviction that postponement might change any of Yasser Arafat's ideas or positions (Albright and Woodward 472). As for the Israeli position, it was represented by what was proposed by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who insisted on holding the summit with promises to make concessions that would erase the negative image left by the failure of the Syrian-Israeli talks (477).

The period leading up to the summit witnessed internal Israeli preparations through meetings and discussions held by specialized groups focusing on the consequences of the Palestinian side's announcement. These discussions covered topics such as the unilateral state, sovereignty, the Jerusalem dilemma, as well as negotiation mechanisms and tactics.

The direct preparations for the Israeli summit began with the Minister of Internal Security, Shlomo Ben Ami, being sent to meet Arafat in the city of Nablus. During this meeting,

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Arafat emphasized the issue of Jerusalem and conveyed the importance of the Holy City and its crucial role to the Palestinian side. He also discussed Barak's failure to fulfil previous pledges to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories (Sontag; Hanieh 81).

With the arrival of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Jerusalem on June 27, 2000, proactive statements were prepared from both sides. Frustration on the Palestinian side was evident in the statements of Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, who expressed disappointment that the negotiations regarding prisoners and withdrawals during the transitional phase did not yield tangible results. Another Palestinian negotiator, Hassan Asfour, emphasized that September 13 (the previously established deadline for reaching a final peace agreement between the two sides) marked the date of sovereignty over the land, and Israeli citizens would be treated as foreigners thereafter (*CNN.Com - World - Palestinians, Israeli Official Urge Delay of U.S.-Brokered Summit - June 28, 2000*).

As for the American Secretary, she tried in Ramallah to convince Arafat to attend the summit. In a meeting that lasted for more than three continuous hours, she emerged convinced of the Palestinian point of view that such a summit requires prior preparation and setting the atmosphere. The final outcome of the session was an agreement to begin preliminary sessions and talks at the beginning of July. Albright's perspective was deemed very important, as Clinton mentioned, since the American President indicated that the decision to hold the summit was tied to the report submitted by the Secretary on the results of her visit (*CNN.Com - World - Palestinians, Israeli Official Urge Delay of U.S.-Brokered Summit - June 28, 2000*).

Frustration was evident in Arafat's tone during the press conference that followed the meeting. He angrily questioned the motives behind Israel's non-compliance with international legitimacy and its decisions regarding the Palestinians. These decisions were the basis of its relations with Jordan and Egypt, as well as a driving force behind its withdrawal from southern Lebanon. At that time, the media was reporting on Barak's taboos, such as his refusal to return

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to the borders of 1967, the absence of a Palestinian army, and Jerusalem remaining a unified capital for Israel, with the majority of settlers remaining under Israeli control (*Albright and Chairman Arafat Remarks*).

After her visit to Ramallah and on her way back to Washington, Albright visited Jerusalem and met again with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who confirmed after the meeting that real negotiations would only take place at the summit. Here, the American side yielded to the Israeli position, retreating from Ramallah's pledges that came hours ago, and the confirmation came. The American delegation informed the Palestinian side that the negotiations would take place at the Camp David Summit, and Clinton used his relationship with Egyptian President Mubarak to pressure Arafat to attend the summit, and he got what he wanted (*CNN.Com - World - Palestinians, Israeli Official Urge Delay of U.S.-Brokered Summit - June 28, 2000*).

In the end, Barak got what he wanted. Arafat attended the summit under American sponsorship and with Egyptian pressure and mediation on the Palestinian side. Barak had to convince Clinton that he would make an offer acceptable to the Palestinian side. He believed that Arafat would be forced to make concessions when faced with pressure at the summit in order to come back with an agreement.

Some parties in the American administration supported the Israeli position, claiming that the Palestinian leadership was willing to pay any price for statehood due to the withdrawal of Arab support. However, they did not consider the opposing viewpoint that Arafat would only accept a solution that met his aspirations and Palestinian national rights, as Arafat's willingness to attend the summit was due to his special relationship with President Clinton. Although the American leadership acknowledged that, the summit required two or three weeks of preparation, the final decision to hold it at the agreed-upon time was influenced by the Israeli perspective.

### 3.2.2 Mediation Strategies Used in the Summit:

The US mediation strategies during the Camp David Summit will be analysed according to Jacob Bercovitch's classification of mediation strategies. His theory is considered one of the important theories in the field of mediation and conflict resolution studies.

The classification includes three main mediation strategies that range from high to low intervention by the mediator. Firstly, there are Communication-Facilitation strategies, which are passive strategies where the mediator has no control over the substance and content of the agreements reached between the disputing parties. The role played by Norway as a mediator in the Oslo Accord 1993, is an example of this approach. Secondly, there are Procedural strategies, which involve the mediator taking formal control of the mediation process, including the environment in which the mediation will take place. Lastly, there are Directive strategies. These are active strategies in the sense that they directly involve the content of the agreement and push both sides to reach an agreement. At this stage, the mediator considers the demands and needs of both sides and presents a proposal to both parties. Additionally, if the mediator has the leverage and/or ability to do so, they can motivate both parties to reach an agreement, either through incentives or punishments. The Directive strategies comprise the following techniques: providing incentives, offering rewards, and introducing new proposals, and issuing ultimatums (Bercovitch et al. 347).

The American administration, led by President Clinton, decided to put forward a plan that includes directive strategies for managing negotiations during the summit. It was based on notes left by President Carter from his experience at Camp David I and what he calls the recipe for successful mediation. After carefully reviewing the observations, Clinton decided to be tough on some issues, to appear firm on others, and to be prepared to shuttle between the two parties if each of them refused to meet the other (Indyk 309–10).

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In Clinton's initial meeting with the two delegations, he began by emphasizing the significant opportunity presented by the summit and expressing his satisfaction in being present with them. He mentioned that he had dedicated countless hours to studying the key focal points of the summit. The President conveyed that the resolution of this conflict lies in the hands of Palestine and Israel, with the United States serving as a mediator committed to creating an environment conducive to fruitful negotiations between the two leaders. After welcoming his guests, Clinton stated:

We have come to the point where we have to make a choice. I believe that this is an opportunity from which both parties can benefit. However, it is your responsibility to make the decisions, and the role of the United States to make this conference successful. We will determine the agenda and set up the committees. But the issues themselves have to be decided by you, not in the light of short-term gains but of the long-term future you are seeking to build. I know that both President Arafat and Prime Minister Barak have initiatives they will brief you on. The question is whether we are ready to take the historic decisions that lie before us. These decisions must be yours and not mine. (Qurie 176)

In addition to the strategy of providing incentives that Clinton adopted in his address, the American team had also adopted the strategy of offering rewards from the beginning. President Clinton ended his speech by emphasizing that both sides would receive substantial financial contributions if they were able to reach a solution (Albright and Woodward 479–80).

Regarding the strategy of introducing new proposals, during the first day, Clinton met with Barak and informed him about the United States' intention to present a parameter paper that the president and his aides had prepared in advance. This paper comprised suggestions derived from Clinton's understanding of the conflict and his vision of the potential solution based on the reports, maps, and briefings he had reviewed. The purpose of these proposals was to present a set of specific criteria that encompass the fundamental issues that must be addressed

## Chapter Three: The US involvement in Camp David Summit

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during the summit. But Barak rejected what was stated in the paper and refused to take it as a basis for starting negotiations (Ross 654).

On the third day at Camp David, the American proposal has been already drafted. Clinton presented this proposal as a synthesis of the opinions of the two parties in order to reach an agreement. However, formulating this draft proved to be challenging for the American side due to their lack of ability to do so. The senior American assistants assigned to write the draft tried to align it with Barak's red lines, resulting in some paragraphs being ambiguous and others being vague. In addition to the senior American staff leaking the draft to the Israeli side, Clinton also informed Barak about the draft that was intended for both sides before it was released, without taking Arafat's position into consideration. As a result, Barak's pressure on the draft influenced Clinton's approval of some of the amendments requested by Barak, which introduced Israeli terms and concepts (Swisher 272).

The final draft was produced following the replacement of Barak's amendments, which caused the draft to lose its American character. In the pages of the draft, manual amendments were made by Denis Ross in response to the demands of the Israeli side shortly before the Palestinian side was informed of them. Subsequently, the Palestinian rejection of this draft was officially communicated during an urgent meeting after midnight on July fourteenth, attended by Albright, Ross, Erekat, and Qurei (275).

In the fifth day of the Summit, there was a meeting about the borders issue, an Israeli team proposed a frontiers map, however Ahmed Qurie (Abu Alaa)<sup>2</sup> rejected their proposal without providing any alternative. Suddenly Clinton intervened to discover what the problem was. After attempting to reach an understanding with Abu Alaa and persuading him that the

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<sup>2</sup> Ahmed Qurei (Abu Alaa,) at the time, was a key figure in the Palestinian leadership, serving as the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council and a senior negotiator for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). His involvement in the Camp David Summit was crucial due to his extensive experience in negotiations, including his participation in the Oslo Accords.

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Palestinians must present alternative proposals after rejecting the Israeli ones, Abu Alaa's stubbornness finally came to President Clinton's attention, and he became extremely angry, and blew up in his face:

I am here to hold a summit meeting, not to waste time. The Israelis have presented their plan, and I agreed with Arafat yesterday that all issues were open to discussion. Now you (pointing his finger at Abu Ala) want them to change their positions and maps. If you want to give lectures and deliver speeches on Security Council resolutions, you can go to the United Nations, where you can say whatever you like, but you should not waste my time here. I will pack up here and leave, holding you personally responsible for the failure of this summit. This is not the way to seek an agreement. Thanks to you, your people will miss the chance to solve your problems and enjoy freedom within a state of your own. (Qurie 197)

This event serves as a clear example of the strategy of issuing ultimatums. It is widely regarded as unprofessional on the part of the President, as he should not have shouted at the men in a room full of people. According to Abu Alaa, the American team was showing bias toward the Israeli side, disregarding the Palestinian position (198).

In his book, Gilead Sher tried to describe the incident stating:

The yelling was heard all over the cabin. Abu Ala, white as a sheet, left the room, very hurt. This was a breaking point of greater significance than was initially thought. Abu Ala lost faith in the fairness of the American mediation, convinced that Americans accepted the Israeli positions without considering the Palestinians. (68)

Even though directive strategies could definitely be effective, general implications are only possible by the skills and experience of the mediator juxtaposing neutrality and balancing the complex dynamics between parties in the mediation process. However, with a close inspection at some of the positions adopted by the American delegation headed by President Clinton himself, Camp David Summit is noticeably marked with bias and a lack of genuine

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balanced mediation efforts; thereby a lasting conflict resolution of the issue is considered out of reach.

The attempts made by the Americans to align the proposals with Israeli interests, as well as the subsequent leak of the draft proposal, indicate a clear bias that undermined the confidence of the Palestinian delegation. What made this bias even worse was Clinton's emotional outburst towards Abu Alaa, which was a blatant example of issuing ultimatums towards the Palestinian delegation, in contrast to the Israelis.

### **3.3 Viewpoints of the Involved Parties:**

The anticipation and waiting surrounding this summit in the Middle East and international circles generated controversy and discussion at both the official levels, in the region and in international power centres. This was significant because all parties were well-aware of the potentially severe consequences of failure. The viewpoints and outcomes presented by the involved parties to their respective audiences varied, as each side was attempting to defend its position and discredit the other's. Notably, the perspectives conveyed by the Israeli side and the one of the American delegations shared a striking similarity, in contrast to the other one presented by the Palestinians. Unfortunately, the Palestinian point of view received less publicity unlike the American - Israeli unified image due to inadequate media coverage.

#### **3.3.1 Palestinian Perspective:**

The Palestinian leadership worked to clarify the picture that was extremely dark before the summit and the objection that Palestinian President Yasser Arafat had announced to holding the summit because the basis was not solid enough to reach an agreement of this magnitude. Arafat had come to the conclusion that seven months of intense negotiations on all issues had led the two parties to a deadlock. However, the Palestinian side came out of the summit with

## Chapter Three: The US involvement in Camp David Summit

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the belief that the American media is biased towards the Israeli narrative and that any media confrontation will not have a positive outcome.

The Palestinian negotiator, Ahmed Qurei, expressed a viewpoint that aligned with the Palestinian perspective on the events at Camp David. He emphasized that Camp David was not a typical negotiation round, but rather an episode intended to produce a decisive agreement that would bring an end to the long-standing conflict in all its aspects. Qurei acknowledged that the Palestinian side, under the weight of American pressure and unwise mediation by the United States, was the weakest link. He also recognized that the performance of the Palestinian delegation was not ideal due to internal contradictions and disputes that affected their negotiating behaviour (Qurei 303–05).

In terms of assigning blame to the American side, criticisms were directed at their blatant bias and confusion, which resulted in improvised work and hasty summit preparation. The limited time available hindered their ability to deal with contentious issues in a balanced manner, leading them to rely on pressuring the Palestinian side and using financial aid as leverage. (306–07)

### **3.3.2 Israeli Perspective:**

The Israeli media machine worked to create a deliberate and gradual image by presenting its terms and principles as established facts and theoretical rules. This narrative was not solely crafted by Israeli journalists, but also by their allied counterparts. The most notable terms and statements were those that portrayed Arafat as having rejected the generous Israeli offer at Camp David, and continued to highlight the unprecedented nature of Barak's offer to Arafat. Barak's proposal included Israel's withdrawal from approximately ninety-one percent of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip to establish a Palestinian state. The proposal also suggested divided sovereignty in Jerusalem. (Pressman 16) The intention behind this narrative

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was not only to blame Arafat, but also to establish a systematic process that depicted him as an ineffective leader who had no genuine interest in participating in the peace process, and that his involvement in the negotiations was merely a way to avoid responsibility (10–12).

Shlomo Ben Ami, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Israeli government during the Barak administration, was one of the most prominent members of the negotiating delegation at the summit. He played a significant role in promoting the Israeli perspective on the summit's events. Ben Ami used the same terms that were previously used to describe Arafat, characterizing him as a terrorist and a deceiver who led negotiations without providing any counter-offers from the Palestinians. He highlighted Barak's generosity, which surprised Israeli negotiators who admitted that they did not possess the same level of courage to propose such positions. In terms of Jerusalem, there were unexpected qualitative advances, even surprising the American side (*Israel's Top Negotiator Reflects on Summit's Failure*).

Regarding Arafat, Ben Ami believed that he posed a strategic threat to peace in the Middle East and the world as a whole. In fact, Ben Ami went further to suggest that the entire Palestinian national movement shared the same perspective and was not ready for any form of peace, as they considered their offer of giving up seventy-eight percent of historic Palestine as the ultimate concession, with no further compromises to be made (*Israel's Top Negotiator Reflects on Summit's Failure*).

### 3.3.3 American Perspective:

The intense promotion of the American image started with the final press statement issued by Bill Clinton, in which he spoke about the Summit being a distinct advance in terms of opening files that had not been opened before. His dissatisfaction with the Palestinian side was evident in his speech, as he praised the courage of Barak's proposals, particularly regarding the issue of Jerusalem, in contrast to Arafat, who was not as cooperative (Clinton 842). US

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National Security Advisor Sandy Berger echoed the same sentiment, describing Barak as more capable of breaking the stalemate and finding a way out of the impasse (*Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger | The American Presidency Project*).

The results of the summit were utilized in the American electoral arena. The American First Lady, Hillary Clinton, was the first to make use of them, doing so the day after the summit ended. She called for the discontinuation of American aid to Arafat in the event that he unilaterally declared the state on September 13, 2000, as schedule. She said in her statement: "It must be clear that any unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood would be entirely unacceptable and should be met with a cutoff of United States assistance." Her objective was to demonstrate support for the Israeli side, given her Senate candidacy in New York. In this state, Jewish voters represent twelve percent of the electorate. This move was prompted by accusations of anti-Semitism that Hillary had faced due to previous statements she had made (Sengupta).

Eventually, the press conference held by Clinton to evaluate the summit and what followed was not a coincidence. Barak submitted a request for a set of points that he wanted to include in the final statement. Barak's demands included clarifying that what was presented at Camp David is considered invalid since the two parties did not reach an agreement. He also emphasized the specificity of relations between the American and Israeli parties through military and strategic cooperation, and called for the announcement of the American readiness to move the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Additionally, he requested a strong stance against the declaration of a Palestinian state unilaterally. The American side responded to Barak's request, and the final statement included all of the Israeli demands, and even added praise for Barak (Ross 789).

The Camp David Summit led to significant developments that fundamentally changed the trajectory of Palestinian negotiations. It revealed the American bias towards Israel and

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forced Israel to demonstrate its unwillingness to make concessions for genuine peace and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with full sovereignty. Over the past two decades, the US has continued to pressure Palestinians to abandon their national principles, culminating in early 2020 with President Donald Trump's "Deal of the Century." This plan included moving the American embassy to Jerusalem and granting Israel complete control over the city, resolving long-standing issues in Israel's favor.

The motivations for US mediation in the Middle East are driven by a desire for regional stability and maintaining global standing. American foreign policy aims to secure oil supplies and contain the influence of adversaries, with Israel serving as a strategic ally to meet these interests. The US also sought to enhance its role as an international peacemaker, aiming to reduce its image as a war monger and affirm its capability to resolve international conflicts. This summit was an opportunity for the US to exercise leadership and solidify relationships with its allies in the Middle East.

The US's alliance with Israel is influenced by the Zionist lobby's impact on American foreign policy and the portrayal of Israel as a small, democratic country surrounded by hostile nations. Supporters argue that Israel is a strategic asset, providing significant benefits to the US in terms of geographical location, defense capabilities, and intelligence. This relationship has been maintained to ensure American interests in the region are met, including the control of oil and support of loyal regimes.

President Clinton's legacy and desire for a diplomatic achievement also played a crucial role in the US involvement. Despite advice to postpone the summit for better preparation, Clinton pushed forward, hoping to achieve a significant diplomatic success that would enhance his legacy and benefit the Democratic Party in the upcoming elections. Clinton's belief that any agreement would ease tensions in the peace process drove his determination to hold the summit.

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In the lead-up to the summit, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright engaged in extensive shuttle diplomacy, meeting with Palestinian and Israeli leaders to revive the peace process. Despite Palestinian concerns about the timing and preparation for the summit, American pressure and Israeli insistence led to the decision to proceed. Internal Israeli preparations and American mediation strategies, such as providing incentives and introducing new proposals, shaped the negotiation dynamics. However, the American team's bias towards Israel and the subsequent Palestinian rejection of proposals indicated a flawed mediation approach.

The viewpoints of the involved parties varied significantly. The Palestinian perspective highlighted the American bias and pressure, leading to a sense of frustration and a belief that the US media favored the Israeli narrative. The Israeli perspective portrayed Arafat as rejecting generous offers and depicted the Palestinian leadership as unwilling to compromise. The American perspective emphasized Clinton's efforts and Barak's courage, while utilizing the summit's outcomes in the domestic electoral arena.

Ultimately, the Camp David Summit exposed deep-seated biases and strategic interests that hindered the possibility of a balanced and lasting resolution. The American administration's alignment with Israeli interests and the subsequent handling of the negotiations demonstrated a lack of genuine, impartial mediation, making a lasting peace agreement elusive.

## **General Conclusion**

## General Conclusion

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This study aims to identify whether American mediation during the Camp David Summit was impartial, or leaned toward creating an Israeli-oriented solution. The study provides multifaceted reasoning on this event by analyzing the key milestones in the US-Israel diplomatic relationship and strategic, political, and economic motivations that drove American intervention.

From this research, it can be said that the US mediation in the summit was biased towards Israel. This bias can be observed in the strategies of mediation, the diplomatic efforts, and the framing of narratives, which led to the stagnation of the peace process.

Moreover, findings reveal that there has been a strategic diplomatic relationship between the US and Israel. Such a relationship has an enormous effect on the peace process in the area, as treaties have been made, strategic and military help has been provided, and actions have been taken that are widely perceived as biased, thus affecting the diplomatic situation in the area. The designation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is a clear example of this bias.

Furthermore, the findings of the study show that the United States held the Camp David Summit to attain strategic, political, and economic objectives. These objectives included stabilizing the Middle East, containing extremism, ending President Clinton's tenure on a high note, and promoting the country's international reputation. Besides, the United States aimed to secure economic benefits in the form of assured oil markets and economic/trade opportunities. Direct diplomacy, shuttle diplomacy, the use of expert teams, the employment exertion of high-level pressure, in addition to the compromise proposals are different diplomatic approaches used during the negotiations. However, despite efforts at impartiality, the summit was marred by a perceived lack of fairness, as the Palestinians viewed the U.S. proposals as one-sided or in favour of Israeli interests.

## General Conclusion

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This study is very significant in its academic contribution, as it examines, in a very thorough manner, the multi-dimensional dynamics surrounding the impact of the US-Israel diplomatic relationship on the Middle East peace process. It would, therefore, be important to delve into historical, strategic, political, and economic aspects to unravel this evolution of American foreign policy in the region. It will shed light on US milestones and shifts in foreign policy orientation while pursuing its interests. Besides, the analysis of the summit sheds light on U.S. mediation strategies: what they have been perceived to represent and their effectiveness in facilitating peace negotiations. The present research not only enriches scholarly debates in the field of international relations, but also draws important lessons for policymakers and practitioners on the way of navigating complex diplomatic challenges in the Middle East.

Taking into consideration the potential bias limitations of primary resources, researchers may consider comparative case studies with other diplomatic relationships or peace processes. This will show context and allow the identification of different patterns. Moreover, various interdisciplinary inputs from political science, history, sociology, and international relations are advised in order to enrich the analysis and bring forth fresh interpretations and new perspectives. Lastly, a transparent disclosure of the research methodologies and any possible biases right from the outset can improve the credibility and reliability of future research.

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# **Appendices**

# Appendix 1

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat letter to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. (*PLO-Israel Mutual Recognition – PLO Letter (1993) - Yasser Arafat Foundation*)

September 9, 1993

Yitzhak Rabin

Prime Minister of Israel

Mr. Prime Minister,

The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East.

In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments:

The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.

The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.

The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators

## Appendices

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In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

Sincerely,

Yasser Arafat

Chairman

The Palestine Liberation Organization

# Appendix 2

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin letter to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. (*PLO-Israel Mutual Recognition – Israel Letter (1993) - Yasser Arafat Foundation*)

September 9, 1993

Yasser Arafat

Chairman

The Palestinian Liberation Organization

Mr. Chairman,

In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.

Yitzhak Rabin

Prime Minister of Israel

# Résumé :

Cette étude vise à analyser de manière critique la médiation Américaine lors du Sommet de Camp David en l'an 2000, en particulier si les États-Unis étaient biaisés en faveur d'Israël au détriment de la Palestine. L'objectif central est donc de déterminer si les États-Unis pouvaient être considérés comme neutres et donc efficaces dans leur processus diplomatique durant cette phase critique du conflit Israélo-Palestinien. Pour ce faire, la recherche retrace la trajectoire historique des relations diplomatiques Américano-Israéliennes depuis 1948, afin d'analyser de manière critique la façon dont les variables stratégiques, politiques et économiques ont influencé l'intervention américaine dans le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient. La méthodologie utilisée est la recherche historique. Cette méthode de recherche fournit un outil approprié pour analyser de manière critique les motifs de l'intervention Américaine au Sommet de Camp David, les stratégies utilisées lors de la négociation de la médiation, et les techniques de négociation et les mouvements diplomatiques qui ont suivi. Les résultats indiquent un biais apparent dans l'approche Américaine en faveur d'Israël. Ce biais est cependant évident dans les stratégies, les chemins diplomatiques et les récits des médiateurs Américains lors du sommet. La recherche montre que la relation Américano-Israélienne, caractérisée par une proximité due au soutien stratégique, politique et économique, a activement façonné le processus de paix dans l'ensemble et a la plupart du temps désavantagé les intérêts de la Palestine.

**Mots-clés :** Biais, Israël, Médiation Américaine, Moyen-Orient, Palestine, Processus de paix, Sommet de Camp David.

## المخلص:

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تحليل نقدي للوساطة الأمريكية خلال قمة كامب ديفيد في عام 2000، وتحديد ما إذا كانت الولايات المتحدة منحازة لصالح إسرائيل على حساب فلسطين. والهدف المركزي هو بالتالي تحديد ما إذا كان يمكن اعتبار الولايات المتحدة محايدة وبالتالي فعالة في عملية دبلوماسية بينها في هذه المرحلة الحرجة من الصراع الإسرائيلي-الفلسطيني. لتحقيق ذلك، تتبع البحث المسار التاريخي للعلاقات الدبلوماسية الأمريكية-الإسرائيلية منذ عام 1948، وذلك لتحليل نقدي لكيفية تأثير المتغيرات الاستراتيجية والسياسية والاقتصادية على التدخل الأمريكي في عملية السلام في الشرق الأوسط. المنهجية المستخدمة هي البحث التاريخي. يوفر هذا الأسلوب البحثي أداة مناسبة لتحليل نقدي لدوافع التدخل الأمريكي في قمة كامب ديفيد، والاستراتيجيات المستخدمة خلال مفاوضات الوساطة، والتقنيات التفاوضية والتحركات الدبلوماسية التي تلتها. تشير النتائج إلى وجود انحياز واضح في النهج الأمريكي لصالح إسرائيل. ومع ذلك، فإن هذا الانحياز يبدو واضحًا في الاستراتيجيات والمسارات الدبلوماسية والسرديات التي اتبعتها الوسطاء الأمريكيون خلال القمة. تظهر الدراسة أن العلاقة الأمريكية-الإسرائيلية، التي تتميز بالتقارب بسبب الدعم الاستراتيجي والسياسي والاقتصادي، قد شكلت بشكل نشط عملية السلام بشكل عام وغالبًا ما أضرت بمصالح فلسطين.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** قمة كامب ديفيد، فلسطين، إسرائيل، الوساطة الأمريكية، الانحياز، عملية السلام، الشرق الأوسط.