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**Britain's Loss of International Status and Its Diplomatic Struggle
For the Empowerment of its Foreign Policy
(1945-1990).**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT FOR THE REQUIREMENT OF MASTER DEGREE
IN ENGLISH LITERATURE AND CIVILIZATION**

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DEDICATIONS

I dedicate this work to :

- My whole family (my mother, my two sisters and brothers, my wife and her family members).
- All my English teachers at the University of Laghouat.
- All my friends without exception.
- All those who granted me moral support along my whole studying career, whose words of encouragement and push for tenacity, still ringing in my ears.

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I am, above all, grateful to the almighty ALLAH who granted me this opportunity to realize such a work.

ALLAH's Messenger, Mohamed peace and mercy be upon Him, stated "*Whoever does not thank people (for their favors) is not thankful to ALLAH*".

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	: Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty
CC	: Central Committee
EC	: European Community
ECSC	: European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	: European Economic Committee
EFTA	: European Free Trade Area organization
EIC	: East India Company
EMS	: European Monetary System
EU	: European Union
FCO	: Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FO	: Foreign Office
G7	: Group of seven
GDR	: German Democratic Republic
ICL	: International Commission Law
ICO	: International Community Order
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
INF	: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
IR	: International Relations
LN	: League of Nations
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organizations
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PM	: Prime Minister
SALT	: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCUA	: Suez Canal User's Association
SG	: Secretary General
UN	: United Nations
USA	: United States of America
USSR	: Union of Socialist Soviet Russia
VCCR	: Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
VCDR	: Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
WB	: World Bank
WWI	: First World War
WWII	: Second World War

ABSTRACT

This academic research aims to examine the British diplomatic practices and manoeuvres adopted from 1939 onwards, after Britain had lost its international position and status right after WWII. It also deals with the diplomatic action taken after 1979 to revive Britain's lost status through a rigorous diplomacy. To reach this objective, light is shed on the characteristics of the decline and its causing factors, and a focus is made on the different required diplomatic practices to recover the lost status. Throughout the whole research, information and concepts are introduced thematically following a chronological order, where events and facts are treated on the basis of a historical description supported with a systemic evaluation and analysis. Practically speaking, the work offers a portrait about Britain's high international status experienced up to WWII, the period during which it could build the strongest and most unique Empire whose diplomacy was highly acknowledged. But, right after the war, Britain entered a critical period characterized by a serious decline in terms of its world position and diplomatic efficiency. Growing aware about the alarming situation, far-reaching diplomatic efforts to empower foreign policy, were successfully deployed between 1979 and 1990 by the British government under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher.

Key words :

Great Britain – Loss – International status – Diplomacy – Second World War – Foreign Policy – Empowerment.

CONTENTS

	DEDICATIONS.....	i
	ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S	ii
	LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	iii
	ABSTRACT	iv
	GENERAL INTRODUCTION	01
I	CHAPTER ONE : Background to Pre-WWII British International Status and Diplomacy	
	• Introduction	04
1.1	Historical and Theoretical Framework.	04
	1.1.1 Historical Evolution	04
	1.1.2 Definitions and Main Concepts.	07
1.2	Britain’s International Status and Diplomacy up to 1919.	09
1.3	Inter-War British International Status and Diplomacy (1919-1939).	13
	• Conclusion	15
II	CHAPTER TWO : Loss of Status and British Foreign Policy (1939-1979)	
	• Introduction	16
2.1	Hitler, the War and the Turning Point	16
2.2	Post-War Difficulties and Britain’s Loss of Status	18
2.3	Attitudes Towards the Empire	23
2.4	Anglo-American Special Relationships: A Compulsory Coalition?	25
2.5	Joining the EU : No Way Out?	27
	• Conclusion	30
III	CHAPTER THREE : Britain’s Foreign Policy and the Revival of its Diplomatic Machinery (1979-1990)	
	• Introduction	31
3.1	Thatcher’s Ideology in Context.	31
3.2	Aggressive Diplomacy : Recovering the Falklands.	33
3.3	British-Soviet Relations : Interest and Anti-Communism.	35
3.4	Anglo-American Special Relationships : Support with Interest.	37
3.5	Diplomacy Towards the EU : Sovereignty and National Interest.	39
	• Conclusion	41
	GENERAL CONCLUSION	42
	WORKS CITED	44
	APPENDICES	46

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The post-war world has brought strategic changes in terms of global redistribution of powers and rearranging many countries' international positions. Such changes affected the nature of the existing international system requiring new forms of cooperation between nations. For this, new diplomatic practices and manoeuvres have been introduced to adjust these new world circumstances. In this vein, the problematic that lies is the whatness and the nature of post-war diplomatic practices that a nation adopts to either preserve and sustain already established strong foreign policy or empower it.

Back into history, Britain, our main concern in this paper, had been for a long period of time the Empire upon which the *sun never set*. It could expand territorially and as a result acquire control upon many countries all over the world. But its international strength during the post-war period started declining as the war had brought with it strong "winds of change" clearing the way to the emergence of the USA and the USSR, as new world powers that entered a competition for the leadership of world affairs.

This reality required from all successive British governments to struggle diplomatically to regain the lost position. Whereas, the years since 1979 onwards are considered the most flourishing in terms of empowering British Foreign Policy. This research will discuss the given problematic through studying and analysing post-WWII British Foreign Policy and diplomacy.

In this vein, the main objectives are grouped within the following set :

- 1- To shed light on British pre-war international status and diplomatic practices.
- 2- To identify and analyse the causes and circumstances leading to Britain's loss of international status, from 1945 up to 1979.
- 3- To discuss and analyze British diplomacy practices between 1979 and 1990 for reviving the strength of its foreign policy.

In order to reach these objectives, the questions listed below have to be answered :

- 1- What were the main characteristics of the pre-war British diplomacy?
- 2- In which sense had Britain lost its status during the Cold War period (1945-1990)?

- 3- How was the British diplomacy characterized from 1945 up to 1990?
- 4- Could Britain revive its international position and foreign policy?

Accordingly, a set of books, official papers and published works, was selected, consulted and analyzed. Thematically, a number of sources treated diplomacy and Foreign Policy in terms of theory and practice, by offering the historical and theoretical frameworks that are necessary for understanding British foreign policy and diplomacy. For instance, David Sanders through his book entitled *Losing an Empire, Finding a role : Introduction to British Foreign Policy since 1945*, tries to depict British history since the early time, the thing that offered the necessary historical facts about the post-war era. Moreover, K.C. Byrde's research of 2012, entitled *To what extent World War Two, was the catalypte or cause of decolonization?* has granted clear clarifications about the post-war period by enumerating its legacies on Britain in the different domains mainly the political and economic ones. More information are inspired by the researcher from the book *A companion to contemporary Britain 1939-2000*, for John Addison et al., since it regroups a series of academic researches about British domestic and external affairs from 1945 up to 2000.

To assess the extent to which the British government managed to revive its lost status, plenty of information and facts could be inspired from Paul Sharp's *Thatcher's diplomacy : The revival of British Foreign Policy*. The source examines deeply the period of Thatcher's premiership from 1979 to 1990. It was the period when British Foreign Policy and diplomacy reached its peak. Last and not least, there are other primary sources that offered extra information and more illustrations as being authentic papers, such as the United Nations' Charter (1945), and Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR-1961). In the light of what has been said above, this research aims at gathering all the necessary aspects of post-war British diplomacy and Foreign Policy in this dissertation. Information and concepts are presented chronologically and thematically following a methodology based on historical description and systemic analysis of facts.

Structurally, the work is divided into three main chapters in attempt to answer the questions previously stated. The first chapter is devoted to shed light, first, on the general backgrounds about the topic of diplomacy in terms of its historical and theoretical formworks. This section is jugged important to start with since it will provide the raw materials that enable both the researcher and the reader to master the different concepts

closely linked to the topic. The second part makes a focus on the pre-war British international status and diplomacy up to 1939.

The second chapter treats post-war Britain from 1939 up to 1979, a period that is characterized by a loss in terms of the international status at the different levels. In this respect, the work aims to explain the circumstances leading to the loss, and then the diplomatic practices adopted as a reaction. The third chapter will discuss the period between 1979 and 1990, and to assess the extent to which Thatcher's government managed to translate into practice its political wills devoted to the revival of British international status and the empowerment of its Foreign Policy.

To close with, this academic work has got professional motives to choose diplomacy as a research area. The researcher has been promoted to the rank of a diplomat. For this reason, it is a must to guarantee a complete compatibility and correlation between the topic and the professional career, as highlighted by the different working Laws and Orders.

Academically, it is important to study the British post-war diplomatic practices from the point of view that Britain was for a long period of time, the Empire upon which "sun have never set". But right after the Second World War its international status started declining clearing the way for the emergence of new superpowers. So the research will answer the problematic whether Britain could recover the alarming situation or not.*

As a final matter of fact, this humble academic achievement may be considered as a reference for futher studies related to the topic. It will also contribute in the enrichment of our University's library.

CHAPTER 1 ONE :

Background to Pre-WWII British International Status and Diplomacy

 **Introduction :**

Defining the bold lines of Foreign Policy is a compulsory strategic step for all states to be able to integrate within the International Community System. Meanwhile, the success of this policy relies on the extent to which the diplomatic machine is engaged in terms of its orientations and targets aimed at. For this, Foreign Policy and Diplomacy are interlinked concepts in the sense that both affect each other. This chapter is devoted to throw light on the historical evolution of diplomacy and its theoretical framework. Secondly, pre-WWII British diplomacy will be put under review up to 1939.

1.1. Historical and Theoretical Framework of diplomacy :**1.1.1. Historical Evolution diplomacy :**

Diplomacy is as old as humanity because man used to interchange and cooperate with others since antiquity, but its emergence as a specific concept didn't enter into usage till the late eighteenth century. As far as we are able to go back into history, we can distinguish between three main distinctive diplomatic periods : (a) the *Medieval* one starting from the year 476 AD to 1475, (b) the *Modern*, that lasted till 1914, and (c) *New diplomacy*, known as "Democratic diplomacy", which has been conceptualized by the US President Wilson after the 1st World War (Bjola, 6,8). These three periods are detailed as follows :

a) Medieval diplomacy : The Greeks were the very first to develop something approaching a regular inter-state system of communication based on the policy of sending special envoys and missionaries, so that to normalize relations and regulate disputes or any state of misunderstanding and tension. They were sent under the shape of *Ad Hoc*¹ missions organised in three distinctive groups: (1) the *Angelos*, as messengers and elders sent for high specific missions, (2) the *Keryx*, as envoys having the mission of keeping inter-state safety, and (3) the *Proxenos* who were designated to represent the State in the interior plan, by hosting guests and official visitors. This multi-faceted system of

¹ The concept comes from the Latin words that mean "for this". The term is, often, used as a criticism, in the sense that something done *ad hoc* is done hastily and can be ill thought out, serving only to address a problem in the short term. Government programs, for example, are often described as *ad hoc*.

representation had made ancient Greece diplomacy highly sophisticated as being characterised by “ ... *the constant flow of missions, the mutual respect of diplomatic immunities, the treaties and alliances that resulted from diplomatic interaction and the high interaction of public debate...*” (Qtd in Bjola et al., 13).

Moreover, Greek diplomacy was a peace-oriented one through concluding agreements and treaties. If not fruitful, arbitration was a secondary principle to deal with in order to resolve conflicts, where arbiters were designated either from biased states or from the staff of highly reputed philosophers. Even sports and culture had been engaged, for the first time, by the Greeks in order to buttress up the diplomatic practices in the shape of organizing festivals and Olympic Games. Statistically, around 46 cases of dispute had been resolved between 300 and 100 BC (Bjola 10).

As time passed, the diplomatic practice had seen more progress through introducing the rules of a “*civilized conduct*” that had to reach the targets of :

... [realizing] fair treatment of prisoners, non-use of poisoned weapons and treacherous stratagems, observance of truces and armistices, prohibition of warfare during religious festivals or athletic contests, as well as inviolability of important temples, sanctuaries and embassies. (Bjola et al., 15).

The Romans, on the other hand, had followed the Greeks by orienting their international relations towards peace. So, no war could take place unless a legal justification was offered. Roman envoys were called *Oraters*. They were given a senatorial rank. Their duty was to report to the Senate about their missions for further decision-making. In the same context, after the formation of the Empire, governors or vice-roys had been nominated to manage the different regions over occupation as representatives and mediators who would report to the Emperor from whom they were receiving instructions about the conduct of the diplomatic practices.

From 1400s onwards, the world, mainly Europe, had entered a critical period characterized by the outbreak of wars and military clashes in different regions, which

consequently perturbed relations between many European countries, most importantly; Britain, Spain, France, Belgium and Italy. For this, the maintenance of the international relations was a necessary step and deal in order to stabilize the domestic and foreign affairs as well.

b) Modern diplomacy: The main distinctive feature of this period was the establishment of resident Ambassadors. In this context, the role of diplomacy had been widened and oriented towards practicing intelligence by gathering information about the host country concerning especially its politico-economic sectors. As time passed, the Westphalia conference held in 1648 in Italy, is acknowledged to be the milestone of today's international relations system that had conceived the headlines of the diplomatic principles by offering the ambassadorial staff a set of immunities where the most important ones are (1) being immune from the physical inviolability, (2) being immune from the indictment for civil or criminal offences, and (3) receiving freedom to practice religion in private (Bjola et al., 20-21).

As far as religion is concerned, there had been considerable contributions of religious men in the enrichment of the diplomatic practice. For instance, the Pope had introduced, in 1504, a memorandum placing himself first proceeded by the kings of France, Spain, Aragon and Portugal, respectively. This memorandum came to resolve the problem of precedence. Along approximately two centuries, religion remained sacred, considering respect towards foreign representatives a holy practice (Bjola et al., 22).

c) New diplomacy: It had been introduced right after the First World War (WWI-1919), as a receipt to develop and strengthen the diplomatic practices in its quality and quantity. The main reasons leading to the emergence of this type can be grouped around the followings. First, the growth of the desire for more territorial expansion expressed by of the Great Powers, especially Germany which was the main causer of many diplomatic incidents that led to the outbreak of military confrontations. Secondly, the scientific progress that introduced new technologies and means of communication (telegraph, radio, telephone ...), thanks to which diplomacy had marked a quantum leap and a remarkable development. The third piece of evidence is the influence of the United States on the world affairs.

“New diplomacy” had been introduced by the US President Woodrow Wilson, TO refresh the conduct of external affairs, and also as a response to the existing European diplomatic practices that were highly criticized and distrusted by the Americans. The main points that caused this state of distrust are the question of “secret negotiations” and the principle “balance of power”. (Bjola et al., 28-30)

For this, *Wilsonian* concept had fixed three guiding principles which are still considered as the fertile ground for diplomacy. The first is *Public accountability* that comes as a response to secrecy in the conduct of negotiations. For this, transparency and taking account of the public became new prospects. The second is *self-determination* that strived against imperialism and colonialism, and calls for equality and democracy, considering all nations alike in treatments and have equal rights in terms of their relationships with each other. The third is *collective security* that aims at reinforcing the two previous principles, since settling the issue of security collectively is the most vital factor thanks to which the world’s progress can be achieved and sustained. Moreover, it makes Foreign Policy diplomacy accountable, and also grants a military mutual trust to avoid competition (Bjola et al., 30,31,35,38,39). In this vein, The League of Nations’ Charter aimed at strengthening these concepts, mainly by virtue of its 10th and 15th articles (App.1 p.46)².

1.2. Definitions and Main Concepts :

Theoretically speaking, the study of diplomacy as a pivotal issue in the field of International Relations (IR) had been, since a long period of time, a subject of multiple studies and an area of scholarly endeavours. But scholars and practitioners haven’t come up with a final and a generally agreed on definition. As for Constantinou, the term derives from the Greek word *Diploma* that may refer to the documents interchanged between the existing societies at that time. Its usage had expanded to cover the inter-states relationships and the envoys who, as a result, were given a specific set of rights (Constantinou et al. 13).

On the other hand, diplomacy as defined by G.R Berridge and Alan James in their book *Dictionary of Diplomacy*, is “*the conduct of relations between sovereign states through the medium of officials based at home or abroad*”, and, therefore, is exploited as

² The whole Charter is available at the UNO’s website : <http://www.un.org/en/> (Last check : 25-05-2018 at : 23h00).

being “... *the principle means by which states communicate ...*” (pp. 68, 96). From this definition, we can conclude that diplomacy can reach the communicative finalities that states aim at, through establishing relations and interacting directly, for instance, by means of resident embassies.

For Ernest Satow, diplomacy is “*the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of relations between the governments of independent states ... by peaceful means*” (Berridge 70). This definition is judged to be deficient and narrow since it can't be applied in today's international system that is characterized by its multiplicity and diversity, and which witnesses many changes day after the other.

As a modernist politician, Harold Nicolson states that diplomacy is “*the management of International Relations by negotiations ... managed by ambassadors and envoys*” (Nicolson 15). For him, the function of diplomats is to give the suitable remedies for cases of discontent between states. The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy defines it as being “*the conduct of relations between sovereign states through the medium of officials based at home or abroad*” so that to “... *promote negotiations particularly in circumstances of crisis*” (Berridge, 69-70).

Alfred Heinz Kissinger³ comes to strengthen Nicolson's definition by considering diplomacy as “...*the art of relating states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force*”. By underlining the utterance “*the exercise of force*”, it is quite important to notice that diplomats contribute in the process of settling peace, but experience shows that the way round is true, since there are those who took place in the outbreak of some wars, disputes and political tensions between states.

After having shedding light on the whatness and the different concepts of diplomacy, it is now quite important to know its different functions, orientations and forms. First, concerning the functions, diplomacy can be practiced between two states or dealers in the International Community, forming a shape of bilateral cooperation, whereas any sort of practice where the number of dealers exceeds two is classified as being multilateral.

³ **Henry Alfred Kissinger** (1923), an American political scientist, diplomat and geopolitical consultant who served as the United States Secretary of State and National Security Advisor under the presidential administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.

The emergence of *bilateral diplomacy* was thanks to the establishment of the first resident embassy in 1535 by King of France, François I, in Constantinople at the court of Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, Suleiman the Magnificent. As a result, cooperation could be settled and conducted between the two states. This kind of diplomatic practice had been criticized as being too slow in resolving problems that took place between many countries. For this, it became very necessary to think about procedures to gather all the interested countries at once, so that to discuss the different topics of common concern.

Consequently, multilateralism had been introduced as a concept and a practice as well, thanks to the creation of the League of Nations in 1920, enabling many parties to discuss and debate any issue of common concern at the same moment, as for instance being engaged in the process of peace settlement that the League was calling for. The United Nations Organization was founded in 1945 to strengthen these principles of multilateral cooperation between all dealing states in the international community.

Furthermore, each diplomatic process can have one of the two conventional orientations, either peace or war. Peace-oriented diplomacy is the attempt of any international entity to either give an end to states of war, tension and military dispute, or to keep and preserve an already established stability and security. By contrast, War-oriented diplomacy is the attempts deployed in order to look for legitimacy to intervene militarily in any region in the world, by mainly criminalizing a country's leading regime and condemning it of being authoritarian, terrorist or guilty of sorts of humanitarian disasters, or composing a real and momentum threat over the international security (Dr Sidi M., 1-4).

In practice, diplomacy can be conducted in different forms and shapes. This can be done either by holding negotiations, conferences and summits, establishing resident embassies and consulates in the host countries with which relations are connected, or by organizing special missions and initiating sessions of mediation (App.2 p 47)⁴.

1.2. Britain's International Status and Diplomacy up to 1919 :

From the 18th century onwards, Britain could build the greatest Empire in the world thanks to its great territorial expansion over many regions along the continents. The

⁴ For further details and information, check the book : Diplomacy – Theory and Practice (2010), for G. R. Berridge. Available on the net via : <http://gen.lib.rus.ec/> (Last check : 25-05-2018 at : 23h30)

motivations behind this policy of expansionism were purely commercial. Moreover, the emergence of the Industrial Revolution had highly heightened Britain's desire to acquire more territories to guarantee, on the one hand, diversified sources of raw materials, and on the other, ready markets for its manufactured goods. Since the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 up to 1914, it could gain control over around 400 millions peoples of different races and regions, with an estimate of 10 million square miles of territorial expansion (Garnett et al., 60).

With regard to its treatment of the international community, Britain had, since the 1700s, adopted a Foreign Policy based on the principle of the "balance of power" that required a great reliance on the military sector. Its aims were preserving the established links with the Vice-royalties of the Empire, and preventing any challenging power that may threaten its dominance over the world's commerce and trade. In this respect, the British could build a strong maritime armada forming highly professional and qualified mobile military troops. As a security procedure, military bases were established in the colonies everywhere, in order to protect British interests there, safe and secure its ships and trading routes. (Sanders, 19).

Commercially speaking, some companies had been granted Royal charters and were delegated to deal with trade in the different continents. The most promising and important maritime trading one was the East India Company (EIC). According to statistics, Britain had reached the top-rate of about 23 per cent of output manufactured goods, in comparison to the USA with 14.3 and Germany with 8.5, only (Garnett et al., 60).

The "balance of power" was the diplomacy practiced by Britain that made it "*... see herself as the champion of the rights of small nations*" (Nicolson, 134). From a British view, any threat coming from the Great Powers, should be opposed and deterred. Ideologically, for Britain it was not only a matter of interest to adopt a world policy as such, but, indeed, a matter of "*a law of nature*", to recall the words of the Head of the Western Department, Sir Eyre Crowe (Nicolson, 134).

Although London's pre-1914 Foreign Policy relied highly on military power, diplomacy was also practiced at a certain level. It had taken the form of both formal and secret treaties, agreements and coalitions of a bilateral or regional rank. Consequently, its

Foreign Policy was “... directed towards organizing coalitions against whatever country may, at any time, be the strongest power in Europe” (Nicolson, 135).

On the political level, it is noticed that there were no planned or long-term guiding principles of British Foreign Policy. This what led Frederick the Great to confirm that “*The English have no system*” (Nicolson, 136), and till now Britain still didn't have a concrete constitution. But, by analysing Gladstone's letter (App.3, p.52) that he addressed, on April 17th, 1869, to Queen Victoria, we can underline so many important facts that became the principles of British Foreign Policy, which are till nowadays practiced and considered as its directives and guiding principles. In the light of this official document, Dr Kantorowicz had, in his work entitled *the Spirit of British Policy*, evaluated this policy as being characterized of chivalry, objectivity and humanitarianism. According to his analysis, the only defect laid in its irrationality due to the lack of prospects by treating the different world affairs after their rise rather than before (Nicolson, 138-139).

In the same context, to prove this state of irrationality let's take the example of the Sepoys mutiny that took place in British-India between 1857-58. The mutiny was led by Indian officers incorporated within the British troops, as a reaction to the ill-treatment they experienced. As a response, London had passed a decision to dissolve the East India Company whose managers became condemned of corrupt. By the year 1883, a vice-roy was appointed in order to manage the British interests in that colony.

As a matter of fact, among the famous diplomatic practices adopted by British governments since the mid-1800 was the *splendid isolation*. It was the diplomacy that required avoiding any external conflict that can affect and disturb the well-ongoing of its commercial interests in the colonies. But, the emergence of the Russian threat was a sufficient factor to descend from this state of isolationism. Japan was the important ally with which Britain could negotiate the terms of a defensive alliance. This decision aimed at preventing the increased Russian desire to gain control over India (Garnett et al., 65).

On the plan of management, Britain was among the very first countries interested in conducting external affairs. For this, two departments, each of which conducted by a Secretary of State, were established. One department was concerned with the Northern issues whereas the other one took in charge the Southern's issues. But, the unstable political circumstances in American British colonies, had made an urge and an absolute

necessity to delegate a third Secretary of State in 1768, on the head of a new Department devoted to the question of its Colonies all over the world (Garnett et al., 29).

By the year 1782, Northern and Southern Departments had been linked together forming an organ of a ministerial rank called Foreign Office (FO). It was established to guarantee a well-conduct of Foreign Affairs and all sorts of international relations cooperation. On the other hand, due to the unprecedented increase in terms of territorial expansion that Britain could realize, the Department of Colonies was promoted in 1854, to an Office in charge of Overseas Affairs with more enlarged prerogatives and duties (29).

During the 18th and 19th centuries, Britain could be an interesting partner that enriched and highly contributed in the enrolment of many international meetings and conferences devoted to the settlement of many states of tension, amongst which are the following set below :

- Congress of Utrecht held between 1712-13, to resolve the question of Spanish succession.
- Concert of Europe that took place in 1814, in London, right after the end of the Napoleonic wars, to discuss the world's circumstances after the decline of the French Empire.
- Congress of Vienna organised in 1815, to resolve the problematic of precedence by establishing it within the diplomatic representations according to the date of presenting the credentials.
- Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818, to support and enforce question of precedence in terms of fixing the signature of treaties to be in an alphabetical order.
- Berlin Conference of 1884, that was devoted to resolve the diplomatic escalations between the Great Powers on the issue of the partitioning of Africa.

By analysing the respect towards international diplomatic customs, England could be considered as one of the countries that had effectively offered legal protection to foreign diplomatic agents installed over its lands. Queen Anne Act of 1706, for instance, had granted Diplomatic privileges aiming at preventing diplomats from being subject to the normal legal process without, of course, breaking down the law (Bruns, 198). Many other facilities and regulations had been passed offering more privileges and immunities. In this respect, London became an interesting home that, by the year 1913, could host nine

embassies and thirty legations counting a total of 543 foreign diplomatic agents (Bruns, 197).

The beginning of the 20th century was a turning point in the course of British International Affairs. Accepting the establishment of a self-governing system within some colonies, was an unprecedented decision to be officially approved. As a result, the status of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa, was transformed from being colonies to White Dominion. They could, ever since, conduct and control their national affairs autonomously.

This historical fact is said to be the first hints towards the decline of the international position of Great Britain, since granting a self-governing status had paved the way to the rise of nationalism which, itself, had resulted in decolonization everywhere in the Empire. In the same vein, the 20th century is characterised by the emergence of the United States and Japan as new competing powers. They could develop strong industries thanks to the technological advances. Meanwhile, British industrial capacities started declining, adding to this its weak and less equipped army and the failure of its maritime power.

These factors led Britain to become weaker than it was earlier, but in spite of that, the government decided to enter the First World War to protect and sustain the Empire. Another reason of its participation was to prevent any further German expansion. Victory stood in the side of Britain, the factor that increased enormously its appetite to double its international role during the inter-war era.

1.3. Inter-War British international status and diplomacy (1919-39)

Britain was one of the those countries that could realize a consistent victory in the war, a fact that enabled it to acquire control and mandates over new territories, such as Tanganyika, South West Africa (Namibia), Turkey, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq and the Persian Gulf. But, the British military forces had encountered a severe state of weakness which led the Chief of the General Staff to rise the question of whether Britain would still acquire its strength or not (Sanders, 23).

At the international level, the war had affected the world system and order marking a quantum leap in terms of the formation in 1920 of a first global institution called the

League of Nations, where many countries could be gathered around one table at once, all working for the purpose of the maintenance of relations and settling peace and safety. The League aimed at forming a new international order where formal channels of cooperative diplomacy had been established on the basis of the Wilsonian principle of *collective security*, replacing the previously practiced one called the *balance of power*, (Sanders, 23-24).

Britain joined the League and showed its commitment towards its different declarations and resolutions. This effectively affected the conduct of British Foreign Policy, since the League had highlighted in its agenda, the topic of developing the international law as a priority. For this, London's international role started being restricted and narrowed. For instance, the four-year war experienced between Britain and Turkey in 1925, over the issue of possessing the Mosul was ended by the intervention of the League's Council that always favoured pacific settlement of disputes. Its members agreed on offering the territory to Iraq, a decision that was rejected by Turkey leading to another state of tension with Britain. In front of this problematic, British diplomatic machinery was engaged and could, by the end, convince the Turkish side to sign a treaty in June 1926, recognizing the Council's decision.

By the end of the 1920s, Britain could be safe from the international economic crisis that swept the world. This situation had enormously enabled it to guarantee an economic and financial ease for more than a decade. *The Ottawa Conference* of 1932, known by the *Imperial Preference*, had buttressed up this state of rest, since it ensured trade from the colonies to Britain at low tariffs, whereas with high ones for the rest of the world. These economic circumstances had put aside all competitors, enabling Britain's currency to be not only the most available, but moreover, of the highest value in the international financial market till 1939, on the basis of 1 pound (£) to 4 dollars (\$). The pound could be the currency by which, approximately, the half of the world's trade and economic affairs, were being conducted.

By the year 1933, the world had witnessed the emergence of the German Nazi regime under the Leadership of Adolph Hitler. Consequently, some signs of change started taking place at the level of the international system and order. At the very first, successive British governments preferred treating Hitler's dictatorship and authoritarian regime peacefully, though an alarming intelligence report (App.4, p.53) had been elaborated five

years before (1928), by the British Ambassador to Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold. He had forecasted the rise of a Nazi threat in the region, a fact that would make the outbreak of a Second World War approaching (Sanders, 27).

As far as Germany is concerned, Hitler started his attempts to revive the German international position by focussing on executing a special defence programme to develop German military powers. Behaviours as such were criticized as being a break-down within the clauses of the *Treaty of Versailles* of 28 June 1919, that concluded the decision to limit the German armament. In response, British Baldwin government continued dealing with its co-operative diplomacy with Germany in the hope that this latter would re-examine its Foreign Policy, but nothing could be realised on the ground.

Even under the premiership of Neville Chamberlain since 1937, the same policy towards Germany was exercised. The PM was highly relying on the advice and recommendations of Neville Henderson, Ambassador of Britain to Berlin, who suggested avoiding conflicts with Germany since, according to him, there had been no strategic interests in Eastern Europe, and any response would cost Britain heavily without gains (Sanders, 28).

Chamberlain's suppositions started betraying him when he noticed, in August 1938, the first military moves of Hitler to annex Czechoslovakia. As a result, a meeting was held a month later in Berlin, gathering the two leaders and other representatives from France and Italy, in order to discuss the Czech question. The meeting was concluded by an agreement about the right for Germany to annex the territory of Sudetenland, while *Hitler* would consult Britain whenever there would be conflicts and tensions.

Conclusion :

Up to 1939, Britain could build the strongest empire in the world, a situation that enabled it to dominate the world affairs. As a result, its diplomacy could be the most influential. Moreover, the first seeds that paved the way to the decline of its status came as a consequence to the emergence of new superpowers, namely the USA and Germany. The following chapter will discuss in details this state of decline.

CHAPTER 2 TWO :

Loss of Status and British Foreign Policy (1939-1979)

Introduction :

The post-war world witnessed several changes that affected the world map in terms of redistributing the power and rearranging many countries' positions. Among the factors that led to these changes are the emergence of the authoritarian and dictatorship Nazi regime, and the economic and financial crisis that followed the war. Britain was one of those countries being affected. For this, light will be shed on the circumstances to Britain's loss of its international status during the period from 1939 up to 1979, which are, principally, the emergence of the Nazi threat, the economic and financial crisis led by the war, and the emergence of the USA and the USSR as new superpowers.

2.1. Hitler, the War and the Turning Point :

On March 1939, Hitler declared a massive military attack to invade Czechoslovakia, he disappointed the promises he granted to his British homologue during the Berlin meeting held on September 1938. At that time could Chamberlain realize the greatness of the mistake he committed by ignoring Rumbold's alarming report of 1928, believing in the extent to which the Nazi threat that was growing. Furthermore, he acknowledged the failure of his government's diplomacy to control and influence Hitler's policies, expressing his state of anxiety about the future of the world's peace and security, admitting that "... *it was impossible to deal with Hitler after he had thrown all his assurances to the wind*" (Sanders, 29). Even the League of Nations failed in its attempts to pass a resolution to condemn the German military intervention in the region, which drove the world to a Second World War.

British diplomacy towards German militarism was seen as a kind of classic *balance of power*, which was dictating that "*my enemy's enemy is my friend*". In practice, Britain wanted to drive and sustain Hitler in its side in order to form a barrier in front of the spread of the Soviet Union's Communism, allowing on the other side the capitalists to emerge and enforce their positions. But during the war, this strategy had been completely changed. Britain attempted to keep close relations with Stalin since he became the enemy of Hitler who was receiving the same state of hatred from London. As an act of support, the Soviets received by October 1941, around 450 aircraft from the British government. By the year

1942, the mutual relations between the two powers, were extended thanks to the signature of the *Anglo-Soviet 20-year Mutual Aid Treaty*⁵.

Another matter of evidence is the desire of Chamberlain's government to gain much more time to prepare the adequate financial circumstances to modernise and equip the army. In fact, this strategy could grant its fruits when a crucial victory was gained during the Battle of Britain in 1940 (30).

In the same year, Britain concluded an agreement with the United States, called the *destroyers-for-bases*, enabling the Americans to exploit the British bases in Canada and the Caribbean, where in return, Britain could receive a number of 50 destroyers. Moreover, the *Arcadia conference* that took place in December 1941, in Washington, had concluded the Anglo-American alliance to take revenge from Japan after its attacks on Pearl Harbour, and the British Colonies Malaya and Singapore.

By time, Britain, the United States and The Soviet Union could compose the bloc of the *Big Three*⁶. They met in Teheran in 1943 to discuss the post-war international order, but the meeting didn't reach its targets. A year later, Churchill and Roosevelt stayed together at the *Dumbarton Oaks Conference*, and managed to establish a fruitful debate that resulted the preparation of the basic ground upon which the United Nations Organization had been built in 1945 (36).

By evaluating the legacies of WWII, Britain was among those that had been highly affected due to its direct involvement in the war. This latter had caused big economic damages that led to a serious decline at different levels. For this, huge efforts were seen necessary to be deployed on the internal and external plans. But this didn't change Britain's Foreign Policy since the principal of remaining an international power was strengthened by the Labour Government that came into power right after the war, under the premiership of Clement Atlee.

⁵ Concluded between the UK and the USSR, in London on 26 May 1942, to establish a military and political alliance during WWII and for 20 years after. The treaty was signed by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov.

⁶ Coined in 1944 by Winston Churchill referring to the-military alliance consisting of the three major Allied powers of WWII : the USSR, the USA, and the UK. It is often called the *Strange Alliance*, because it united the world's greatest capitalist state, the greatest communist state and the greatest colonial power

This policy had been inspired from the manifesto of the new economic and social consensus set by Beveridge in 1944. The reporter had insisted on the absolute necessity to maintain a substantial overseas trade. It was also seen vital that Britain would play a forceful role in the framing of a new international economic order, thanks to its long experience as a world trading and financial power. Furthermore, Britain's future role should be oriented, as established in the report, towards the promotion of the economic development in the backward regions all over the world.

This strategy aimed at assuring the sustainability of the basic elements of the old colonial system which are respectively, to guarantee sources of raw materials and natural wealth, to provide opened markets for the manufactured goods, and to over-spread the English ideology, language and culture under the concept of Britishness.

Moreover, *Atlee's* government had set the strategy of future British Foreign Policy under the emblem of "*never again*". It means that serious errors committed earlier must not be repeated, on the light of the following cautions: (a) No more appeasement, (b) no more neglect of Britain's defences, and (c) no more refusal to enter into military commitment on the continent.

Furthermore, since Britain could, previously, gain control over many countries all over the world, it was seen very necessary for the successive governments since 1945 onwards, to preserve the image of Britain as a world power that must, as a result, contribute in the conduct of the new international affairs and in shaping the post-war order. These finalities were desirably affirmed by the Labour and Conservative Governments that were joined together for more than three decades, under the umbrella of the so-called Consensus.

2.2. Post-war Difficulties and Britain's Loss of International Status

Directly involved in the war, Britain witnessed a serious damage to its economy, finance and industry. To contain that critical situation, Britain asked for a loan in order to bypass the danger. For this, John Maynard Keynes⁷ was charged by Prime Minister *Clement Attlee* to negotiate with the American government a loan of \$5 million (Byrde, 5).

⁷ **John Maynard Keynes** (1883-1946), one of the most influential British economists of the 20th century, whose ideas fundamentally changed the theory and practice of macroeconomics and the economic policies of governments, which became known as Keynesianism.

After negotiations, Britain could, receive only \$3.7 million at 2% of interest per annum. What is necessary to be noticed is that, as time passed, the United States had highly invested in this question of the loan by making pressure on successive Britain governments, to opt for the process of decolonization and its withdrawal from the Suez Canal. It was effectively a hard experience for Britain when finding itself in a state of compulsory obedience due to the economic and financial weaknesses it was suffering from.

In the same context, the previously strong pound and worldwide available currency, started suffering from a state of devaluation. It declined in 1949 to 1£ against \$2.80 (4). In order to contain the situation, Britain created a form of sterling area that included the commonwealth countries. This financial policy had a two edged aim, on the one hand, to rescue the sterling from more devaluation, and, on the other one, to prevent these countries from flying to other currencies mainly the dollar (Addison et al., 447).

But this policy didn't reach its finalities since the sterling continued its decline till its complete devaluation in December 1967. This critical situation had broken London's back creating a state of financial instability that urged Britain to ask for a rescue package from the International Monetary Fund in 1976 (468-477).

By the end of the 1970s, Britain was depicted as the “*sick man of Europe*”, since it had entered a critical period of “*Declinism*” characterized by a great defect in the commercial, technological and managerial domains, that swept harshly the economic sector. This state of decline can be linked to problems related, not only to particular policy decisions or institutional arrangements, but also to problems of culture and wider assumptions of British society. In this context, the writer Arthur Koestler commented on this fact in his collection entitled *Suicide of a nation*, claiming :

... *psychological attitudes are at the root of the economic evils – not the loss of Empire, not the huge sums we must spend on armaments, not the misfortune that the steam engine was invented by an Englishman. We are at the moment dying by the mind ...* (166).

In this vein, the reason, in Thatcher's convictions, that led to this state of "psychological decline" was the policy of State assistance that taught the Englishmen principles of reliance and laziness. Her coming into power in 1979 had brought new thoughts and changed the mentalities towards self-reliance and hard-working as secret keys of success.

The loss of the Suez is another factor that had highly worsened the situation. The Canal had got a very significance in the course of British imperial system, where its loss was of a high negative impact over both the political and economic plans. Historically speaking, Britain became the unique dominator of the Canal Zone after the French recognition on the light of the *Entente Cordiale* signed, in 1882, between the two sides.

Britain could highly benefit politically in terms of possessing a maritime lifeline opened as a passage in favour of its military troops towards the Far-east. Economically speaking, the canal was considered also as an overseas passage for British trading armada. As time passed, post-war Britain entered a sharp race and competition with the newly emerged superpowers namely the USA and the USSR. As a matter of fact, the impacts of the Cold War reached the Middle East leading to the outbreak of a state of tension over the issue of occupying the Canal, the factor that started threatening British interests in the region.

Since the Suez Canal was of great importance to Britain, around 50.000 soldiers were sent to Egypt (Cairo, Alexandria and the Canal Zone), though a decision had been passed to withdraw the majority of the overseas British military troops due to the state of hostility declared, in order to encounter the financial crisis.

Being afraid from the Russian intervention in the region, Washington deployed enormous efforts in order to prevent the spread of Communism through the pressure that it made and imposed on Britain to stop its military movement in the region. The pressure was under the umbrella of threatening to damage British currency and cutting off oil supplies coming from Latin America. Furthermore, the subject of previous US loans was also exploited intelligently as to remind London about the precedent American favour. On a wider plan, the Suez Canal User's Association had been engaged by the US government under its Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in order both to avoid British use of force, and to prevent further Russian intervention.

Britain declared military attacks with the help of France, from 29 October to 6 November, causing thousands casualties and several damages especially in the Egyptian capital. The situation called for the intervention of the UN's Security Council that passed, on October 31st, an instruction to "*retain from the use of force*". Whereas, clashes continued till the establishment of the resolution of the UN's General Assembly, on November 2nd, ordering for a ceasefire and immediate withdrawal from the region.

Losing the Suez Canal was the main factor leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Anthony Eden from the office in 1957. Furthermore, this incident caused a great economic disaster which paved the way for many changes in British policies, such as the speeding up of the process of decolonization, and the willingness to enter the European Economic Council.

In the light of the facts discussed above, successive post-war British governments started gradually orienting most of their diplomatic practices towards keeping peace for the following reasons to have a cut-period to evaluate the gains and the loss of the war, and be able to reconstruct what had been damaged, and plan for a promising future, avoid any factor that may, on one hand, weaken the treasury causing sharp financial deficit, or affect negatively its strategies on the domestic plan, and buttress up the well on-going of its international trade and investment on the basis of an opened economic system, for which serious political wills were needed to be devoted.

On the other side, many practitioners in diplomacy and politicians, especially from the side of the opposition, had highly criticized this diplomatic practice, considering it a kind of retirement from the international scene and an act of self-moral resignation. For them, Britain's position had greatly changed for the worse and its prestige and reputation had dramatically collapsed. Consequently, there had been many requirements for a necessary revival of the lost status.

In the aftermath of the war, the Labour government under the premiership of Atlee, found itself in a crossroad, where it had to choose one of these four options, either to (1) retire from the international scene since the weaknesses were permanent and heavy, (2) play a role as one of the new middle powers and contribute during the workshops devoted to the maintenance of the international order with the collaboration of the United States and a commitment with the United Nations' orders and resolutions, (3) preserve narrower

role as a great power until recovery from the impacts of the war, or (4) continue acting as a world power as if nothing had been changed (Sharp, 3).

By analysing these options, after considering early British history, including the ideologies and psychology of the Englishman who is described, in the words of Dr. Heinrich Heine, as “*the most odious race that God ... has ever created*” (Nicolson, 139), we can obtain the following result : The first option wouldn't be taken since it is not the habit of the Englishmen to leave the scene easily, they had conquered the half of the world and managed to conduct its affaires for a long period of time as being the Empire upon which “*the sun never set*”. Moreover, the fourth one couldn't be opted for, since the war had annihilated and weakened the economic and financial sectors. So, there weren't enough efforts to support more pressure and costs, whereas the second could be partially accepted in terms of collaboration with the USA and commitment with the United Nations, whereas playing the role of a middle power wouldn't be acceptable at all.

As a final decision, the third option was the one opted for and which required adopting a peace-oriented diplomacy, the criteria that had characterized post-war British international policy up to 1979. This latter was the adopted policy by means of which the successive governments could preserve the international position that Britain had strived to build, and could also gain a cut-period of time in order to reorganize the British home, and look for urgent and effective remedies for the legacies of the War.

A good example to justify the British peace-oriented diplomacy after 1945 is its high commitment with the UN's different resolutions. For instance, in December 1952, a resolution numbered 985 was passed for the codification of diplomatic immunities and privileges. For this, during the enrolment of the negotiations that took place from 1945 to 1958, the successive British governments, had devoted, unlike other great powers such as France, a team of negotiators composed of highly qualified specialists in the field of international law. Consequently, they succeeded in influencing the constitution of the first draft of the code. Britain could also play a leading role during the conference to discuss and ratify the draft, which took place in Vienna from March to April 1961. The conference gave birth to the final and official document, known as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations⁸ that is still being considered the basic ground of the diplomatic

⁸ For further details and information, download the document from the UN's website via : <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/LONOLine.aspx?clang=en> (Last check : 26-05-2018 at : 18h20).

practice. Moreover, Britain had also positively contributed in the negotiations and the Conference devoted to the ratification of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963⁹ (Bruns¹⁰, 201-204).

2.3. Attitudes Towards the Empire :

After the war, there were no intentions from Britain to decolonize the Empire. Clement Atlee, Labour Prime Minister who came to office in 1945, had expressed these beliefs and motivations by declaring that independence for colonies is like “*giving a child of ten [years] a latch key, a bank account and a shotgun*” (Byrde, 5). It meant that the colonized countries were not yet ready to gain their freedom, and reacting as such will be considered a crime. His Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, had confirmed the supposition by commenting that “*our crime is not exploitation, it is neglect*” (6). But critically speaking, the hidden aim was to sustain colonies as source of more money in order to pay the debts and compensate the loss of the war.

But the winds were blowing in the controversial direction, since all circumstances were pushing the successive British governments to opt for the process of decolonization. First, Britain had encountered serious economic and financial difficulties. So keeping soldiers outside the borders needed around \$800 million every year, a budget that is equivalent to $\frac{1}{3}$ of the Anglo-American loan of 1945 (5).

Secondly, the loss of the Suez Canal in 1956 was a factor that had highly weakened British international position, and led to the transfer of power to the US. This latter could take over the economic assistance to some regions under British occupation, for example, the pro-Western Greek and Turkish Governments. The Suez crisis was a strong hit that had broken the camel’s back, on the light of which Britain would realize that “... *imperialism was no longer welcome and that it was an out dated ideology...*” (5), that is to say the crisis enforced highly the process of decolonization.

The third factor is the emergence of the national movements all over the world, had played a predominant role in the acceleration of British withdrawal from the colonies. It

⁹ For further details and information, download the document from the UN’s website via : http://treaties.un.org/Pages/LONOnline.aspx?clang=_en (Last check : 26-05-2018 at : 18h35).

¹⁰ For further details and information, check Kai S. Bruns’s [A hazardous task : Britain and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2016.1185021). London : Routledge. Available via <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2016.1185021> (Last check : 26-05-2018 at : 19h05).

was wiser for Britain to leave peacefully unlike France and Portugal which entered very expensive and unsuccessful bloody wars. Britain took into consideration the movements' requests and demands, and acknowledged them throughout *Harold Macmillan's* speech in 1960, who declared publicly that “[the] growth of national consciousness is a political fact ... our national policies must take account of it” (7). He also made the recognition about the blowing of winds of change by hook or by crook.

Moreover, the former British Colonial Secretary *Lain Macleod*, confirmed this process of decolonization process, by stating that “it is said that when I became colonial secretary [in 1959] there was a celebrate speeding up of the movements towards Independence. I agree” (7). It is so important to shed light on the fact that the growth and spread of nationalism was the product of the British policies of establishing dominions at the beginning of the 20th century. British imperial process of creating dominions and offering self-governing was condemned to collapse since it had encouraged regaining the national identities, feelings and belongings, and accelerated building the economies, what had effectively paved the way towards independence.

The third piece of evidence is the role of the Security Council of the United Nations in making pressures over the colonial powers to opt for the process of decolonization. Britain, as a founding member of the UN, was obliged to show its commitment with the organization's resolutions and decisions. It, also, received many other pressures from the American side which intelligently could influence on the British overseas policies, by exploiting the topic of previous loans as a winning ballot, threatening, as a matter of fact, to cripple the British economy and destroy and devalue its currency if it wouldn't withdraw. So there was no way out of only to comply. In this vain, David Keynes had already hinted at a dangerous supposition as such American way of pressure. He argued that “ [by accepting the loan,] Britain could no longer afford to enjoy the great-power status” (5).

On the other hand, the successive US governments had also played a great role in the course of supporting the movements of liberation and anti-imperialism by means of *Truman doctrine* initiated in 1947, and the Atlantic Charter that had clearly declared that “all people had the right to self-determination”, and promised “to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” (9).

As a result to these factors mentioned above, many colonies that were under the British occupation, especially those located in the Asian continent, could gain their independence in two ways, either by taking profit from British self-decision of withdrawal due to economic disabilities, like the case of India and Pakistan in 1947, and Palestine in 1948, or by receiving much more help and support from the US, like Malaya in 1957, Singapore in 1963 and the colonies in Northern Borneo.¹¹

Generally speaking, we can say that the Second World War was a cause clearing the way to decolonization, since it had weakened the British economic and military sectors. It also acted as a catalyst to the independence of some colonies such as in Asia and Indian subcontinent. British policy-makers themselves had predicted by anticipation the coming of the moment “... *to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire*”, to catch up Winston Churchill’s statement that he declared in 1941 (13).

2.4. Anglo-American Special Relationships : A Compulsory Coalition?

The Anglo-American special relationship is the fruit of socio-historical factors that went back to the years before the American independence (1783), when the United States was a former British colony. As time passed, they could establish relations that could highly develop especially during the Second World War, by forming an alliance against Japan and Germany. This alliance continued in the post-war era.

After the war, the US emerged as a great power and became the first creditor in the world, whereas the British position in the international scene started declining as being the first debtor. Britain was directly involved in the war, and, consequently, its economy had been highly affected causing a serious crisis. The post-war critical circumstances pushed Britain to ask for a loan from the US. This later accepted but under some conditions.

Another fact of combination between the two countries was their attempts together devoted to block the spread and expansion of the Communist USSR, during the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine, for example, was launched in the shape of financial aids to replace Britain’s occupation over some regions such as Greece and Turkey in order to prevent their fall in the hands of the Soviets. The Marshal Plan launched in 1947, was also highly

¹¹ By 1968, independence reached all British colonies except Rhodesia in Africa, Falklands in America, and Hong Kong in China. This latter was the last region that was granted independence in 1997, marking the official end of the Empire.

welcomed as a US-financial package to help the European continent's recovery from the legacies of the war. Moreover, the two superpowers worked together to create a liberal-democratic world order by forming the United Nations Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

On the security plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹² has been created in 1947 to guarantee a military security from the Communist threat. In the same context, Britain and the United States agreed on joining their German zones of occupation forming the German Democratic Republic in 1946.

Another factor that provided a long-term link between London and Washington was Britain's absolute need after the war to strengthen and modernize its military and security system. As a result, an agreement of purchase was signed between the two sides to allow Britain possess heavy developed and sophisticated arms and weapons in the shape of missiles, submarines-based Polaris and nuclear heads. It was so vital to possess an arsenal as such, in order to prevent, on one hand, Communism threat, and, on the other hand, the French threat which started developing its own nuclear weapons.

It is clear that Britain and America worked closely together, but elements of competition based on national interests were apparent. Though Britain was aware about the reality of its dependence on America in terms of security and financial supports, the fact that should be acknowledged is that Washington was unable to dictate policy on London (Sharp, 506).

In this vein, signs of divergence were glittering because the US international strategy was oriented since the end of the First World War, toward condemning imperialism and supporting movements of liberation. The US anti-imperialist ideology had, through time, accelerated the withdrawal of imperial powers from their colonies. Financial aids had been granted in order to enable their voices of freedom to be heard in the United Nations. Moreover, the US great pressure on Britain in order to retreat from the Suez Canal, by exploiting intelligently the favour of the loans previously granted. Devaluating the pound was another card by which pressure had been made to oblige Britain to withdraw. But the final retreat didn't occur till 1967.

¹² An intergovernmental military alliance between 29 North American and European countries, based on the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed on 4 April 1949.

It can be concluded that the United States aimed in all times at reducing the power of Britain in terms of incorporating it within the European Community and making it feel of its belonging to that environment, instead of looking for being a world power.

2.5. Joining the EU: No Way Out? :

Although Britain could in 1973 successfully join the European Economic Community (EEC / later on the European Union – EU), it had expressed and confirmed its desire to form a union right after the Second World War. It was the very first country to think about the absolute necessity to establish a sort of a multilateral institution where all the European countries should be gathered to discuss and share their matters of common concern.

In his speech delivered in the university of Zurich in 1946, Prime Minister *Winston Churchill*, introduced the British vision about the political, economic and socio-cultural future of Europe, insisting on the :

... must [to] build a kind of a United States of Europe. In this way will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones, and gain their honor by their contribution to the common cause. (Perisic, 1)

As time passed, his words had been translated into practice by the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, as the first common European economic and industrial organization. But what must be understood is that Britain, unlike France, Italy and Germany, didn't show at the very beginning its interest to join the institution, since there had been a strong belief that Britain was “*with Europe, but not for it*”, to recall

Churchill's expression (Sharp, 12). There are several motivating factors behind this state of hesitation which can be ideological, economic, political or strategic.

There was a remarkable on-going of the feeling of superiority, since Britain could construct the greatest and unique Empire in the world, lasted for centuries. This historical fact was sufficient for London to express its hesitation to integrate within a group of middle-power countries. Moreover, Britain preferred, during the post-war era, granting much more interest to questions of recovering the financial deficit and the economic damages, by relying on its colonies as a source of wealth.

On the political plan, the successive British governments opted for keeping a sharp eye on the critical circumstances occurring in its colonies which started, day after the other, developing to the worst, due to the spread of the feeling of nationalism and the emergence of movements of liberation. So it was seen unwise from the British side, to make a step outside before reorganizing what is inside. In the same context, valuable and considerable efforts had been deployed in order to gather and join, once again, all British former colonies that had already gained their independence or self-governing like Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India...etc.

The British position towards the EEC remained the same for more than a decade. But, by the 60s, the winds of change started blowing. As a matter of fact, an official request to join the organization was officially formulated by the year 1961, by the Conservative Government under the premiership of Harold MacMillan. There are two main reasons to explain this state of change within British international policy. First, the loss of the Suez Canal had broken London's back, since it was considered the source of financial revenues, economic strength and international sovereignty. So, joining a multilateral organization was seen vital in order to prevent any further decline. The second factor resides in the desire of Britain to get rid from its dependence on the US in terms of security and economy. So the EU was seen as a new source of power.

This application had been vetoed in 1963 by France for purely strategic reasons. French President, Charles De Gaul, was extremely to believe in the fact that Britain would never grant its complete faithfulness to the EEC, since it was by history linked to the USA and the Commonwealth as well, towards which it had always expressed a high commitment. So its membership was seen as a real danger on the future of the

organization, since, once accepted, there would be no escape from the US indirect intervention and influence on its decisions and policies. Moreover, the French side was convinced about the incompatibility between the British trade policy and the European Union customs (Perisic, 4-5).

In 1967, another application had been filed by the Labour Government under *Harold Wilson*, but Britain received, for the second term, a rejection because of the French veto. The motivating factor was due to its weak currency, that would affect negatively on the collective European economy. On the other hand, Britain was still seen from an Atlanticist eye rather than a European one, due to its special relationship with the US, (Jones, 15).

The third attempt was expressed under *Heath* conservative government, in 1971. It was successful allowing Britain to join the EEC in 1973, followed by Denmark and Ireland, respectively. The new French President, *George Pompidou*, had realized that the EEC would benefit to a certain extent from the membership of Britain, since it was the leading member of the European Free Trade Area organization¹², as a strong intergovernmental economic institution. As a result, many economic and financial bilateral agreements had been signed between the two European multilateral organizations (14).

The question of joining the European Community became a subject that opened multiple debates about whether it was a mistake, or that Britain would benefit. Some observers and critics considered the membership as a wise step, since it would pave the way for Britain to execute more effectively its foreign policy and orientations towards Europe, whereas others had criticized the procedure considering it an act of committing suicide, since Britain would, consequently, be obliged to adjust all its policies according to organization's laws and orders, a fact that would cause a decline not only in terms of international position, but its affairs on the domestic plan, as well (Jones, 13-14). On the light of these two hypotheses, relations between Britain and the EC, can be evaluated as being unstable where several states of discontent and disagreement took place, which made the D-day of a Brexit, approaching.

¹² An intergovernmental organisation set up in 1960 to compete the EEC, constituted of seven Member States, including the UK, for the sake of promote free trade and economic integration between its members.

 **Conclusion :**

Throughout this chapter, we have learnt the extent to which Britain had lost its international status between 1939 and 1979. Consequently, its diplomacy highly weakened where its influence reduced to a considerable extent. For this, British diplomatic machinery necessitated serious and far-reaching reforms to revive the loss and empower Foreign Policy. The coming chapter will throw the light on the nature of efforts deployed and the strategies adopted by the British government in order to regain the glory.

CHAPTER 3 THREE :

Britain's Foreign Policy and the Revival of its Diplomatic Machinery (1979-1990)

 **Introduction :**

Post-war Britain has encountered a state of loss by excellence, that consequently affected the role of British diplomacy in the international scene. This chapter is devoted to depict the period from 1979 up to 1990, in the course of British Foreign Policy. Light will be thrown on the forms of the diplomatic practices of the British government under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher, aiming at reviving the international status. A sharp focus will be put on Thatcher's statesmanship that is considered the source of success, and then on Britain's relationships with and diplomatic manoeuvres towards the USA, the USSR and the EU, on the light of her ideologies and convictions.

3.1. Thatcher's Ideology in Context :

Margaret Thatcher, a less known political personality at the very beginning, but could successfully come to power in 1979, finding Britain in a state of decline at different plans. But, her strong personal moralities of hard work, willingness and abnegation, that she had acquired since her prime infancy, enabled her to make the "sick men of Europe" recover soon. Consequently, she could obtain an honourable reputation within her public and the international community, as well. *Thatcher's* statesmanship was the outcome of her combination between the principles of economic liberalism and political nationalism. These two elements that can scarcely be joined together within one personality had led Britain to experience a life made up of prosperity and individual freedom but with responsibility.

On the external plan, the "iron lady" could also gain a reputation as being an international statesman. The motivating factors behind this are grouped in three elements. First, there is the relationship with the US President, Ronald Reagan, and the support she offered him in the course of the Cold War, made her well known, and, by the way round, enabled Britain to receive much more US support. Secondly, the news about recovering the Falkland Islands had been overspread all over the world, providing Britain with a "*brief moment of modest glory*", whereas the third is Britain's opposition to the EC's plans for further integration that had received a great international satisfaction (Sharp, XV-VXI).

Before holding the elections of 1979, post-war British economy was characterized by being unable to enter the competition in the international market. Moreover, the economic boom experienced during the 60s, found an end by the 70s causing severe impacts at the level of both Britain's internal and external plans. Serious crisis had led to a state of industrial unrest in 1978-79 known as "*the winter of discontent*"¹³, where inflation the rate of unemployment highly increased leading it to ask for a loan from the IMF. Internationally speaking, the crisis made Britain's Foreign Policy too weak (22, 25). This dark picture that Britain reached had been confirmed by the candidate for the 1979 elections, Margaret Thatcher. In her speech delivered during the by-election in Clitheroe, she declared :

Twenty years ago, Britain stood really high in the world, one of the richest nations in Europe, and one of the most influential ... Britain is now seventh out of nine nations of Europe and among the poorest after Ireland and Italy. And this is no place for Britain. (25)

While some observers and critics tried to confirm that there had been no clear political road-map concerning the future of British Foreign Policy under the premiership of the Conservative Party, many academics and specialists in the field of international relations, argued that there had been a strong political will to develop Britain's international role, predicting the pursuit of its influence, mainly on the NATO, the USA, the UN and Europe.

Consequently, all considerations would be taken into account since "... *the reputation of Britain is at stake ...*", as *Thatcher* had confirmed. She added that the government should "... *not look at it [reputation] on the basis of precisely how much it will cost...*" (67). In the light of this declaration, repairing Britain's image and position on the international scene had been granted since 1979 much more priorities over any far-

¹³ Was the winter of 1978-79 in the United Kingdom, during which there were widespread strikes by public sector trade unions demanding larger pay rises, following the ongoing pay caps of the Labour Party government led by James Callaghan against Trades Union Congress.

reaching reform or other political issue, and even at the expense of the financial costs that would annihilate the treasury.

The renowned politician Sir Francis Leslie Pym¹⁴ was appointed as Foreign Secretary. This decision was highly acknowledged by many observers such as *Robert Conquest*, a newspaper journalist and reporter in *The Times*, who published an article entitled "*The Return of the British Lion*". She forecasted a promising future for Britain under her premiership (26-27). What were her effective realizations? Thatcher replied confidently on the question of "*what she'd brought?*", with one-word answer, "*Everything*" (XV).

3.2. Aggressive Foreign Policy : Recovering the Falklands :

On the 2nd of April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands that were under the occupation of Britain whose reaction, on the military plan, was characterized, at the very beginning, by a small resistance. The British government demanded the withdrawal of Argentineans and proposed holding negotiations to discuss, bilaterally, the crisis and look for how to conclude terms of pacific settlement of the dispute. This policy was adopted in the light of the orders and principles of the UN's charter, chapter VI, articles 33 to 38 (App.5 p.55)¹⁵.

Moreover, London brought its complaint against Argentina to the UN, describing the Argentinean behaviour as an act of aggression over sovereignty which is "... *a willingness expressed by action to use force*" (Sharp, 65). Another attempt was deployed by London, in the shape of peace proposal, to resolve the crisis peacefully. But the adversary rejected the initiative (64).

In return, several attempts to establish peace by means of mediation had been initiated by third biased parties, such as the Peruvian President Belaunde Terry, the United Nations' General Secretary Perez de Cuélar, and the American Secretary of State Al Haig. But unfortunately, they were unfruitful (64).

¹⁴ (1922-2008). He was a member of the Conservative Party, who served in various positions in the Cabinet during the 1970s and 80s, inter alia, Foreign Secretary, Defense Secretary, Northern Ireland Secretary and Leader of House of Commons.

¹⁵ For further information and details, check the UN's Charter. Available on the net via its website : <http://www.un.org/en/index.html> (Last check : 27-05-2018 at : 01h15).

Many observers and politicians were questioning the secrets of London's passive reaction in response to this aggression, commenting "*Where are they?*" (51). But by assessing Britain's reactions from an objective view it is noticed that diplomacy was practiced intelligently in the sense that it engaged its diplomatic machine to look for legitimate reasons to use force against Argentina, under the principle of war-oriented diplomacy. For this, British Foreign Secretary had confirmed in an assessment meeting held in Washington his country's total respect of diplomatic customs, and its high commitment with the UN's resolutions and orders. He highlighted the bold lines of a peaceful settlement, in :

... The arrangement for the Argentine withdrawal, the nature of any interim administration for the Islands, and the framework for negotiations on the long-term solution to the dispute for which the United Nations resolution called." (91)

According to decision-makers, Britain would move militarily under the cover of a total world legitimacy, respecting the international laws. Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal claimed in this respect, that "*... all the more has Britain's response in this instance been a service to the world community, which condemns the invader ...*", but the international law still "*... lacks the means to deny him the fruits of aggression*", he added (99).

On the basis of the law, Britain could convince the international community that Argentina had violated two main principles. The first one was *self-determination*, in the sense that it was up to the Islanders to choose whether to remain under the British crown or not. Secondly, any shape of armed aggression was forbidden, even if it would be to change the status of inhabitants experiencing bad situations under other country's occupation or mandate. If it would be allowed, endless territorial disputes might occur all over the world (74). As a result, the first British military reaction and move started at the beginning of May, where determined troops landed in the region. The confrontations had lasted only for a month after the surrender of the Argentineans by mid-June, leading to a quick recovery of the Islands (64).

Margaret Thatcher had highly prepared morally for this step by delivering a speech in front of the House of Commons, insisting on the importance of the military intervention, claiming “*You have to be prepared to defend the things in which you believe and be prepared to use force if that the only way to secure the future of liberty and self-determination.*” (74).

She continued her strategy of motivating and mobilizing both British armed forces and Public opinion, by beating on the tendon of belonging and loyalty, insisting on the must to stand behind the Islanders since “*...their way of life was British, they were ‘an island race’ like ‘the people of the United Kingdom, and their allegiance was to the crown*” (67).

The war had highly enabled Britain to regain its reputation within the International Community. Many examples of acknowledgement can be set in this respect. An officer claimed on the situation that “*...so that our children can walk about in the world with their heads held high*”. The Conservative MP, Alan Clark, told a journalist towards the end of the war, that the victory had “*...enormously increased our world standing... [that] has been totally altered by this. It has made every other member of NATO says ‘My God, the British are tough’*” (67).

To close with, many observers and critics had appreciated this success considering it not only a glory for the nation but more importantly a factor that granted Margaret Thatcher wide acceptance within the international community.

3.3. British-Soviet Relations : Interest and Anti-Communism :

The post-war period had witnessed a rapid spread of the Communist threat against which Britain stood behind the USA to deter its eventual overspread. For this, “Containment”¹⁶ was seen an effective policy to fight it (Keeble¹⁷, 206). Consequently, British-Soviet diplomacy after the war entered a critical period but relations with the USSR under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) was characterized by its two-fold target to deter the Communist expansion but without missing any interest whenever and wherever met.

¹⁶ A theory coined in 1947, by the American politician and diplomat George Frost Kennan (1904-2005).

¹⁷ Herbert Ben Curtis Keeble (1922-2008), British diplomat and Ambassador to MOSCOW between 1978-82.

In terms of relations, there had been many instances where the Anglo-Soviet relationships were deteriorating. The first diplomatic incident between Britain and the Soviets resulting in a short-cut of diplomatic relations was the decision to boycott Moscow Olympic Games of 1980, in response against the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan. As claimed by London's Ambassador to Moscow, C. Keeble, it was "... *a decision which required my temporary withdrawal from Moscow*" (293). Another matter of fact was when *Thatcher* decided not to attend the funeral of the former Soviet General Secretary of the Central Committee, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev in 1968 (Sharp, 187).

In the light of the Anglo-American alliance against Communism, Britain supported the US policy of deterring the Soviet due to the SS 20 missiles. It accepted the proposal of hosting and deploying 160 missiles on its land (108).

But despite this state of ideological tension, it was not a matter for Britain to establish relations with the Soviets. As a result, the first Gorbachev-Thatcher summit took place in 1984, by invitation from the British side. This State visit had contributed to a certain extent to defreeze the ice between them. *Thatcher* claimed at the end of the encounter "*I like him. We can do business together*" (Qtd in Keeble, 299).

This political factor that could open a political dialogue between the two States, had cleared the way to other summitries. In 1986, Thatcher visited Moscow as a mediator between the US and the USSR on the question of the application of the terms of SALT I¹⁸ and II. The Soviet side asked for reducing the conditions that the treaty brought, whereas, Britain's response was immediate, and reflected its anti-Communist policy, claiming that respecting them is a must, confirming that the US side, itself, remains "*anxious that both sides should continue to do so*" (194).

In the following year, another State visit had been held in Moscow, on the basis of which many bilateral agreements were concluded in the field of science and culture. A decision was also taken to reconstruct the headquarters of their embassies. These significant results led British Prime Minister to declare that the visit was "*... at what could be, a turning point in history*" (Qtd in Keeble, 299).

¹⁸ **Strategic Arms Limitation Talks**, are bilateral conferences held in two rounds, involving the USA and the USSR, on the issue of arms control.

To some extent, even though these meetings could strengthen the Anglo-Soviet relationship, "... *the reality and the nature of Communism had not changed, even if its image has been touched up*", as Thatcher claimed in front of the Parliament right after holding the summit (Sharp, 193). A good example to confirm this Thatcherite anti-Communist conviction is that during the meeting the question about the extent to which the terms of both INF¹⁹ and ABM²⁰ treaties had been applied by the Soviets, was opened and deeply discussed (297).

It can be argued that Thatcher's Statesmanship enabled her to defreeze the ice and establish solid relationships with the two enemies at once, namely the USA and the USSR. On the international plan, Britain under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher had regained its world position and could effectively be "*the third force*", to recall Gorbachev's expression (200).

3.4. Anglo-American Special Relationships : Support with Interest

Since 1979, British government grew aware about the fact that the United States became a great world power. This reality had highly affected British diplomatic practices towards the USA. As a result, it started being oriented towards supporting the US foreign policies and manoeuvres. The Anglo-American relationship during Thatcher-Reagan leadership has witnessed a very special kind of normalization that hadn't been enjoyed since Churchill-Roosevelt's times. Thatcher could develop this close relationship thanks to its statesmanship, a characteristic that is required, according to Kissinger, in order to maintain the creative momentum and to provide inspiration.

British motivations to adopt diplomacy of support towards the US can be grouped around the following two key-factor. On the one hand, there had been a realization that enjoying power needs keeping close relations with great countries. Consequently, it was argued that this target can be reached only by normalizing more relations with the US whose international power was really growing. On the other, to be a part within the international decision-making team, and to get influence and access to the conduct of the

¹⁹ **Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces** treaty, was held between the USA and the USSR, on the question of the elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range missiles.

²⁰ **Anti-Ballistic Missile** treaty, was an arms control treaty held between the USA and the USSR on the question of the limitation of the anti-ballistic missiles.

world's affairs, it was seen necessary to not allow the US behaves and be engaged alone in the international scene.

Right after her election in 1979, Margaret Thatcher organized a state visit to America in order to express British support to its policies. She, also, declared to the annual "Pilgrim's Dinner" after Reagan came to office in 1980, that "*we are with you*" and "*setbacks for them [the US] are setbacks for us*" (Sharp, 105). Moreover, in a G7²¹ meeting held in Ottawa in 1981, the British side expressed its total commitment to all US policies, by claiming "*... as for the leadership of the western world, ultimately the US is the guarantor of the freedom of Europe and we should make it clear that we understand that, and we are grateful for it*" (105). Thatcher's government had offered support to many US programmes and policies. There are several examples reflecting the extent to which its support had reached the peak in the different fields: political, defence, economic and even the cultural ones.

On the political plan, it replied positively to the US proposal to back a request to the UN, in order to impose economic sanctions against Iran. Britain's response was rapid and the Prime Minister confirmed its support telling her homologue that "*... we shall support you and let there be no mistake about it*" (104). Another good matter of evidence is the support offered to the US programme of expansion and modernization of the armament to deter the USSR's missiles (SS 20). The British agreed to receive around 160 missiles (124 plus extra 36) and deployed them on its soil. Doing so was considered as a vital defence strategy to be adopted strengthen national security and to safe British interests, as well, against foreign threats especially from the Soviet side (108).

Although the US international policy had adopted a new doctrine based on the policy of reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, on the basis of *Reagan's* "*zero option*" strategy initiated in 1981 Britain had agreeably welcomed the policy considering nuclear weapons blunt instruments of last resort.

Moreover, during the US-Lybian confrontations that took place in 1986, when Tripoli was swept with a heavy air raid composed of carrier-borne and planes, Britain confirmed its high commitment with the US policy by providing land-bases for the

²¹ The group of seven is an unofficial forum which brought together the heads of the richest industrialized countries namely: France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.

American air-armada (110). Moreover, Britain had not only recommended the American military intervention in Iraq to deter the regime of Saddam Hussein during the so-called the Gulf War of 1990, but, indeed, it had offered much more military support and even contributed in the air-armed-attacks.

Thatcher offered complete support to the US concerning the question of backing a request to the UN for economic sanctions over Iran. As a result, there had been a common agreement with the European Community, in Naples - Rome, about a set of economic sanctions to be imposed (104).

This state of British commitment and support to the US policies was established on purpose which had really got its finalities and targets. First of all, it was sufficient for Britain to be the closest ally of the US, since this special relationship had granted it much more international strength even though it was just on the ideological plan, as the Mexican proverb states “*Tell me who your friends are, I'll tell you who are you*”.

As for the security and defence issues, preventing the Communist spread and threat was a factor that enabled Britain to benefit from the great experience and even the technological advance of the US, allowing it to possess nuclear heads, develop the atomic bomb and equip its military arsenal with highly sophisticated weapons. This situation enabled British army to be promoted to the rank of the well-armed forces in the world (122-124). Furthermore, based on the theory of the “*influence of the political ideology upon the economic thoughts*”, the international position that could Britain gain had allowed it to acquire a pivotal position in the world's market. This factor made the treasury at financial ease, especially after the discovery of more oil fields during the 80s.

3.5. Diplomacy Towards the EU : Sovereignty and National Interest

Unlike the Anglo-American diplomacy that was characterized, during *Thatcher's* premiership as being a two-fold practice Britain had established a one-way relation with the European Community, or in other words, as Roosevelt Churchill commented “*with Europe, but not for it*”. The strong desire that had been expressed by London to join the EEC, was, from the very first the outcome of the financial and economic crisis that swept post-war Britain, especially after the disastrous loss of the Suez Canal.

In a Parliamentary session held in 1981, *Thatcher* had presented her government's agenda concerning Britain's policy within the EC. It can be summed up in one utterance "... *no more than economics*" (Sharp, 161). For this, Britain called for the creation of a European single market. The proposal found a way by 1992. Furthermore, there had been many proposals and calls for unifying the European Community in terms of economy, finance and social policies. A commission was founded to discuss all possibilities of the union, and, finally, could prepare some recommendations, which can be grouped within a set of five points as follows (167) :

- Single currency.
- Financial authority.
- Common economic, social, external and defence policies.
- Reformed central institutions.
- Free internal movements of goods, services, capital and labour.

Britain, in this respect, didn't completely welcome this vision of United Europe. *Thatcher* declared on the sidelines of the Franco-British Council held in 1984 in Avignon that it was impossible to shape a United States of Europe alike to the USA. The reason lies in the difference between the European countries in terms of their Histories (Sharp, 162). She continued her comments declaring in her speech to the European College held in Bruges in 1988 that :

... To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the center of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be [as a result] folly to fit them into some sort of identikit European identity. (Qtd in, 198)

Thatcher's declaration contained hidden and indirect responses, since we can learn from it and pick-up many hints. First, Britain's economic interests were put first. Consequently, it was not acceptable to share the same policies and strategies with weak

and satellite countries that are suffering from many crisis and weaknesses. So, Britain decided to never carry their financial and economic burdens. Furthermore, the value of the pound was flourishing under the premiership of *Thatcher*, a factor that made Britain rejecting an equal currency.

Secondly, the PM was beating on the tendon of cultural nationalism in the sense that Britain as a former Empire unlike many other European countries could build a civilization with proudest great achievements in terms of culture and traditions. For this, any attempt to establish a sort of similarity, mainly with newly emerged nations, would not be accepted (170-172).

In this context, according to *Thatcher*, the Commission's project of union had brought no taste. Most importantly, since it had no economic promises, it would never be realized on the ground. For this, many proposals had been rejected since they were opposing the British interests, such as the European Monetary System (Perisic, 7,8). Moreover, UK-EU's relations could never be well established, a fact that had given the signs of a near divorce.

Conclusion :

This chapter drew the image of Britain's revival of international role and diplomacy under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher thanks to her statesmanship built on strong ideologies and convictions. The bold lines of Foreign Policy has been well defined, where issues of sovereignty and national interests were granted much more priorities. From 1979 onwards, Britain could regain its position as a superpower and a decision-maker within the post-Cold War international system. Its diplomatic machine could be one among the most influential.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

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Examining the British diplomatic machinery up to the Second World War, one can say that London could establish an efficient and a highly worldwide reputed diplomacy. Thanks to this reputation, it could preserve and sustain its international position as being the strongest and most unique empire for centuries, and on the other hand, being able to control and affect the world's order and affairs.

A post-WWII serious economic and financial crisis swept the Kingdom. The crisis led to a critical state of decline counted on the domestic plan and also got negative repercussions on Foreign Policy because of the decline of Britain's international status. As a reaction to this alarming situation, successive governments had granted much more interest to the issue of recovering the internal defect, whereas the diplomatic practices had been temporarily reduced. This policy weakened Britain's role and influence on world affairs.

Two strategic incidents took place during that era, leading Britain to a state of decline by excellence. The first of these is the process of decolonization that cleared the way to the fall of the British Empire. The second is the loss of the Suez Canal had highly broken Britain's back in terms of losing an interesting financial source.

The coming of Margaret Thatcher to power, was a turning point in British Foreign Policy, since she could revive the diplomatic practices and manoeuvres and regain the lost international status. Between 1979 and 1990, Britain had oriented its diplomacy toward war and force that granted it much more strength not only on the international plan but even on the psychological level (see pp. 24-25). There are many examples about the extent to which Britain revived its international status, two of these are using force to recover the Falkland Islands and granting a complete support to the US even in terms of defence issues.

Based on the findings of the research, the following points seem of great importance :

- Foreign Policy and Diplomacy are two complementary concepts, each one can affect and be affected by the other. Up to 1939, Britain was the unique and the strongest Empire in the world, a fact that made its diplomatic machinery more efficient and highly reputed, and enabled it to affect the world affairs. During the post-war era, the British diplomacy was weak due to the loss of the international status, and the narrow contribution in world affairs, since all successive governments were highly interested with the issue of reorganizing the British home.
- State leadership is not a question of sex, belonging, ideology or fame, but rather a matter of personality. Margaret Thatcher could jump from being an unknown politician to a Statesman who could acquire a wide acceptance in both inside and outside Britain. As a result, unlike all successive governments from 1939 to 1979, she succeeded to empower Foreign Policy in terms of recovering the international status.
- The principles of sovereignty and national interest had been always granted the first priority and much more focus by all successive governments.
- There had been some factors that took place before 1945 which contributed in the speeding up of the loss of British international status, amongst which are the spread of nationalism that created states of tension in British colonies affecting its politics and economy as well, the emergence of Nazism that dominated the international scene in terms of affecting its policies and decision-making process, and the role that the League of Nations played to standardize to a certain extent the world system.

To close with, this topic deserves more extension by questioning about British post-Cold War Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. Moreover, it opens the gate for further discussions and debates in the light of the current events mainly in terms of security issues and the spread of terrorism and organized crimes.

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APPENDICES

○ **Appendice n° 01 :**

➤ **Articles 10 and 15 of United Nations' Charter :**

• **Art. 10 :**

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

• **Art. 15 :**

The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

○ **Appendice n° 02 :**

➤ **Glossary of some useful definitions :**

a) **Negotiations** : They are considered as the most famous and practiced diplomatic habit between countries. It can be achieved through conducting discussions by state representatives officially designed to fulfil one or several well defined tasks, mainly to settle disputes and maintenance states of tension. It is also seen as a lengthy process since it consumes time in terms of the ennoblement of marathonic debates. But what makes it so sensitive, is the running of the risk of a breakdown due to misunderstandings or disagreement at any stage of the following steps: (1) holding a sort of *Pre-negotiations* to make an agreement about the motivating factors, the agenda and the procedures of negotiations, (2) fixing the *Formula* by establishing a set of ideas and guidelines relevant to the topic under review, and (3) dealing with the *details* by fleshing out the the fixed formula (Berridge 25 - 27- 49 - 50).

b) **Resident Embassies:** Diplomacy can be directly practiced by means of resident embassies established in the host countries. This system brought new practices and had clearly meant not only the establishment of permanent relations, but, more importantly, the designation of an ambassador and his staff and their families, with the right to acquire an official and proper building to exercise appropriately their missions. By the establishment of permanent representatives, many problems arose concerning the status and the matters of protection of the diplomatic staff, the building and even the family. This problematic is known as diplomatic inviolability coined in 1895, by experts in the International Law (Bruns 199).

For this, many efforts had been deployed in the attempt to fix a legal framework that can gather all the conditions which can enable the diplomat to execute his missions perfectly according to his country's Foreign Policy principles and out of any pressure or influence from the hosting country.

On the legal plan, the most practical source of best diplomatic practices till today, is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), codified in 1961 under the leadership of the United Nations' International Law Commission (ILC), on the

bases of the resolution 985 of 5 December 1952, passed by the UN's General Assembly.

Briefly speaking, the convention was codified after a long period of multilateral negotiations (1954-58), proceeded by series of conferences hold from the 2nd of March till the 18th of April 1961. The final and official draft contained 53 articles that could cover all the aspects of the diplomatic practices. It promoted the international relations by offering immunities and privileges to protect the diplomatic function.

- c) **Consulates** : Relations can be set throughout Consulates established between countries that have strong relations. This state of relationships is the outcome of the increase in the number of resident emigrants from both countries, which requires the establishment of Consular posts to deal with the occupations of their citizens abroad, whereas the task of promoting diplomatic relations is let to the staff of the Embassies which by then should have a consular section.

The consular staff has approximately the same set of immunities and privileges that are granted to diplomats, thanks to the codification of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 1963 (VCCR). The differences lay in the following points (Berridge 125-127) :

- Diplomats receive a total immunity from criminal jurisdiction for both their official and private acts, whereas the consulate's staff are immune from it in terms of official acts only.
- The diplomatic staff is granted immunities from any kind of arrest even if a crime is committed, by contrast, the consular agents can be arrested, judged and imprisoned.
- The diplomatic bag can never be detained and alone opened, whereas the consular one receives less immunity since in case of refusing to open it, it will be sent back.

- d) **Conferences** : Holding conferences is a fourth kind of the diplomatic practice. This type had existed earlier by the emergence of the European-state, but was restricted only to discuss questions concerning controlling territories. The Berlin Conference of 1884, is the biggest multilateral meeting that took place between the great

powers. The creation of League of Nations in 1920 and than the United Nations in 1945, had brought more accurate, precise and concise meaning of this practice. Moreover, the emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) that became important partners within the international community system, had highly enriched this concept.

On the other hand, the different World's circumstances occurred since 1945, had promoted many issues to the rank of permanent international concerns that required continuous multilateral discussion and evaluation. For instance, the very first diplomatic conference that took place after the Second World War, was the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), launched in 1957, under the supervision of the UN's General Assembly. It has a General Conference that meets each year grouping 146 states members and 64 international organizations and NGOs, to discuss how to prevent the nuclear proliferation and promote the peaceful uses of atomic weapons (Berridge 147).

Practically speaking, a conference passes through five stages which are : (1) Fixing the **venue** by setting the objectives and targets of the conference's topic, (2) declaring the **participating** states and the different dealers in the issue to be discussed, (3) establishing the **agenda** that details the circumstances of the enrolment, (4) **organizing** the conference in the shape of debates and different interventions from the participators, and (5) **making decisions** by the end of this multilateral meeting. (Berridge 148-158).

- e) **Summits** : They are another form of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic practice but it is restricted only for Heads of States, Governments or the different Organizations. It is introduced not because of a deficient in the process of treating certain topics by the resident embassies, but in fact, because the topic is highly interesting that needs a special and a very serious treatment from the high authorities of the nations that are concerned with it, so that to reach the targets aimed at.

Summit diplomacy was practiced in the inter-war period, between the Presidents and the Chiefs of Governments of the great powers namely Britain, Germany, the USA, Russia and France. The post-WWII era had witnessed a considerable

emergence of this diplomatic practice due to many reasons, amongst which are (Berridge 161-162) :

- The outbreak of the Cold War that necessitated frequent encounters between the leaders of the Three Big who are Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt.
- The spread of nuclearism as a real threat that urged the superpowers mainly Britain and the United States to keep a sharp focus on the issue.
- The emergence of new independent nations which created a new mode of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the high ranking officials of these nations.
- The spread of the regional and non governmental Organizations whose leaders could meet to deal with new world's issues such as defence and security, human rights, health, environment, finance and new technologies

It is important to be mentioned that summits have a great impact on the nations' publics, since they tend to gather the nations' high authorities who met to settle serious issues especially concerning conflicts and tensions.

f) **Special missions** : Diplomacy by sending special missions can be dealt with when two nations are in a state of disagreement that led to the cut of the diplomatic relations. As a result, special envoys could be sent from the two hostile nations in order to discuss and look for ways to break the ice and recover relations. This bilateral diplomatic practice is judged to be very interesting for the following dynamics (Berridge 223-224) :

- It guarantees a total security of the secrecy of the message between the heads of the states in terms that the envoys are chosen from the confident side of each one.
- The members of the special mission are generally persons who gain high acceptance within mainly the general public opinion, and also have special knowledge about the topic under discussion, which affect positively on the enrolment of the mission, without forgetting.
- The immunities and privileges granted to them on the light of the UN's Convention on Special Missions codified in 1969

g) Mediation : This multilateral diplomatic practice is highly reputed and acknowledged. It occurs through special sessions of negotiations under the supervision of a third part that took the initiative and the responsibility to conduct the process of settling peace and breaking the ice between two or many conflicting nations. This intermediately part must have some distinctive features and characteristics, such as (Berridge 236):

- Being totally impartial in the dispute.
- Expressing a real will to settle the dispute.
- Guaranteeing fairness and a complete neutrality

In this respect, the UN's Charter has clearly tackled the process of mediation as an interesting diplomatic practice, by fixing its bold lines of in its articles 33, 36, 37, 38 and 99. It fixed the ways by means of which mediation is conducted under the supervision of either the Secretary-General or the Security Council. As a result, the dispute can be settled during the process of mediation by opting for arbitration, judicial settlement, conciliation, or any other peaceful means of chosen and agreed upon by the conflicting parties. Furthermore, regional organizations and agencies and even international personalities can also play the role of mediators to settle disputes and conflicts.

○ **Appendice n° 03 :**

- **Gladstone's letter addressed, on April 17th, 1869, to Queen Victoria:**

“ England should keep entire in her own hands the means of estimating her own obligations upon the various states of facts as they arise, she should not foreclose and narrow her own liberty of choice by declarations made to other Powers, in their real or supposed interests, of which they would claim to be at least joint interpreters; it is dangerous for her to assume alone an advanced and therefore isolated position, in regard to European controversies, come what may it is better for her to promise too little than too much; she should not encourage the weak by giving expectation of aid to resist the strong, but should rather seek to deter the strong by firm but moderate language from aggression of the weak; she should seek to develop and mature the action of a common, or public, or European opinion, as the best standing bulwark against wrong, but should beware of seeming to lay down the law of that opinion by her own authority, and thus running the risk of setting against her, and against right and justice, the general sentiment which ought to be, and generally would be, arrayed in their favour”.

Source : Nicolson 137.

○ **Appendice n° 04 :**

- **Glimpse from the alarming intelligence report of Sir *Horace Rumbold*, British Ambassador to Berlin, elaborated in 1928, on the topic of the Nazi threat.**

« [Hitler] starts with the assumption that man is a fighting animal; therefore the nation is a fighting unit, being a community of fighters...A country or race which ceases to fight is doomed...Pacifism is the deadliest sin...Intelligence is of secondary importance...Will and determination are of the higher worth. Only brute force can ensure survival of the race. The new Reich must gather within its fold all the scattered German elements in Europe...What Germany needs is an increase in territory...[to Hitler] the idea that there is something reprehensible in chauvinism is entirely mistaken...the climax of education is military service [for youths] educated to the maximum of aggressiveness...It is the duty of the government to implant in the people feeling of manly courage and passionate hatred...Intellectualism is undesirable...It is objectionable to preach international understanding...[he] has spoken with derision of such delusive documents as peace-pacts and such delusive ideas as the spirit of Locarno ».

« ...it would be misleading to base any hopes on a return to sanity...[the German government is encouraging an attitude of mind]...which can only end in one way...I have the impression that the persons directing the policy of the Hitler government are not normal ».

Source : Wikipedia.

○ **Appendice n° 05 :**

➤ **Articles 33 to 38 of United Nations' Charter**
Chapter VI : Pacific settlement of disputes.

• **Art. 33**

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

• **Art. 34**

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

• **Art. 35**

Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

- **Art. 36**

The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court

- **Art. 37**

Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

- **Art. 38**

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Source : United Nations website.