

People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
University of Amar Thledji, Laghouat
Faculty of Letters and Languages
Department of English



**The Role of Eastern European Immigration in Grounding the Brexit
Movement**

A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of English in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for Master Degree in Civilization and Literature

Supervisor

Prof. Mohamed Afkir

Submitted by:

Meriem Rouighi

Boards of Examiners:

Mr. Jamel Benredda University of Laghouat, Chairman

Mr. Raouf Nebeg University of Laghouat, Examiner

Prof. Mohamed Afkir University of Laghouat, Supervisor

Academic Year 2021-2022

Dedications

*I dedicate this work to my beloved parents for their support and love,
my brother for his continuous encouragement. To my husband and
children for their patience and support.*

*To my dearest father in law and aunt may they rest in peace for all
their precious pieces of advice and to my family in law and friends.*

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude and my warmest thanks to my supervisor, Prof. Mohamed Askir , who made this work possible. His expertise, knowledge and advice guided me throughout this project. I also would like to thank the members of the jury, Mr. Jamel Benredda, Mr. Raouf Hebeg and Prof. Mohamed Askir for their judicious remarks and advice.

Abstract

Migration has shaped Britain's economy, legislation, society, culture, and ties to the world. Britain's connection with immigration is a sensitive political and sociological issue, forcing the government to either accept immigrants as refugees or for economic benefits, or establish legislation to restrict and control it. In May 2004, the EU welcomed 10 new members from Central and Eastern Europe: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia commonly referred to as A8 and EU 8 countries. Malta and Cyprus entered the European Union without any limits on the free movement of citizens from other member states. Romania and Bulgaria, two additional Eastern and Central European nations, joined the European Union in 2007, followed by Croatia in 2013. It was the largest expansion since World War II. This was particularly significant within Britain who opened to the new member states its labour market without restriction from day one in 2004 contrary to the other member states who imposed transitional restrictions. Thanks to their free movement in Britain acquired by EU membership, their impact led to Britain's most contentious immigration decision to leave the European Union joined in 1973. In response, this study examines the effect that led to the Brexit process. The work will be non-experimental, historical, explanatory, descriptive, comparative, and analytic, collecting and analyzing qualitative data. It utilizes scholarly articles, books, newspaper stories, and websites as credible online sources. Though the impact of EU immigration was at the center of the debates before and during the referendum fueled by politician and tabloids raising antagonism among British, the EU immigration was more utilized as a scapegoat for elections rather trying to answer the real social problems impacted by the EU immigration.

Key words: Eastern European Immigration. United Kingdom. European Union. Referendum. Brexit.

Résumé

La migration a façonné l'économie, la législation, la société, la culture et les liens avec le monde. Le lien de la Grande-Bretagne avec l'immigration est une question politique et sociologique sensible, obligeant le gouvernement à accepter les immigrants comme réfugiés ou pour des avantages économiques, ou à établir une législation pour la restreindre et la contrôler. En Mai 2004, l'Union Européenne a accueilli 10 nouveaux membres d'Europe de l'est et centrale : la République Tchèque, l'Estonie, la Hongrie, la Lettonie, la Lituanie, la Pologne, la Slovaquie et la Slovénie communément appelées pays A8. Malte et Chypre ont rejoint l'Union européenne sans aucune limite à la libre circulation des citoyens des autres États membres. La Roumanie et la Bulgarie, deux autres pays d'Europe de l'est et centrale, l'ont rejoint en 2007, suivies de la Croatie en 2013. Il s'agissait de la plus grande expansion depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cela a été particulièrement significatif au sein du Royaume-Uni qui a ouvert aux nouveaux États membres son marché du travail sans restriction en 2004 dès le premier jour contrairement aux autres États membres qui ont imposé des restrictions transitoires. La libre circulation des pays de l'est de l'Europe en Grande Bretagne acquise par l'adhésion à l'UE a eu un impact sur la décision de la Grande de quitter l'Union européenne jointe en 1973. En réponse, cette étude examine les facteurs qui ont conduit au processus du Brexit. Le travail sera non expérimental, historique, explicatif, descriptif, comparatif et analytique, recueillant et analysant des données qualitatives. Il utilise des articles scientifiques, des livres, des articles de journaux et des sites Web comme sources en ligne crédibles. Bien que l'impact de l'immigration de l'UE ait été au centre des débats avant et pendant le référendum alimenté par les politiciens et les tabloïds soulevant l'antagonisme parmi les Britanniques, l'immigration de l'UE a été davantage utilisée comme bouc émissaire pour les élections plutôt que pour tenter de répondre aux véritables problèmes sociaux touchés par l'immigration de l'UE.

Mots clés : Immigration d'Europe de l'Est. Royaume-Uni. Union européenne.

Référendum. Brexit

ملخص

شكلت الهجرة اقتصاد بريطانيا وتشريعاتها ومجتمعها وثقافتها وعلاقاتها بالعالم. تعتبر علاقة بريطانيا بالهجرة قضية سياسية واجتماعية حساسة، مما يجبر الحكومة إما على قبول المهاجرين كلاجئين أو للحصول على مزايا اقتصادية، أو وضع تشريع لتقييدها والسيطرة عليها. في مايو 2004، رحب الاتحاد الأوروبي بعشرة أعضاء جدد من أوروبا الوسطى والشرقية: جمهورية التشيك وإستونيا والمجر ولاتفيا وليتوانيا وبولندا وسلوفاكيا وسلوفينيا يشار إليها عمومًا باسم A8 و8 دول الاتحاد الأوروبي. دخلت مالطا وقبرص الاتحاد الأوروبي دون أي قيود على حرية تنقل المواطنين من الدول الأعضاء الأخرى. انضمت رومانيا وبلغاريا، وهما دولتان إضافيتان من أوروبا الشرقية والوسطى، إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي في عام 2007، تلتها كرواتيا في عام 2013. كانت أكبر توسع منذ الحرب العالمية الثانية. كان هذا مهمًا بشكل خاص داخل المملكة المتحدة التي فتحت للدول الأعضاء الجديدة سوق العمل دون قيود من اليوم الأول في عام 2004 على عكس الدول الأعضاء الأخرى التي فرضت قيودًا انتقالية. تأثير الهجرة إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي على المملكة المتحدة وخاصة الشرقية بفضل حرية الحركة التي اكتسبتها عضوية الاتحاد الأوروبي وانضمام المملكة المتحدة إلى قرار الهجرة الأكثر إثارة للجدل بمغادرة الاتحاد الأوروبي الذي انضمت إليه في عام 1973. استجابةً لذلك، تبحث هذه الدراسة في العوامل التي أدت إلى ذلك. لعملية خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي. سيكون العمل غير تجريبي وتاريخي وتوضيحي ووصفي ومقارن وتحليلي يجمع البيانات النوعية ويحللها. يستخدم المقالات العلمية والكتب وقصص الصحف والمواقع الإلكترونية كمصادر موثوقة عبر الإنترنت. على الرغم من أن تأثير الهجرة إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي كان في قلب المناقشات قبل وأثناء الاستفتاء الذي غذى من قبل السياسيين والصحف الشعبية التي أثارت العداء بين البريطانيين. فقد تم استخدام الهجرة إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي ككبش فداء للانتخابات بدلاً من محاولة الرد على المشاكل الاجتماعية الحقيقية التي تأثرت من قبل الهجرة الأوروبية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: هجرة أوروبا الشرقية. المملكة المتحدة. الاتحاد الأوروبي. استفتاء خروج بريطانيا من الاتحاد الأوروبي.

Table of content:

Dedication.....	I
Acknowledgment.....	II
Abstract.....	III
Résumé	IV
ملخص	V
Table of content:.....	VI
List of abbreviations:.....	VIII
List of Figures:	X
List of Tables :.....	XI
General Introduction:	1
Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK.....	6
1.1 Introduction:.....	6
1.2 European Immigration before the EU Enlargement:	7
1.3 Eastern European Immigration after 2004 (A 8):	10
1.4 EU Immigration after 2007 (Romania/Bulgaria and the 2014 immigrants' wave):.....	199
Conclusion:	266
Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of Eastern and European Immigration on the UK.....	27
Introduction:.....	27
2.1 Impact on the UK Economy:	28
2.2 Impact on the UK Labour Market:	300
2.3 Local Workers Reactions:.....	35
2.4 EU Immigrants and Housing:	38
2.5 Pressures on NHS:	40
2.6 Crime and Social Safety:	44
2.7 The Cultural Issues:	49
Conclusion:	51
Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign.....	53
Introduction:.....	53
3.1 Arguments of the Nationalist Political Discourse of the Leave Campaign:	55
3.2 Counter Arguments of the Stay Movement:	63

3.3	EU Immigration after 2016:	67
	Conclusion:	76
	General Conclusion:	78
	Bibliography:	82
	Appendices	87

List of abbreviations:

A2	Accession 2
A8	Accession 8
A10	Accession 10
AWC	Accession Worker Card
BBC	British Broadcasting Channel
BREXIT	Britain Exit Europe
BSE	Britain Stronger in Europe
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
COVID 19	Corona Virus Disease of 2019
CReAM	Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration
CSEW	Crime Survey for England and Wales
CSO	Central Statistical Office
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EHIC	European Health Insurance Card
ERC	European Research Council
EU	European Union
EU 8	European Union 8 countries
EU2	European Union 2 countries
EU15	European Union 15 countries
EUSS	European Union Settlement Scheme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GO	Grassroots Out Movement
GP	General Practitioner
ILO	International Labour Organization

IPS International Passenger Survey

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

LFS Labour Force Survey

MAC Migration Advisory Committee

MHCLG Ministry of Houses, Communities and Local Government

MSQR Migration Statistics Quarterly Report

MP Member of Parliament

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NHS National Health Service

NINO National Insurance Number

NMS New Member State

OMS Old Member States

ONS Office for National Statistics

Q3 Year Ending September

QNHS Quarterly National Health Service

SAWS Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme

SBS Sectors Based Scheme

SME Small Business Expand

STEM Science, technology, engineering and mathematics

UCL University College London

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nation

UKIP United Kingdom Independent Party

US United States

VAT Value-Added Tax

VL Vote to Leave

WRS Work Registration Scheme

List of Figures:

Figure1. 1 Total EU immigration and emigration 1976-2015.....	87
Figure1. 2 Year- on year net migation to/from the UK by EU-nationals (thousands)....	87
Figure1. 3 Figure1. 3 EU8 number of residents in the UK 2015.....	87
Figure1. 4 : EU8 Nationals employment sector.....	88
Figure1. 5 EU (EU8, EU 2 and EU15) immigration to the UK, 2006 to 2016 (year ending June 2016).....	88
Figure2. 1 Average net fiscal contribution of each migrant and native,relative to the average UK adult, 2016/17(£ per accountable adults)	88
Figure2. 2: Hourly earnings for immigrants and non- immigrants.....	89
Figure2. 3: Share of new social housing lettings by migrant group in England.....	89
Figure2. 4: Accident and Emergency attendances in England	89
Figure 3. 1 vote to leave campaign arguments	90
Figure 3. 2 Most important issue in deciding how to vote	90

List of Tables:

Table 2.1 Share of cautions and convictions by EU.....	
91	
Table3. 1: Most prominent issues.....	91
Table3. 2: UK industry and the EU.....	
911	

General Introduction

General Introduction:

Migration has continuously played a major part in Britain's history, impacting its economy, legislative issues, society, culture, and connection with the wider world. Nevertheless, Britain's relations with immigration has also been a controversial political and societal concern, leading the government to either welcome immigrants as refugees or for economic benefits, or pass laws to restrict and control it. Brexit is by far the most controversial decision in Britain related to European immigration. In May 2004, the European Union welcomed ten new members from Central and Eastern Europe in what was the largest expansion in the history of European integration since World War Two. Commonly known as the Accession 8 or A8 and EU 8, they are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Malta and Cyprus joined without any restrictions on free movement from the other European Union member states. Two other Eastern and Central European countries, Romania and Bulgaria, joined the European Union in 2007 followed in 2013 by Croatia. Yet, the New Labour government of Tony Blair, which has been supportive of Eastern European access to the European Union, has encouraged an economic immigration policy in support of this white and mostly Christian immigration as opposed to more control and restrictions on the other non-European immigrants, particularly the Muslim immigrants who were targeted especially after the 9/11 events. While other European member states waited seven years after the EU enlargement to the A8 to permit access to their labour markets, Britain opened its labour market immediately to these new European citizens from former Soviet Union block countries, which suffered from a high rate of unemployment.

Therefore, the impact of immigration on the UK, whether economically, politically, culturally or socially, has always attracted researchers because of its complexity. For

General Introduction

example, a study by Jonathn Portes (2018) in “The Economic Impacts of Immigration to the UK” highlighted that migration does not appear to have had a negative impact on the employment outcomes of UK natives, even in the short term. Since 2014, the continued vigour of the British labour market has strengthened this consensus. Rapid declines in unemployment, which are just above 4%, have been accompanied by sustained high levels of immigration. In addition, there is no evidence that immigration has affected the employment prospects of particular groups, such as the young or the unskilled. The lump of labour fallacy, that the number of jobs or vacancies in the economy is fixed (which typically refers to the medium to long term), is also false in the short term. Similarly, Nickell and Salaheen (2015) discovered that a ten percentage point (not ten percent, as some politicians falsely claimed) increase in the immigrant share—that is, more than what has been observed over the last decade—results in a 1.5 percent decrease in wages for native workers in the semi-skilled and low-skilled service sector. This would imply that immigration since 2004 has reduced wages for native workers in that sector by approximately 1 percent, or in other words, it has reduced annual pay increases by approximately one cent per hour. Impacts on other sectors are considerably less significant. Migration may have had a small negative effect on low-income people's wages, but other factors, both good and bad (such as technological progress, tax credit programs, and the national minimum wage), were much more important.

Beyond political motivations, there were economic benefits, one in a capitalist system and a thriving UK, which heavily encouraged free movement of people seeking jobs and who were expected to have little negative impact on the UK in comparison to previous immigration. Concerns over their freedom to travel, reside, and work in the UK influenced the British people's choice to vote to leave the EU in the Brexit referendum.

General Introduction

This work is particularly concerned with the Eastern European migrants who have been at the centre of the debate during the 2016 referendum in the "Leave" or "Remain" campaign. This work is researchable because of this unexpected and contradictory outcome and the impact of this immigration on an irreversible political and economic decision made by Britons.

Thus, the purpose of this work is to explore and analyse how the consequences of this immigration have resulted in the political and societal discourse resulting in the UK's exiting from the European Union. This paper's primary goal is to emphasise the part Eastern European immigration played in the UK's decision to leave the EU and trace how this welcomed white, invisible, and mostly Christian immigration led to a radical decision by the UK to the extent that it asked for a referendum to "leave" or "remain" in the European Union, the second time in UK history.

Many questions arose in order to understand how this Eastern European immigration impacted the UK's decision to leave the EU. The central question that this work attempts to answer is: how did the impact of Eastern European immigration create a fertile atmosphere that would contribute to both the "leave" campaign discourse, and the resulting "Brexit"?

Further related questions are listed below:

- How did Eastern European immigration become a central part in the UK's political debate?

- How the UK Brexit voters were directly concerned with the question of Eastern immigrants?

The causes and consequences that led to the process of Brexit in relation to European immigration, and more particularly the Eastern European one, have attracted the

General Introduction

attention of many scholars. As a result, many works have already addressed the relationship that existed between Eastern European immigration and Brexit. “Unemployment, reliance on factory jobs, and low income explain Brexit” (2017), and their findings establish a correlation, not a causation, between the growth rate of immigration from eastern European accession countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2007. Rafal Racznski highlighted in “Migration and Brexit” (2017) the domination of immigration that led to the referendum call, especially immigration from the A8. In “Immigration as a key factor in the United Kingdom's decision to withdraw from the European Union”, Viona Rashica discussed the number of factors that contributed to the decision to leave the EU, pointing out as a key factor for the vote to leave, migration from Eastern European immigrants, but questioning whether it was mainly because of labour and housing competition or for a change in their social conditions (of voters). These findings were also mirrored in the article “Central and Eastern European Accession: Changing Perspectives on Migrant Workers”, which explained that the vote to leave due to eastern European immigration is linked to the political and media comments which “fed into populist myth”. “Does Migration Cause Extreme Voting?” Explored how migration from Eastern Europe contributed to the rise of UK euroscepticism.¹

Although Brexit is a recent issue but the process was long and controversial. The previous studies discussed the causes and the consequences that led to it, their focus lied heavily on euroscepticism.(Page). This dissertation in addition to the previous ones opts to further this euroscepticism. but in relation to the European immigration and more

¹ Euroscepticism used to be a largely British phenomenon, at least in terms of mainstream political parties and political and opinion-forming elites. Indeed, the word was coined in the 1980s to describe Margaret Thatcher’s policies and attitude towards the EC at a time when she was reasserting British sovereignty against Brussels’ plans for political and monetary union (Leconte 2010: 3). It was later applied to the anti-European wing of the Conservative Party when it battled against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992–1993 (Baker et al. 1993a, 1993b, 1994, Alexandre-Collier 2002, Forster 2002) Britain and the Crisis of the European Union, 2015 ISBN : 978-1-349-55500-0 David Baker, Pauline Schnapper .(Page)

General Introduction

particularly since the 2004 Euro expansion to Eastern and Central European Immigrants by presenting and comparing them to the previous EU immigrant and the UK born to explore their impact on the UK economically, socially, culturally and politically.

The study will be non-experimental, historical, explanatory, descriptive, comparative and analytical in which qualitative data will be collected and analysed. It draws on reliable online sources from scholarly articles, books, newspaper articles, and websites.

This dissertation is composed of three chapters. The first chapter will explore the enlargement of the EU and Eastern European immigration to the UK and will consider the motivations of EU Immigration to the UK and the reasons that led the British government to opt for this new type of immigration and the Eastern European migrants' motivations. The second chapter will then explore, describe, and analyse the economic and societal effects and repercussions of these Eastern European immigrants in the UK and the British response to them. The third chapter will explore and analyse the arguments of the Nationalist Political Discourse of the Leave and Remain Campaign as well as the Leave and Remain Political Discourse on EU immigration during the referendum campaign and will try to clarify how the consequences of immigration from Eastern and Central Europe affected the UK's decision to leave the EU. It will finally look at their situation after the 2016 referendum.

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

Introduction:

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, European immigration in the UK rose steadily. However, it became more visible only with the 2004 European Union enlargement to eight countries from Central and Eastern Europe commonly named Accession 8 or A8, or referred to as the EU8: Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, and Lithuania, along with two other states, Cyprus and Malta². Two other Eastern European countries named A2 or EU 2: Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007 followed by Croatia in 2013. Thus, within a very short period of time, immigration from Eastern European countries has increased to become one of the largest immigrant groups in the labour market of the UK. While other European member states waited seven years after the EU enlargement to the A8 to permit access to their labour markets, the United Kingdom opened its labour market immediately and did not impose transitional constraints on the free movement of workers to these new European citizens from countries of the former Soviet Union block countries, which had suffered from high rates of unemployment. The removal of the administrative barrier that was placed on the selection of immigrants has created a change in the size of flows, the composition, and the quality of immigrants³.

² Cyprus and Malta also joined the EU in May 2004, but limitations on the free movement of labour do not apply to them. (Lafleur et al.)

³ (Roels and Rahmel)

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

1.1 European Immigration before the EU Enlargement:

The free movement of citizens of EU member states inside the EU's borders was made possible by new immigration laws that were adopted in conjunction with membership in the EU. The successive waves of EU enlargement⁴ in the 1980s and 1990s strengthened the flows between EU member states. The Southern enlargement, marked by the admission of Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal together in 1986, was subject to the same interim constraints imposed by the accession treaties as the Central and Eastern European republics. In reality, the Southern enlargement marked the first occasion on which the European Community imposed temporary restrictions on the freedom of movement of people. During the transition period, the number of Portuguese living in the EU increased by just 30,000 (3%), while the number of Spaniards declined by 25,000 (-5%). (Dustmann et al. 2003:44; Entzinger 1978). While migration from the South to the North slowed significantly, returning Southern Europeans and Northern Europeans heading south utilised the same pathways. The establishment of a new migration route from the North to the South of Europe, as well as the intensification of migrations from Central and Eastern Europe to both Southern and Northern Europe, were conclusive indicators of the South-North route's demise.

The history of Central and Eastern Europe can be traced to the large-scale immigration from that region. Migration patterns shifted as a result of the political environment after the 1990s, when CEE countries made the transition from communist states to market economies and democratic societies. Migration to the United Kingdom from Eastern Europe has a long history with Ashkenazi Jews who were forced to leave the western regions of the Russian Empire and immigrate to the UK around the beginning of

⁴ Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

the nineteenth century. Besides, during Clement Attlee⁵'s premiership, 80,000 homeless or impoverished East Europeans moved to the UK and were hired to assist in the nation's post-World War II reconstruction. A new wave of migration was caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the iron curtain. Besides, the very definition of "worker" was gradually enlarged to include seasonal or temporary workers and apprentices in Member States, in addition to industrial workers. Then, in 1990, it was made sure that students, retirees, and people without jobs, as well as their families, could move around freely. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty⁶ in 1992, set up the European Union (EU) and introduced the idea of a common European citizenship, all citizens of Member States were given the right to move freely. As the strategy of encouraging migration and lowering travel restrictions continued, the reduction of border control requirements within Europe became a priority. The Schengen Agreement⁷, which went into effect for the first time in 1995, incorporated Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain into a quasi-borderless common territory. Travel documents were only required at the region's external boundaries. Two years later, the Schengen rules were included in the Treaty of Amsterdam, and by 1999, most intra-European borders were open to European nationals without the need to present a passport.

⁵ UK Prime Minister 1945-1951. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Clement-Attlee>

⁶ The Maastricht Treaty (formally known as the Treaty on European Union), which was signed on February 7, 1992 in Maastricht (Netherlands) created the European Union. The treaty consisted of three main pillars: the European Communities, a common foreign and security policy, and enhanced cooperation in home (domestic) affairs and justice. The treaty changed the name of the European Economic Community to the European Community (EC). <https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union/The-Maastricht-Treaty>

⁷ The United Kingdom was never a member of the Schengen Agreement, it was subject to European Union law. No border control, free movement for long-stay travellers, right to work, study or live in the UK, etc. EU law provided for many arrangements between the UK and EU countries. <https://schengen.europa-assistance.com/>

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

In 2000, around 51% of the population of the EU-15⁸, or 19 million people, resided in a country of which they were not citizens. Just about 6 million (1.6%) of the foreign people residing in the European Union were nationals of another EU Member State. However, immigrations targeted not only Northern Europe, but also Southern European countries, which had experienced significant economic expansion and convergence with Northern Europe in the 1980s as a result of their membership in the European Union. However, immigration was not restricted to the former countries of Western Europe. The collapse of the iron curtain and the transition of former Soviet Bloc countries to free-market economies triggered migrant flows from poorer countries to richer countries due to disparities in economic development. In 2001, 100,000 people from Eastern Europe were residing in the UK and the number of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) migrants authorised to work in European countries in 2002 was likewise quite low. It comprised roughly 450,000 people in Germany (mostly Croats, Poles, and Serbs), 320,000 people in Greece (primarily Albanians), 200,000 people in Switzerland (primarily ex-Yugoslavs), 160,000 people in Austria (primarily ex-Yugoslavs), 150,000 people in Italy (primarily Albanians, Poles, Romanians, and Ukrainians), and a few hundred thousand people abroad. In addition, some 350,000 seasonal migrants, most of whom were Poles, worked in Germany. Until May 1, 2004, however, inhabitants of CEE nations were generally permitted to enter EU countries freely only as tourists. This allowed them to have a valid stay on EU territory (or in one of its member states) for up to three months. Increasing numbers of individuals (mostly Poles, Romanians, Ukrainians, and Bulgarians) are travelling to the EU in search of employment. However, access to local labour markets remained extremely constrained (see Figure 1.1 in appendices 87). In practise, the majority

⁸ EU-15 area countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. <https://www.oecd.org/>

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

of migrants from the eastern portion of the continent were forced into irregular employment and several hundred thousand people from Central and Eastern Europe were working illegally in Europe (Salt and Almeida).

1.2 Eastern European Immigration after 2004 (A8):

The expansion of the EU -15 to ten countries from Eastern and Central Europe on January 2004: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta⁹ led to a substantial increase in the number of temporary and part-time migrants as shown in Figure 1.2 (see appendices p87) The number of emigrants from the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) to the wealthier European nations rose from 1.66 million in 2004 to 7.3 million in 2016. With the intensification of the EU's enlargement, the principles of the single market (i.e., free movement of goods, persons, services, and money) became obligatory for the new member states (NMS) in Central and Eastern Europe¹⁰ (S. O. Becker et al.). From the perspective of population movements, the EU concept of freedom of movement of persons is of prime significance (Lemos and Portes). The European Commission supports and encourages the mobility of the labour force, viewing it as a method for decreasing supply and demand disparities in European labour markets¹¹. As a result of adopting the rule of free movement of persons (Directive 2004/38/EC), inhabitants of the countries joining the Community acquired the right to free movement, residence, and work within the EU's territory, taking into consideration the

⁹ The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland Slovakia, Slovenia referred to A8 countries. Cyprus and Malta are Mediterranean islands and two members of Commonwealth of Nations.

¹⁰ In the history of the EU, which comprised 28 countries in 2015, there were six enlargements. The largest of them took place on the first of May 2014, when 10 countries joined the Union: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary. In 2007 Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU, and in 2013 Croatia became a member.

¹¹ This idea was highlighted in the EU's guiding project entitled "The Agenda for New Skills and Jobs" as part of the Europe 2020 agenda (Commission Communication 2010) and Employment Package (Communication from the Commission 2012)

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

transition periods employed by the EU-15. As a result, the rate of emigration from the New Member States (NMS) gradually increased.

As a result of the European Union's enlargement, the principle of free movement of persons became legally binding for the new member states' inhabitants¹². The EU-15 members were given the right to implement transition periods for workers from the new member states to join national labour markets and social protection systems in order to prevent an excessive influx of immigration from these countries. The transition periods were set at seven years, and the so-called "2+3+2 formula"¹³ permitted the adoption of two-year, three-year, and two-year transition periods, from May 1, 2004, to April 30, 2006, and May 1, 2006, to April 30, 2009, respectively (from 1 May 2009 to 30 April 2011). Each of the EU-15 nations was permitted to determine how to implement these temporary limits (Ukrowska 2004, p. 43). At the time of welcoming new member states into the European Union, only the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden¹⁴ completely applied the idea of free movement (Clark and Hardy). During the first transition period, although the labour markets of the remaining EU-15 countries remained officially closed, some countries implemented individual solutions such as immigration contingents (Austria), work permits for working in selected deficit jobs (France, Holland, Italy), temporary work

¹² The transitional measures did not apply to the citizens of Cyprus and Malta. Once those countries joined the EU, their citizens gained full freedom of movement within the EU territory

¹³ These regulations are based on the 2+3+2 formula: for the first two years following accession, access to the labour markets of member states depends on their national laws and policies. National measures may be extended for a further period of three years, and could continue for a further two years, but only if there are serious disruptions in the respective receiving labour market. (Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2009, 1) Following the 2004 EU enlargement, Ireland, the UK and Sweden opened access to their labour markets immediately.

¹⁴ At the beginning of the 2004 enlargement, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom erased all significant barriers to accessing the labor market; however, additional countries later followed. According to Galgóczi, Lesch, and Watt (2010), only Germany and Austria increased their labor-market entry requirements to a maximum of seven years.

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

permits (Denmark), and work permits granted to seasonal job employees (Germany) (Kurkowiak 2010, pp. 67–74). Many citizens of newly acquired EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe chose to take advantage of free movement and to seek employment in any EU nation. Between 2004 and 2016, it is anticipated that the number of residents from these countries residing in the EU-15 rose from 1.66 million to 7.3 million, greatly exceeding the estimates of British migration researchers. According to their projections, the number of immigrants from the Central and Eastern Europe, CEE–10, to the United Kingdom through 2010 was expected to be between 5,000 and 13,000 people. As of 2015, the overall number of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe to the "old EU" countries was predicted to range from 700,000 to 2.6 million (Dustmann 2003, p. 6). However, the EU's enlargement accelerated labour mobility (Holland et al.). Sweden, though was one of three countries that quickly got rid of restrictions, saw a very small increase in the number of people coming from new member countries, while the United Kingdom and Ireland saw a large increase. (Okólski).

The EU enlargement in 2004 with the accession in May 2004 of the eight Eastern and European countries have significantly modified not only the dynamics of intra-European labour mobility but also the "selection and nature of migration". The 2004 European Union (EU) enlargement made it possible for people of the accession countries to not only travel freely within the EU as outlined in the original Treaty of Rome¹⁵; but also legally seek employment in some of the older EU member states, the United Kingdom being among the first. Since that date, citizens of Malta and Cyprus have had complete freedom of movement and employment rights throughout the EU. It was a condition for

¹⁵ In 1957 the Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community (EEC), included six founding countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and (West) Germany. Nine further countries gradually joined the community from 1973 to 1995: Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Sweden, and Finland

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

the United Kingdom that all EU countries offer instant labour market access on the assumption that other member states would likewise open their labour markets. Conversely, a number of Member States seized the opportunity granted by the accession treaties to place "transitional" restrictions on the free movement of labour until the following year. The United Kingdom, along with Ireland and Sweden did not restrict immigration from the new Member States and quickly opened its labour market. Since then, a rumour has circulated that the main reason the British government provided quick access was due to an apparent "Home Office projection" that just between 5000 and 13,000 Central and Eastern Europeans would migrate to the United Kingdom per year. In reality, the forecast in question (Dustmann et al., 2003) was an independent external study, commissioned but not produced by the government, and had become largely irrelevant prior to the decision being made. The flow turned out to be twenty times more than the highest estimate. In 2004 and 2005, 129 000 migrants from A8 countries entered the United Kingdom, according to research made by professor John Salt at the University College London.¹⁶

After the 2004 Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, migration to the United Kingdom increased considerably. Goodhart (2013)¹⁷ described the inflow of A8 nationals into the United Kingdom as the "*Largest peacetime migration in European history.*" It was considered the "*Greatest expansion in the history of European integration.*" Migration from A8 countries to the United Kingdom was substantially larger than anticipated. The number of immigrants from new member states far exceeded all estimates. Prior to December 2006, more than 550,000 EU8 immigrants entered the United

¹⁶ <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/about/people/professor-john-salt/>

¹⁷ David Goodhart, director of Demos, a British think-tank, who claims that since 2004, the UK has been witnessing "the biggest peacetime movement in European history". The think tank says that more than 1.5 million migrants (remember the word) have arrived in the UK since 2004.

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

Kingdom. It consistently increased until the number of people in the labour force reached 516, 000 in September 2008, and representing 1.7% of the labour force. Over one million and four hundred thousand Eastern Europeans arrived in Britain within the first five years. The United Kingdom government implemented transitional measures to regulate A8 citizens' access to the labour market via the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS)¹⁸ and to restrict their access to welfare payments(UK Border Agency DWP). According to Gilpin et al. (2006) and et al. (2007), the Home Office created the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) to ensure that immigrants entering the United Kingdom were employed and to limit their access to benefits and social services. A8 migrants (Cyprus and Malta excluded) who registered with the WRS¹⁹ were permitted to work in the United Kingdom, but they could only access the benefits system after 12 months of continuous employment, at which point they could apply for a residence permit.(Drinkwater et al.).In July-September 2003, the Labour Force Survey²⁰ (LFS) revealed that 47,000 people born in A8 nations were employed in the United Kingdom, representing less than 0.2% of the total. For the reasons already stated, this is likely to have been an underestimate; it will have omitted illegal workers in particular. The following year after their entry to the European Union, the number increased to 97 000, but this was still less than 0.3% of all employed individuals. Until July-September 2008, when there were 516 000, the rate of increase was accelerating (1.7 per cent of the workforce).

¹⁸ The Work Registration Scheme (WRS) was introduced by the British government to monitor the flows of migrants from the new 'Accession 8' countries into the UK. The WRS collected information on nationality, industry, occupation, number of hours worked, pay by the hour, gender, and age (Bauere et al, 2007).

¹⁹ A8 migrants were required to register under the WRS with the Home Office for an initial fee of £50 (which eventually increased to £90). This process, which did not impose any restrictions on the free movement of labour (aside from the registration fee), gave the government and researchers a crucial source of information about immigrants from the accession countries on the labour market (Portes and French, 2005).

²⁰ The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a study of the employment circumstances of the UK population. It is the largest household study in the UK and provides the official measures of employment and unemployment. <https://www.ons.gov.uk/>.

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

Numbers hovered around 500,000 until April-June 2010, when they began to grow again with 59.3000 employees born in A8 nations employed in the United Kingdom in July-September 2010(2.0 per cent of all workers). In the first two months following enlargement, 24,000 A8 residents registered to work in the United Kingdom, according to WRS registration data. About 60 percent of these workers were already in the United Kingdom prior to May 2004 (Clark 2004). Subsequently, the number of applications (the vast majority of which were accepted) increased steadily, reaching its peak in 2007 with 845, 000 applications, of which 812,000 were accepted (McKay 2009). 895,000 applications were approved by the end of September 2008. Very few applications were really rejected. Afterwards applications when the recession²¹ began in 2008 and the exchange rate between the pound sterling and A8 currencies (especially the zloty)²² dropped. In the 12 months leading up to September 2010, the number of successful applications rose by 2%, to 111,000. While the numbers from Poland were declining, those from Latvia and Lithuania were increasing. Significant inflows from the new EU member states have constituted the single largest wave of foreign immigration the United Kingdom has ever encountered (Bauere et al, 2007). In 2009, 393,000 more Poles resided in the United Kingdom than in 2005. The fastest-growing countries were almost all new EU members from East-Central Europe. Polish nationals in the UK climbed by 289% between 2005 and 2009 and was among the most common EU nationalities in the UK(*Review of the Balance of Competences Internal Market : Free Movement of Persons Call for Evidence*).

²¹ The great recession refers to the economic downturn between 2008 and 2013. The recession began after the 2007/08 global credit crunch and led to a prolonged period of low/negative growth, rising unemployment and a period of fiscal austerity. In particular, the great recession highlighted problems within the Eurozone which experienced a double-dip recession and high unemployment.

<https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/7501/economics/the-great-recession>.

²² The Zloty is the official Polish Currency

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

The United Kingdom continued to gain more A8 migrants than it loses (ONS, 2011). Half of the EU nationals entering the United Kingdom were from the new accession countries. In 2015, the number of Eastern European migrants exceeded 1 million, with Poland constituting the vast majority of new arrivals and contributed 65 percent of the new European Union (See Figure 1.3 in appendices p 87) (Home Office and Others, 2007). The examples of the United Kingdom (and Ireland), which experienced large influxes of migrant workers upon enlargement, demonstrated a geographical redirection of historical migration patterns and pre-enlargement labour flows towards those EU15 countries that opened their labour markets immediately after enlargement and simultaneously displayed favourable conditions in terms of labour market demand²³. Prior to EU expansion, Germany had been the leading destination for Polish labour migrants between 1999 and 2003. However, the United Kingdom became the leading destination. In fact, the proportion of Polish migrants in the three countries that did not maintain labour market restrictions following enlargement increased from 12.1% to 42.4% (Fihel and Okólski, 2009) (McCollum et al.). The net increase in the stock of Britain-based temporary Polish migrants between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2012 was between 573, 000 and 588,000. In 2011, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data indicated a gradual increase in the annual stock to 658 000, well below the census total for that year, to 679 000 in 2013, followed by a sharp increase to 826 000 in 2014. In the meantime, Polish LFS and census data revealed that as of December 2012, around 637 000 Poles had lived in the United Kingdom for more than three months and their number reached more than 800,000 in 2015 (Okólski and

²³ Sweden also opened its labour market at the same time, but did not experience a significant inflow of EU8 migrants

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

Salt). Concerning National Registration, 79,000 National Insurance Number (NINo)²⁴ registrations were issued to EU accession country nationals the first year of EU expansion. Roughly 3.5 times the previous year. In 2005, A10²⁵ countries received more than twice as many NINos as Asian and Middle Eastern nationals, accounting for over two fifths of total registrations (Migration Watch UK).

Temporary employment was reported by 53 % who registered in the first year following the expansion. This was especially high among agricultural workers (76% temporary) and those employed in administration, business, and management (79 %). According to Clark and Drinkwater (2008), after enlargement, the percentage of A8 migrants to be self-employed decreased dramatically. This was due to pre-enlargement limitations that forced A8 workers into self-employment in order to enter the British labour market. Over the period of the WRS's operation (May 2004 to April 2011), there were 1,133,950 registrations of labour migration flows from East-Central Europe. These movements have been focused in specific segments of the labour market, with the majority of A8 migrants working in the hospitality and agriculture sectors and frequently through employment agencies rather than directly for employers²⁶. Since the beginning of the recession in 2008, the number of new entrants from the A8 nations has declined but remained strong at the end of the WRS period. Agriculture has maintained a reasonably

²⁴ The National Insurance number is a number used in the United Kingdom in the administration of the National Insurance or social security system. It is also used for some purposes in the UK tax system.

The number is sometimes referred to as a NI No or NINO. <https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/national-insurance-manual/nim39100>.

²⁵ The territorial scope of the analyses conducted covers selected member states which accessed the EU in the year 2004 (i.e. the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary) and in 2007 (i.e. Bulgaria and Romania)

²⁶ EEA migration in the UK: Final report Migration Advisory Committee September 2018, p49. *NMS New Member States (usually refers to EU12; in studies before 2007, to EU10). <https://ec.europa.eu/>

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

stable need for migrant labour relative to other sectors of the economy during the crisis, suggesting that companies in this industry may continue to require foreign workers despite the current state of the labour market. In other industries, the demand for foreign labour had decreased significantly by 2011. This conceptually indicated that A8 migrant labour served diverse "functions" on the British labour market.

As displayed in Figure 1.4 (see appendix p 88), a substantial number of A8 migrants worked in the fields such as administration, business, and management industry. However, the high number in this category is a result of how registrations were classified in the WRS and the majority of migrants in this sector were employed by recruitment firms, which belong to the administration, business, and management sector. However, they were also widely employed in other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, food processing, and hospitality (Home Office, 2009). Similarly, given the relatively low skill requirements for many jobs in these sectors, the concentration of registrations in industries like hospitality and catering and with recruitment agencies suggested that A8 migrants primarily found employment in the UK in occupations that were accessible to them using frequently agencies for job opportunities in the British and Scottish labour markets. Despite their high levels of education, many post-enlargement migrants worked in "low-skilled and underpaid positions" and were more likely to have their occupations downgraded upon arrival than other EU immigrants. According to the 2016 Office National of Statistics (ONS) around 40 % of EU8 were over-qualified for their job²⁷. In contrast to many past waves of immigration, the first destinations of East-Central European migrants have been surprisingly geographically dispersed, as opposed to being centered on big metropolitan areas with a history of receiving immigrants. This shift in

²⁷ New ONS analysis on migrants from EU 8 countries including Poland and Hungary Helen Warrell JULY 10 2017 .<https://www.ft.com/content/14b558c8-6585-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614>

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

settlement patterns has had a substantial influence on local governments that had little experience with immigration previous to 2004. (Pollard et al, 2008). The areas with the highest migrant inflows were those with more prosperous economies and labour markets, such as London, the South-East, and East England. The regions with the lowest A8 immigrant populations were the North-East, Wales, and Northern Ireland. This could be expected because these places tend to have small populations and are in economically and geographically remote parts of the UK (McCollum et al.). The expansion of the EU in 2004 provided companies with access to a new pool of hard-working, compliant, hard-working, and cheap labour which contrasted well with local workers, who, during a period of low unemployment, were able to exert greater control over where they worked and their terms and conditions of employment (Cook et al.). According to the Annual Population Survey (APS), 13% of the workforce in Britain was made up of immigrants in 2008, with a third coming from immigrants that were A8 members of the European Union (EU). Bauere et al. (2007) claimed that this was the biggest migration wave Britain has ever seen..(Viskanic)

1.3 EU Immigration after 2007 (Romania/Bulgaria and the 2014 immigrants' wave):

Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU three years after the EU8 on January 2007, known as the A2 or EU 2, Romania and Bulgaria completed the process of European integration and became members of the EU. Members of the European Parliament voted a resolution in October 2011 asking all EU Member States to permit Bulgaria and Romania to join the Schengen border-free zone since both countries had met the conditions for a successful completion of the Schengen evaluation process. However, European Union

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

interior ministers delayed until 2014²⁸ a decision on admitting both countries to the EU Schengen visa zone. The 2+3+2 transitional rules also applied to Romania and Bulgaria. Introduced by various EU-15 nations in response to political pressure and the substantial income difference per capita. Theoretically, these arrangements permitted member states to restrict the free movement of labour until 2014. During the first phase of the 2007 enlargement, ten EU-25 member states (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, and Sweden) relaxed access to their labour markets for Bulgarian and Romanian employees. The second phase for EU-2 countries began on January 1, 2009, and as a result of the Commission's report, Spain, Greece, Hungary and Portugal have also opened their labour markets to EU-2 citizens. Denmark then offered access without charge on May 1, 2009. The majority of the remaining EU-25 member states have simplified their procedures or reduced limitations for certain industries and professions (Kahanec et al. 2009, 1)²⁹. Bulgaria and Romania had also resulted in a considerable rise in migration flows. Although this time Spain and Italy were the leading destination countries. Italy completely lifted its transitional restrictions in December 2011, whereas Spain, citing an increase in unemployment, maintained its restrictions until 2014³⁰. Croatia began accession talks with the EU in 2005, signed the Accession Partnership in 2007, and became the 28th member state in July 2013 (Fic).

²⁸ In September 2011 the Netherlands and Finland announced their decision to veto Bulgaria's and Romania's Schengen accession, citing ongoing problems with corruption and organized crime. As enlargement of the Schengen zone requires the unanimous consent.

²⁹ See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at:
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325626126>
Migration from Bulgaria and Romania to the EU-15 Chapter January 2012

³⁰ Starting in January 2014, European law guarantees Romanian and Bulgarian workers the ability to work in any EU nation,

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

In 2008, the EU27³¹ accepted approximately two million migrants from other EU nations (European Commission, 2012), the majority of this migration was East-West migration from EU8+2 to EU15 (see Holland et al., 2011) with the Bulgarians and Romanians forming indeed the most migratory individuals in Europe. Southern European nations and, to a lesser extent, Germany, were the principal destinations for Bulgarian and Romanian migrants). Italy and Spain were popular destinations for Romanians, attracting around 40 and 43 % of mobile Romanians in 2009. In terms of migration from Bulgaria, Spain was by far the most popular destination, with over 38% of Bulgarians choosing to move there. Other popular destinations for Bulgarian migrants included Germany (15%), Greece (13%), and Italy (11%). The United Kingdom ranked fourth as a destination country for Romanian movers. In 2009, over 4% of mobile Romanians resided in the United Kingdom. It ranked fifth for Bulgarians in 2009, garnering approximately 6% of mobile Bulgarians. (*Potential Impacts on the UK of Future Migration from Bulgaria and Romania Heather Rolfe , Tatiana Fic , Mumtaz Lalani , Monica Roman , Maria Prohaska and Liliana Doudeva*). The employment rates of Bulgarian and Romanian workers decreased in 2009 due to the crisis that impacted Spain and Italy, the primary destination countries for Bulgarian and Romanian migrants. This resulted in a rise in unemployment among EU2 migrants, which, according to the European Commission (2012), was mostly attributable to their concentration in Spain, where 62% of all unemployed EU2 migrants resided (Holland et al.). In the UK, the majority of Bulgarian and Romanian mobile workers were concentrated in three industries: construction, home tasks and accommodation and food service activities. These sectors accounted for more than half of all recent EU2 migrants in the labour force, while their local employment share in EU15

³¹ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. <https://www.gov.uk>.

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

nations was just about 14%. Manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and housing and food services employed the majority of EU8 nationals (Holland et al., 2011). The bulk of Romanian migrants were working in elementary jobs³² (42%), followed by qualified employees in the manufacturing sector (35%), and the service industry (11%). (Barbulescu, 2009). Their earnings were substantially concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution. Also, their level of education particularly of Romanian migrants had nothing to do with whether or not they had jobs or how much money they made. (*Potential Impacts on the UK of Future Migration from Bulgaria and Romania Heather Rolfe , Tatiana Fic , Mumtaz Lalani , Monica Roman , Maria Prohaska and Liliana Doudeva*). As for their location, the proportion of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals settling in London was somewhat larger before the economic crisis. (*Potential Impacts on the UK of Future Migration from Bulgaria and Romania Heather Rolfe , Tatiana Fic , Mumtaz Lalani , Monica Roman , Maria Prohaska and Liliana Doudeva*)

The two new member states from Eastern and Central Europe took also the path of the A8 to the United Kingdom. However, after three years of administering the WRS for the A8 countries, the British government decided in 2007 not to provide the same access to the labour market to citizens of Bulgaria and Romania (the "A2"). Instead, it provided that A2 workers might apply for a relatively small number of temporary positions (3,500 per

³² Tasks performed by workers in elementary occupations usually include: selling goods in streets and public places, or from door to door; providing various street services; cleaning, washing, pressing; taking care of apartment houses, hotels, offices and other buildings; washing windows and other glass surfaces of buildings; delivering messages or goods; carrying luggage; doorkeeping and property watching; stocking vending machines or reading and emptying meters; collecting garbage; sweeping streets and similar places; performing various simple farming, fishing, hunting or trapping tasks performing simple tasks connected with mining, construction and manufacturing including product-sorting and simple hand-assembling of components; packing by hand; freight handling; pedalling or hand-guiding vehicles to transport passengers and goods; driving animal-drawn vehicles or machinery. <https://www.ilo.org>.

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

year) in the food manufacturing sector under the Sector Based Scheme (SBS)³³ or in the agricultural sector (21,500 per year) under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS), with young workers under 35 years of age specifically targeted. A2 citizens were subject to the same employment restrictions as non-EU citizens. However, they were permitted to establish themselves in business, i.e., to work on a self-employed basis. The British government put restrictions on Bulgaria and Romania when they joined the EU in 2007, but only on unskilled migrants who were required to apply for an Accession Worker Card (AWC)³⁴ unless they had other work permits. Highly skilled A2 immigrants, students, the self-employed, the self-sufficient, and their dependents could apply for a registration certificate. A2 nationals who have worked lawfully for a year without breaks didn't need an Accession Worker Card. Between 2007 and 2009, representing a relatively modest number of employees from A2 countries, the majority of AWC applications were submitted by Romanian nationals (58 %) and related to work permits, but around a third of Romanian applications related to other AWC categories such as the Sectors Based Scheme (SBS). (Lymperopoulou) (Cook et al.). The United Kingdom imposed interim restrictions, which were lifted in all EU nations in 2014 (Blanch Flower and Lawton, 2008). The majority of immigrants from the EU2 worked in occupations requiring low or intermediate levels of education, such as elementary jobs and crafts and related trades. These included building, manufacturing, housing, food and service businesses, and wholesale and retail trade across the EU. In the United Kingdom, the proportion of self-employed migrants

³³ The UK previously operated two seasonal migration programmes: the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) and the Sector Based Scheme (SBS). The SAWS was originally a cultural exchange programme set up following the Second World War for agricultural workers. In contrast, the SBS was established in 2003 to counter labour shortages in, primarily, the hospitality sector. WP2 Seasonal work flows UK Contribution to WP2 Inventory Report Samuk & Consterdine

³⁴ A2 Nationals who want to take up employment in the UK from 1 January 2007 generally have to apply for workers authorisation document. <https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/claimant-compliance-manual/ccm20140>

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

from other Central and Eastern Europe was quite low, whereas the proportion of self-employed migrants from Bulgaria and Romania was substantially greater (Kausar, 2011).

In January 2014, Bulgarians and Romanians gained the same rights to work in the UK. As a result, the number of EU2 nationals immigrating to the United Kingdom climbed from 183,000 in the year ending in June 2013 to 228,000 in the year ending in June 2014. According to IPS estimates, citizens of the EU 15, the EU 8, and the EU 2 accounted for 52 %, 31 %, and 15 % of EU immigration in the fiscal year ending in June 2014. The International Passenger Survey (IPS) ³⁵ estimated that 32,000 Bulgarians were in the United Kingdom in the year ending in June 2014. A rise from 18,000 in the preceding twelve months. 75% of the EU2 population arrived for work-related reasons (24.00). 72 % of EU 2, compared to 71 % for the fiscal year ended September 2013. There was a 32,000 increase over the previous year (2013), with a 76% increase due to work-related reasons ³⁶. (figure 1.5 see Appendices p 88) (Garrote-sanchez and Kreuder). The number of Romanians and Bulgarians working in the UK has fallen by 4,000 since employment restrictions were lifted in January, but was up 29,000 compared to 2013. During 2015, long-standing EU14 nations accounted for 24% (120,000) of non-British inflows, A8 countries accounted for 15%, and A2 accession countries accounted for 10%. The number of Romanians and Bulgarians living in the UK increased at from 30,400 on 2013 to 64,500 on April 2014 (Migration). This indicated that when the "transitional controls" on A2 migrants claiming benefits or working in the UK ended on January 1, 2014, there was not the

³⁵ The International Passenger Survey (IPS) is a continuous survey carried out by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). It covers all major air, sea and tunnel ports, providing detailed information on the numbers and types of visits made by people travelling to and from the UK. <https://www.ons.gov.uk/s>

³⁶ Office for National Statistics, Long-Term International Migration <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/dec2016>

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

massive influx the press and some politicians had predicted. Arguably the number of Bulgarians and Romanians in the UK increased by 47,000 from 205,000 in the third quarter of 2013 to 252,000 in the third quarter of 2014, according to the researchers who collected and reviewed data from the Office for National Statistics' Labour Force Survey. The rise from Q3 2012 to Q3 2012 was 45,000, not a decrease. Nigel Farage, the leader of the anti-EU party UKIP, warned a day before the limits were lifted that a rush of migrants from Bulgaria and Romania would cause a "Romanian crime wave" in the United Kingdom³⁷. As displayed in Figure 1.5 (see appendices p 88), the numbers of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants increased when transitional controls on the British labour market were removed by the UK on EU 2 in 2014 (Strey et al.) .From 29,900 net immigration in 2012 to 30,400 net immigration but which increased to 64,500 on April 2014 to reach 125,400 net immigration in 2016 (Migration)³⁸. Although after January 2014, when transitional controls on the British labour market were removed, the government did not publish any predictions on the number of Bulgarians or Romanians who could migrate to the country, the press, particularly the tabloids, predicted an influx of migrants.

³⁷ Office for National Statistics, Long-Term International Migration <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/dec2016>

³⁸ Migration, E. U. *BRIEFING EU Migration to and from the UK*. 2016. Migration Watch UK. *National Insurance Numbers and Immigration Figures for Eastern Europeans*. 2016, pp. 1–7.

Chapter one: The Enlargement of the EU and Eastern European Immigration to the UK

Conclusion:

On May 1, 2004, the European Union expanded to include eight countries from Eastern and Central Europe commonly referred as A8 or EU 8. A large number of migrants from the A8 countries entered the British labour market, making Central and Eastern Europe becoming one of the most important source regions for migrants to the United Kingdom. This was possible thanks to the New Labour government's decision to open its labour market from day one to these new European Citizens without restrictions on the expectation that other EU Member States would also open their labour markets along with a booming British economy in need of these new labour workers (*Article _ The Immigration Legacy of Tony Blair _ Migrationpolicy*). The UK implemented for the A8 workers only to register to the Work Registration Scheme (WRS) the first year. By underestimating their numbers and the large inflow, the United Kingdom imposed interim restrictions to Romania and Bulgaria (known as "A2s") who were admitted to the European Union in January 2007 but lifted them in 2014. The expansion of the EU gave A10 migrants a lot of new options, which led to a wide range of migration patterns, from permanent residence on one end of the scale to more frequent and short-term moves on the other.

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

Introduction:

Immigration and its potential effects on the economy have far-reaching implications for both social and economic policy. To be member of the EU, grants free movement and labour to any new EU member states upon their accession. As a result of the 2004 expansion, many countries changed their approach and delayed labor market access while the United Kingdom granted citizens of the new member states immediate, unrestricted access to its labour market which led to an unprecedented inflow of immigrants. This led to a widespread belief among the general public and policymakers that EU immigration has substantial effects on the labour market in general and employment, wages, benefits and crime in particular and became at the heart of the debate on EU membership. On the one hand, there was a widely belief that EU immigration in Britain and particularly the Eastern one has caused wages to drop in jobs that have been affected by immigration more than other factors with the stereotype of the Polish plumber as a symbol of cheap labour. On the other hand, thanks to an increasing labor force, EU immigration has contributed to the expansion of the British economy, to a more diversity in areas of the United Kingdom where there is only one culture, entrepreneurship and the growth of small businesses which benefits the British society³⁹.

³⁹ (Nickell and Saleheen).

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

2.1 Impact on the UK Economy:

Migration may have both good and negative effects on the economy and public finances of receiver countries. Free movement by the other EEA countries to the UK offers the benefit of a minimal bureaucratic load, but at the cost of losing control over the quantity and nature of immigration into the United Kingdom (Migration Advisory Committee et al.). The free movement of people, as part of European Union single market, determined the increasing immigration flow in the European Union, which raised questions again, especially after 2004 A8 expansion and A2 in 2007, about the costs and benefits of EU immigration. Since the entrance of the lower-income Eastern European countries in 2004, the flows have become asymmetric, with a larger number of EU migrants opting to immigrate to the United Kingdom than UK citizens opting to migrate to other EU countries. In the Final report of Migration Advisory Committee on September 2018 on EEA migration in the UK, it is indicated that despite the considerable magnitude of migration from EU countries since the early 2000s, the overall economic effects have been rather minor, with population growth being the primary influence. As claimed by some, EEA migration as a whole has not hurt the current resident population, but it has also not had the considerable positive impact asserted by others. This does not imply that all migrant workers have the same effect but that the impact of high-skilled migration is more positive than that of low-skilled migration. This is most evident in the effect on government finances and innovation. In addition, while the evidence for a more positive impact of high-skilled migration on productivity is limited, there is some evidence that EU migration has marginally restricted employment possibilities for those born in the United Kingdom, particularly those with lower levels of education.

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

Conversely, it was suggested that migration has a minor negative influence on earnings at the bottom of the wage distribution and a tiny positive effect at the top. (Migration Advisory Committee et al.)(Rowthorn). According to new researches by the University College London (UCL) Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), European immigrants who arrived in the UK since 2000 have contributed more than £20bn to UK public finances between 2001 and 2011.⁴⁰ Moreover, they have endowed the country with productive human capital that would have cost the UK £6.8bn in spending on education. Over the period from 2001 to 2011, European immigrants from the EU-15 countries contributed 64% more in taxes than they received in benefits while Immigrants from the Central and East European 'accession' countries (the 'A10') contributed 12% more than they received. Giving the findings of new analysis by Professor Christian Dustmann and Dr Tommaso Frattini of the fiscal consequences of European immigration to the UK published by the Royal Economic Society in *The Economic Journal in 2014*, the positive net fiscal contribution of recent immigrant cohorts (those arriving since 2000) from the A10 countries amounted to almost £5bn, while the net fiscal contributions of recent European immigrants from the rest of the EU totalled £15bn. Over the same period, the net fiscal contribution of native UK born was negative, amounting to almost £617bn. Professor Christian Dustmann, Director of CReAM and co-author of the study, said:

⁴⁰ <https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/6399/economics/impact-of-immigration-on-uk-economy>

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

Immigration to the UK since 2000 has been of substantial net fiscal benefit, with immigrants contributing more than they have received in benefits and transfers. This is true for immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe as well as the rest of the EU..... European immigrants, particularly, both from the new accession countries and the rest of the European Union, make the most substantial contributions. This is mainly down to their higher average labour market participation compared with natives and their lower receipt of welfare benefit (Press et al.)

Figure 2.1 (see Appendices p 88) displays the average net fiscal contribution of each migrant and native relative to the average UK adult in 2016-2017, EEA migrants contributed approximately £2,300 more per capita than the average UK adult, whereas non-EEA migrant adults contributed almost £800 less⁴¹. In reality, migrants from original member states made the lion's share⁴² of this contribution in 2016/17, contributing an average of £3,700 more per head than the average adult in the United Kingdom. Additionally, NMS immigrants contributed more than the UK average (Rowthorn).

2.2 Impact on the UK Labour Market:

During periods of robust economic expansion, migration has always been crucial for filling labor market gaps. In the month of May in 2004, there was a substantial, quick, and concentrated increase of influx of accession migrants into the United Kingdom. Similarly in 2004, the British labor market was historically and internationally strong (Coats 2008). And between May 2004 and May 2006, claimant unemployment

⁴¹ National_institutions_and_the_fiscal_eff.pdf. . p22

⁴² The largest part or most of something. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/lion-s-share>

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

(ILO)⁴³ increased by approximately 96,000 (250,000)(Lemos and Portes). This was despite the fact that employment continued to grow, with low levels of layoffs and a high number of job openings (Home Office, 2007). In 2013, immigration to the United Kingdom from the rest of the EU increased with 223,000 to 282,400 in 2016 with EU14 which accounted for 95,000, 125,400 EU2 and 58,700 EU8 (Migration) and importantly, 72% of EU immigrants came to the United Kingdom for economic reasons. Given their skills, more immigrants worked in jobs like cleaning and bartending that did not require a lot of training(Strey et al.).A8 immigrants were concentrated in skilled manual and elementary manual occupations, whereas EU15 immigrants were concentrated in the professions. Particularly in 2013, EU immigrants had a tendency to be younger, more educated, and less likely to be unemployed than people born in the UK. However, there were some effects. Even though there may have been more downward pressure on wages and more competition for jobs for those with less education, these effects seem to have been small. The bulk of economic research suggested that EU immigration had minor or nonexistent effects on the income and employment of native workers. Concerning the United Kingdom, there were data and conceptual gaps. The gross weekly earnings of full-time workers grew between 2005 and 2008, coinciding with the largest intake of A8 workers⁴⁴. After 2008, the decreased rate of weekly pay increase was attributable to the aftermath of the economic crisis. After 2008, a significant number of A8 personnel left, and the number of new hires declined significantly.

⁴³ International Labour Organization (ILO), the only tripartite U.N. agency, since 1919 brings together governments, employers and workers of [187 member States](https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm), to set labour standards, develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and men. <https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm>

⁴⁴ UK and non-UK people in the labour market: February 2020.P5

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

Accordingly, Blanchflower et al. (2007) stated that A8 migration is likely to have loosened restrictions on the labor market, increased the flexibility of the labor force, decreased inflation, and decreased the natural rate of unemployment in the United Kingdom, with no major adverse effects on unemployment (Gilpinetal 2006). The fact that these workers appear to move frequently to industries and locations where there is work has likely contributed to regional growth and prevented labor shortages in vital industries and those that have difficulty attracting locals, such as agriculture. The majority of companies identified the consistency, willingness to put in more overtime, motivation, and reduced staff turnover of A8 migrant workers as positive qualities. In 2007, surveys conducted by the British Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of Directors confirmed this and that A8 immigrants have also aided the expansion of small businesses (SMEs). This applies to small and medium-sized enterprises in general, particularly in industries such as construction, as well as to economic activity related to the arrival of a significant number of migrants, such as specialized food stores and airport transportation. For the entirety of fiscal year A8, immigration's contribution to total government revenue was proportional to its share of the total population. For example, in 2008-09, they represented 0.91 percent of the population and 0.96 percent of the government's revenue. This is because A8 immigrants had exceptionally high employment rates despite earning less than natives and paying less income tax on average. Despite comprising only 0.9% of the population in 2008–09, A8s contributed 0.85% of all income tax revenues and 1.3% of all VAT⁴⁵ revenues. Dustmann et al. (2007) conducted the first comprehensive examination of the net fiscal contribution of A8 immigrants. This, according to the authors, *"paints a very favorable picture of A8 immigration to the United Kingdom, with highly educated young*

⁴⁵ A value- Added Tax (VAT) is a consumption tax assessed on the value added in each production stage of a good or service. taxfoundation.org

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

people coming to the country primarily for employment and then making positive contributions to the tax system." Importantly, the analysis showed that A8 immigrants have made a big financial contribution to the UK's fiscal system. Their share of the population is much lower than the amount of money they get from the government in the form of benefits and welfare, which is a good indicator of this.

As opposed to studying or joining their families, approximately 70% of EU immigrants said they came to the UK for employment-related reasons (ONS, 2016). In 2015, there were about 3.3 million EU immigrants living in the UK, compared to about 0.9 million in 1995. During a time when EU immigration was rising sharply (after 2004), the unemployment rate for those born in the United Kingdom rose, but then returned to a very low level, while EU immigration continued to rise. In fact, despite the global recession in 2008, the rise in unemployment among native-born Brits was significantly less than during previous recessions, when EU immigration was substantially lower. The employment rate of native-born Britons varied with the economic cycle. From the late 1990s until the global financial crisis in 2008, median real wages for British-born individuals increased. Since that time, salaries have dropped by about 10%. Such declines in real wages are unprecedented since the end of World War II. . Figure 2.2 (See Appendices p 89) shows that this decline occurred at a period when EU immigration was increasing. But, the significant increases in real earnings for UK workers also occurred at a time when EU immigration was increasing⁴⁶. Therefore, rather than immigration, the effects of the Great Recession⁴⁷ are to blame for the decline in earnings. Moreover, Nickell and Saleheen

⁴⁶ UK and non-UK people in the labour market: February 2020.P5

⁴⁷ The economic slowdown that followed the 2007 financial crisis resulted in a significant decline in gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the United Kingdom between 2008 and 2009, with growth falling by over

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

(2015) found modest pay declines in occupations with rapid immigration growth. Their findings suggested that all EU immigration since 2004 has reduced semi-skilled and unskilled service sector salaries by no more than 0.7%. (In comparison, the minimum wage increased by 4% over the same period, according to the Centre for European Reform, 2016). It is possible that even their tiny effects of EU immigration on wages were due to its effects on other immigrants. Moreover, the occupations that lost jobs in a local area might have been counterbalanced by occupations that gained jobs, meaning that the total effect on wages in the area was zero. EU immigrants made a positive fiscal contribution, according to Dustmann and Frattini (2014), since they paid more in taxes than they received in welfare payments. Since 2004, A8 immigrants, for instance, contributed around £15 billion more to the public capitals than they withdrew. In contrast, the average British citizen received more benefits than they paid in taxes. The report found that "*immigration is not a significant factor in the wage growth experienced by existing residents.*"

There is some evidence that higher rates of immigration from the EU decreased the wages of the lowest-paid workers while increasing the wages of the highest-paid workers. For those in the lowest-paid tenth of the wage scale, EU migration is estimated to have decreased pay by 5% in real terms between 1992 and 2017, while it increased pay by 3.5% for those in the highest-paid tenth of the wage scale during the same time period. However, pay increased significantly for those born in the United Kingdom. The pay of those in the lowest tenth of the wage scale increased by 49% over the same time period. Those in the top tenth received a 35% pay increase. Furthermore, Wadsworth noted that EU immigrants were more likely to compete with existing migrants at the top end of the distribution of

6 percentage points. The unemployment rate rose from just over 5% in the second quarter of 2008 to nearly 8% in the second quarter of 2009 and remained relatively stable around this level (peaking at 8.4% in the fourth quarter of 2011) until mid-2013, when it began to fall and returned to around 5% in 2016.

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

skills, and that any increased competition for work between EU migrants and British workers would be concentrated among individuals with low skill levels, in specific industries, and in local labor markets. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that EU migrants have filled critical labor and skills shortages for many years, at both the skilled and unskilled ends of the labor market and frequently in key economic sectors. For instance, Eastern European migrants were known to be concentrated in the service sector, which accounted for 79% of GDP and included the hospitality, tourism, and healthcare industries. In addition, there were a large number of highly skilled EU migrants in the finance sector, another industry that the United Kingdom depended on. (Rienzo and Vargos-Silva).

2.3 Local Workers Reactions:

In general, European immigration had a considerable positive impact on the British labor market. However, depending mainly on the economic, social and political context, there might be mixed returns from local workers. Local workers are typically the first to form an opinion or respond to immigration, whether based on preconceived notions or their everyday work experiences. Regarding European immigration, as opposed to ethnic or Muslim immigration of the past, their whiteness or predominantly Christian faith have aided them in gaining employment and exercising their right to free movement. Their diligence and adaptability, especially among immigrants from Eastern European nations, enabled their employment. Since enabling free migration from EU member states, the United Kingdom has seen extraordinary employment migration from Eastern Europe. Their entrance has changed the British labor market to the point where the term "migrant worker" became synonymous with "Pole" or, more generally, "East European." The attitude of British workers towards them has prompted studies. Catherine Harris of the Department of Geography at the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom, utilized

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

biographical interviews as part of the European Research Council (ERC)-funded research project LIVEDIFFERENCE (2014). Participants in the study came from a variety of social backgrounds (in terms of socioeconomic position, occupation, gender, ethnicity, religious/belief, sexual orientation, and (dis)ability); their personal situations and lifestyles afforded them a diversity of encounters with "different." In the paper, all quotations are presented in their exact form. Respondents reported instances of harboring prejudice against migrant workers such as seasonal migration generating instability and transience in local communities and transnational flows of money sent to relatives in Poland that could have been spent in the UK economy.

Despite this, meetings with migrant workers caused a significant number of respondents who had previously held biased opinions to change their unfavorable attitudes into positive ones. Such adjustments frequently result from job and community interactions. As was the case with negative attitudes, the transformation to positive attitudes was largely based on the large-scale aspect of East European labor migration, such as bringing new skills, enriching the culture of local communities by sharing East European cultural traits, and fostering business ties between the homeland and the United Kingdom. These negative opinions were frequently rooted in the large-scale character of EU migration. This was exemplified mostly by East European migrant workers sending money back to family in their native countries, thus withdrawing it from the British economy (cf. Taylor 1999; Harris 2012). However, these beliefs were frequently explained by government policy rather than the behavior of the migrants. As one responder stated:

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

"I'm prejudiced towards Poles at present because they're coming and taking all our jobs, and the government is proposing that they must be earning £28,000 or £30,000 a year after 12 months or be deported." With this approach, our lower-paid employees will have a chance to obtain employment, and the company will have a better opportunity to hire more competent candidates. If they come here to work, that's fine, but if they just take the money and send it home, that's bad, and it makes me prejudiced towards them, especially when our own people are hurting
(Michael, 55-59, white-British).(F. G. Becker et al.)

Many British workers voted for Brexit in June 2016, induced by the 'take back control' argument of the Leave campaign, a thinly veiled attack on EU immigration. After 2004, the number of EU migrants employed in the United Kingdom increased rapidly but remained low. The problem for workers born in the United Kingdom was the increased employability of recent EU migrants due to their greater skill levels, lower salary rates, or both. Since 2013, the number of EU workers in the United Kingdom has increased from 1,400,000 to 2,100,000. Britain's relative prosperity has made it the "jobs factory of Europe". However, local workers may respond badly to labor market competition. They embrace the capitalist economic system and labor market, yet whine when things go wrong. They want the government to halt or regulate immigration. Instead of "workers of the world unite," the Labour Party and the worthless left support "British jobs for British workers." On January 30, 2009, protesters gathered in front of the Total Lindsey oil refinery in Immingham, close to Grimsby, as an illustration of the response of British workers. Across the United Kingdom, hundreds of oil refinery workers went on strike to protest the use of foreign labor in engineering and building projects. Workers walked off the job on Wednesday At Britain's third-largest refinery, Lindsey, operated by the French

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

oil firm Total, there have been disagreements regarding the use of Italian and Portuguese contractors on a development project. In the words of Gordon Brown, one of the demonstrators carried a sign that read, "UK jobs for British workers."⁴⁸

2.4 EU Immigrants and Housing:

It is often assumed that migrant workers have priority over native-born families for social housing. As a result of underestimating the amount of A8 workers that would arrive, inadequate housing and welfare provisions were made. Due to job opportunities, EU migrant workers have relocated to regions of the United Kingdom with no migration history and, as a result, no fundamental expertise in delivering welfare or managing integration issues. Local councils reported that they were obliged to provide public services such as education, but did not receive sufficient funding. The organization Shelter⁴⁹ asserts that housing problems existed in the United Kingdom prior to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, but that the influx of A8 and A2 exacerbated the situation. In many locations of the United Kingdom, a shortage of social rental housing has resulted from decades of underinvestment in social housing and a crisis in affordable housing. There is evidence that A8 migrant workers have had difficulty acquiring access to social housing. Less than one percent of housing association rentals in 2006/07 went to A8 nations. In 2007, just 7% of the homeless individuals recognized by local authorities, which were obliged to provide accommodation, were A8 and A2 nations. In 2008, 90 percent of NMS immigrants who had arrived in the United Kingdom within the previous two years lived in the private renting sector, frequently enduring inadequate and

⁴⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/gallery/2009/jan/30/oil>

⁴⁹ The UK housing and homelessness Charity

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

overcrowded conditions. The House of Commons Library summarized the criteria governing migrant eligibility for housing assistance in 2014 and stated that they were "very complex." However, EEA immigrants are generally eligible if they have the right to reside there. In comparison to EEA migration, which has unavoidably had an impact because of the increased demand, the fall in the supply of social housing has by far had the greatest impact on the ability of UK natives to obtain social housing. The proportion of NMS migrants living in social housing was rising, which might have further reduced the likelihood that locals will be able to find social accommodation.

Although some migrant groups are as likely to reside in social housing as those born in the United Kingdom, migrants make up a very small fraction of all social housing residents because their population share is tiny. From 1997 to 2017, the proportion of UK-born residents in social housing declined by 7.9 percentage points, while the proportions of EU13⁵⁰ migrants and NMS migrants climbed by 0.2 and 2.2 percentage points, respectively. Despite this, EEA migrants made up only 3.4% of the total number of people in social housing in 2017, whereas those born in the United Kingdom made up 86.1% in the same year. Arguably, numerous household budgets are dominated by housing expenses, so any impact of immigration on housing costs is significant. The ONS reported that the ratio of the home price of existing residences to annual earnings in England and Wales increased from 3.4 in 1997 to 7.6 in 2017, with the majority of the increase occurring before 2005. The proportion of new lettings going to UK-born renters has fallen from 94.5 per cent in 2007 to 91.5 per cent in 2016⁵¹. Figure 2.3 (See Appendices p 89)

⁵⁰ Since 2004 there have been 13 new countries added to the European Union - Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. <https://www.statista.com/study/28557/education-in-the-new-eu-member-states-eu13>

⁵¹ EEA migration in the UK: Final report Migration Advisory Committee September 2018 p 104

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

shows that this fall in the share of lettings to British citizens is mostly the result as a rising share of EU migrants in general and NMS (A8 and A2) migrants in particular. In 2018 the Ministry of Houses, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) published a brief report on the effect of a variety of factors, including immigration, on the growth of housing prices. MHCLG estimated the rise in the number of households caused by immigration between 1991 and 2016, and then applied the housing model's assumption that a 1% increase in the number of households leads to a 2% increase in prices. They found that EU immigration had caused home prices to go up by 20% because more people wanted to live there. Sá, Filipa in "Immigration and House Prices in the UK." *The Economic Journal* 125.587 (2015): 1393-1424 is the most well-known existing academic study on the impact of migration on home values in the United Kingdom. Her study indicated that an increase in immigration led to a decrease in local housing costs. They discovered that EU migrants exert upward pressure on home prices with smaller estimates than the MHCLG model; a one-percentage point increase in population owing to migration results in a one-percentage point increase in house prices (Migration Advisory Committee et al.).

2.5 Pressures on NHS:

"The British take more pride in the NHS than anything else, the royal family included"⁵². Nevertheless, , whether coming for a long or short period, any citizen of the European Union had the "*Freedom of movement in the UK*" which permits every EU citizen to work and live in another EU country without requiring a work or resident visa. Thus, EU nationals who have the status of "worker" in another EU country are entitled to the same rights and privileges as working citizens of that country, including access to the

⁵² <http://www.kingsfund.org.uk>

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

welfare state. Hence, millions of EU citizens have benefited from free movement, but its repercussions have sparked heated public and political discussions in several EU nations, particularly after the 2008 economic crisis. Particular attention has been paid to the effects of providing EU workers full access to the welfare state of the host country, such as whether free movement fosters so-called "benefit tourism" and whether generous welfare states act as "welfare magnets" (Şerban et al.). When on May 1, 2004, the United Kingdom opened its door to the A8, a considerable number of immigrants entered the country as a result of the United Kingdom's being with Sweden and Ireland one of the three EU countries to open its labor market to them upon accession from day one. Wadsworth (2013) concluded, based on longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey, that immigrants use hospital and general practice services at the same rate as UK nationals. According to evidence presented by Steventon and Bardsley (2011), it seems unlikely that immigrants exploit secondary care more frequently than native-born Britons.

Regarding waiting periods in the NHS, they function as a form of pricing and rationing (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984) and are the primary cause of patient dissatisfaction with the NHS (Giuntella et al.). In 2015, there has been a headline deficit of £2.45 billion incurred by NHS trusts in England, which conceals an even larger underlying financial gap. In the debate over whether the United Kingdom should leave the European Union, the role that immigration from Europe played in this was a significant and contentious issue. EU citizens entering and transiting the United Kingdom alter both sides of the NHS's financial equation. By paying taxes or transferring funds from their home countries under programs like the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC), they also influence the amount of money the health service spend. The question is whether or not they are profitable. The trust deficit and broader pressures facing the NHS are caused by the unceasing annual increase in the cost of treating new patients. It is estimated that

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

migration from the EU added £160 million to the UK's National Health Service in 2014. This number was calculated using NHS England's estimates of the cost to the health service for individuals of various ages. It assumed that EU immigrants use health services at the same rate as Britons of the same age, which is supported by some studies, but there is evidence that EU immigrants are healthier. £160 million is a significant figure. However, these costs are insignificant to those caused by other strains on the health service. Changes in the number and age of people in the United Kingdom resulted in additional costs of £1.4 billion. This was mostly because the people who already lived there were getting older and more people were moving in from outside the EU. Before 2016, costs went up by about £2.8 billion due to inflation and wage increases and about £1.6 billion because of new technologies and the costs of trying to improve the quality of care. Long-term, immigrants are both taxpayers and patients; they affect the amount of money available to the NHS and how much it is asked to spend since almost all funding for the NHS comes from the government's central budget.

To see how immigration affects the NHS, different researchers reached different conclusions. For instance, two studies on immigrants living in the United Kingdom between 1995 and 2011 have been conducted: one by UCL academics and the other by the advocacy group Migration Watch. During this time, however, the United Kingdom as a whole ran a budget deficit, meaning that the population as a whole received more public spending than they paid in taxes. In this situation, the studies disagree on whether migrants from the EEA contributed enough more to be considered net contributors overall. UCL claimed that the net effect was to bring in £4.4 billion for the government, while Migration Watch says that the overall effect was a loss of £13.6 billion. In March 2016, Labour MP John Mann gave the results of a parliamentary inquiry into how much money the UK got from EEA countries to treat its citizens on the NHS and how much those countries paid to

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

treat British citizens. The UK gave other nations £674 million while only receiving £49 million in return. Immigration from the EU contributes to financial strain on the NHS, but its annual impact is negligible when compared to other factors. It is difficult to determine whether EU immigrants contributed enough to the public finances to cover their costs, and different researchers had different opinions. However, it appears that their net contribution is greater than that of other groups. The NHS does not ask for money it is owed, which is the main reason why the United Kingdom does not get back as much as it could of the cost of treating Europeans who visit or retire in the country for a shorter time.⁵³

According to "voteleavetakecontrol.org" on April 6, 2016, European migration has "placed pressure on the NHS." They used 2016 UK Statistics Authority statistics showing 475,935 live births to EU mothers between 2005 and 2014. (UK Statistics Authority, 15 March 2016). According to NHS officials, assisting these families might have cost £1.33 billion. "Rising demand" was also blamed for the NHS's £2.4 billion shortfall in 2015–2016. In 2013, 2014, and 2015, there was a 1.5 million increase in GP registrations, and the number of patients visiting A&E departments increased by 59%, from 14.0 million in 2002-2003 to 20 million in 2009-2010 to 22.4 million in 2014-2015 to nearly 24 million in 2017 (see Figure 2.4 in Appendices p 90)⁵⁴. In 2014-2015, NHS Foundation Trusts had a £353 million net deficit and NHS Trusts a £484 million net deficit. NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts recorded a net deficit of £2.26 billion in the first nine months of 2015–2016. Authorities said "growing demand" was one reason NHS providers face operational and financial challenges (NHS Trust Development Authority/Monitor, February 25, 2016).

⁵³ Dayan, Mark, and Nuffield Trust. "The facts: EU immigration and pressure on the NHS." *Nuffield Trust and Full Fact briefing 23* (2016).<https://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/resource/the-facts-eu-immigration-and-pressure-on-the-nhs>

⁵⁴ : <https://fullfact.org/health/accident-and-emergency-attendances-and-performance>

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

Since 2004, 1.07 million more people have come to the UK from the EU than have departed (ONS, 2012), which has increased NHS demand. Attendance was constant between 1995–1996 and 2002–2003, but has since risen considerably. In 2014-2015, there were 22.4 million A&E visits, a 59.16% increase from 2002-2003. NHS England has tracked ER admissions since 2004–2005. Accident and emergency hospital admissions rose 42% from 2004-2005 to 2014-2015. More people are waiting more than four hours in emergency rooms⁵⁵. During the 2016 vote for the Brexit campaign, Boris Johnson said, "Uncontrolled immigration puts unsustainable pressure on our crucial public services." Those who campaigned for the UK to exit the EU blamed immigration, especially European immigration, for straining public services, especially the NHS. Visitors and non-permanent EU residents cost the NHS roughly £340 million every year, they said. This figure includes "health tourists" who travel to the UK to use its health care system. This is a modest portion of the NHS's annual spending, which was £113.3 billion in England in 2014/15.

2.6 Crime and Social Safety:

The United Kingdom is a major destination for migrants from both Europe and the rest of the world. Large numbers of foreign-born workers arrived in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the number of immigrants to the United Kingdom has increased considerably, mainly as a result of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements. These rapid changes and the government's response to them have brought the question of EU immigration and crime connection. Crime statistics in the United Kingdom are primarily derived from either the

⁵⁵ <https://fullfact.org/health/accident-and-emergency-attendances-and-performance>.

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) or police recorded crime.⁵⁶ The second source of crime statistics in the United Kingdom is crimes recorded by police in England and Wales. From 2002 to 2016, the nationality composition of the immigrant prison population changed dramatically. As anticipated, a number of these modifications resembled the evolution in the composition of immigrant inflows to the United Kingdom. In 2002, the largest proportion of foreign convicts came from the West Indies (35.5%), followed by Europe (29%), Africa (16.7%), Asia (11.4%), Latin America (3.1%), the Middle East (2.3%), North America (1.6%), and Oceania (1.6%). (0.4 percentage point) In 2016, Europeans accounted for slightly more than half of the immigrant inmates (50.5%). The increase in European detainees from 2002 to 2016 was almost entirely attributable to citizens of the thirteen new member States NMS (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) that joined the EU between 2004 and 2013. The arrival of immigrants from NMS after 2004 is evident in the nationality mix differences between the two time periods. Irish Republic nationals made up 30% of European detainees in 2002, followed by those from Turkey (10%), the Netherlands (9%), Spain, Serbia, and Italy (5% each), Germany, France, Portugal, and Albania (4% each) (3%) Poland (20%), the Irish Republic (15%), Romania (13%), Albania (10%), Lithuania (9%), Portugal (5%), the Netherlands and Latvia (both 3%), Italy and Slovakia (both 2%), were the top five countries in 2016 (Fasani et al.).

The UK experienced a relatively large influx of Eastern European immigrants after the A8 accession countries joined the EU in 2004 which caused a major rise in

⁵⁶ The Crime Survey for England and Wales (formerly the British Crime Survey) is an annual victimization survey in which interviewees are asked about their experience with crime in the previous twelve months, their perceptions of crime and safety in their local community, and their opinions on the work of the police and judicial system. The CSEW captures a wide variety of victim-based crimes, including those not reported to police. Nonetheless, estimates derived from CSEW data do not account for a number of serious but relatively infrequent offenses (such as homicide and sexual offenses)

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

immigration to England and Wales from countries where there had previously been relatively few immigrant settlements, and with this transition came a considerable change in the composition of immigrants. Bell et al. (2013) used an empirical method to do a causal research design and found no evidence that immigration caused criminal behavior on average. This was in contrast to the populist claim that "*immigration causes crime*," which was often made in the media and in political discussions. According to the popular press, an increase in criminal activity committed by migrant workers had a negative impact on the welfare of native workers. Years after expansion, one analysis of the coverage in a regional newspaper in East Anglia revealed a continued tendency to portray migrants (mostly from Eastern Europe) in a negative light (Rasinger 2010). But Bell et al. (2010) looked at the link between crime and immigration and found no evidence. On the contrary, they identified a property crime-reducing effect of A8 citizens. Arguably there have been different claims regarding the relation between crime, social safety and EU immigration. (Jaitman and Machin). The table 2.1 (see appendices p 92) displays the proportion of cautions and convictions by nationality group for those with a recorded nationality. From 2012 to 2016, 88.5% of all cautions/convictions were issued to British and Irish citizens, 6.7% to EEA citizens, and 4.7% to non-EEA citizens⁵⁷. To get a sense of the rate of cautions and convictions, the second row of the table displays the proportion of the total population (16+) that each nationality group represents. The first and second rows would be identical if the rate was the same across all nationalities. But EEA citizens (and especially NMS citizens) are more likely to get a warning or conviction than would be expected based on how many of them there are (Migration Advisory Committee et al.).

⁵⁷ EEA migration in the UK: Final report Migration Advisory Committee September 2018.p111

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

Since the EU's expansion in 2004, there have been up to one million immigrants from Eastern Europe, which has affected crime patterns. With extortion, human trafficking, sex trafficking, assault, and alcohol-related offences. According to research done in 2008 by two chief constables for the Association of Chief Police Officer, in many localities, sheer numbers, hatred, and misunderstanding have caused problems. The report also noted how the government's lack of information about future migration has hurt enforcement⁵⁸. In April 2012, the Evening Standard's headline⁵⁹ "Eastern European immigrants commit 10% of crime" set the tone for European immigration, especially from the East. New data suggested Eastern European immigrants were responsible for 10% of all crime in some districts of Britain. One in ten imprisoned in the worst-affected districts were from one of the eight former Soviet countries that joined the EU in 2004, sending 600,000 immigrants to this country. A leaked Whitehall memorandum anticipated a rise in eastern European criminality in Britain two months after Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007.

The confidential Cabinet Office report sent to Tony Blair and senior ministers warned of a potential surge in street violence, human trafficking, prostitution, cash machine thefts, and fraud. The dossier asserted that Romanian criminal groups committed 80–85% of cash machine crime in the UK before it joined the EU. Westminster City Council helps tens of thousands of Eastern Europeans each year. "A8 Nationals" from the eight newest EU members were engaged in 400 of 4,000 arrests in one police division in the year running up to June 2006. The added that some larger stores chose to employ their own security

⁵⁸ <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/41589/Immigrants-bring-more-crime>

⁵⁹ Founded in 1827, the Evening Standard is London's most iconic news brand and the UK's largest quality daily. Recognised as setting the agenda in politics and business, as well as being first with major news and sports stories, the brand reaches a total of 18 million cross-platform readers a month. Every day we have 2.6 million cross-platform readers and 87% of those consume our news on mobile.
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/evening-standard>

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

guards to keep known offenders out instead of calling the police. The research warned that "social turmoil and anti-social behavior had substantially escalated in Victoria." Shoplifting, alcoholism, prostitution, and burglary became common among A8 immigrants. Half of all rough sleepers in central London were A8 nations, predominantly Polish men, whose aspirations for a better life in the UK have been crushed and who became at risk of falling into crime, prostitution, and drug abuse. Furthermore, a number of policing and crime-related issues have been reported in A8-migration-heavy regions. In 2008 alone, the Cambridgeshire Constabulary⁶⁰ spent £800,000 on translation due to the influx of thousands of migrants from Poland and Lithuania. Half of this amount was spent on communicating with witnesses and victims (Brown 2013) At this time, the chief inspector of Cambridgeshire Constabulary said that crime was getting more complicated and that drunk driving and drinking in public were becoming more of a problem (Barkham, 2008).

Conversely, researchers discovered that property crime decreased significantly in neighborhoods with high levels of immigration from Eastern Europe (Bell et al., 2013). In a period of relatively substantial immigration to the UK between 2003 and 2012, violent crime and murder rates declined in the United Kingdom more quickly than in any other country in Western Europe and that EU migrants have a higher employment rate than the resident population. It is believed that this is what drives these trends. As the number of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants to the United Kingdom increased, so did the number of Romanians and Bulgarians in police arrest statistics. However, newspaper claims that a third of Romanians living in the United Kingdom have been arrested since 2009 are

⁶⁰ The British police organization for a particular area.
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/constabulary>

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

grossly inaccurate (such as Doyle 2013). Since 2008, there have been 27,725 arrests of Romanian citizens and 3,781 arrests of Bulgarian citizens (Metropolitan Police 2013). It is true that a disproportionate number of Romanians are represented in these statistics. Romanian citizens have been detained more frequently since 2008 than any other nation, with the exception of Poland, whose population is substantially larger than Romanians in the United Kingdom (ONS 2012). In British jails as of June 2013, there were 608 Romanians and 51 Bulgarians (Ministry of Justice 2013). Europol has located 240 of Romanian organized crime organizations responsible for 90% of European credit card fraud and pickpocketing (Metropolitan Police 2013). Although some areas with high levels of A8 migration have seen a decline in crime since 2004, immigration can present difficulties for law enforcement. However, there have been an increase in antisocial behavior as a result of an increase in the number of young EU people who were unfamiliar with UK laws.

2.7 The Cultural Issues:

Migration inevitably means a change in some communities, and people care about their communities. It may also play a role in enhancing or reducing their feeling of wellbeing. (Migration Advisory Committee et al.) Compared to some previous immigration in the UK, European Union citizens are largely white and Christian immigrants, also known as "free movers" (Favell, 2008) it will be then predicted that this type of immigration wouldn't carry the possibility of any cultural conflict. After 2004, Polish immigrants began to arrive, reviving some Catholic churches indeed in Northern Ireland, they have also made available new foods (like pierogi) and beverages, have enhanced cultural diversity (for example, the Polish beer stocked by the main British supermarkets) and Polish nights have been hosted in bars and clubs. (Mackela). Regarding the integration

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

of Eastern Europeans into British society, it is claimed that language plays a crucial part in the integration process of migrants. Even if they were able to interact with British citizens, migrants with an Eastern European accent were noticeably alienated from the rest of society. Furthermore, British accents exacerbate the difficulty of assimilation because they are difficult to understand and learn for immigrants. The employment history of Eastern Europeans was seen as a mechanism for both inclusion and exclusion. While some experts suggested that migrants with better employment are more integrated, others demonstrated that Eastern Europeans as a cheap labor force are separated from the rest of society by their terrible working circumstances. Similarly, collective effort within the immigrant community proved both beneficial and detrimental to the integration of East Europeans in the United Kingdom. A cross-country study conducted by Dirk Jacobs and Hean Tillie⁶¹ showed that involvement with one's national society increases integration. Others, on the other hand, have said that close relationships between migrants themselves make it harder for them to integrate, since they spend more time with people from their home country than with people from the new country. However, natives of a region may perceive newcomers as a threat to their way of life and fear losing their jobs or having their culture ignored. When work and opportunity are favorable, most people are tolerant of immigration. When the economy is bad or there's uncertainty, people are more hostile to immigrants (Fernández-Reino).

⁶¹ Jacobs, Dirk, and Jean Tillie. "Introduction: social capital and political integration of migrants." *Journal of ethnic and migration studies* 30.3 (2004): 419-427.

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

Conclusion:

When the UK joined in 1973 what was then named the European Economic Community, there was no "big bang" from EU immigration. Inwards migration from the EU was a slow burn to begin with. It is only from 2004 onwards that there was significant net migration due to the huge and unplanned immigration from the East of Europe to the United Kingdom. This led to the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment and the popularity of limits on free movement and welfare access. The employment of low-skilled employees from these countries has notably contributed to such pressures. There were more hostility towards immigration because of problems like competition for jobs, stress on public services, housing and access to welfare. These problems were reported by the media and are supported by more and more political parties, except for the Green Party and the Scottish National Party. According to IPSOS-Mori (2014), EU immigration became the most important topic of concern to the British public and was the determining factor in the vote to leave the European Union. Prior to EU Enlargement in 2002 and until 2014, the British were, on average, more enthusiastic about immigration's benefits but also more choosy about who they preferred to see immigrate. In the years leading up to the Brexit decision, there has been a growing gap between the opinions of young college graduates and older school-leavers regarding the economic impact of EU immigration. The locals became a little less optimistic about the cultural benefits of immigration. They were highly sensitive to variations between specific migrant categories and far more favorable to the entry of migrant students or skilled professionals than family reunion migrants or unskilled

Chapter Two: The Economic and Social Effects of the Eastern European Immigration on the UK

workers⁶². As the United Kingdom granted citizens of the new EU 8 and EU 2 member states immediate and unrestricted access to its labour market, the argument began to shift its focus to them. At the heart of this disagreement was the widespread belief among the general public and politicians that Eastern European immigration had a significant influence on the labour market, particularly employment and earnings. The stereotype of the Polish plumber, which was commonly used as a symbol of cheap labour, reflected the belief that EU immigration in Britain has lowered wages in occupations that have been most affected by immigration. Eastern European immigration was more targeted as it was distinct. Though often more educated, they were more likely to find employment in low-skilled occupations. Even while a statistically significant (but negligible) effect on native unemployment has been demonstrated, the majority of native-born Britons may have experienced a favourable labour market, as many moved into higher-status employment. Nevertheless, the increase in the demand for benefits and private rental housing from European immigrants and more targeted the Eastern European one increased strains on public services and housing. This may have contributed to the popular assumption in the lead-up to the UK's EU Referendum that Eastern European immigration had a negative impact on the quality of public service delivery.

⁶² National Centre for Social Research

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

Introduction:

In 1975, with a turnout of 64 percent, two-thirds of the British electorate opted to remain in the EEC joined in 1973, securing Britain's position for the next four decades. In 2016 this time, on a turnout of 72 percent, 52 percent of the population opted to leave the European Union, while 48 percent chose to remain. Though immigration (non-European) has always been a contentious subject which produced mixed debates, the economy was by contrast shadowed by the EU immigration' issues which became the central point of the referendum debates from the leave side. Thanks to the free movement right of people to reside and work in any European counties and in the UK indeed, the European immigration seemed to have on the opposite benefited the UK especially economically. However, following the expansion of the EU especially to the Eastern European countries, domestic politics has increasingly hijacked British euroscepticism and hostility to European integration to define the comeback of English nationalism. Notably with the emergence of the right-wing UK Independence Party (UKIP). Calls for an "independent" Britain and "repatriation" of powers from Brussels became increasingly common among Tory "rebel" backbenchers, fueled by UKIP propaganda and widely echoed by the anti-EU tabloid press. In response to these requests, the then-Prime Minister David Cameron stated in 2013 that the next Conservative government would seek a mandate to negotiate a new settlement with the EU from the British people. After Mr. Cameron won the general election in 2015 and made a "deal" with his EU allies, he called for an "in/out" referendum and promised to fight for the UK to stay in the EU. Britain Stronger in Europe's discourses centered on portrayals of the EU as the Single Market and emphasized the advantages of the status quo and the dangers of exiting the Single Market. The discourses of Britain Stronger in Europe

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

(BSE) focused mostly on economic issues and, in certain instances, also addressed the social and political aspects of Single Market membership (such as workers' rights). In contrast, migration and sovereignty-related themes were little mentioned by BSE. (Zappettini). Whereas early VL discourses addressed economic issues and the question of sovereignty via legal and political arguments, in the final weeks of the campaign, the Leave campaign increasingly shifted its focus to EU immigration and free movement (as did the UKIP campaign).

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

3.1 Arguments of the Nationalist Political Discourse of the Leave Campaign:

During the referendum campaign the Vote to Leave (VL) and the UKIP's arguments to leave the EU were mainly nationalist and populist. The primary discourse drive of the Leave camp was the portrayal of "independence" from the EU as a necessary must for the United Kingdom to exercise control over its domestic and international interests. Their arguments included three major areas: economics, political, legal integration and immigration in terms of the most important expansive methods, argument and representations. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning first how the VL emerged. Actually, The Electoral Commission⁶³ selected VL and BSE as the official campaigns for each side on April 13, 2016. VL emerged from "Business for Britain", a Eurosceptic coalition affiliated with the Confederation of British Industry, and was supported by both top Conservative and Labour leaders. Each organization was subsequently backed by civic and corporate organizations. Grassroots Out Movement (GO), endorsed by UKIP's Nigel Farage and funded by multimillionaire contributor Arron Banks, was the other major "Leave" candidate besides British Stronger in Europe(BSE). Despite some initial in-fighting between VL and the GO movement in response to the Electoral Commission's ruling, Nigel Farage stated that his party *"would cooperate with anyone who wanted to leave the EU"* (The Independent, 2016). Mr. Banks, a donor to UKIP, endorsed VL because he believed its appointment would appeal to Euroskeptics who viewed Mr. Farage

⁶³ The Electoral Commission is an independent agency established by the Parliament of the United Kingdom that controls party and election spending and establishes criteria for well-run elections. As its responsibility in the event of referendums is to select the candidate who "best represents those pushing for the [referendum] outcome" (Electoral Commission, 2016), the Electoral Commission acted as a crucial institutional gatekeeper in framing the discussion

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

as an excessively divisive personality (BBC, 2016). While acting in the background, UKIP would essentially launch a parallel campaign in support of VL, emphasizing the "immigration question," which shifted the center of gravity away from the original VL's economic argument for leaving the EU⁶⁴.

From day one, VL talks were mostly about how to discredit the EU. They were based on economic arguments that said the EU "limited," "tied down," or "controlled" Britain's economic potential. Several of the arguments that characterized the leave decision as "liberating" Britain from the unresponsive and expensive EU were based on the burdens placed on British firms by "red tape," an understatement for job rights and social and environmental protection. In addition, VL argued for the "leave" option using discourses of free trade in which the EU was delegitimized as unresponsive and impeding the United Kingdom from capturing global economic prospects. The idea of "free trade agreements" was often and uncritically used as a powerful, if simple, answer to the limits of EU membership and the question of lost or reduced sovereignty (Zappettini). In the press release issued by Vote Leave on 4 December 2015, VL argued that Britain's "wasted" contributions to the EU budget should be utilized to aid British citizens rather than "foreigners." Another set of economic reasons for leaving was that "we", as referred to the British people, were more important than them (referred to Brussels) which make them lose control. As popularized by a red bus campaign proclaiming, "We send the EU £350 million a week. Instead, let's help our NHS,"⁶⁵ as the Brexit campaign director admitted. "Taking control" played on the symbolic national appeal of non-EU education and health

⁶⁴ The Brexit referendum: how trade and immigration in the discourses of the official campaigns have legitimised a toxic (inter)national logic Article in Critical Discourse Studies · March 2019 .p17

⁶⁵ <https://www.reuters.com>

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

systems (the NHS is the largest employer in the UK and has been a touchy subject in political campaigns for a long time).

For their arguments, leaving the EU would "free" the UK from further political and legal integration with other European nations. These arguments repeated sovereignty-loss-based proposals to reject Europe as a political effort. Some reasons for departing included avoiding risk, such as the Euro crisis. Political arguments were prompted by (inter)national influence, which portrayed the EU as an arena of national interests to be protected and Britain's losing political weight inside it. Many of the grounds for quitting the EU were that the UK was a tiny nation left out by a bigger, more aggressive European alliance. The ECJ was also an argument for the "Brexiters" by highlighting that the ECJ "interfered" in British politics and law, "Freeing Britain from ECJ authority" was used to support economic independence and immigration restrictions. The leave campaign also used negative reports regarding ECJ rulings against the British government on citizenship rights. These reports helped legitimize the leave vote by arguing for "loss of sovereignty." Fear of immigration and the potential consequences of Turkey joining the European Union were utilized by the Leave camp to instill a sense of dread for the future⁶⁶. With the assistance of a sympathetic media, the Leave camp was able to shape its narrative throughout the debates and through sympathetic tabloids. Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage created a charming and approachable persona, whereas David Cameron, John Major, and Tony Blair represented the distant establishment. Moreover, the Leave camp attempted to represent the concerns of the "baby boomer" generation. Thus, arguing that the EU is a distant power

⁶⁶ <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1271200/more-than-100000-turks-a-year-will-flock-to-britain-after-it-joins-the-eu-pushing-net-migration-to-a-staggering-420000/>

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

that threatens British identity and that immigration has flooded the United Kingdom with foreign customs and/or ideas.

Freedom of movement, the EU legislation that permits inhabitants of EU countries to travel, live, and work in other EU countries, has become one of, if not the most prominent topic in this referendum on the United Kingdom's EU membership. After the 2004 expansion of the European, the number of EU nationals moving to the United Kingdom increased dramatically. In 2015, three million non-British EU nationals resided in the United Kingdom. When compared to the number of British people living in other EU countries, around 1, 2 million Britons have immigrated to other EU countries. The fact that EU immigration numbers continued to rise has become controversial as the Leave campaign considers it to put too much pressure on British public services such as the NHS, where people are permitted to enter and request free healthcare, and the school system, where there is a shortage of available school places. According to the Leave Campaign, the rising number of migrants entering Britain posed a threat to the safety of the British people. Following the migration crisis and the desire of many migrants to enter the United Kingdom, the Leave campaign viewed open borders as a severe threat to national security.

Fear-mongering and scapegoating tactics and arguments played a significant influence in the campaign's violent turn on immigration(" *Arguments for Brexit : Rhetorical Analysis and Comparison of The Communication of Key Actors in the Leave Campaign* " *Arguments for Brexit : Rhetorical Analysis and Comparison of The Communication of Key Actors in the Leave Campaign Mémoire Réalisé Par*). People often say that the rising number of immigrants in the UK is a threat to national security. Michael Gove, for instance, addressed this topic in his April 2016 speech:

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

Regarding migrants, we lack the ability to determine if their presence is economically useful, beneficial to the public, or in our national interest... We cannot adequately examine new arrivals for credentials, radical ties, or criminal histories. We have granted the European Court power over how we implement the essential 1951 UN Convention on Asylum. We are unable to deport even convicted killers (Gove)

In Farage's arguments regarding immigration during his speech at the Grassroots Out launch ceremony, the arguments of immigration and taking back control for the benefits of the British over Europe was quite the same though the tone might have been different:

Too many people coming into our country too quickly has lowered wages for ordinary workers in Britain and put intolerable pressure on primary school places, the health service, and all of our vital public services... And I'm sorry. I'm a big believer in assisting those in need around the world, but it's time to prioritize the interests of men and women in our communities, and we're going to do it by regaining power. (Farage)⁶⁷

It is undeniable that the arguments on EU immigration were fueled by broader issues of racism, nationalism, colonialism, and populism (Mandelbaum). Since the beginning of the referendum campaign in the United Kingdom, there has been an alarming point in anti-immigrant xenophobia and racism, as seen by the escalation of hate crimes against immigrants and ethnic minorities. However, this questioning of the rights and belongings

⁶⁷ Nigel Farage at the launch of Grassroots Leave.EU.<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Anb6ljuAwrg>

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

of European migrants is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it was a continual process that began far before the referendum and proceeded on multiple levels. Much attention has been paid to "Eastern Europeans" who have been subjected to persistent antagonism⁶⁸, stigmatization, and racialization by British media⁶⁹ and political discourses (Burrell, 2010; Fox, Moroşanu, & Szilassy, 2012; Rzepnikowska, 2018). In the United Kingdom's media and public discourse, the terms "health tourism" and "benefit tourism" have become frequent before and during the referendum.

Since VL became the official candidate for the leave side, its campaign has increasingly concentrated on immigration-related issues. Even though they still supported free trade and national sovereignty, the desire to "take control" was used to support arguments that first made immigration seemed like a problem through the cliché of numbers. Later in the campaign, increasingly negative depictions of immigration contributed to the construction of an overall discursive scenario of "moral panic" regarding immigrants. In this situation, the leave option was justified by risk avoidance and public safety deceptive arguments. Figure 3.1 (see appendices p 90) shows a common claim that was made on the VL website (and often repeated in the news) between the end of April and the date of the referendum: that the EU secretly planned to let millions of Turks into Europe without a visa. The figure clearly supported the "risky" choice to stay in the EU by showing that nearly 80 million migrants from countries that want to join the EU are "targeting" the UK. This argument was based on the false assumption that there will be a lot of migration from these countries. "Breaking Point "billboard produced a week before the referendum illustrated how this amalgamation of discourses occurred inside their

⁶⁸ Fieldhouse et al.

⁶⁹ Tax credits 'turned UK into a honeypot for EU immigrants': worker on minimum wage could receive additional £330 a week", as one Daily Mail headline. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/>

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

argumentative structure "if Britain remains in the EU, this will occur" bringing a disproportionate number of possible EU migrant⁷⁰. Another argument was strengthened by a picture that shows EU citizens' freedom of movement as people illegally crossing a border⁷¹.

The moral panic about immigrants was also constructed focusing on the threat of terrorist attacks and border vulnerability. In all cases, the argument for leaving is that "EU membership makes it easier for terrorists to enter the UK." As a reason for leaving the EU, the need to manage borders seemed to refer to Europe's openness ("from the shores of Greece to the English Channel") and the threat the UK thinks it poses. Thus, the importance of EU immigration to the Brexit campaign cannot be underestimated. From their political, representative, and journalistic platforms, Leavers highlighted EU immigration and border control as a significant, if not central, issue in the Brexit campaign. This emphasis on EU immigration issues increased in both political statements and the media one month before the referendum. It appeared that the two areas coordinated their efforts. As a result, the polls swung, and the Leave camp accomplished their purpose(Boza). Fortunately, the Office for National Statistics handed a gift to the Leave campaign four weeks before the referendum vote by stating that 630,000 people moved to the United Kingdom in 2015, of which 270,000 came from foreign EU member states. In 2015, net migration was 333,000. Table 3.1 (see Appendices p91) displays which problems

⁷⁰ EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign *Early reflections from leading UK academics*. p67.

⁷¹ Mandelbaum, M. 'Making Our Country Great Again': The Politics of Subjectivity in an Age of National-Populism. *Int J Semiot Law* 33, 451–476 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09717-6>. p15

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

received the most press and television coverage. Three subjects dominated media debate: the economy, immigration, and the campaign's conduct⁷². Initially, the economy received much more attention than immigration, which may have benefited the IN campaign. Later, though, there was a big change: immigration became more important than economic issues, which may have given the OUT movement a lot of force.

When the discussion shifted to immigration, the Remain camp reiterated the proverb that "there are no silver bullets"⁷³, while the Leave camp relied on the cliché "taking back control." Both Gisela Stuart and Andrea Leadsom⁷⁴ were eager to note that they are mothers, a repeated but meaningless assertion that Ruth Davidson⁷⁵ afterwards derided ('there are actually moms and fathers...on our side of the argument, too!'). On June 21, during the largest broadcast EU debate at Wembley Arena, Johnson declared that Brexit will be the United Kingdom's (UK) "Independence Day."⁷⁶ Along with his fellow Brexiteers, he repeated that Leave vote would, like Canute⁷⁷, turn back the "waves" of

⁷² EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign *Early reflections from leading UK academics*. p66

⁷³ "There are no silver bullets means there is no product or method or a trick that can guarantee successful results. <https://medium.com/>

⁷⁴ With Boris Johnson, Labour MP Gisela Stuart and energy minister Andrea Leadsom were prominent members of the Leave campaign during the 2016 referendum and gained standing in referendum TV debates. <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36593120>

⁷⁵ Ruth Davidson is the former leader of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. An ex-Territorial Army veteran and BBC journalist. She became party leader in 2011 and stood down in August 2019, although she remains an MSP. She quit after having a baby and clashing with UK Tory leader Boris Johnson over his hard-line Brexit stance. <https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk>

⁷⁶ The final live debate of the UK's EU referendum campaign took place at Wembley Arena on Tuesday June 21st 2016. <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36593120>

⁷⁷ King Canute united the three kingdoms of England, Norway and Denmark, together referenced as the king that tried to stop the tide in Southampton. <https://www.dailyecho.co.uk/news/19927441.king-tried-stop-tide-southampton---maybe/>

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

immigration invaders from Eastern Europe. According to many who supported the Leave campaign, the United Kingdom would only be able to control its borders by leaving the EU. This message resonated with voters who blamed EU free movement for record net migration, straining public services that were already at capacity. Both UKIP and the official Vote Leave campaign framed their campaigns around immigration. Although immigration was the main topic of their campaigns, they appeared to address other topics that were at least somewhat connected. Immigration and the economy, immigration and security, and immigration and social transformation are all linked. This gave them the opportunity to successfully refocus the discussion on the issue of immigration and present sovereignty as the primary remedy for these problems. The British people could only "take back control" of their nation in this way. Brexiters did, at least in part, vote with their wallets in mind, but the economic solution to their issues was to "take back control" of immigration policy rather than market stability.(Jackson et al.).

3.2 Counter Arguments of the Stay Movement:

Britain Stronger in Britain (BSE) was a Westminster-based organization supported by many pro-EU campaign organizations and funded by various financial institutions and businesspeople. In contrast to the Leave Camp on EU immigration, the "Remain" campaign talked a lot about how EU migrants help the British economy and how, without EU migration, there would be a lot of open jobs in the British public sector (The Government of the United Kingdom).The counterarguments emphasized the benefits of a stronger British economy. The EU is Britain's biggest trading partner with 44% of British exports, from cars to insurance, go to the EU. Staying in the EU guarantees access to its Single Market. Departure creates risk and uncertainty. They also asserted that the EU

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

Single Market has more than 500 million customers and an almost five-time larger economy than the UK and that it makes it easier and cheaper for British businesses to export, creating jobs. Being in the EU also encourages businesses to invest in the UK, creating additional jobs. Foreign companies invested £540 billion in the UK over the past decade, or £148 million every day. As the table 3.2 (see Appendices p 91) shows, being a member of the EU has a positive effect on the number of jobs in many fields⁷⁸. Concerning Securing the Borders, the government counterarguments was that they needed to be in control of their own borders in order to be able to inspect everyone arriving from continental Europe, even EU citizens. The government secured an immigration compromise that reduces the appeal of the British social system to EU citizens. Promising that future EU migrants won't be eligible for certain benefits for four years after arriving in the UK. They strengthened that the government would have more power to stop immigration abuse arguing that some say leaving the EU would limit immigration. Non-EU countries, like Norway, must allow EU residents to live and work in exchange for access to the EU's Single Market. According to the Remain side, a decision to leave the EU might cause years of economic turmoil which would reduce investment and kills jobs. As the UK dismantles its partnership with the EU and renegotiates new arrangements, the government predicts a no-deal Brexit could cause ten or more years of instability. Whereas, a more restrictive trade agreement with the EU would reduce the UK's access to the Single Market, especially for services, which make up 80% of the economy (Zappettini).

Britain Stronger in Europe 's communicative techniques attempted, on the one hand, to underline the existing benefits of EU membership while, on the other hand, to

⁷⁸ Why the Government believes that voting to remain in the European Union is the best decision for the UK. P4

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

emphasize the detrimental effects of Brexit on jobs, economic and social prosperity (as summarized in Figure 3.2 in appendices p90) ⁷⁹. Whereas the former strategy was achieved through positive factors like the benefits, the latter strategy tended to portray a bad scenario for the UK outside of the EU (which the Brexit campaign nicknamed "project dread") and was driven by different risk in case the Leave prevails. BSE advocated "Britain's role in the world" with themes of foreign relations and security that were prevalent in the Remain campaign. By highlighting Britain's leadership on the international stage through the theme of (inter)national influence, BSE presented the case for remaining in the EU ⁸⁰. Being a leading member of the EU, NATO, and the United Nations enables the United Kingdom to stand tall in the world and promote its own interests. Notably, BSE did not substantially deal with immigration issues. It only briefly talked about how British people could study, travel, and retire anywhere in the EU without a visa and how British businesses could benefit from the free movement of labor. (Clarke et al.)(The Government of the United Kingdom)

Contrary to the Leave argument on immigration that Britain will never be able to control immigration until it quits the European Union, the Remain discourse argued that Brexit would not address the migration situation, but rather bring it to the doorstep of the

⁷⁹ EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign *Early reflections from leading UK academics*.p115

⁸⁰ The Brexit referendum: how trade and immigration in the discourses of the official campaigns have legitimised a toxic (inter)national logic Article in *Critical Discourse Studies* · March 2019.p 14.

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

United Kingdom, as border controls from the Continent would be relocated from Calais in France to Dover in the United Kingdom. The European Arrest Warrant permits the extradition of British nationals to foreign countries to face criminal charges, typically for minor offenses. They argued that an exit would stop this from occurring and that rapists, murderers, and other dangerous criminals convicted of crimes in the United Kingdom could only be returned if they fled overseas, thanks to the European Arrest Warrant. Exit would hinder justice being done. While the Brexiteers claimed that Britain's ties to the EU prevented it from focusing on emerging markets, and that a Brexit would permit the United Kingdom to diversify its foreign ties. The Remain campaign replicated that 44% of British exports are to countries outside the EU. Putting up barriers with the countries that the United Kingdom does the most business with would not help. In terms of law, the Leave campaign argued that an excessive number of Britain's laws are formed abroad by directives from Brussels and decisions backed by the European Court of Justice. While the Remain emphasized that the exit campaign has inflated the number of laws determined by the European Commission and that it is preferable to shape EU-wide laws from within rather than to withdraw. As for employment, Leave stated that the threat to employment was exaggerated and that by stimulating investment with low corporation tax rates and other perks, the United Kingdom may prosper similarly to non-EU Scandinavian nations.

As a counterargument, the Remain stated that three million jobs are tied to the EU and will be plunged into uncertainty if voters choose to leave, as corporations will be less willing to invest if the country leaves the European Union. Regarding finance, the Leave camp stated that capital flight talk is bogus. Due to low tax rates, London will continue to be a leading financial center outside of the EU, and banks will continue to locate their headquarters in the United Kingdom. The Remain camp stated that banks would flee the

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

UK and the City of London would collapse if Britain voted to leave the EU due to the fact that the commercial advantages of being a member of the EU improve bank profitability. The Leave position on sovereignty was that there is no longer a sovereign British Parliament. Given that the EU wants "ever closer unity" and that more economic integration was likely to happen as a result of the euro crisis, it would be better to call it quits before the connections get stronger. In contrast, the Remain camp argued that in a globalized world, all nations must collaborate in order to prosper economically. A Little Englander yearning for isolation would destroy the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister may have secured a referendum opt-out from "ever closer union." Finally on the question about defense, the Leave camp said that Britain may soon be asked to contribute to an EU Army, with rumors indicating that German Chancellor Angela Merkel may seek the Prime Minister's approval in exchange for other concessions. This should be rejected as it would diminish the UK's independent military force. As a counterargument, the Stay claimed that the European nations together were facing risks from ISIS. The best way to deal with these problems is to work together. This would be more difficult to accomplish if Britain turned its back on the EU.

3.3 EU Immigration after 2016:

The EU immigration became at the center of the talking before during and after the 2016 referendum with certainly a little margin, 3.8 percent but enough to produce a historic decision of leaving the EU. Thus, the question about what future was going to be for European living in the UK after 2016 and surely the British living in other European countries arose seriously. Concerning the European migrants living, working or studying in the UK, they must have been anxious about an answer to the question especially when they wrongly or not were blamed and were at the focus of the leave and remain debates.(Clarke

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

et al.). Prime Minister David Cameron accepted the result as a loss; he resigned after Leave voters won by a margin of 51.9% to 48.1% with a high turnout of 72.2%. March 2017 saw the British government led by Prime Minister Theresa May who triggered Article 50⁸¹ of the Treaty on European Union, formally launching negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union. After the referendum, Theresa May decided that she needed to make a clear break with the EU in order to get the support of her Eurosceptic backbenchers.

She saw the referendum result as a clear sign that people wanted the government to limit immigration from the EU. This meant that the UK would have to leave the single market and the customs union, which is called a "hard" Brexit. In her speech at Lancaster House in January 2017, the Prime Minister outlined the government's goals for Brexit discussions. The speech ruled out membership in the single market and customs union. Other important government objectives included regaining control over immigration and British laws; ending the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice; avoiding a "hard border" with Ireland; and ensuring the rights of EU citizens residing in Britain and British nationals residing in other member states.

Nevertheless, on BBC News⁸² May said EU migrants will not receive special treatment. She has pledged that low-skilled immigration will decrease when the United Kingdom stops free movement access to the European Union following Brexit. According to May, high-skilled workers will be prioritized, with no preference given to EU citizens over those from other parts of the world. She stated, however, that a future trade agreement

⁸¹ Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon gives any EU member state the right to quit unilaterally and outlines the procedure for doing so. It gives the leaving country two years to negotiate an exit deal. When the UK triggered Article 50, it was thought that once in motion it couldn't be stopped except by unanimous consent of all member states. The ECJ's ruling changes that completely.

⁸² <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-45714413>

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

with the EU may include a clause regarding the "mobility" of each other's labor. In an interview on BBC Radio 4's Today show in October 2018, she said that free movement will end "forever" after the UK leaves the European Union. With the largest overhaul of the immigration system in decades, ministers have taken a significant step towards the future of the system. The Cabinet agreed in principle that after Brexit, EU nationals and people from other areas of the world should be subject to the same immigration laws if they wish to live or work in the United Kingdom. Professor Alan Manning, chair of the Migration Advisory Committee, presented the ideas to ministers at the cabinet table, where they engaged in a lengthy discussion of the ideas. According to what some sources have referred to as a "high-level conclusion," *people who seek to come to the United Kingdom to live or work should be subject to the same laws regardless of where they are from*" (Bulmer and Quaglia)

In June 2016, during the referendum, net migration to the United Kingdom reached an all-time high of 333,000. This included a net migration of more than 200,000 from the rest of the EU. Net EU migration has decreased by a little more than 150,000. This is the case despite the fact that the Brexit process has been slower than expected and despite the robustness of the UK labor market between the referendum and the commencement of the COVID-19 issue. While economic conditions remained reasonably favorable, these data show that the psychological impact of Brexit on past and future migrants from other EU countries has been greater than anticipated (Portes). According to the Migration Observatory (2017), between July 2016 and June 2017 the first full year since the UK's vote to leave the EU, the UK experienced a "great slowdown" in EU immigration; the decline of approximately 100,000 in net migration compared to the previous year (from 336,000 in mid-2016 to 230,000 in mid-2017, 107,000 of whom were EU citizens) was the

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

largest single-year decline in net migration to the UK. It was a result of fluctuations in the number of EU citizens (both due to reduced immigration and also slightly increased emigration). The dip was driven by the EU8 and EU15, whose net migration decreased by 63,000 over this time period (Strey et al.).

The government has previously outlined its plans for a new points-based system to be implemented following the conclusion of the Brexit transition period. With the exception of Irish nationals, the new system will apply to all those moving to the United Kingdom for employment after December 31, with the end of free movement. Under the "settled status" program, EU (and EEA/Swiss) nationals already residing in the UK can apply to remain indefinitely. The administration has substantially adopted the recommendations of the independent Migration Advisory Committee (MAC). These encompass: New migrants should come to work in jobs that pay more than £25,600 or the lower quartile of the average salary, whichever is greater, and require at least A-level-level abilities. There will be a reduced initial threshold for new entrants and those in shortage occupations, indicating that the income requirement for certain occupations might be as low as £20,000. Additionally, the bar will be lowered for PhD holders, notably in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) subjects. In the education and National Health Service sectors, there would be no minimum pay requirement. If the position requires an appropriate skill level (again, roughly equivalent to A-levels and including not only nurses and doctors but also radiographers and technicians), then existing national pay scales will be sufficient for determining the right salary. There will be an extended plan for seasonal farm workers, but no other sectorial plans for workers who don't meet the skill barrier, especially not in the social care industry.

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

Beyond the personal hostility or abuse they had experienced, many EU nationals were aware of incidents occurring elsewhere through media coverage and expressed concern about the various examples of hostility and ongoing abuse highlighted here, which demonstrate how the processes of "othering" EU nationals did occur not only at the level of policy and discourse but also on the everyday level, through name calling such as "go back home" and "why are you still here? ", and other forms of harassment (Rzepnikowska, 2018). Although there was a significant increase in hate crimes against immigrants in the aftermath of the vote, these narratives made evident the persistence of anti-immigrant feelings and attitudes. As Tomek, a Polish respondent, highlighted, *"poor press" also made people feel "ashamed to exhibit themselves as Polish," which impacted their daily lives as they were hesitant to talk openly in Polish or connect with their fellow countrymen in public*". In the context of EU migration and mobility, "East European" migrants have been particularly attacked by the British media and politicians, and "Polish," the largest group among these migrants, has become a generalized and stigmatized category in terms of hate directed against EU migrants. Dunn (2001) argues that denying "othered" actors access to public space undermines citizenship.

The anti-immigration program of Brexit has further exposed significant differences in British. One of the most worrying post-referendum trends was the increase in hate crimes, intolerance, and prejudice against immigrants and ethnic minorities of all nationalities. Once more, people from Eastern Europe, and Polish people in particular, found themselves in the line of fire. As a result of the outcome of the referendum on the EU, postcards asking for "Polish vermin to go home" were discovered in a town near Cambridge. This disturbing and dehumanizing message set off alarm bells in the Polish community (Fox, 2016). A total of 1,100 young Central and Eastern Europeans between

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

the ages of 12 and 18 who have lived in the United Kingdom for at least three years responded to a recent survey. Results indicated that 49% of respondents reported an increase in racism after the referendum results, with bullying incidents ranging from name-calling to physical assaults (Sime et al., 2017, p.4). Adults have also reported encountering difficulties that they did not encounter prior to the election, such as being insulted on the street or having drinks thrown in their faces by others who overheard them speaking in their native Eastern European languages (BBC Newsnight, 2016). It is thus undeniable that the Brexit vote has worsened pre-exit tensions. It has contributed to a pre-existing climate of intolerance, characterized by years of subtle attacks against Eastern Europeans in public discourse. Paul Drechsler, former president of the Confederation of British Industry stated:

It is an absolute scandal that, after two and a half years, European citizens in the United Kingdom and British citizens in Europe still do not have an unambiguous, unconditional guarantee that they will be okay regardless of what happens." Leaving people hanging by a thread of uncertainty is completely contrary to British and European ideals (O'Carroll, 2018). The European Union has highlighted that citizens' rights should be at the center of the Withdrawal Agreement. This is true for both EU-27 citizens who live in the UK and UK citizens who live in other EU countries and that UK and EU citizens should be treated equally (European Commission, 2017, p. 2). In real fact, this has not been a major priority in the post-vote era, and in a statement that has raised concerns about future UK-EU relations, Theresa May stated that EU citizens will not be prioritized under a new post-Brexit immigration strategy. Instead, she has highlighted that the policy will focus on bringing 'high-skilled' migrants to the UK, which, given the industries in which many Eastern Europeans work, will have an effect on future migration from the region (BBC, 2018). To its credit, the government of the United Kingdom has begun to address

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

some of the issues that have been voiced in regard to meeting the requirements of current citizens. Some EU residents will be allowed to apply for "settled status" in the United Kingdom, namely those who have resided in the country for at least five years, can provide proof of identity and residence, and have no criminal record. The government has stated that the emphasis will be on granting applications rather than rejecting them (O'Carroll and Grierson, 2018). Charities were concerned that the "shocking" process of applying for a visa will be made more difficult for people with limited English language and literacy skills due to language obstacles. Also, many of the jobs that Poles and Romanians want are "cash in hand" jobs. This, combined with the fact that many people rent flats instead of owning them, means that many of them don't have tax records or contracts with their landlords, which makes it more likely that they'll slip through the cracks (O'Carroll, 2018a).

Following the referendum, internet advocacy forums indicated high levels of EU resident anguish (Existential Academy, 2017). People with employment, families, social circles, and established lives in the United Kingdom did not know what would happen to them; anxiety and depression rates among these groups were so high that a mental health effort has been launched to support people through the process (Existential Academy, 2017). The Brexit vote has had a particularly negative impact on young people. Young Eastern Europeans discussed feelings of uncertainty and anxiety about the future, a lack of a sense of belonging, and many were concerned about their future rights and treatment in the United Kingdom (Sime et al., 2017, p.4) and were constantly told that they do not belong in a country that they consider home. In an interview with the BBC, a young man from Poland stated that after the vote, his friends no longer wanted to play football with him out of fear for their safety (BBC Newsnight, 2016). Moreover, an increasing number

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

of young people started doubting their European identity, emphasizing the fact that the fundamental concept of European citizenship and identity was in jeopardy.

Long-term migration to the EU dropped after the referendum in June 2016, even before any new policies were put in place to stop it probably. The political uncertainty caused by Brexit; and the fact that EU migration was unusually high before the referendum have certainly played a role in that decrease. The post-referendum decline in EU migration disproportionately affected migrants from new (EU-8) member states, such as Poland. Within fiscal years 2016–2020, net migration from "EU-8" Eastern European countries like Poland declined by a projected 126%, from 58,700 to -15,100. During the same period, net migration from "EU-14" nations like France, Germany, Italy, and Spain declined by 42%. To remain legally in the UK after 2021, the majority of EU nationals and their family members living in the UK prior to the end of free movement were required to submit a European Settlement Scheme application (EUSS). Hence, they must reapply to EUSS if they wish to remain permanently in the United Kingdom. Post-referendum EU migration had already declined significantly in 2020 with minus 58 %for all EU with its highest decrease from EU8 minus 126% and minus 42 % for EU14 and 40% for EU2 (Page)⁸³. There has also been also a decline in the number of EU applicants for undergraduate study, with 40% fewer applicants for study in the 2021 academic year (beginning in September) than in the 2020 academic year .This reduction occurred despite an increase in applications from non-EU international students, showing that Brexit (which only affected EU individuals and their families) and not merely the pandemic played a factor. This meant that international students have to apply for a visa and pay more for tuition. In 2021, the

⁸³ BRIEFING EU migration to and from the UK.p6

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

number of EU citizens halted at the UK border climbed significantly. The loss of free movement and EU membership significantly increased the instances in which border agents could refuse entry to EU residents.

In 2021, the number of EU individuals stopped at the border for questioning rose significantly. During the first nine months of the year, a little more than 12,500 EU members were questioned further at the border before being granted or denied admission 7400 were Romanian. Although, EU residents do not need a visa to visit the United Kingdom, but border agents have the right to deny entry if they feel the visitor is likely to breach immigration laws, such as working without authorization. Conversely, Opinion polls (ipsos 2019) indicated that there has been a significant movement in public opinion towards immigration in the United Kingdom, with voters simultaneously becoming much less anxious and much more optimistic about its effects. While questioned on the impact of EU immigration on the United Kingdom, the negatives dropped from 64 % before the referendum to 26 % after it. While the positive part was 19 % before the referendum ,it increased to 48 % after the referendum (Portes).The COVID-19 dilemma has sparked a heated debate over whether the United Kingdom can afford to limit the migration of Europeans working in the vital health and social care sectors, as well as broader questions about the purpose and position of the European Union and Immigration in modern Britain.(Migration). Figure3. 8 Estimated net migration of EU citizens to the per year, 2012-2020

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

Conclusion:

On January 1, 2021, and following a very long and hard EU negotiation after the 2016 referendum, the United Kingdom left the European Union's Single Market and Customs Union. Economy and more importantly immigration were the two most influential persuasive factors in the debate for Brexit. On the one hand, Britain Stronger in Europe (BSE) primarily addressed economic issues and highlighted the positive impact of Britain's EU membership on trade and employment. On the other hand, it emphasized on the risk of leaving the EU by predicting a series of negative consequences for citizens and households. Similar to the BSE campaign, the early Leave campaign (VL) focused on economic issues and sovereignty. Notably, as the campaign progressed, immigration became the central subject, gaining importance in VL's discourse which contributed significantly to the establishment of the "moral panic" of mass migration. Against this backdrop, Brexit was legitimized through myths of numbers and public safety, as well as misrepresentations of EU policy on freedom of movement. VL reframed UKIP's anti-immigration policy, which was ideologically based on a populist and divisive reading of immigration as an "us and them" issue. As political problems, the EU and EU immigration became inextricably interwoven, especially with the admission of 10 new member states in 2004. This convergence of these two factors led to the establishment of UKIP and to its significant influence with its success in both the 2014 EU Parliamentary Election and the 2015 General Election. The appearance of a serious eurosceptic opponent encouraged David Cameron to pledge that a Conservative government would organize a referendum on EU membership. The increasing prominence of immigration after the 2004 and 2007 enlargement predominantly Eastern European nations was followed by an underestimated large immigration rates which altered the public's perception on the European Union

Chapter Three: EU Immigration in the Leave Campaign

membership. Immigration loomed larger in people's minds. Anger directed at immigrants played a major role in the Brexit campaign, and for many in the United Kingdom, antagonism toward Eastern European immigrants became associated with Brexit. The Eastern European immigration's economic and social impact on the UK brought different sentiments between the "Leavers" and the "Remainers".

General Conclusion:

General Conclusion:

Decades of British political and social discourse have centered on immigration. Because of post-crisis events, freedom of movement was a central issue in 2016 on the British vote to leave the European Union.. Until the 2000s, the most contentious aspects of immigration were migrants and asylum seekers from outside the EU, as well as the invisibility of European migration and European migrants. However, for the first time since its proclamation in the Treaty of Rome, the very principle of migration from other member states was being systematically. Prior to the 2004 expansion of the EU to Eastern European countries, only a small percentage of their population was mobile, and migration rarely resulted in permanent relocation. On May 2004 the EU was expanded to include Eastern and Central European countries what are known as the "A8" countries, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland. Followed in 2007 by Bulgaria and Romania.

Tony Blair's New Labour government, which supported Eastern European access to the EU, has encouraged an economic immigration policy in support of white and mostly Christian immigration rather than more control and restrictions on other non-European immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants who were targeted after 9/11. While other European member states waited seven years to their labor markets' access with transitional restriction in 2004 due to wage and GDP disparities, the UK let these new European residents from countries with high unemployment into its labor market right away. The removal of administrative barriers has created a change in size of flow, composition and quality of immigrants. Except for registering on the WRS, the United Kingdom had no restrictions. Attracted by free mobility and employment, the new member states moved extensively throughout the United Kingdom to migrate to industries and regions where

General Conclusion:

there was work. This promoted regional prosperity and prevented labor shortages in vital industries such as agriculture. They loosened restrictions on the labor market, increased the flexibility of the workforce, controlled inflation, and reduced the UK's natural rate of unemployment without causing significant unemployment.

Nevertheless, Coupled with the development of UKIP and Conservative party MPs advocating for an in /out EU a referendum in 2012, Prime Minister David Cameron was encouraged to organize a referendum to reaffirm Conservative Party support (from UKIP supporters) and Conservative Party MPs' confidence in his leadership. The EU immigrants and Eastern one in particular were used a scapegoat for elections. Cameron thought that a referendum on the EU would deter eurosceptic members of parliament and supporters from joining UKIP. Since the 2004 accession of Eastern European nations with high immigration rates, public discontent has increased. The Brexit movement was inspired by anger over EU immigration, and many Britons identified it with anti-immigrant sentiments. The 2016 Brexit vote was strongly impacted by Eastern European immigration.

Prior to 2004, East-West migration was restricted to Western European countries that bordered EU8 members, primarily Germany and Austria. The liberalization of labor markets in Sweden, Ireland, and the United Kingdom altered the general distribution of East-West migration, with the United Kingdom becoming the principal receiver country. The removal of EU8 immigration restrictions by the United Kingdom influenced both the quantity and composition of immigrants. The expansion of the EU provided A10 migrants with more movement possibilities, resulting in a vast array of migration patterns, from regular short-term immigration to permanent residence. The Eastern European immigrants who came after the 2004 and 2007 enlargement had different levels of income and employment. Thus, they were likely to work in underpaid and low-skilled occupations.

General Conclusion:

This unplanned and unexpected inflow of immigrants from Eastern Europe to the United Kingdom, led to anti-immigrant sentiment by the locals as the EU immigrants and more targeted the Eastern European ones were responsible for pressures on public services, like housing and welfare because of their free movement and work. The Polish plumber stereotype conveyed the belief that EU immigration to the United Kingdom has resulted in lower wages in occupations affected by it. This immigration was presumably targeted because it became distinctive not as a European immigration but labelled as an Eastern European immigration.

On January 1, 2021, the United Kingdom left the Single Market and Customs Union Immigration and commerce to what was become named Brexit. During the referendum campaign in 2016, the Remain side represented by Britain Stronger in Europe (BSE) primarily addressed economic issues through broad tactics that emphasized the positive impact of Britain's EU membership on commerce and jobs and the risk of leaving the EU by predicting catastrophic repercussions for individuals and households. Whereas the Vote to Leave (VL), used the term "reclaim (your) power" to gain credibility by emphasizing independence from EU adversaries. VL's discourse on immigration and its expanding methodologies helped to create the "moral panic" of mass migration; Brexit was legitimized by statistical inaccuracies and misrepresentations of EU policy on freedom of movement. VL reframed UKIP's anti-immigration position, which was populist and centered on national collaboration rather than international cooperation. Many British residents were indifferent to the political and economic consequences of leaving the EU. Their top concern became EU immigration, which influenced the Brexit decision. This occurred even in areas with low-immigration areas. In the high-turnout referendum, low-

General Conclusion:

educated people, older people, and those in rural England and Wales voted to leave while Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain.

Both of the 2004 and 2007 events are of great significance, as they formally relinquished Britain's control over EU migration, and the latter formally granted these countries the four EU freedoms that have enabled a large migration which facilitated "Brexit". The Brexit campaign and vote caused these social inequalities, not Brexit. Policymakers who are trying to build a new immigration settlement for the post-EU future will face a wide and historic division in the UK. Moreover, with the 2022 "new global recession" which has already started caused by the war between Ukraine and Russia, it has led not only to a geopolitical crisis but also to an economic one. If the UK thought that Brexit meant that Europeans willing to live in the UK or those seeking EU membership were no longer a concern, recent rail strikes, a shortage of truck drivers primarily from Eastern Europe, and a sharp drop in the number of EU nurses and midwives may prove otherwise.

Bibliography

Bibliography:

Books:

Bibliography: Becker, Sascha O., and Thiemo Fetzer. Has Eastern European Migration Impacted UK-born Workers?. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, 2018.(S. O. Becker et al.)

Barbulescu, Roxana. *From international migration to freedom of movement and back? Southern Europeans moving north in the era of retrenchment of freedom of movement rights." South-North migration of EU citizens in times of crisis.* Springer, Cham, 2017. 15-31.

Burrell, Kathy, ed. *Polish Migration to the UK in the 'new' European Union: After 2004.* Routledge, 2016.233-238

Fasani, Francesco, et al. *Immigration and Crime in the United Kingdom (Chapter 3) - Does Immigration Increase Crime?* Cambridge Core, www.cambridge.org, 1 Aug. 2019, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/does-immigration-increase-crime/immigration-and-crime-in-the-united-kingdom/F797CD9CE64D07E7DE1CE3DEE2167CE2>. 54-90

Articles:

" *Arguments for Brexit : Rhetorical Analysis and Comparison of The Communication of Key Actors in the Leave Campaign " Arguments for Brexit : Rhetorical Analysis and Comparison of The Communication of Key Actors in the Leave Campaign Mémoire Réalisé Par.*

Article_ The Immigration Legacy of Tony Blair _ Migrationpolicy.

Becker, Fernando Gertum, et al. "No Title." *Syria Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1, 2015, pp. 37–72, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269107473_What_is_governance/link/548173090cf22525dcb61443/download%0Ahttp://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/Civil_wars_12December2010.pdf%0Ahttps://think-asia.org/handle/11540/8282%0Ahttps://www.jstor.org/stable/41857625.

Becker, Sascha O., et al. *June 2018 No : Warwick Economics Research Papers ISSN 0083-7350 (Print) Has Eastern European Migration Impacted UK-Born Workers ?* no. June, 2018.

Boza, Diego. *R e i C.* no. 2, pp. 1–30.

Bulmer, Simon, and Lucia Quaglia. "The Politics and Economics of Brexit." *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 25, no. 8, 2018, pp. 1089–98, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1467957>.

Clark, Nick, and Jane Hardy. *Free Movement in the EU The Case of Great Britain.* no. May, 2011.

Clarke, Harold D., et al. "Why Britain Voted For Brexit: An Individual-Level Analysis of the 2016 Referendum Vote." *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 3, 2017, pp. 439–64,

Bibliography

<https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsx005>.

- Cook, Joanne, et al. "The Experiences of Accession 8 Migrants in England: Motivations, Work and Agency." *International Migration*, vol. 49, no. 2, 2011, pp. 54–79, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2009.00595.x>.
- Drinkwater, Stephen, et al. "Poles Apart? EU Enlargement and the Labour Market Outcomes of Immigrants in the United Kingdom." *International Migration*, vol. 47, no. 1, 2009, pp. 161–90, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2008.00500.x>.
- Fernández-Reino, Mariña. "Migrants and Discrimination in the UK - Migration Observatory - The Migration Observatory." *University of Oxford*, 2020, pp. 1–14, <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-and-discrimination-in-the-uk/>.
- Fic, Tatiana. "Migration from Bulgaria and Romania to the UK." *National Institute Economic Review*, vol. 224, no. 1, 2013, pp. F4–7, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002795011322400109>.
- Fieldhouse, Edward, et al. *Electoral Shocks: The Volatile Voter in a Turbulent World*. 2020.
- Garrote-sanchez, Daniel, and Janis Kreuder. *Public Disclosure Authorized Migration in Bulgaria : Current Challenges and Opportunities*. no. 2109, 2021.
- Giuntella, Osea, et al. "The Effects of Immigration on NHS Waiting Times." *Journal of Health Economics*, vol. 58, 2018, pp. 123–43, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.02.001>.
- Holland, Dawn, et al. "Labour Mobility within the EU - The Impact of Enlargement and the Functioning of the Transitional Arrangements." *National Institute of Economic and Social Research Final Report*, no. 379, 2011, pp. 1–144.
- Jackson, Daniel, et al. *EU Referendum Analysis 2016 : Media , Voters and the Campaign Early Reflections from Leading UK Academics*. 2016.
- Jaitman, Laura, and Stephen Machin. "Crime and Immigration: New Evidence from England and Wales." *IZA Journal of Migration*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2013, <https://doi.org/10.1186/2193-9039-2-19>.
- Lafleur, Jean Michel, et al. "South-North Labour Migration Within the Crisis-Affected European Union: New Patterns, New Contexts and New Challenges." *IMISCOE Research Series*, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39763-4_11.
- Lemos, Sara, and Jonathan Portes. "New Labour? The Impact of Migration from Central and Eastern European Countries on the UK Labour Market." *SSRN Electronic Journal*, no. 3756, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1286694>.
- Longhi, Simonetta, and Magdalena Rokicka. "Eastern European Immigrants in the UK Before and After the 2004 European Enlargement *." *NORFACE Migration Discussion Paper*, vol. 30, 2012, pp. 1–26, www.norface-migration.org.
- Lymperopoulou, Kitty. *The Incidence of Worklessness among New Immigrants in England**. no. March 2011, pp. 1992–2010.

Bibliography

- Mackela, Paulius. "Eastern Europeans in Britain: Successfully Integrated Citizens or Alienated Migrants? A Case Study of the Lithuanian Migrant Community in London." *Undergraduate Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 1, no. 1, Mar. 2018, <https://doi.org/10.22599/ujpir.46>.
- Mandelbaum, Moran. "'Making Our Country Great Again': The Politics of Subjectivity in an Age of National-Populism." *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2020, pp. 451–76, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09717-6>.
- McCollum, David, et al. "Spatial, Sectoral and Temporal Trends in A8 Migration to the UK 2004-2011. Evidence from the Worker Registration Scheme." *ESRC Centre for Population Change Working Paper*, vol. 17, no. 17, 2012, pp. 1–39, http://www.cpc.ac.uk/publications/2012_WP17_Spatial_Sectoral_and_Temporal_Trends_in_A8_Migration_McCollum_et_al.pdf.
- Migration Advisory Committee, et al. "EEA Migration in the UK: Final Report." *Cell*, vol. 158, no. September, 2018, pp. 1–140, [papers3://publication/uuid/B9C3A6B9-5BAC-4D91-840F-176E5650806B%0Ahttps://www.gov.uk/Government/organisations/migration-advisory-committee](https://publication.uuid/B9C3A6B9-5BAC-4D91-840F-176E5650806B%0Ahttps://www.gov.uk/Government/organisations/migration-advisory-committee).
- Migration, E. U. *BRIEFING EU Migration to and from the UK*. 2016.
- Migration Watch UK. *National Insurance Numbers and Immigration Figures for Eastern Europeans*. 2016, pp. 1–7.
- National Centre for Social Research. *British Social Attitudes 34: Immigration*. 2017, pp. 1–30, <http://natcen.ac.uk/our-research/research/british-social-attitudes/>.
- Nickell, Stephen, and Jumana Saleheen. "The Impact of EU and Non-EU Immigration on British Wages." *IZA Journal of Development and Migration*, vol. 7, no. 1, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40176-017-0096-0>.
- Okólski, Marek. "Europe in Movement : Migration from / to Central and Eastern Europe." *CRM Working Papers*, vol. 22, no. 80, 2007, <http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/publ/602/>.
- Okólski, Marek, and John Salt. "Central and Eastern European Polish Emigration to the UK after 2004: Why Did So Many Come?" *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, vol. 3, no. 2, 2014, pp. 1–27, https://www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/research-centres/migration-research-unit/pdfs/Okolski_Salt_Polish_Emigration_to_the_UK.pdf.
- Page, A. M. *Migration and Brexit*. no. June 2016, 2017, pp. 5–20.
- Portes, Jonathan. "Immigration between the Referendum and Brexit." *UK in a Changing Europe*, 2020, pp. 1–21, <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/long-read/immigration-between-the-referendum-and-brexite/>.
- Potential Impacts on the UK of Future Migration from Bulgaria and Romania* Heather Rolfe , Tatiana Fic , Mumtaz Lalani , Monica Roman , Maria Prohaska and Liliana Doudeva.
- Press, U. C. L., et al. *Positive Economic Impact of UK Immigration from the European Union : New Evidence*. no. November, 2014,

Bibliography

<https://doi.org/10.1111/eoj.12181/abstract>.

Review of the Balance of Competences Internal Market : Free Movement of Persons Call for Evidence. no. May, 2013, pp. 1–21.

Rienzo, C., and Carlos Vargas-Silva. “Migrants in the UK Labour Market: An Overview.” *The Migration Observatory at Oxford University*, 2014, pp. 1–8, <http://storage0.dms.mpinteractiv.ro/media/1/186/3927/10538667/2/briefing-migrants-the-uk-labour-market-0.pdf>.

Roels, Leo, and Axel Rahmel. “The European Experience.” *Transplant International*, vol. 24, no. 4, 2011, pp. 350–67, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1432-2277.2011.01225.x>.

Rowthorn, Robert. “The Fiscal Impact of Immigration on the Advanced Economies.” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, vol. 24, no. 3, 2008, pp. 561–81, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grn025>.

Salt, John, and José Carlos Almeida. “International Migration in Europe.” *Revue Européenne Des Migrations Internationales*, vol. 22, no. 2, 2006, pp. 155–75, <https://doi.org/10.4000/remi.2828>.

Șerban, Andreea Claudia, et al. “The Impact of Eu Immigration on Economic Growth through the Skill Composition Channel.” *Technological and Economic Development of Economy*, vol. 26, no. 2, 2020, pp. 479–503, <https://doi.org/10.3846/tede.2020.11954>.

Strey, Anina, et al. “Determinants of Migration Flows Within the EU.” *Reminder*, no. March, 2018, www.reminder-project.eu.

The Government of the United Kingdom. *An Important Decision for the UK*. no. June, 2016.

UK Border Agency DWP. “Accession Monitoring Report.” *Communities*, no. May 2004, 2009, pp. 1–35, http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/files/Accession_Monitoring_Report_may04sept08.pdf.

Viskanic, Max. *Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail: Did Immigration Cause Brexit?* *. 2017.

Zappettini, Franco. “The Brexit Referendum: How Trade and Immigration in the Discourses of the Official Campaigns Have Legitimised a Toxic (Inter)National Logic.” *Critical Discourse Studies*, vol. 16, no. 4, Aug. 2019, pp. 403–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2019.1593206>.

Websites:

<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/2015-06-30#net-migration-to-the-uk>.

<https://marketbusinessnews.com/romanian-and-bulgarian-influx-same-in-2014-as-2013-uk/42777/>.

Bibliography

<https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/r>.

<https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/380/national-insurance-numbers-and-immigration-figures-for-eastern-europeans>.

<https://www.ft.com/content/14b558c8-6585-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614>.

<https://www.employment-studies.co.uk/news/eu-immigration-impacts-and-prospects-uk-labour-market>.

<https://www.migrationpolicy.org>.

Appendices




Figure 1. 1 Total EU immigration, EU 2 Immigration, EU 8 Immigration
Source: ONS.png




Figure 1.2 : Year- on year net migration to/from the UK by EU-nationals (thousands)
Source : ONS.png



Figure 1. 3 EU8 number of residents in the UK 2015

Source: New ONS analysis on migrants from EU 8 countries including Poland and Hungary
Helen Warrell . JULY 10 2017 <https://www.ft.com/> <https://www.ft.com/content/14b558c8-6585-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614>

Appendices




Figure 1. 4 : EU8 Nationals employment sector:

Source: New ONS analysis on migrants from EU 8 countries including Poland and Hungary
Helen Warrell. JULY 10 2017 <https://www.ft.com/content/14b558c8-6585-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614>




Figure 1. 5 EU (EU8, EU 2 and EU15) immigration to the UK, 2006 to 2016 (year ending June 2016)*Source: Office for National Statistics, Long-Term International Migration <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/dec2016>




Figure 2. 1 Average net fiscal contribution of each migrant and native, relative to the average UK adult, 2016/17 (£ per accountable adults)

Source: National_institutions_and_the_fiscal_eff.pdf . p22

Appendices




Figure2. 2: Hourly earnings for immigrants and non- immigrants.

Source: UK and non-UK people in the labour market: February 2020.P5





Figure2. 3 Share of new social housing lettings by migrant group in England

Source: EEA migration in the UK: Final report Migration Advisory Committee September 2018 p 104

A&E attendances in England

Attendances at all types of A&E department, 2004/05 to 2017/18



* 'Seen' means time from arrival to admission, transfer or discharge

Source: NHS England A&E Attendances and Emergency Admissions 2017/18: Quarterly time series 2004-05 onwards (April 2018)

Figure2. 4: Accident and Emergency attendances in England

Source: <https://fullfact.org/health/accident-and-emergency-attendances-and-performance>

Appendices


If we vote to stay in the EU

Click to find out

The EU is expanding



The EU will cost us more and more



The EU already costs us £350 million a week

— enough to build a new NHS hospital every week. We get less than half of this back, and have no say over how it's spent.

Immigration will continue to be out of control

Nearly 2 million people came to the UK from the EU over the last ten years. Imagine what it will be like in future decades when new, poorer countries join.



We'll have to keep bailing out the €

The countries that use the Euro already have a built-in majority, meaning they can always outvote us. You will be paying the bill for the Euro's failure.

The European Court will still be in charge of our laws

It already overrules us on everything from how much tax we pay, to who we can let in and out of the country, and on what terms.



Vote Leave, take back control

Figure 3. 1 vote to leave campaign arguments

Source: Mandelbaum, M. 'Making Our Country Great Again': The Politics of Subjectivity in an Age of National-Populism. *Int J Semiot Law* **33**, 451–476 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09717-6>. p15




Figure 1: Most important issue in deciding how to vote
 Source: YouGov, Fieldwork 23 June 2016

Figure 3. 2 Most important issue in deciding how to vote

Source: EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign *Early reflections from leading UK academics.p115*

Appendices

Table 2. 1 Share of cautions and convictions by EU

	UK/Ireland	EU13+	NMS	All EEA	Non-EEA
Share of all Cautions/Convictions	88.5	1.1	5.6	6.7	4.7
Share of Pop 16+	91.5	1.7	2.4	4.1	4.3
Share of Pop 16-29 Male	88.9	1.9	3.6	5.5	5.6
Share of Cautions/Convictions for Violence	91.3	0.9	3.3	4.2	4.5
Share of Cautions/Convictions for Theft	86.4	1.0	9.2	10.2	3.3
Share of Cautions/Convictions for Robbery	89.4	1.7	3.1	4.8	5.7
Share of Cautions/Convictions for Drugs	92	1.2	2.2	3.4	4.6

Source: EEA migration in the UK: Final report Migration Advisory Committee September 2018.p111

Table3. 1: Most prominent issues

Table 2: Most prominent issues

	All Media %	IN papers %	OUT papers %	TV news %
Referendum conduct	30.9	33.5	29.6	28.9
Economy/business	18.9	18.9	18.9	18.8
Immigration	13.2	9.9	14.8	15.6
Public opinion and citizens	8.0	8.8	5.0	11.3
Constitutional/legal	6.1	5.8	6.7	5.5
Employment	3.6	3.9	3.4	3.4
Defence/military/security	3.4	2.9	4.4	2.7
Standards/ corruption	2.4	2.1	4.2	.3
Health & health services	2.3	2.7	2.2	1.7
EU operations and activities	1.7	1.4	1.6	2.4
Housing	0.9	.7	1.1	.8
Crime/ law and order	0.9	1.1	1.2	0.0
Social security	0.8	.6	1.2	.7
Devolution in UK	0.8	.8	.3	1.5
Other foreign policy	0.7	.8	.7	.5
Taxation	0.6	.6	.7	.5
Public services	0.6	.1	1.0	.6
Agriculture	0.6	.6	.3	.9
Environment	0.5	.7	.6	0.0
Education	0.5	.4	.7	.2
All other issues	2.7	3.5	1.5	3.4

Source: EU Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign *Early reflections from leading UK academics*.p66

Industry	Jobs	Share of exports going to EU
Aerospace	110,000	47%
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals	136,000	54%
Financial services	1,069,000	41%
Food manufacturing	373,000	53%
IT and telecoms	1,364,000	46%
Transport	1,065,000	44%

Table3. 2: UK industry and the EU

Source: Why the Government believes that voting to remain in the European Union is the best decision for the UK.P4