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Unravelling the Algerian Eyalet Navy's Pivotal Contribution to the Formation of the American Naval Fleet During 1794-1816

A Dissertation to the Department of English in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement For Master Degree in Civilization and Literature

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Dedication

I pleaurably dedicate my dissertation to my great lovely parents who raised me and helped me in every step in my life .

I would like to thank them for all the love and support they provide me.

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Abstract:

During the Ottoman era, the Algerian Eyalet was a significant and powerful state. It had a strong navy that controlled the Mediterranean Sea and maintained diplomatic and commercial ties with many countries. This naval power helped protect its sovereignty from conflicts. In this research, we are examining key aspects such as the maritime crisis with America, the captives, and dealing with the Dey of Algiers through a peace and amity treaty, as well as tribute payments, which prompted the United States to strengthen the American Navy. The qualitative approach is used in addition to the historical research method to track the events that occurred during that period to reach the goal. This study aims to identify these historical events. Its ultimate goal is to shed light on the Algerian Eyalet's influence over America, which prompted it to build a naval fleet. The findings reveal that America initially commended Algerian Eyalet for ensuring safe passage and agreements, including repatriate captives. In response to the threat of Barbary piracy, the United States established its Navy in 1794. The ensuing war was a reaction to Algerian dominance, which provided valuable experience for the young nation. This included promoting nationalism and unity among Americans and adopting the abolition of slavery. It also gained it a skilled political elite and a military force that protected its interests.

Keywords: The Algerian Eyalet, the American navy, captives, maritime crisis, peace and amity treaty.

Table of Contents

Dedication	I
Acknowledgments	II
Abstract	III
Table of Contents	IV
List of Abbreviations	VIII
General Introduction	02
CHAPTER ONE: An Overview of the Algerian Eyalet	
Introduction	08
1-1 Algeria's Historical Status	09
1-2 Algerian State	10
1-3 The function and Role of Algerian Naval Force	10
1-3-1 Navigation System in the Mediterranean	12
1-3-2 Types of Ships	12
1-3-3 Ships Spoils Register	13
1-4 Algeria's Control of the Mediterranean Sea and its Effects	14
1-4-1 Insurance Prices in the Mediterranean	15
1-4-2 Some Independent Treaties Concluded by the Eyalet of Algiers	16
1-4-3 The Permissibility of Algerian Naval Navigation in the Mediterranean Basin.	16
1-5 Raïs Hamido: Admiral of the Algerian Navy 1770-1815.	17
1-6 Captives of Algiers.	17
1-6-1 The Captives Situation.	18
1-6-2 Differences in the Concept of Slavery between Algeria and America.	19
1-6-3 Using Captives as a Negotiation Card.	20
1-6-4 Treatment of American Prisoners by the British Consul in Algeria.	20

1-6-5 The Influence of Captives on American Society.	21
1-7 Establishing American Consulates in Algeria: “A Captive’s Path to Becoming a Prominent American Diplomat”.	21
Conclusion	22
CHAPTER TWO: The Algerian and Its Impact on America’s Naval Fleet	
Introduction	24
2-1 Confronting Mediterranean Piracy: America’s Struggle with the Barbary States.	25
2-2 The Impact of Barbary Threats.	25
2-2-1 Europe Raises Shipping Prices for Trade with America Amidst Barbary Conflicts.	26
2-3 Consequences of the Seizure of Two American Ships by the Eyalet of Algeria.	27
2-3-1 Tendency Towards Establishing Diplomatic Relations with the Eyalet of Algeria.	28
2-4 Urging the Construction of a Naval Fleet for a United America / Some Views on Naval Power.	28
2-4-1 John Paul Jones.	28
2-4-2 John Jay.	29
2-4-3 Thomas Jefferson.	30
2-4-4 Adams’ submission to Algeria’s Demands and Opposition to Naval Fleet Construction.	31
2-5 The Difficulties Faced by the United States in Securing Treaties with The Eyalet of Algeria.	32
2-5-1 A peace Agreement Between Portugal and the Eyalet of Algeria.	32
2-5-2 An Internal Condemnation of the Political and Military Situation.	33
2-5-3 Algeria’s Influence on the Movement to Abolish Slavery in America.	33
2-5-4 Nationalism and Captivity: A Comparison in Freeing Captives.	34

2-6 The U.S. Navy's Founding: Congressional Actions and Challenges in Shipbuilding.	35
2-7 The Release of American Captives: Celebrating Peace with Algiers.	36
2-8 Bainbridge's Protest: Delivering Tribute Under Threat of War.	36
2-9 Jefferson and Adams' Plan for a Maritime League Against the Barbary Pirates.	36
2-9-1 Jefferson's Plan for an "Anti-Pirate Confederation" to Combat Mediterranean Threats.	37
Conclusion	38
CHAPTER THREE: The Algerian Catalyst for America's Maritime Ascent	
Introduction	40
3-1 Definition of Strategic Choice Theory.	41
3-2 Definition of Power Transition Theory.	41
3-3 Exploring the Historical Legacy and Strategic Position of the Algerian Eyalet in the Mediterranean.	41
3-3-1 The Algerian Eyalet's Position in the Mediterranean:	42
3-3-2 Strategy of the Algerian Maritime Navigation System.	42
3-3-3 American Perceptions and Interactions.	42
3-4 The Algerian Eyalet's Strategic Position in the Mediterranean During the Ottoman Era.	43
3-5 The Navel Power of Algerian Eyalet Influenced the Rise of American Naval Power in the Early 19th as a Strategic Choice.	43
3-5-1 Jefferson's Strategic Initiatives.	44
3-5-2 American Strategic Defence Capability.	44
3-6 The Shifting Power Dynamics and Alliances Between the Algerian Eyalet and the United States in the Early 19th Century.	44
3-7 The U.S. Navy's Warships Diplomacy as a Strategic Choice to Victory over the Eyalet of Algeria	45
3-7-1 A Turbulent Period in Algerian Eyalet's History "Internal Circumstances"	46

3-7-2 Conflict and Power Dynamics: The Emergence of the United States of America as a New Power.	46
3-8 The Rise of the U.S as a New Power, in Contrast to the Decline of the Algerian Eyalet.	47
Conclusion	49
General Conclusion	51
Works Cited	54
Appendices	58
Résumé	65
ملخص	66

List of abbreviations

AD Anno Domini

US United States

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Algerian Eyalet history can be traced back to the eighteenth century with the United States. Where America saw that Algeria counts as a significant factor in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean because of great authority and significant power military. This influence made America to consider the benefits of collision with Algerian Eyalet after paying tribute and signing a treaty which was called a treaty of peace and amity with captives. A conflict arose next whose return was calculated towards evaluating cooperation amongst politicians in America, elevating patriotism, and building and nurturing a naval force necessary for America's defense.

This dissertation studies in its broad historical context the role of the Algerian Eyalet in specific Mediterranean basin which has been addressed at large, especially through the prism of its relevant naval sea power. One of the most important points of that history is the impact of Algerian Eyalet on American who formed their naval forces in from 1st half of 18th century as response to maritime crisis. This research problem requires an analysis of the complex diplomatic and armed relations between the Algerian Eyalet and America throughout 1794 to 1816.

This is an important element of the overall process of interaction between states, as it indicates that conflict is sometimes the driving force in resolving various issues, as it allows a state to adapt to events and update its military system in this or that field as necessary. This paper is a literary review, which presents some of the main historical points of contact between Algeria and America, and contributes to the understanding of the complex nature of this relationship.

The story written by James Leander Cathcart centers on the protagonist's transformation from a slave to a consul, as well as the themes of development and imprisonment. At the age of 17, the youthful Hardy was taken prisoner on a merchant ship

by the Algerian navy in 1785, and he was held captive for 11 years. Nevertheless, Cathcart was able to get this job clean and the most desirable position for a prisoner to be in, where he was able to help free other prisoners. The biographical “evidential” story of “*The Captives*” poses words meaning-making and belief as transformative, not only in terms of representation, as is distant but was also heard from the native informant. As illustrated by how these ideas provided a sense of direction towards the characterization of American society and subsequently twisted the understanding of the freedom from slavery.

Dr. Rekia Charef offers a thorough examination of the historical figure *Raïs Hamido (1770-1815): A Figure Of The Algerian Navy*, emphasizing his significance to the country's institutional and military framework at the time. The article offers a nuanced understanding of the social situation prevailing at the time, emphasizing Admiral Raïs Hamido's significance as a historical figure. Dr. Rekia's ideas intersect with the historical narrative cited in Ali Tableet's book, “*Raïs Hamido, Admiral of the Algerian Navy 1770-1815*.”

Besides Lawrence A. Peskin, “*Captives and Countrymen: Barbary Slavery and the American Public, 1785-1816*,” studies the impact of Barbary captivity on the American public sphere, foreign policy, and national identity. Peskin argues that the successful resolution of the Barbary crisis strengthened American confidence as an international player. The book also explores how captivity narratives influenced American society, particularly in relation to issues of masculinity, honour, and the development of the American navy.

Additionally, Peskin discusses the historical narrative of American people being kidnapped and confined by North African captors and how this formed the American racial and nationalism discourses. The book is, therefore, a remarkable piece of historical research with regard to the context and role of the Barbary War and its implications for the early American history to explain the nature of the society and policy.

Even more detailed account of Algeria during the Ottomans can be explored in the “*Studies on Algeria in the Ottoman Era (Piracy, Fleets and Reality)*” by Lemnouar Merouche. It looks into the major themes of piracy, legends, and reality and gives insight into the age and its importance to the nation’s formation. Through an understanding of history, the book demonstrates the historical and social effect of piracy, especially in Algeria. Furthermore, it also looks at the area where myths and reality come into play, this reflecting how legends and stories impacted the views of the public on piracy and its consequences in Algeria.

Craig L. Simmonds's book, *Creating an American Navy*: This book, “*The Birth of the Navy*” digresses on how formation of Navy came into being after the American Revolution; more particularly, it majorly offers the controversies and discussions that took place regarding formation of Navy. Simmonds then covers the quasi-war with France, and the Barbary Wars two wars which helped the infancy of the navy to seek and go for its expansion and professionalism.

The author is devoted to the War of 1812 and what it caused by Jefferson's strategy of imposing the trade embargo and his naval role. Simmonds skillfully incorporates Navy combat operations throughout his writing to give the reader an overview of the US Navy.

Through these references, we discover that the development of the American naval fleet has improved and kept pace with global changes. Notably, most of the books did not address the Algerian naval crisis, which was the most significant factor. Through our research, we shed light on this gap, as it reveals the impact of the Algerian Eyalet Marine on America. This led to a consensus on its decision to build its navy, which ultimately contributed to protecting American interests.

The primary research question addressed in this paper is: to what extent was the Algerian Eyalet influential in the development of American-Algerian relations and the

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

founding of naval power during 1794-1816? The sub questions that would help us reach an ultimate answer are:

In the late 18th century, Algeria's presence on the global stage was quite significant, as evidenced by the country's substantial influence and power in the Mediterranean region. This dominance that Algeria wielded in the Mediterranean had a profound impact on the West, particularly on the United States, as they engaged in complex negotiations with the Algerian government between 1794 and 1816. What were the specific consequences of Algeria's political policies during this period? Most notably, these policies directly led to the establishment of America's naval fleet, and also brought about broader political changes that reverberated throughout the region.

In response to the stated problem and subsequent sub-questions, the study highlights the importance of the Algerian Eyalet and its historical impact on the emergence and development of the power of the American naval fleet during 1794-1816. By studying the significance of geographical location and the effects of power and strategy used by the leaders between the Algerian Eyalet and America during this period, this study aims to provide a better understanding of how America kept pace with the changes occurring at home and abroad and how it protected its interests by establishing a naval force?

1. To contribute to a better understanding of the historical role of Algerian dependency in the context of American history.
2. To evaluate the historical importance of these interactions and identify the role of tribute and peace agreements in dynamism between the two entities.
3. To identify the conditions of the American prisoners in Algeria and its impact on the American internal situation and its reflection on the construction of the American naval fleet.
4. to explore America's strategy in agreeing to a peace contract and preparing for war.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

5. To analyze the effect of choosing the strategy and making the appropriate decision in gaining strength.
6. To analyze the impact of the Algerian deed on the development of the US Navy during this period.

This study will adopt a qualitative approach to explore the links between the Algerian Eyalet and America, and we will use the pure historical method because we will utilize primary and secondary sources to gain insight into what occurred in a specific place during a specific period of time. To collect relevant data and achieve our goals, we will enrich our understanding of these events between the two countries and explore some outcomes that impacted the construction of the naval fleet.

Several factors led us to choose this particular topic as the focus of our study, including our appreciation for our nation's history and our determination to challenge the belief that Algeria lacked a historical identity before French colonialism. Furthermore, we aim to highlight Algerian Eyalet's impact on American history.

This dissertation is divided into three chapters; the first chapter is devoted to an overview of the Algerian Eyalet. The second one tackles how Algeria had an impact on the establishment of America. Finally, the third chapter, where previously unknown information about the influence of Algeria on the initial formation of the American fleet was disclosed. This paper, therefore, employs two key theoretical lenses that are power and strategic choice, which gives adequate explanation on how the formation of the Algerian Eyalet impacted the development of the former's navy

Chapter One:

An Overview of the Algerian Eyalet

This chapter aims to present a historical account of the Algerian Eyalet sovereignty and its strategic positioning in the Mediterranean. It attempts to explore Algeria's interactions with the Ottoman State, as well as its relationships with both allies and adversaries. Furthermore, the present part aims at highlighting the significance of Algeria's maritime location in shaping diplomatic ties between nations. Additionally, the chapter discusses Algeria's role in Mediterranean countries and its engagement with America, which prompted the development of a naval fleet to safeguard its interests.

Since the beginning of the seventeenth century AD, the Eyalet of Algeria enjoyed its forces as a modern sovereign state as it managed to create a balance of power in the Mediterranean with its naval power. The latter played a pivotal role in ensuring the security of the Algerian Eyalet and more generally in the security of international trade in the Mediterranean area. That being said, Algeria could potentially realize its real threat that was essentially from European, and therefore sought to prepare itself to confront this menace politically, militarily, and economically. The effectiveness of its strategic location, which led it to pay attention to building a naval military force to confront opponents, which made European countries work to end the enjoyed power of this country as a necessary step to build its colonial project in the region, which was raised during the scramble for Africa.

1-1 Algeria's Historical Status:

Algeria's influence in the Mediterranean was perceived as a threat that needed to be eradicated, with Islam often portrayed as the underlying cause of this danger. During the Ottoman era, Algeria held a position of power in the Mediterranean region, enjoying significant independence that allowed it to establish political and commercial ties with numerous countries worldwide (Peskin 204). It was notable for being the first state to recognize the French Revolution in 1789 and the American Revolution following its independence from British rule in 1776. Known as the "Eyalet¹ of Algeria" or sometimes referred to as the "Republic" or "Kingdom of Algeria," (Peskin 75) the state entered into numerous treaties with nations globally. Its naval fleet grew to such strength that it established a navigation system in the Mediterranean, ensuring security for Algeria and the Ottoman state while facilitating international trade (Daraj,29)

European powers sought to dismantle this system under the pretext of combating piracy. The Congress of Vienna in 1814/1815 saw France take the lead in proposing the elimination of the "province of Algeria", as several European countries agreed at the Aix-la-Chapelle Conference in 1819 to dismantle the Algerian state. (Hausman 58-59)

¹The Ottoman Empire was administratively divided into large states known as Eyalets. These Eyalets were further subdivided into sanjaks (plural of sanjak), which were districts, and the districts were divided into Aqdhaia (plural of qadha). Additionally, the districts were further divided into smaller administrative units known as "districts." The Eyalets were governed by a governor-general who held the title of beylerbey. By the mid-16th century, the administration of these governorates shifted to ministers. The beylerbey, or vizier as he came to be known, served as the representative of Ottoman authority in the state, overseeing both civil and military affairs with absolute power in those domains. However, judicial and legal matters that fell outside his jurisdiction were handled by separate legal authorities

.Sertoğlu, Mithat. OsmanlıTarihLügatı. İstanbul, 1986, pp. 106-234

1-2 Algerian State:

According to Professor Saad ‘Allah, the period from 1516 to 1830 witnessed the emergence of the modern Algerian state (Saad ‘Allah 170). This state was established based on the geographical, political, and economic unity of the country, as well as the intellectual and spiritual unity that was established since the Islamic conquest. The majority of the Algerian people were involved in this state, which had various institutions, including a land army, a naval fleet, a flag, a Shura Council (parliament), a currency, and a capital. Moreover, the Algerian state respected customary and diplomatic traditions in accordance with the international law prevailing at the time. Algerian citizens have developed a sense of national identity, leading them to work together to strengthen the state and protect their homeland from Christian fanatics who pose a threat. (Saad ‘Allah 184)

Richard O’Brien, the person in charge of the Dauphin and the head of the American captives, sent a message to Jefferson about Algiers’s “very strong” and “well-fortified” capital city and complimented the Algerines as “a tolerable smart active people.” As such, O’Brien admonished the government to “use every means to obtain a peace with the Barbary States, although it would cost vast sums. (Richard 3-4)

1-3 The function and role of the Algerian Naval Force:

The Algerian naval force was necessary to maintain the safety of the country and facilitate foreign trade in the Mediterranean. The Algerian sailors built a Mediterranean navigation system in the eighteenth century, which helped in the country’s security. Moreover, Algeria developed into an important Mediterranean country during the Ottoman era, which sparked a number of naval battles. Historically, the Algerian naval forces were crucial in providing international trade in the Mediterranean and the security of the Algerian state.

Chapter One: An Overview of the Algerian Eyalet

Emanuel d'Aranda, a Flemish soldier, was enslaved in Algiers during the 1640s. He claimed that the city was where the hardships of slavery had led to the deaths of around 600,000 Christians since 1536 when it came under the control of Cheredin Barbarossa. Algiers was particularly known for its significant involvement in the slave trade (Davis 8)

Thomas Jefferson, who served as the United States representative to France from 1785 to 1789, noted in 1785 that Algeria had a large naval force with about 16 warships. Also, Captain Richard O'Brien, an American who was captured in Algiers, said that they had 9 warships. However, a Massachusetts newspaper called the *Gentil* claimed that the Algerines had 47 sales of frigates, and another vessel. (Wilson 38)

John Adams described that Algiers was a very strong country in a letter from July 1786. He pointed out that Algiers had a large navy and strong defences: "they have now fifty gun-boats, which, being small objects against great ships, are very formidable... The harbor of Algiers, too, is fortified all round...which renders it more difficult and dangerous to attempt a blockade."²

Even John Paul Jones, a hero of the American Revolutionary War, advised being careful when dealing with Algiers. He believed that Algiers posed a significant threat: "a powerful State; that can put 200,000 Troops into the Field" (Zeledon 28)

²Adams to Jefferson, July 31, 1786, Lester Cappon, ed., *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 146.

1-3-1 Navigation System in the Mediterranean:

During the eighteenth century, according to Ali Tableet, the naval fleet of Algeria became powerful enough to establish a navigation system in the Mediterranean. It had a ministry, ranks, headquarters, and many types of ships, like in our modern era. This system ensured the security of Algeria and facilitated international trade in the Mediterranean. However, European countries sought to dismantle this system by labelling it as “piracy,” using it as an excuse to undermine the Algerian state’s defensive efforts against the colonial wave that started in the fifteenth century. It is important to note that Algeria willingly joined the Ottoman Caliphate to confront the colonial expansion, while Europeans engaged in piracy with the approval of their respective countries. (Charef 430)

1-3-2 Types of Ships:

Devoulx Albert mentions that in 1802, there were 30 frigates, corvettes, and brig-type ships. These are the types of ships that were primarily of interest to foreign observers because they constituted the basic naval force of the Algerian fleet due to their durability and firepower. However, some other ships, known for their lightness, speed, more agile ships like the Xebec³ type, also possessed strong armament at times. For instance, an American consular report (Devoulx 348-420) on the Algerian naval force in 1802 states that it consisted of 13 ships with

³The xebec (شباك in Arabic, Jabeque in Spanish, Xabeco in Portuguese, chébec or chabek in French, Sciambecco in Italian, Schebeck in Dutch, and Schierbek in Danish) belongs to the family of narrow ships. Is a narrow ship derived from the Mediterranean galley. Its long and low hull, lateen-rigged masts, shallow draft, and numerous rowers allowed for swift movement and high manoeuvrability in shallow waters. Historians suggest that the xebec evolved from the galley and was a formidable weapon in early modern naval warfare. Other ships such as galliots and fustas were similar to galleys but smaller in size, armament, and carriage capacity. Together, these ships belong to the Long Ships family¹. The xebec was first mentioned in the Algerian navy in the 1730s, with Albert Devoulx reporting two xebecs in 1737. One was armed with six cannons and 24 swivel guns, while the other had four cannons and 14 swivel guns.²

- Salmi, AbdelhadiRadjai. “The Algerian Xebec: An Integral Part of the Algerian Naval Strategy in the eighteenth century.” *Journal of Historical Military Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2, 2023, pp. 166-188

- Devoulx, Albert. “La Marine de la Régenced’Alger.” *Revue africaine*, no. 77, 1869, p. 396

- Sumner, Charles. *White Slavery in the Barbary States: A Lecture Before the Boston Mercantile Library Association*. William D. Ticknor and Company, 1847.73.

between 12 and 44 cannons, accompanied by 60 cannon-armed boats to defend the port. The report further notes that Algeria owned approximately 150 sailing ships with a capacity of 25 to 50 tons, each crewed by an average of around 14 sailors. (Merouche 403)

1-3-3 Ships Spoils Register:

In the absence of restrictions on the prices of captured ships in ships spoils register, an overview of the prices of various ships can be provided. In his research, Devoulx noted the tonnage of 20 plundered ships sold to European merchants in Algeria between 1772 and 1797, with an average tonnage of 153 tons per vessel. However, he did not disclose the specific prices of these ships. Conversely, reports from French consular and commercial sources detailed the prices at which plundered ships were sold in Algeria from 1775 to 1804. The prices varied significantly and were denoted in francs:

- Small Spanish ship: 3000
- Ship from Naples: 3038
- Ship from Naples: 3240
- Various ship prices: 6594, 6075, 5265, 4560, 4515
- Additional ship prices: 38000, 21263, 16706, 13669, 9325, 9113

The average price of these ships amounted to 10,383 francs. (Merouche 469)

1-4 Algeria's Control of the Mediterranean Sea and its Effects:

The breakdown of relations with France following the Revolution also heightened the risk of piracy and attacks on America. The 1778 Franco-American ⁴ Treaty that shielded American ships from Barbary States during wartime did not provide the same protection during peacetime, leaving American vessels and sailors vulnerable to Barbary pirates without strong support from an ally. To address the piracy threat, the United States had to engage in negotiations with the Barbary States to secure the safety of its merchant ships and ensure their smooth passage through the Mediterranean. These negotiations typically involved paying tribute or ransom, forcing the young nation to make concessions in order to maintain peace and protect its interests. (Bevans, Charles I. 32.57)

The vulnerability of the United States to piracy was alarmingly demonstrated when two American vessels were captured by Algerian privateers in 1785. This fear was further heightened by a second wave of captures in 1793. As a result, shipping and insurance rates for trade with the Iberian Peninsula significantly increased, hindering American attempts to dominate the shipping market as a neutral carrier for Europe. Additionally, there were concerns that the lack of a strong response to North African piracy would encourage corsairs to attack poorly defended American harbours. The government's response to this pirate threat was characterized by indecisiveness and unsuccessful diplomacy (Peskin 94).

The United States did not have a diplomatic corps capable of negotiating favourable treaties to prevent piracy, and their financial constraints made it impossible to fulfil any treaty obligations they might have made.

⁴Act of February 6, 1778, American States Papers: Statutes, 1:12-31.

Despite its own weaknesses in economy and military, Algiers was able to bring the United States under its control. This humiliating and subservient relationship highlighted the United States' disillusionment with its position in the world after the Revolution, when Americans were painfully aware of their inferior status. It became clear to every rational American that Barbary piracy had revealed the stark contrast between the "victims of independence"⁵, and the promised greatness they had envisioned. (Peskin 94)

1-4-1 Insurance Prices in the Mediterranean:

Following the capture of the Betsey, the higher insurance rates enraged American merchants, leading many to use British ships instead. Lloyds of London was reported to charge at least 25% to insure American ships, but only 1.25% to 1.5% for British ones, as Jefferson learned from one of his correspondents. This led to a difference in insurance rates that prompted merchants to order their goods to be shipped in British vessels. The public was also aware of this practice, as newspapers in various states published articles claiming that captains were afraid to carry American stars and stripes even in the Atlantic and had bought British ships instead. One widely published article spreading fear portrayed foreign trade as extremely dangerous, citing a letter from Gibraltar. The Algerians had "sworn eternal enmity" against America and were "indefatigable in making preparations to cruise against the Americans, both in the Mediterranean and Atlantic."⁶ (Peskin 102).

The United States' transition from vulnerability to a position where it could exert physical and imaginative dominance over the Barbary States continued into the early 19th century. The

⁵that Barbary piracy revealed just how far the "miseries of independence" fell short of their "promised greatness." "London," Times (London) 13 October 1786.

⁶The Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), April 30, 1785; The Connecticut Courant, and Weekly Intelligencer (Hartford, CT), May 10, 1785; The Vermont Journal and the Universal Advertiser (Windsor, VT), May 31, 1785. The State-Gazette of South-Carolina (Charleston, SC), June 6, 1785. An abridged version of this article (it lacks the "sworn eternal enmity") ran in The United States Chronicle: Political, Commercial, and Historical (Providence, RI), May 12, 1785.

vulnerability of the United States to North African privateers not only affected its economic prospects and military capabilities, but also called into question the effectiveness of the federal government and the wisdom of the Revolution itself. With the absence of naval protection for commercial shipping after the breach with Britain, some captives felt that they were victims of American Independence. (Cathcart 145)

1-4-2 Some Independent Treaties Concluded by the Eyalet of Algiers:

Algeria was independent in concluding international treaties and agreements of various kinds, even with the presence of hostile countries, such as the Ottoman State. Additionally, Algeria had the autonomy to establish diplomatic missions without consulting these hostile entities. (Merouche 196)

1-4-3 The Permissibility of Algerian Naval Navigation in the Mediterranean Basin:

Merchant ships were protected from Muslim privateers in exchange for gifts. This safeguard was guaranteed through the use of divided sea permits, with one portion dispatched to the Barbary States and the other held by the ship's captain. When the two parts of the permit aligned, ships could sail without disturbance. Various European countries employed distinct patterns to divide their permits. In 1729, Denmark contemplated emulating Sweden's approach by negotiating a treaty with the Dey of Algiers. (Göbel 176)

1-5 Raïs Hamido: Admiral of the Algerian Navy 1770-1815:

Raïs Hamido is a prominent figure in the history of Algeria. He was famous during the period 1793-1815 AD for his achievements in revitalizing the Algerian navy. One notable incident that boosted the Dey's confidence and standing was where Hamido proved his worth by cleverly defending himself against the Dey's doubts about his actions. Despite the challenges he faced, Hamido continued to achieve victories, seize enemy ships, and obtain large naval spoils under the slogan of maritime jihad in the name of the Ottoman Caliphate, which disturbed Christian Europe. (Charef 426)

Under various rulers such as Dey Hassan Pasha and Dey Mustafa Pasha, Hamido's successes continued, including the capture of a Portuguese war frigate named Portegaza during the reign of Dey Ahmed Pasha. However, his confrontation with the American fleet in 1815 led to his martyrdom as he faced attacks from American ships after a misunderstanding regarding the English flag. Forced to retreat by Dey Omar Pasha, Hamido's legacy as a brave and skilled naval commander remains an important part of Algerian history. (Charef 428)

1-6 Captives of Algiers:

In the 1785, the Algerian sailors captured two American ships – the ship Maria, commanded by Captain Isaac Stevens and a crew of five men from Boston, and the ship Dauphin, commanded by Captain Richard O'Brien and a crew of fourteen men from Philadelphia. Maria was captured off the Spanish coast, while the Dauphin was captured off the Portuguese coast. (Wilson 39)

1-6-1 The Captives Situation:

The prisoners suffered a lot during the time they spent on board the ship before arriving in Algeria. The place was dirty, and the food vinegar and stale bread with poor oil and water. The prisoners almost starved to death had it not been for the sympathy of some pirates who provided them with fresh fruits and vegetables. The American sailors received help from some Algerian pirates on board the ship, and a relationship developed between them, especially after they used them in service work on the ship. When the ship arrived in Algeria after an arduous journey, the American prisoners were transported to the Ministry of War in a festive and parade procession in the middle of the market, where people gathered to watch them. In the meantime, food and drink were provided to them, but anxiety was troubling them because they did not know their fate, as they feared that they would be sold in the countryside and end up in an isolated place that no one knew, and spend their lives in slavery. (Cathcart 21)

According to Cathcart, he suggests that the Algerian privateers (pirates) who captured the Americans felt some sympathy and gave sympathetic treatment to their captives, as evidenced by Cathcart's account of good treatment by the "venerable old Arab" who captured him. (Cathcart 27-28)

Foss noted that when American prisoners had to unload and prepare ships in port, the people in charge would sometimes give them a little olive oil or some olives. The prisoners considered this a special treat, even though it was only a small amount of food. (Foss 27)

1-6-2 Differences in the Concept of Slavery between Algeria and America:

Perceptions of slavery in Algeria differ from those of Americans. Slavery in America was linked to agriculture, where they bought black Africans and forced them to work hard in agriculture for life, lacking the slightest degree of freedom. But slavery in Algeria was a different matter. The prisoners were used in many fields to benefit until they were ransomed. In addition, these slaves/captives enjoyed a space of freedom to work in their own time, collect money, and practice their own trade, which might enable them to ransom themselves if they collected money. Enough. At the same time, they enjoyed the freedom to practice their religious rituals and eat their own food, and even wine was available to them. Some books said slavery in Barbary was not as bad as in America. Mathew Carey felt sorry for the captives “we are not entitled to charge the Algerines with any exclusive degree of barbarity. The Christians of Europe and America carry on this commerce a hundred times more expensively than the Algerines.” (Carey 16)

In the book “*The Algerine Captive*” by Royall Tyler, it is shown that white men on slave ships raped African women. The Muslim characters were portrayed as more humane because Islam did not allow the enslavement of fellow Muslims. The novel criticizes Christians for justifying slavery by converting slaves to Christianity before treating them brutally. The protagonist in the story realizes his past sins after experiencing mistreatment as a slave in Algiers. (Royall 96)

1-6-3 Using Captives as a Negotiation Card:

The Dey wanted to put all the prisoners in his custody so that he could use them as a negotiating card with America to sign a treaty in which he would provide annual money (as a tribute) like all European countries, and at the same time earn a sum of money as a reward for ransoming them.

The American prisoners were distributed and employed in many professions according to their rank, qualifications, and skills. The Dey chose five of them to work in the palace. One worked in the palace kitchen, two worked as chief servants, and two others worked in the palace garden. The sailor Cathcart worked in the palace, reaching a rank very close to the Algerian Dey. As for the rest of the prisoners, they were sent to the slave prison or the prison for Christian prisoners, as all European prisoners were known as (Christian slaves). The Americans were part of the Christian prisoners, so the name was given to them as well. But they hated being considered Christians like the rest of the Europeans, especially considering the eighteenth century. They hated the rest of the Europeans because they were Catholics, while most of them were Protestants. (Cathcart 54)

1-6-4 Treatment of American Prisoners by the British consul in Algeria:

The British Consulate hosted Stevens and O'Brien, the captains of the ships Mary and Dauphin, but they were treated humiliatingly like servants and suffered forms of humiliation and contempt "very contemptuously." (Parker,70) even though custom required treating the ship's captain with respect. O'Brien, captain of the ship Dauphine, worked in the consulate garden pruning trees, while Stevens, captain of the Mary, cleaned up trash at the consulate. The way the British consul dealt with them stemmed from the hostility caused by the American War of Independence, as most of the American prisoners a few years ago had been subjects of the British king. In fact, all the prisoners expected to be treated well by the British, especially the captains of the two ships who were hosted at the consulate. Cathcart, one of these prisoners, after seeing O'Brien and Stevens working as servants in the consulate, wrote in his memoirs: "a set of beings

without strength or resources, and so contemptible that his Master did not think us worth the trouble or expense of subduing.” (Cathcart 4)

1-6-5 The Influence of Captives on American Society:

In the late 18th century, American citizens were captured by Algerian pirates and held as slaves. The captives endured harsh conditions and some spent years in captivity. They tried to differentiate themselves from European captives and sought help from their government. The situation sparked public outrage, leading to fundraising efforts (Peskin, 66), and awareness campaigns across the United States. When the prisoners returned, their experiences influenced American culture, inspiring fictional works and shaping societal norms. The issue of American prisoners in Algeria became a significant social and cultural phenomenon of the time. (Peskin 67)

1-7 Establishing American Consulates in Algeria: “A Captive’s Path to Becoming a Prominent American Diplomat”:

During the early 18th century, the American General Redemption Treaties formulated a strategy to establish consulates in Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunisia. Richard O’Brien was appointed as the consul in Algiers by George Washington and John Adams, who entrusted him with overseeing other North African consuls. O’Brien, who had previously been enslaved in Algeria and served as an officer on the “Dauphin” ship, despite his lack of formal diplomatic training, O’Brien had acted as a de facto consul during his captivity and further honed his skills after regaining his freedom, successfully negotiating with Tunisia and Tripoli. Assuming the role of Consul General in Algiers in 1799, O’Brien played a prominent role as an American diplomat in the Barbary States. (Hausman 34)

Conclusion:

By the 18th century, the Eyalet of Algiers, a maritime institutional unit, had emerged and attained a position of importance and power in the Mediterranean region. Its strategic location along the southern coast of the Mediterranean Sea enabled it to control, organize, and control the trade routes crossing the sea. This firm stance also allowed the Eyalet's to exercise its influence and authority over the surrounding lands and nations.

The main factor in Eyalet's rise was its huge navy. Algerian sailors took advantage of this powerful fleet to carry out daring raids and attacks on European ships sailing in the Mediterranean. These pirates also targeted coastal cities and settlements, capturing their residents and holding them captive. In addition, they confiscated goods and cargo from European ships that did not adhere to Algerian maritime policy. These bold and courageous operations helped demonstrate and confirm the Eyalet's dominance and superiority in the region.

The status of the navy and the power of the Algerian Eyalet not only protected and protected its interests but also enabled it to establish diplomatic relations with various other Mediterranean countries. This included establishing relations with the newly formed United States of America, which he wanted to carve out a place in the Mediterranean basin. Eyala's ability to project naval power and engage in diplomacy allowed it to expand its influence and power throughout the Mediterranean world during the eighteenth century.

Chapter Two:

The Algerian Eyalet and Its Impact on America's Naval Fleet

Chapter Two: The Algerian Eyalet and Its Impact on America's Naval Fleet

The United States faced persistent conflicts with North African countries, including the Algerian Eyalet, in the decades following its independence. These conflicts led to hostage crises and wars, which had a major impact on the young nation.

The Algerian Eyalet imposed piracy as this was normal at this time from the state to extract tribute, and this reflected a kind of sovereignty over its maritime domain. When the United States lost the protection of the British Navy after the Revolutionary War, American merchant ships became vulnerable to capture by Barbary pirates after their independence as they were flying their own flag. This led to a commercial and maritime crisis that the United States struggled with as America sought to gain power after the Algerian state pressured it, with its limited revenues and naval forces, to deal with it. Under the Articles of Confederation, the adoption of the Constitution in 1789 gave the federal government the ability to levy taxes and build a navy. This allowed the United States to negotiate treaties and, when necessary, engage in military action against the Barbary States.

The first and the second, saw the United States successfully defeat the Barbary forces, ending the practice of paying tribute and the revision some articles on the treaties. This experience was pivotal in reshaping American perceptions of the world and reevaluating the political and military landscape of the young nation.

Conflicts with North Africa, particularly the Barbary hostage crises, played an important role in the development of American foreign policy, maritime affairs, and views toward the peoples of North Africa in the first decades of the country's independence.

2-1 Confronting Mediterranean Piracy: America's Struggle with the Barbary States

The United States encountered challenges in establishing its global presence. One of the key obstacles was addressing rampant piracy in the Mediterranean area. The commercial ships were among the specific targets, prompting a revaluation of these assaults. America's struggles commenced with Algeria, one of The Maghreb states like Morocco, Tunisia, and Tripoli referred to as "Barbarian states" or "Barbarian pirates" by the Christian West were strategically positioned along Mediterranean trade routes. They presented a significant threat to American ships, disrupting trade and putting the country's economy at risk. (Zeledon 01)

In 1785, the Algerian navy took advantage of America's vulnerability by capturing two U.S. ships, the *Maria* and the *Dauphin*, off the coast of Spain and enslaving twenty-one sailors. Many observers regarded Algiers as a formidable adversary, citing its substantial naval resources and purported 40,000-man army to repel potential Spanish attacks. A South Carolina newspaper praised Algiers for its recent victory over Spain, commending the Dey's strategic foresight and the proficiency of his officers. The article portrayed the Dey as a skilled military leader and highlighted the talented military commanders within Algiers. Despite Spain's unsuccessful attempt to conquer Algiers, they eventually paid approximately \$3 million for a peace treaty and the release of hostages. (Zeledon 27)

2-2 The Impact of Barbary Threats

After its independence, the United States faced many challenges in asserting its position at the external level. One of the most important challenges it faced was the threat of barbaric piracy in the Mediterranean region, which contributed to America being exposed to attacks, reducing its efforts, and threatening its interests.

Chapter Two: The Algerian Eyalet and Its Impact on America's Naval Fleet

The most prominent early challenges to which America was exposed can be traced back to its roots in Algeria, as the province of Algiers was one of the Barbary Stats, which included Morocco, Tunisia, and Tripoli, which had a strategic location on trade routes in the Mediterranean. Pirate and privateer fleets posed a major threat to American merchant ships, disrupting trade and endangering the emerging nation's economic prospects.

America's separation and weakness during this period exacerbated its exposure to barbaric piracy. In the wake of the American Revolution, the newly formed Confederate Congress faced financial constraints and made the decision to sell the *Alliance*, the last frigate in the Continental Navy. This left American sailors and merchants without the protection of sea power, making them easy targets for Barbary pirates. (Foss 26-32)

2-2-1 Europe Raises Shipping Prices for Trade with America Amidst Barbary Conflicts:

The success of the American Revolution and a diplomatic dispute with France left U.S. merchant ships vulnerable to Barbary piracy, as the 1778 Franco-American Treaty's protection only applied during wartime. To safeguard American ships in the Mediterranean, the U.S. made deals with the Barbary states, often involving payments or gifts, despite conflicting with American principles. However, piracy remained a persistent threat to U.S. trade well into the early 1800s, prompting the decision to take military action against the Barbary states in the First Barbary War, demonstrating America's resolve to protect its interests and combat piracy in the region. (Ford 578)

The Algerine War that followed the conflict with Tripoli, highlighting the economic motives driving the Barbary States to target American vessels. In contrast to the Tripolitan War, the Algerine War saw a more robust naval response from the U.S., fewer Americans enslaved, and did not benefit the declining Federalist Party. President James Madison pursued victory with

Chapter Two: The Algerian Eyalet and Its Impact on America's Naval Fleet

determination to permanently eradicate Barbary piracy, learning from Thomas Jefferson's errors. Algiers' unexpected declaration of war in 1812 raised suspicions of British involvement among Americans, hindering Federalist opposition to Madison's leadership. (Zeledon, 319)

2-3 Consequences of the Seizure of Two American Ships by the Eyalet of Algeria:

The United States did not establish a permanent naval before Algeria's capture of Maria and Dauphin in 1793, Early in the Revolution the Continental Congress had established a navy, commissioned more than a dozen ships, and established a Board of Admiralty, but in the end, it relied primarily on privateers and the French. With the war's end, Congress sold off the small fleet after Revolution. Some officials considered re-establishing a navy, but the weak confederation government made it seem unwise. During the ratification debates, Hugh Williamson stated that Algerians could enslave American residents without a single sloop of war, implying the Constitution led to naval armament. Alexander Hamilton and others saw a navy as a way for the new nation to become the arbiter of Europe in America. Anti-Federalists like William Grayson saw a navy as a potential threat to American liberties, as the expense could lead to revenue officers. (Peskin 110)

During this time, numerous Americans were reluctant to react due to Republican opposition to military institutions. However, the capture of Maria and Dauphin served as a pivotal moment, prompting many Americans to reconsider the idea of a naval presence. The challenges faced by the United States in establishing a global presence, particularly in addressing piracy in the Mediterranean region, influenced Congress and public perceptions of U.S. involvement in foreign affairs. This resulted in the creation of the U.S. Navy and shaped American interactions with other nations in terms of trade and diplomacy. (Peskin 111)

2-3-1 Tendency Towards Establishing Diplomatic Relations with the Eyalet of Algeria:

It was widely acknowledged that confronting the Barbary pirates would be a significant undertaking, requiring substantial resources. Policymakers were informed by American captives in Algiers about the country's formidable defences. Richard O'Brien, the commander of the *Dauphin* and a leader among the prisoners, described Algiers' capital city as "very strong" and "well fortified," praising the Algerians as "a tolerable smart active people." O'Brien urged the government to "use every means to obtain a peace with the Barbary States, although it would cost vast sums."⁷ recognizing the challenges posed by their military capabilities. In contrast to Jones, O'Brien advised pursuing peace through negotiation rather than engaging in warfare "no Nation in the World can fit an equal Number of Cruisers half so cheap as the Algerians can."⁸. He highlighted Algiers' ability to efficiently build warships due to its abundant resources, emphasizing that no other nation could match their cost-effectiveness in ship construction.

There was a general consensus that Americans were ill-equipped to confront experienced adversaries like the Barbary pirates. Discussions also included sober assessments of Algiers' military prowess. (O'Brien 3-4)

2-4 Urging the Construction of a Naval Fleet for a United America / Some Views on Naval Power:

2-4-1 John Paul Jones:

Even the experienced naval officer John Paul Jones advised caution in dealing with Algiers, recognizing its military power and formidable navy. He believed that building a strong American navy was necessary but acknowledged the challenges of winning a potential conflict. He saw war

⁷O'Brien, Richard. Letter to Jefferson. *Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers*, vol. 1, edited by Dudley Knox, Government Printing Office .8 June 1786. 1939, pp. 3-4.

⁸O'Brien and Others to Adams, February 13, 1787, *Emerging Nation*, III: 422.

Chapter Two: The Algerian Eyalet and Its Impact on America's Naval Fleet

as a positive good since it could “unite the People of America” and “rouse them from that ill-judged security which the intoxication of success has produced since the Revolution.” (Jones 734)

John Adams shared Jones’s view of Algiers as a powerful adversary, in a July 1786 letter, he emphasized the size of their navy and the strength of their defences. He expressed scepticism about the effectiveness of retaliating against Algiers, arguing that they would not be deterred by American attacks. Adams believed that engaging in war with Algiers would only benefit them, as they could capture American ships and demand high ransoms for their crews.

Adams also criticized the rulers of the Barbary States for their self-serving governance, contrasting them with republican leaders dedicated to the welfare of their citizens. The consensus among many was that confronting the Barbary pirates would require significant resources and preparation, given their strong defences and capabilities. (Zeledon 28)

2-4-2 John Jay:

The secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay advocated for the establishment of a navy on a national scale, viewing the crisis with Algerian hostages as a symptom of weak government. He expressed doubt to John Adams about the captives' release due to governmental inefficiency. Jay believed that conflict with Algiers could foster nationalism and unity among Americans, seeing it as a potential training ground for sailors and the foundation for a strong navy.” He envisioned a force of forty-five gunboats under the leadership of a “Board of Admiralty.”⁹(Jay 868-869)

He advocated for establishing a strong national navy to address the crisis with Algerian hostages, emphasizing the need for military supplies and larger crews. He believed conflict with Algiers could foster nationalism and unity among Americans and serve as a training ground for

⁹Jay, John. "Report on the Algerine Declaration of War, October 20, 1785." *The United States and the Barbary Pirates*, edited by Dudley Knox, Government Printing Office, 1939, pp. 868-869.

Chapter Two: The Algerian Eyalet and Its Impact on America's Naval Fleet

sailors. Jay advised against making peace overtures or offering tribute to Algiers, focusing on addressing the root causes of America's vulnerability. Despite facing opposition from some congressmen, Jay sought a lasting solution to the piracy issue and criticized southern representatives for hindering efforts to regulate trade and address piracy. "Our federal government is incompetent to its objects."¹⁰(Jay 863) John Jay noted that the reluctance to build a navy stemmed from the lack of significant shipping interests among certain groups, particularly those in regions like the Eastern and Middle States. He highlighted the regional divisions and stressed the importance of a unified national interest in supporting naval development. Jay's perspective on potential conflict with Algiers differed from those who feared an Algerine invasion; he welcomed the idea of war, seeing it as a means to foster national unity and cohesion. He believed that war had the power to unite Americans and shift their focus from individual economic interests towards a collective purpose, especially in a post-peace era with Britain.

2-4-3 Thomas Jefferson:

Jefferson advocated for the United States to establish a strong navy. In contrast to many others, he believed that the country could easily defeat the Barbary pirates. In a letter to James Monroe in November 1784, Jefferson proposed a ship-building program, "Can we begin it on a more honourable occasion, or with a weaker foe? I am of opinion, Paul Jones, with half a dozen frigates, would totally destroy their commerce."¹¹(Jefferson 499), and suggesting that starting it under more honourable circumstances or against a weaker enemy was unnecessary. He even suggested that Paul Jones, with a few frigates, could destroy the pirates' commerce.

¹⁰Jay, John. Letter to Adams. 14 October 1785. *Emerging Nation*, vol. II, p. 863.

¹¹Jefferson, Thomas. Letter to James Monroe, 11 November 1784. *Emerging Nation*, vol. II, p. 499.

Chapter Two: The Algerian Eyalet and Its Impact on America's Naval Fleet

However, Jefferson's views on naval power were misguided, as Paul Jones would likely have disagreed with the idea that a handful of ships could defeat the Algerian navy. Jefferson also proposed a controversial idea of funding the navy through demanding tributes from foreign countries involved in the West Indies trade.

While Jefferson did not address the threat of the powerful British navy directly, he expressed overconfident visions of victory against both England and Algiers. He argued that a naval force posed no risk to civil liberties, unlike a standing army, which could threaten freedom and lead to bloodshed.

Jefferson's perspectives challenge traditional views on the role of a navy in a republican government. Unlike an army, which can operate on land, a navy is confined to water bodies and can not harm inland areas. This logistical difference highlights the distinct nature of naval and land forces. (Zeledon 33-34)

2-4-4 Adams' Submission to Algeria's Demands and Opposition to Naval Fleet Construction:

John Adams favoured paying tribute to Algiers over going to war due to cost concerns and doubts about military success. He estimated war expenses to be high, including costly gifts for the government. While recognizing the potential for gaining prestige through military action, Adams cautioned against engaging in prolonged conflicts without full commitment from the American people, especially considering opposition from Southern States.

Adams instead advocated for prompt treaty negotiations. Similarly, Abigail Adams expressed a similar concern, noting that since England, France, and Holland “treat and pay, would it not be folly and madness in America to Wage War?” “Treat and pay, would it not be folly and

madness in America to Wage War?" If mighty Europe purchased peace, then the United States should follow suit.¹² (Zeledon 35)

2-5 The difficulties Faced by the United States in Securing Treaties with The Eyalet of Algeria

John Adams informed O'Brien that the United States had given permission to John Lamb, a merchant from Connecticut, to engage in treaty negotiations, but cautioned that Congress had limited financial resources. He also mentioned that the captives might need to repay the government for the ransom expenses. Unfortunately, Lamb was not successful in his mission. The captives viewed him as incompetent and unreliable, leading Congress to recall him in October 1787. For his part, Jefferson deemed him "not a proper agent" and suspected him of embezzling money.¹³(Jefferson 329)

2-5-1A peace Agreement Between Portugal and the Eyalet of Algeria

After British Consul Charles Logie facilitated a peace agreement between Portugal and Algiers in 1793, the Algerian pirates were no longer bound by the treaty. Consequently, they targeted ships departing American ports and seized eleven merchant vessels in October and November of that year. Among the captured ships was the brig Polly, on which John Foss served as a sailor. The pirate captain, Chief Hodja Mohamed Salaria, informed Foss and the rest of the crew that a lasting treaty between Algeria and Portugal was on the horizon. (Foss 11-12)

¹²Abigail Adams to John Thaxter, March 20, 1785, The Adams Papers: Series II, Adams Family Correspondence, edited by Robert Taylor, vol. 6, Harvard University Press, 1963-, p. 80.

¹³Jefferson, Thomas. "Letter to James Monroe, August 11, 1786." The Papers of James Monroe, vol. 2, 1784-1789, edited by Daniel Preston, University Press of Virginia, 1990, pp. 329. Jefferson, Thomas. "Letter to John Jay, December 31, 1786." The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 10, 1786, Princeton University Press, 1954, pp. 649-650.

2-5-2 An Internal Condemnation of the Political and Military Situation:

William Eaton (a Connecticut Yankee and the United States consul at Tunis) criticized the United States for opting to pay tribute to Algiers instead of using force to safeguard American merchant ships. He believed Algiers would persist in demanding payments as long as American commerce in the Mediterranean remained profitable, and he condemned the notion of yielding to “fearless robbers.” Eaton was frustrated by the idea that his fellow countrymen’s hard work was benefiting idle individuals in Algiers, and he expressed displeasure at the perceived lack of resolve in resisting these demands. (Eaton 316-317)

Eaton believed that having a strong navy was better than paying money to the barbarian provinces to avoid conflict. He thought it was unjust that the Americans had to pay tribute to Algeria. He felt that giving in to their demands made them more demanding. Adams realized that paying off the Barbary provinces was necessary because America did not have much money after the Revolutionary War. Jefferson, who later became president, initially urged European navies to unite against the Barbary provinces, but he did not have the resources. Eventually, Jefferson realized the importance of having a navy to protect American interests from the barbarian provinces he disliked. (Cathcart 107)

2-5-3 Algeria’s Influence on the Movement to Abolish Slavery in America:

A Massachusetts newspaper printed a dialogue between an Algerian captain and an American captain, where the former criticized the latter for treating Africans as property. The piece discussed religious hypocrisy, with the Algerian captain reprimanding American Christians for disregarding Jesus’s directive to treat others as they would want to be treated “do unto others as you would they should do unto you.”¹⁴ (Zeledon 54)

¹⁴The Medley or New Bedford Marine Journal (New Bedford, MA), January 6, 1794.

Chapter Two: The Algerian Eyalet and Its Impact on America's Naval Fleet

Similarly, Philadelphia newspapers reported that American hostages criticized the Dey of Algiers for enslaving people from nations not at war with him. Some people thought the attacks by Barbary pirates were a punishment from God for America's role in the slave trade. The Pennsylvania Society suggested, "The captivity and sufferings of our American brethren in Algiers...seem to be intended by Divine Providence to awaken us to a sense of the injustice and cruelty of dooming our African brethren to perpetual slavery and misery."¹⁵ (Zeledon 55). Likewise, a Rhode Island newspaper viewed the Algerians' actions as a heavenly judgment on the United States and other nations for their role in the slave trade. They thought this was a sign for America to stop slavery and repent for its sins. (Zeledon 56)

2-5-4 Nationalism and Captivity: A Comparison in Freeing Captives

Newspapers showed support for the captives by publishing their letters. O'Brien penned a letter in December 1792, widely circulated in American newspapers the following year, urging Americans to uphold their principles by securing the hostages' release. O'Brien invoked nationalism by referring to the captives as "the living victims of American Independence" and attempted to shame his compatriots by suggesting that Europeans were more successful in freeing their countrymen held in North Africa compared to Americans.¹⁶(Brigham 919)

¹⁵Various newspapers ran this article over a period of several years. The Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), February 14, 1788; The Providence Gazette and Country Journal (Providence, RI), February 20, 1790; The Herald of Freedom, and the Federal Advertiser (Boston, MA), March 9, 1790; The United States Chronicle (Providence, RI), February 13, 1794.

¹⁶The Independent Gazetteer and Agricultural Repository (Philadelphia, PA), July 20, 1793; The Weekly Register (Norwich, CT), July 30, 1793; The Salem Gazette (Salem, MA), July 30, 1793; The New-Jersey Journal (Elizabethtown, NJ), July 31, 1793; Connecticut Journal (New Haven, CT), July 31, 1793; The Providence Gazette and Country Journal (Providence, RI), August 3, 1793; The Phenix; or, Windham Herald (Windham, CT), August 3, 1793; The Middlesex Gazette (Middletown, CT), August 3, 1793; The Federal Spy and Springfield Advertiser (Springfield, MA), August 6, 1793; The Oracle of the Day (Portsmouth, NH), August 6, 1793; Columbian Centinel (Boston, MA), August 7, 1793; The State Gazette of South-Carolina (Charleston, SC), August 7, 1793; The City Gazette & Daily Advertiser (Charleston, SC), August 7, 1793; Catskill Packet (Catskill, NY), August 13, 1793; The South Carolina Gazette (Columbia, SC), August 13, 1793; Brigham, C.S. Amer. newspapers p. 919 'Herald of the United States (Warren, RI), August 17, 1793.

Library of Congress. "Newspaper The Independent Gazetteer, and Agricultural Repository (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1790-1794 [Online Resource]." Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2020221371/>.

2-6 The U.S. Navy's Founding: Congressional Actions and Challenges in Shipbuilding:

Congress responded to the threat of Algerian pirates to attack American merchant ships by passing a bill to create a temporary naval force. The bill called for the construction of six large frigates, which laid the foundation for the US Navy. There were unexpected delays and expenses during the construction process. Before any of the ships were completed, negotiators reached a peace treaty with Algeria. The treaty required the United States to provide a frigate to Algeria and pay an annual sum in exchange for not attacking American ships. Despite the treaty, Congress agreed to commend Algeria and other North African countries to ensure the safety of American trade. Three of the six frigates have been completed, and the President has discretion to terminate the remaining three frigates if another crisis arises. (Symonds 13).

The passage of the Maritime Bill did not immediately establish a navy, as Congress approved \$700,000 to build six frigates while the Treasury faced challenges in acquiring materials, particularly live oak timber, and had additional responsibilities like paying Algerians for prisoner release and supervising coastal fort construction, though timber procurement issues were resolved by late 1794; as construction progressed, rumours of a peace treaty with Algiers emerged in March 1795, finalized in September requiring the U.S. to pay \$642,500 for peace, prisoner release, and an annual tribute, yet work continued into 1796 despite supply problems and rising costs, prompting President Washington to ask Congress to determine if suspending the program was in the "public interest," leading to a committee formed to address the matter, with some advocating for all six frigates' completion and others pushing for suspension, ultimately resulting in three frigates being finished despite objections from some members of Congress. (Symonds 14)

2-7 The Release of American Captives: Celebrating Peace with the Eyalet of Algeria :

In his message to Congress on December 8, 1795, President Washington expressed his satisfaction at the news that an agreement had been reached with the Dey and regency of Algiers, leading to the expectation of a swift peace and the release of our unfortunate fellow citizens from captivity. This had already been accomplished on September 5, 1795¹⁷ (Lyman 362)

2-8 Bainbridge's Protest: Delivering Tribute under Threat of War:

On October 9, 1800, Captain William Bainbridge found himself in an unexpected situation in the Mediterranean aboard the warship *George Washington*. The Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, had tasked them with delivering tribute to Algiers, including various goods and adopting a warlike appearance. However, upon arrival, the Dey of Algiers demanded that they transport the tribute to Constantinople instead “command from a Despot Dey of Algiers” to take that country’s tribute to “the Grand Seignior at Constantinople.”¹⁸ Threatened with war and outnumbered by the Algerian navy, Bainbridge and his crew reluctantly complied. He wrote, “I hope I may never again be sent to Algiers with tribute, unless I am authorized to deliver it from the mouth of our cannon.” (Bainbridge 378)

2-9 Jefferson and Adams’ Plan for a Maritime League Against the Barbary Pirates:

Jefferson and Adams, recognizing the need for a stronger response from the US government to protect American shipping in the Mediterranean, proposed forming a league of maritime powers to combat the North African regimes. The crew of *George Washington* felt humiliated after being commandeered by Barbary pirates, leading to calls for retaliation against

¹⁷United States Statutes at Large, (Little & Brown’s edit.,) Treaties, vol. Vii. P.133; Lyman’s Diplomacy, vol.ii. p. 362.

¹⁸Bainbridge, George. "Washington log, October 9, 1800." Ibid., vol. I, p. 378.

Algiers. Diplomats argued that war against the Barbary States was necessary to protect American honour and preserve the nation's reputation. Madison believed that using naval forces in the Mediterranean was a cost-effective way to protect American interests. In response, Jefferson authorized the deployment of naval forces to protect American interests in the region. (Zeledon 108)

2-9-1 Jefferson's Plan for an "Anti-Pirate Confederation" to Combat Mediterranean Threats:

Jefferson and Adams recognized the need for stronger support from the United States government in dealing with attacks on American ships in the Mediterranean. Jefferson proposed a plan to form a league of smaller naval powers to fight the regimes in North Africa, with each nation contributing resources and operating under American supervision. This “anti-pirate confederation” aimed to achieve “perpetual peace” through naval squadrons in the Mediterranean. Jefferson believed that this collective approach would be more fruitful than unilateral action by the United States, because it would diffuse responsibility and perhaps garner support from other powers. Although he favoured independence in foreign policy, Jefferson saw this association as the best practical solution to the Mediterranean problem of the time, as it could protect American trade and assert American economic power in the face of European competition.¹⁹ (Zeledon 270)

¹⁹Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949. Vols. 05. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8543, 1970.

Conclusion:

The beginning of the 19th century witnessed a change in the map of world power. Some conflicts broke out with the state-sanctioned province of Algiers against American commercial ships in the Mediterranean after delaying the payment of tribute.

Before the American Revolution, American ships were protected by the British Royal Navy. However, after gaining independence, the United States found itself vulnerable to Barbary pirates, who would seize American merchant ships, enslave their crews, and demand ransom payments. Presidents Washington and Adams initially chose to submit to the Algerian Eyalet in paying tribute to secure safe passage for American ships, but these payments failed, which marked as turning points in the American history. However, President Jefferson had another opinion as he adopted a more aggressive approach, seeking to create and develop a navy and later send the American Navy to confront the Barbary powers directly. This led to the First Barbary War (1801-1805), which saw several U.S. naval victories and strategic successes.

In 1815, President James Madison sent another naval force into the Mediterranean, sparking the Second Barbary War. This campaign culminated in the crushing defeat of Algeria, the most powerful of the Barbary states, forcing it to stop practising piracy and demanding tribute. The Barbary Wars marked the emergence of the U.S. Navy as a world power and an important step in the young nation's quest for economic and diplomatic independence.

Chapter Three:
the Algerian Catalyst for America's
Maritime Ascent

The interactions between America and North African countries, especially the Eyalet of Algeria, date back to the early days of America's independence. The targeting of Americans and the capture of some of their citizens caused tension in the relationship. This issue was resolved through diplomatic envoys and peaceful negotiations. American procrastination in paying dues was a major reason for America's involvement in wars, which enhanced its experience in building a strong naval force and forming alliances that ultimately strengthened American influence in the region.

In this case, the research aims to explore the impact of Algerian Eyalet on America. Specifically, the impact of the captive's crisis on the popular and media circles, where we will focus on the reasons that prompted America to build its naval fleet, and unifying efforts to fight the Barbary states in particular Algerian Eyalet.

To analyze the hidden influence of the Algerian Eyalet on America, we will apply different theories in this research paper. The two theories that are put out are strategic choice and power transition. Both theories aim to provide additional insight into the Algerian Eyalet tutelage on America by clarifying and evaluating the facts gathered from the analysis of both theories.

3-1 Definition of Strategic Choice Theory:

It is an organizational theory that focuses on leaders, as they controlled organizations through dynamic decision-making processes. It highlights the roles of individuals and groups in shaping organizations, emphasizes the importance of managerial choices, acknowledges external influences but emphasizes that choices are not solely dictated, takes into account historical and institutional contexts, and views industrial relations as the result of ongoing interactions.

In essence, this theory reiterates the active leaders in determining outcomes organizational through strategic decision making, providing a framework for understanding these influences. (Child, 43-76)

3-2 Definition of Power Transition Theory:

The contribution of power transition theory provides researchers with a better understanding of the conditions necessary for both war and peace. Therefore, the theory of power transition is a framework for understanding international relations and predicting conflicts between countries. It views the world as a hierarchy with a dominant country and potential rivals. Conflicts are likely when a dissatisfied country approaches parity with the dominant country. The theory looks at how countries grow at different rates and analyses the relationship between power, dissatisfaction, and conflict in the international system. It suggests that wars are more likely when a dissatisfied rising power becomes powerful enough to challenge the dominant state in the global hierarchy. (Koch 87)

3-3 Exploring the Historical Legacy and Strategic Position of the Algerian Eyalet in the Mediterranean:

The geographical and institutional position of the Algerian Eyalet empowered leaders through their role in controlling organizations through dynamic decision-making processes, as it made them aware of interaction relations and how events proceed. However, highlights the roles of individuals and groups in shaping organizations.

3-3-1 The Algerian Eyalet's Position in the Mediterranean:

During the Ottoman era, the Algerian Eyalet held a powerful geographical position in the Mediterranean, enjoying significant independence that allowed it to establish political and commercial ties worldwide. It was known as the “Eyalet of Algeria” or sometimes the “Republic” or “Kingdom of Algeria.” The Algerian state had various institutions, including a land army, naval fleet, parliament, currency, and capital, reflecting its adherence to international law traditions.

3-3-2 The Algerian Navy and Navigation System:

At the beginning of the 18th century, the Algerian Navy reached its peak, as the Navy became a fully equipped maritime institution containing several diverse naval vessels. This made the European powers seek to dismantle it.

3-3-3 American Perceptions and Interactions:

Commander O'Brien, the captive of the Dolphin ship and later the consul, praised the strength of the Algerian navy. He had lived through the conditions there and conveyed to his leaders in America the extent of Algeria's readiness, institutionally and popularly, for any emergency. He asked them to reach peace through diplomatic means without trying to resort to war with the Eyalet of Algeria, even if it cost them huge sums of money. Some newspapers reported that Spain was defeated by Algeria and paid \$3 million for peace.

The status of the Algerian naval fleet has a historical and geographical dimension, as it has been rooted for three centuries, which has given it experience and prestige. This is what prompted the European powers to classify it as a threat to them, and Algeria was included under the name of pirates to justify assessing their defensive measures and then dismantling them, which facilitates the invasion process.

3-4 The Algerian Eyalet's Strategic Position in the Mediterranean During the Ottoman Era:

Algiers, as part of the Ottoman Empire, occupied a strategic position in the Mediterranean basin over three centuries. It witnessed its peak in the 18th century, the naval forces, led by commanders such as Raïs Hamido, were able to project force and wage “maritime jihad”²⁰ against Christian ships. Algeria itself was seen as a formidable power, the “whip of Christendom.”

The Algiers' strategic location allowed it to play an important role in Mediterranean affairs, while the American presence, although limited, also brought it into conflict with the Algerians as the young nation sought to protect its merchant ships. Where America pursued the policy of negotiating the prisoners to pay protection dues to a treaty establishing a consulate under the supervision of O'Brien.

3-5 The Naval power of Algerian Eyalet influenced the Rise of American naval Power in the Early 19th as a Strategic Choice:

America's opportunities to be present in the Mediterranean forced it to deal with the Algerian Eyalet as an important party. And from this, we need to better understand the conditions necessary for both war and peace. We need to shed light on the framework of international relations. As there is a hierarchy that includes a dominant state and potential competitors between satisfaction and conflict.

²⁰The Maritime Jihad and its Role in the Algerian Regency during the 11th-17th Hijri. The Algerian navy, following the founding of the Algerian state in 1519 AD, was characterized by a purely jihadist nature, as most of the lands of North Africa were under Spanish control. Therefore, the Regency of Algeria worked to erase the Spanish Christian presence in Muslim lands, and the Algerian navy, led by its commanders, also attempted to seize a number of Mediterranean islands, which were the subject of conflict between Muslims and Christians, due to their strategic importance in controlling maritime navigation in the Mediterranean.

In this regard, the Algerian historians Nasser al-Din Saidouni and al-Mahdi BouAbdali state: “The naval jihad in Algeria was a direct response to the Christian threats that, following the fall of Andalusia in the late 15th century AD, took the form of crusades blessed by the popes in Rome and supported and led by European governments, particularly Catholic Spain.” (Merouche, 106)

3-5-1 Jefferson's Strategic Initiatives:

At the same time that America was concluding peace treaties with the E of Algiers, Jefferson and Adams proposed the formation of an association of naval forces with the support of Sweden and Dutch to protect American ships in the Mediterranean, with the aim of fighting the regimes in North Africa. This collective approach was aimed at supporting American power and protecting commercial interests against the Algerian Eyalet. Jefferson's mandate for the navy reflects a shift towards a more proactive and collective security strategy.

3-5-2 American strategic defence capability:

President Jefferson's focus on constructing smaller, cost-effective gunboats showcased a strategic shift towards enhancing naval defence capabilities. The victory of the American fleet over the Algerian navy, led by Stephen Decatur, demonstrated American naval strength and influenced the development of alliances, solidifying America's position as a naval power.

3-6 The Shifting Power Dynamics and Alliances Between the Algerian Eyalet and the United States in the Early 19th Century:

The dominance of the Algerian Eyalet on Mediterranean Basin, which the Western considered one of the Barbary pirate states in the early nineteenth century. As a result, protection rights were paid, and peace treaties were concluded. Many historical figures described the size and capabilities of the Algerian navy. For instance, Thomas Jefferson, who noted they had around 16 warships in 1785, Captain Richard O'Brien saying they had 9 warships, a Massachusetts newspaper claiming they had 47 ships, and John Adams describing their 50 gunboats as "very formidable" and their harbour heavily fortified, painting a picture of a powerful naval force that was a major player in Mediterranean trade and security at the time, which the Algerian Eyalet used to project power and influence in the region.

Where Algiers' role was as an important centre for the slave trade, as Flemish soldier Emanuel d'Aranda claimed around 600,000 Christians had died there due to the hardships of

slavery since 1536, demonstrating how Algiers used its position to engage in the lucrative slave trade, profiting off human suffering and wielding economic power and control over the lives of slaves.

Under President George Washington, the United States agreed to pay a ransom and annual tribute to Algeria in 1795 in order to protect American merchant ships from Algerian attacks. However, the Algerian threat to American shipping persisted due to America's delay in paying annual dues. This eventually led to the Barbary Wars between the United States and Algeria in the early nineteenth century.

Following a power transition and America's exploitation of the armistice years, the United States established and developed its navy while strengthening its economy. This provided both material and military advantages, ultimately leading to the United States defeating Algiers in the Second Barbary War in 1815. This victory brought an end to the Algerian threat to American ships in the Mediterranean Sea.

3-7 The U.S. Navy's Warships Diplomacy as a Strategic Choice to Victory over the Eyalet of Algeria:

During President Jefferson's second term, the United States focused on protecting its harbours and sovereignty from British interference by constructing smaller, cost-effective gunboats for defence. These gunboats, measuring between sixty to eighty feet long with a single mast and cannon, were strategically placed at key locations. Costing around \$5,000 each, these gunboats provided a more affordable defensive solution compared to traditional warships, enabling the acquisition of multiple vessels for the cost of one frigate. The US fleet's victory over the Algerian navy later, led by Stephen Decatur, played an important role in this conflict. Along with the formation of alliances, the establishment of the Naval Commissioners Council, and the enhancement of America's naval power, setting the stage for further advancements in naval capabilities. (Symonds, 22)

3-7-1 A turbulent Period in Algerian Eyalet's History, "Internal Circumstances":

During the rule of the Dey Hassan Pasha (1792-1797), following Algerian Eyalet's victory over the Spanish occupation in 1792, a period of turmoil ensued in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The country's naval forces were weakened due to a lack of strong leadership and large ships.

The assassination of the Dey Mustafa Pasha in 1805 marked a significant turning point in the governance system in Algeria. Chaos continued, especially after the weakness of the Dey Ahmed Pasha (1805-1808), leading to the Dey Ali Pasha El-Ghasal (1808-1809), who exiled Raïs Hamido.

Then the new Dey Ali Pasha (1809-1815) reinstated the respect for the Raïs Hamido but was also killed in 1815, before the martyrdom of the Raïs Hamido directly. Mustafa Khaznaji (from March 22 to April 7, 1815) and then the Dey Omar Pasha (1815-1817) succeeded him, but they were also killed, leading to a period of instability.

This turbulent period in Algerian Eyalet's history was characterized by a weak navy, unstable governance, and a series of assassinations. This led to a state of political uncertainty and a disruption in strategic plans, as the country faced internal and external challenges. (Charef 429)

3-7-2 Conflict and Power Dynamics: The Emergence of the United States of America as a New Power:

At the same time that the Eyalet of Algiers was committed to the diplomatic agreement, The United States of America decided to attack Algeria and sent its fleet Led by Stephen Decatur, along with Dutch and Swedish ships, to Gibraltar on May 20, 1815. To deceive the Algerians, American ships hoisted the English flag upon their arrival in the Gibraltar area on June 17, 1815. As the American ships approached, they raised their own flag and attacked Raïs Hamido's ships. The U.S. Navy's triumph over Algiers in 1815 sparked nationalistic pride and showcased

American moral strength against European powers, ultimately securing a lasting peace with the Barbary States. (Zeledon ,320)

Raïs Hamido * was compelled to engage in battle by the approval of the Dey Omar Pasha, indicating his lack of autonomy in decision-making, highlighting the administrative corruption among the Ottoman States' governors. Hamidou was martyred early in the battle by an American shell. Before his death, he instructed his deputy to dispose of his body in the sea to prevent the Americans from desecrating it.

Vice Raïs Hamido followed his instructions and disposed of the body in the sea, likely provoking the Americans due to their inability to retrieve it. Subsequently, the Americans seized the two ships and took prisoners of war.

Following Raïs Hamido's martyrdom and the signing of the peace treaty on June 30, 1815, the Dey Omar Pasha accepted the peace terms, which included the cessation of annual tributes and the release of American captives.

The loss of Raïs Hamido, Algeria's esteemed sailor, not only hindered the development of the Algerian navy but also left the nation vulnerable to external assaults. This vulnerability ultimately led to the occupation of Algeria in 1830, with the Anglo-Dutch campaign serving as a precursor to the ongoing conflicts between Algeria and foreign powers. (Charef,433)

3-8 The Rise of America as a New power, in Contrast to the Decline of the Algerian Eyalet:

Through the amendments to Article 18, we can understand how the balance of power transition after it initially favoured transferring from the Eyalet of Algeria to US in the end, where it was made strides in military advancements and maintained alliances with Christian Europe, asserting dominance over the Algerian navy. A revised Treaty o between the United States and the Dey of Algiers was signed on December 22 and 23, 1816. It was accepted and ratified by the

*America did not win because of its strength. Rather, the Dey Omar Pasha did not allow Raïs Hamido freedom of action to go out in this battle, which led to his martyrdom and the loss of the battle. (Charef 432)

United States Senate on February 1, 1822, ratified by the President on February 11, 1822, and proclaimed on the same day. The treaty aims to restore and maintain peaceful relations between the two powers, according to the American view. He renewed the Treaty of Peace and Amity signed by William Shaler and Stephen Decatur in 1815. William Shaler and Isaac Chauncey were later appointed commissioners to negotiate the renewal of the treaty with the Dey of Algiers. (Bevans, Charles I. 32.57). Through the amendments to Article 18, we can understand how the balance of power transition after it initially favoured transferring from the Eyalet of Algeria to US in the end, where it was made strides in military advancements and maintained alliances with Christian Europe, asserting dominance over the Algerian navy.

By conducting research and analysing previous data on the use of qualitative approaches and the method of historical research, and applying theories such as strategic choice theory, and the power transition theory, we have gained a deeper understanding of the impact of Algerian Eyalet on the United States. It provided us with a valuable vision about the complexities of international relations during this era and the development of American foreign policy and military capabilities, thanks to which Algeria is not. Without the Eyalet of Algeria, America would not have a fleet roaming the seas and defending the interests of America around the world far away from its land.

Conclusion:

The Algerian Eyalet's interaction with America during the first years of its independence sheds light on the complexities of strategic decision-making in the face of external threats. Discussions among political figures and negotiations over various strategic options highlight the challenges American leaders face in dealing with the threat surrounding Barbary piracy. Its lasting effects on America's future and interests, such as the decision to build a navy to protect American interests and Omar Pasha's ill-advised decision, illustrate how historical events shift and change as countries rise and others decline. We can gain valuable insights into the evolution of American foreign policy and the strategic thinking it embodies.

The strategic choice theory and power transition theory provide a framework for understanding the historical legacy and strategic position of the Algerian Eyalet in the Mediterranean. The Algerian Eyalet's maritime navigation system and its influence on the rise of American naval power in the early 19th century are explored. Jefferson's strategic initiatives and the American strategic defence capability are discussed in this context. The shifting power dynamics between the Algerian Eyalet and the United States and their alliances in the early 19th century are examined, including the U.S. Navy's warship diplomacy as a Jefferson's strategic choice that led them to victory over the Algerian Eyalet. This turbulent period in the Algerian Eyalet's history, marked by internal circumstances and the emergence of the United States as a new power, ultimately resulted in the rise of the U.S. as a new power in contrast to the decline of the Algerian Eyalet.

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GENERAL CONCLUSION

General Conclusion:

The 16th century saw major changes across the Mediterranean region. One of these was the growth of the Algerian Eyalet Navy, which continued to develop its naval power, strengthening its position and presence. The 17th century was the peak of Algerian naval strength. It was able to impose its authority on the south-western Mediterranean shores. Its coasts and ports remained protected for over three centuries, as witnessed by the Europeans themselves. The Algerian Eyalet Navy kept up with significant changes in its size, weapons, and effectiveness. It is difficult to determine the exact size of this naval fleet due to the lack of accurate statistics, except for what has been mentioned about Devoulx and others, because the French colonization took the archives, records, and other things, making it hard to track its statistics.

In the first chapter, we introduced the historical events that took place between 1794-1816, how the Algerian Eyalet controlled the Mediterranean and its impact on American trade and foreign relations during this period. The conflicts marked an important turning point in American history by the Algerian, as the nation moved from paying tribute to diplomatically to protect its merchant ships and, then confronting them militarily.

By focusing on the threat posed by Algeria, this chapter captures the theme as acknowledgement by the Algeria's historical status, such as naval power in the Mediterranean. It provides a concise and compelling in the events and their impact on American-Algerian relations.

In the second chapter the focus has been devoted to the conflicts and their significance in shaping America's rise as a global maritime power. The research results highlight how the conflict with the Algerian Eyalet led to the establishment of the American Navy, its development, and the protection of American interests in the Mediterranean. Through the context of the dominance of the Algerian Eyalet Navy in the Mediterranean and the challenges faced by America in protecting

General Conclusion

its merchant ships, the infant nation moved from paying tribute to Algeria to confronting it militarily and diplomatically.

On the other hand, the Algerian Eyalet that the West worked with to dismantle also contributed to a major change within America. Starting with American prisoners and the payment of tribute, this led to diplomatic solutions, peaceful negotiations, and the signing of a peace and amity treaty that had a big impact on America's domestic scene, leading to a major change in their response between political parties (The Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans) and between the North and South on the slavery issue, such as passing the Abolish Slavery Act to confront the Dey of Algeria, which led Americans to adopt this law to negotiate for the release of its citizens from slavery. The Algerian crisis helped strengthen patriotism and achieve identity, and the main argument was that the Algerian crisis, which was an external threat, prompted America to intensify its efforts to build a naval fleet, which led it to reconsider its internal and foreign policies.

Despite some opposition, there was agreement between politicians, the Senate, and the U.S. President on building a naval fleet to protect America's interests and position, while America adopted a delaying strategy in paying the tribute, leading to war against North African countries, including Algeria, especially after the death of Mustafa Pasha, the Algerian Eyalet was suffered by mismanagement and internal corruption. at the same time, America worked secretly to build Christian alliances to counter Algeria's. where it was regaining its strength though raising enough funds for battle. Jefferson's plan was to support naval fleet under Decatur, using alliances and the deception by raising the British flag on its ships, coinciding with Dey Omar's disorder and failure to grant freedom to Raïs (Admiral) Hamido to engage in battle. The battle ultimately resulted in the defeat of the Algerian fleet and the martyrdom of Rear Admiral Hamido on June 17, 1815, leading Dey Omar to accept America's terms afterward and review the peace and friendship treaty

on June 30, 1815, which ended tribute payments and recognized American sovereignty, as amended in Article 18.

Regarding the last chapter, the historical facts in achieving and maintaining power depend on the use of the appropriate strategy at the appropriate time through the decision-making process, which is our subject. By using two theories, power transition, and strategic choice, and employing the historical method, describing the analysis, and we were able to reach a conclusion.

The Algerian Eyalet was the reason for pushing America to build a naval fleet. Through reinforcement active role of leaders in determining organizational outcomes by strategic decision-making, as seen in politicians such as Jefferson, who Manipulating people, parties, and power through a collective security strategy, contributed to setting the goal in favor of America. While this strategy benefited from conditions of both peace and war.

On the other hand, the Algerian state was plagued by corruption at the level of rulers, unstable governance, a series of assassinations, and a state of political uncertainty. At that time emerged the America's readiness to confront the Algerian Eyalet both politically and militarily the new experience of the modern naval fleet, according to a strategic choice that helped in the success of the battle and turned the balance of power in its favour, to gained a permanent power.

Finally, the topic of our dissertation explores how the Algerian Eyalet influenced on America through pushing it to build its naval fleet. We used books, articles, and websites. We hope to help our readers understand the issues explored in this research and believe that this topic remains an interesting topic that needs further investigation that could otherwise be addressed using other perspective.

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
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Appendices


A rare contemporary drawing made by Christian Børs of a 34-gun **Algerian xebec** fully square rigged in the main mast and partially in the mizzen.



Torbjorn Odegaard, *Unepaix et amiti  perp  tuelle*, SINAS, Fredrikstad, 2013, p.87; Erik Gobel, "The Danish Algerian Sea passes 1747-1838", in: *Historical Social Research*, N   134, Vol 35, 2010, p.168.

On 4 October 1769 the Danish ship 'RigernesØnske' of Copenhagen (in the middle) was seized by an Algerian settee armed with ten guns (to the right). The Danish captives were transferred to the Admiral's xebec (to the left) which took them to Algiers a month later .

Contemporary drawing by Christian Børs who was among the captivated. (Bergen Maritime Museum).




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The Permissibility of Algerian Naval Navigation in the Mediterranean Basin

Christian merchant ships were protected from Muslim privateers in exchange for gifts. This safeguard was guaranteed through the use of divided sea permits, with one portion dispatched to the Barbary States and the other held by the ship's captain. When the two parts of the permit aligned, ships could sail without disturbance. Various European countries employed distinct patterns to divide their permits. In 1729, Denmark contemplated emulating Sweden's approach by negotiating a treaty with the Dey of Algiers. (Göbel,176)



Algerian Sea Pass Protocols, 1747-1848

Title page of the printed version of the royal Danish ordinance of 1 May 1747 concerning Algerian sea passes. It is written on it that the text has been read at the town hall to the burghers present on 12 May 1747. The name of the town is unknown. (Danish National Archives) (Göbel,180)



PEACE AND AMITY

On the 21st of ye Luna of Safer 1210 corresponding with the 5th Septem-ber 1795 Joseph Donaldson Jun^r on the Part of the United States of North America agreed with Hassan Bashaw Dey of Algiers to Keep the Articles Contained in this Treaty Sacred and inviolable which we the Dey & Divan promise to Observe on Consideration of the United States Paying annually the Value of twelve thousand Algerine Sequins⁵ in Maritime Stores Should the United States forward a Larger Quantity the Over-Plus Shall be Paid for in Money by the Dey & Regency any Vessel that may be Captured from the Date of this Treaty of Peace & Amity shall immediately be deliver'd up on her Arrival in Algiers

Sign'd VIZIR HASSAN BASHAW

JOSEPH DONALDSON Jun

To all to whom these Presents shall come or be made known. Whereas the Underwritten David Humphreys hath been duly appointed Commissioner Plenipotentiary, by Letters Patent under the Signature of the President and Seal of the United States of America, dated the 30th of March 1795, for negotiating & concluding a Treaty of Peace with the Dey and Governors of Algiers; Whereas by Instructions given to him on the part of the Executive, dated the 28th of March & 4th of April 1795, he hath been farther authorised to employ Joseph Donaldson Junior on an Agency in the said business;

Whereas by a Writing under his hand and seal, dated the 21st of May 1795, he did constitute & appoint Joseph Donaldson Junior Agent in the business aforesaid; and the said Joseph Donaldson Junior did, on the 5th of September 1795, agree with Hassan Bashaw Dey of Algiers, to keep the Articles of the preceding Treaty sacred and inviolable.

Now Know ye, that I David Humphreys, Commissioner Plenipotentiary aforesaid, do approve & conclude the said Treaty, and every article and clause therein contained, reserving the same nevertheless for the final Rati-fication of the President of the United States of America, by and with the ad-vice and consent of the Senate of the said United States.

In testimony whereof I have signed the same with my hand and seal, at the City of Lisbon this 28th of November 1795.

DAVID HUMPHREYS [SEAL]

(CHARLES I.BEVANS, LL. B .37)

سبب خیر عهدنامه در صلح طائفه مریکان



Résumé :

Pendant la période Ottoman, l'Eyalet Algérien était un État important et puissant. Il disposait d'une marine puissante qui contrôlait la mer Méditerranée et entretenait des relations diplomatiques et commerciales avec de nombreux pays. Cette puissance navale l'aidait à protéger sa souveraineté des conflits. Dans cette recherche, nous examinons des aspects clés tels que la crise maritime avec l'Amérique, les captifs, les relations avec le Dey d'Alger par le biais d'un traité de paix et d'amitié, ainsi que le paiement de tributs, qui ont incité les États-Unis à renforcer sa flotte maritime . L'approche qualitative est utilisée en complément de la méthode de recherche historique pour retracer les événements qui se sont produits durant cette période afin d'atteindre l'objectif. Cette étude vise à identifier ces événements historiques. Son but ultime est de faire la lumière sur l'influence de l'Eyalet Algérien sur l'Amérique, qui l'a incité à construire une flotte navale. Les résultats révèlent que les États-Unis a d'abord félicité l'Eyalet Algérien pour avoir assuré la sécurité du passage et des accords, y compris le rapatriement des captifs. En réponse à la menace de la piraterie barbaresque, les États-Unis ont créé leur marine en 1794. La guerre qui s'ensuivit fut une réaction à la domination Algérienne, qui apporta une expérience précieuse à la jeune nation. Elle a notamment permis de promouvoir le nationalisme et l'unité parmi les Américains et d'adopter l'abolition de l'esclavage. Elle lui a également permis de se doter d'une élite politique compétente et d'une force militaire qui a protégé ses intérêts.

الملخص :

خلال الفترة العثمانية، كانت إيالة الجزائر ذات أهمية وقوة بارزة. حيث كان لها أسطول بحري قوي باسط رقابته على البحر الأبيض المتوسط مما فرض علاقات دبلوماسية وتجارية مع العديد من الدول، حيث أن هاته القوة صانت سيادتها من التعديات. في هذا البحث نحن بصدد دراسة عدة أوجه رئيسية مثل الأزمة البحرية مع أمريكا والأسرى والتوصل التعامل مع داي الجزائر من خلال معاهدة السلام والمودة، بالإضافة إلى دفع الجزية الأمر الذي دفع أمريكا إلى تعزيز بحريتها. يتم استخدام نهج نوعي مع التركيز على القرارات المؤثرة التي اتخذت خلال هاته المدة تهدف إلى التطرق للأحداث التاريخية ومنه فإن هدفنا الرئيسي إلى تسليط الضوء على تأثير إيالة الجزائر على أمريكا، الأمر الذي دفع أمريكا إلى بناء أسطولها البحري . حيث تشير النتائج إلى أن أمريكا أثنت في البداية بالجزائر من خلال الإشادة بتوفير ممرات آمنة بتوقيع اتفاقيات لإعادة السجناء. و سعت أمريكا إلى إنشاء البحرية الأمريكية في عام 1794 لمواجهة تهديد القرصنة البربرية. حيث اندلعت الحرب كرد فعل على الهيمنة الجزائرية التي أكسبتها خبرة، والتي وفرت خبرة قيمة للأمة الشابة. وشمل ذلك تعزيز الوطنية والوحدة بين الأمريكيين وتبني إلغاء الرق. كما أكسبتها نخبة سياسية ماهرة وقوة عسكرية تحمي مصالحها .